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MERCHANT v. MERCHANT.
(2 Bradf. Bar. 432.)
Surrogate’s Court New York. Nov., 1853.
TlrOS. W. Higgins, for W. H. Merchant.
Horace Holden and Robert Dodge, for lega
tees.
THE SURROGATE. On the final account
ing of the executor William H. Merchant, the
legatees seek to charge him with three thou
sand dollars, the amount of three Erie Rail
road income bonds, which they allege were
the property of the deceased.
To prove this, the claimants produced the
inventory; but, the entry thereon showing
that the executor claimed the bonds as a gift
from the testator, the proof was insufificient.
Mr. Dodge then testified that the executor,
after the testator’s death, called at his oflice
and stated that he had taken the bonds in
question out of the box containing the se
curities of the estate, on the morning after
the decease of his father—the executor al
leging as a reason, that he claimed them as
his own, as a gift from his parent.
It was then proved on the part of the ex
ecutor, by the evidence of his co-executor,
Mr. Reading, that two of the legatees had
stated that the testator gave to his son, Wil
liam, the bonds in question, some short time
previous to the making of his last will—
" within a month before; that it was a full
and free gift, and William had handed the
bonds to his mother; that subsequently and
after the testator made his last will, his wife
took the bond, oonversed with him about
the will as it then stood, and, holding the
bonds in her hand, said, "Now, that the will
gives each child alike, shall I hand over to
each child a thousand-dollar bond?" The tes
tator said, "No, put them back in my tin
box." It also appears that, the day before
the testator’s death, he directed one of his
daughters to bring the box, open it, and see
if the bonds were there. She opened it and
shewed him the bonds; and he said it was
all right, and told her to put them back in
the box, keep the key, and at his decease de
liver it to Mr. Reading, one of his executors
—that she kept the key till after her father’s
death, when she gave the key, at her moth
er’s request, to her brother William, the other
executor.
It is certain that the bonds in question once
belonged to the testator, and they were en
tcred by him on a schedule of his assets.
The testator having made a will by which
his son had not been placed on an equal foot
ing with his daughters, and having subse
quently become reconciled to his son, made
the gift of these bonds, when his will remain
ed in that condition. He afterwards revoked
that will and executed another, in which his
children were treated alike, except that the
daughters were given the use of his dwelling
house and furniture in common with their
mother. After the new will had been made,
Mrs. Merchant brought the bonds to the tes
tator, and the conversations and circum
stances occurred whlch I have before stated.
1. Was the gift to the son a donation inter
I
vivos or mortis causa? It is proved, that the
testator was at the time in his last sickness,
and that during the whole course of his ill
ness, he did not expect to recover. In such
a case,. the presumption of law is that the
gift was intended as a donatlo mortis causa.
1 Rop. Leg. 22.
2. It having been shown, that after the
gift the testator resumed possession, it is
urged on one side, that the gift was re
voked; and on the other, that possession hav
ing been obtained by the donor without the
consent or privity of the donee, the gift was
not legally revoked. The last point involves
the proposition that the donor cannot re
voke the gift without the consent of the
dance.
I would remark, in the first place, that if
this be so, it is a solitary exception to dis
positions of property made in view of death,
by the voluntary bounty of the donor.
It is true that a will does not revoke a
donatlo mortis causa; but the reason is that
the will does not speak till the testator’s
death—till the very moment the donation by
its terms has become absolute—when of
course it is too late to revoke it. On the
donor’s death, the donee’s title becomes
absolute, and therefore irrevocable by a will,
which from its nature is inoperative during
the donor’s lifetime, the only period during
which the donation could be revoked.
It is insisted, however, that, inasmuch as
the entire dominion of the donor over the
property is transferred to the donee, no right
of revocation exists. But this rule, as I
understand it, does not mean that the donor
reserves no right of revocation—hut only
that he parts with the control and posses
sion of the property (Williams, Ex'rs, 654)—
that there is not a partial but absolute de
livery and change of possession. If such an
absolute delivery is inconsistent with a pow
er of revocation by simple reclamation, it is
just as inconsistent with a revocation in case
of the donor’s recovery. Such an argument
would destroy the peculiar character of this
class of donations, and transform them into
pure irrevocable gifts inter vivos.
The truth is, that the whole of this doc
trine of revocation is a rule of law. The law
declares that a donation mortis causa, is
revocable in case the donor rccover~and
that, too, notwithstanding the gift was in
express terms absolute, and the delivery was
absolute. I do not see in any case that the
power of revocation is inconsistent with ab
solute dominion in the donee, existing under
a condition annexed by the law to the gift,
that the donor may resume the property. An
attorney in fact, for the time being has full
authority and absolute dominion within the
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scope of his power; and yet the power may
be revoked at any instant. In the sense
contended for by the counsel of the executor,
a donee has not absolute dominion over the
subject of the gift: though his possession
for the time is absolute, his title does not
become perfect till the donor’s death. Be
fore that period, he cannot dispose of the
property. If that event should not happen,
the donor may resume his gift.
It is conceded on all hands, that if the
donor recover the gift will be defeated. This
is a condition the law implies; and if the
law likewise implies that the gift may be re
claimed at the pleasure of the donor—the
latter condition is no more incongruous with
the possession and dominion of the donee
than the former.
It is admitted that the gift may be re
voked in the donor’s lifetime, by resumption
of possession; but if that means, that the
subject of the gift must come back into the
possession of the donor by the consent of
the donee, it amounts only to the simple
truism, that both parties can by mutual
agreement annul the transaction. But if by
resumption of possession, a reclamation of
possession is intended, then the gift can be
revoked at the option of the donor. This
seems to be the view taken in Bunn v. Mark
ham, 7 Taunt. 224, where Gibbs, C. J., says:
“It is in .the power of the donor at any time
to revoke the donation before his death." In
Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 433, Lord Hard
wicke does not declare that an actual re
sumption of possession is necessary to con
stitute a valid revocation; but on the con
trary he cites the Commentary of Vinius to
the effect, that the donor where the gift was
defeated by "recovery or revocation," had
his action against the donee. Id. 439.
Suppose the donee dies before the donor,
does the gift stand? In the case of a will,
the prior decease of the legatee causes the
legacy to lapse. This was the rule of the
civil law in respect to donations mortis causa;
and in the same breath this was declared,
the power of the donor to revoke was like
wise expressed. The terms or conditions on
which the donor can recover the subject of
the gift are thus stated in the Institutes:
“Sin autem supervixisset is qui donavit, re
ciperet; vel si eum donationis poenituisset,
aut prior decesserlt is cul donatum sit."
Inst. lib. 2, tit. 7, § 1. Again, in the Digest
it is laid down: “Mortis causa donatio, etiam
dum pendet an convalescere possit donator,
revocari potest." Dig. l. 39, tit. 6, § 16, item
i 30.
The three conditions annexed to the gift
by the civil law, which on happening defeat
the donation. are: 1st, The recovery of the.
donor; 2d, His repentance of the gift; 3d,
- The death of the donee before the donor’sI
decease. These are separate and independ
ent conditions. Ayliffe says, the gift “may
be revoked by the donor’s repeating thereof."
Parergon, 331; Bracton, lib. 2, cap. 26, 5 1.
In Jones v. Selby, Finch Free. 300, the chan
cellor said: "You agree that a donatio causa
mortis is a gift in presenti, to take effect in
futuro after the party’s death, as a will; and
that it is revocable during his life, as a will
is." Chancellor Kent speaks of these gifts
as “conditional and revocable and of a tes
tamentary character." 2 Comm. 445. In
\Vells v. Tucker, 3 Bin. 370, Justice Tilgh
man says: “It is contended on the part of
the plaintiff, that a gift of this kind passes
the property immediately, and is not subject
to revocation by the donor. Without ab
solutely committing myself, I incline to the
opinion, that in this as in several other par
ticulars, it partakes of the nature of a legacy,
and is revocable." In the same case, Jus
tice Yeates describes the donation as “sub
ject to eountermand and revocation." In
Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Whart. 22, Justice
Gibson states accurately the three modes of
defeasance acknowledged by the civil law-
His language is, that it is “defensible by
reclamation—the contingency of survivor
ship—or deliverance from the peril."
I find nothing against this doctrinkun
less it be the language of the vice chancellor,
in Reddel v. Dobree, 10 Sim. 244, who.
speaking of an alleged donation, character
ized it as a gift which "was always liable
during the lifetime of the testator to be re
called by him;" and "therefore the very
essence ofa donatio mortis causa," was want
ing. The gift in that case, was of money
that might happen to be in a. certain box at
the testator’s death, and on condition that
up to the time of his death, he should re
tain “the complete dominion over whatever
might be placed in the box." The opinion of
the vice chancellor is, substantially, that the
reservation of this dominion is inconsistent
with the essence of a donatio mortis causa.
If no more than that was intended, the doc
trine is but another form of stating that there
must be a complete delivery. If it was de
signed to declare that when there had been
a complete delivery, the donor could not re
voke the gift, such an opinion was not called
for by the case in hand, and is not agreeable
with the authorities. There are several
cases besides that of Reddel v. Dobree,
which might be supposed to imply that the
donor had no right to revoke, (4 Dru. &
War. 159, 285; 2 Coily. 356; 8 Mees. & W.
401;) but I think they proceed on the ground
that there must be an absolute delivery, a
change of possession and dominion. so as to
vest the full possessory title in the donee,
subject only to such rules as the law ap
plies to this class of gifts. That a donatio
mortis causa cannot be revoked at the will
of the donor, I find no where decided, or
distinctly asserted; while the rule of the
civil law, that it could be revoked if the
donor repented, even while it was uncertain
whether or not he would recover, is clearly.
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laid down in the Digest, and has been ad
mitted to be the rule at common law, by a
number of distinguished judges, although I
am not aware the point has expressly arisen
as the subject of distinct decision.
Applying this rule to the facts in evidence,
I am of opinion that the testator conceived
this gift to be revoked. After making the
donation, he made a change in his will, and
substantial alterations as to the disposition
of his property, in favor of the donec.
When that act was accomplished, his wife
brought these bonds to him, and asked
whether she should distribute them among
his children. He said, “No," and directed
them to he placed in the depository where
he kept his valuable papers. That direc
tion was not only a resumption of the pos
session, but an indication of a change in his
views in respect to the disposition of the
property. His subsequent conduct, in call
mg for the box, inquiring whether the bonds
were there, and directing his daughter to
lock the box, and give the key not to his
son, but to the other executor, after his
death, confirms the idea of revocation, and
shows he intended the bonds to come into
the possession of his executor, after his de
cease, as a part of his estate. I think,
therefore, that the revocation has been sus
tained. ,
The jurisdiction of the surrogate to try
this question, has been questioned by the
counsel of the donee. The surrogate has
jurisdiction to try every question necessary
to the settlement of the accounts of the ex~
centor. It is competent for the legatees, on
the accounting of the executor, to produce
evidence to charge him with more assets
than he acknowledges in his accounts to
have received. They may prove the testa
tor had assets which the executor should
have collected, or which he has received
and not brought into his accounts. In the
present case, the legatees assumed the last
position. They sought to charge the execu
tor with the amount of these bonds, and
shewed the bonds had belonged to the testa~
tor in his lifetime, and that the executor
had admitted they were in the possession of
the testator at the time of his death. Had
the case stopped there, it would have been
my duty to have charged the executor with
the amount of the bonds. But he sets up a
gift by the testator; and in order to decide
whether he is liable or not for the bonds,
the question of gift must be determined.
The executor himself raised this point, to
exonerate himself from liability; and it is
necessary to decide it in order to settle his
accounts, and make a final decree for the
distribution of the estate. If an executor
can retain assets on the plea of a gift causa
mortis, and then successfully impeach the
surrogate’s jurisdiction to inquire into the
validity of this plea, the power of this court
in respect to the settlement of accounts and
the adjustment of estates is at an end.
I am very clear that this objection is not
tenable—and must therefore decree distribu
tion, in accordance with the conclusion to
which I have arrived, respecting the revoca
tion of the donation by the testator before
his decease.
NOTE. See Jones v. Selby, Finch Prec. 300;
Jayne v. Murphy, 31 Ill. App. 28.
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HIDDEN v. THRALL et a1.
(26 N. E. 627, 125 N. Y. 572.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Feb. 24, 1891.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, second department.
Action by James N. Ridden against
1 James H. Thrall, as administrator.etc., of
Charles H. Edwards, deceased, and_an
other, to determine the validity of an al
leged gift causa mortismadeto plaintiff by
defendant’s decedent om a judgment
aflirmingajudgm t it
’
plaintiff’s
fQ
v r,
defendant appeal , _
Carlisle Norwo (1
,
John H. Corwin
respondent.
EARL, J. On the let day of October,
1888, Charles H. Edwards had money on
deposit in savings banks, and kept the
savings banks books in a tin box, and on
that day he delivered the tin box to the
plaintiff, informing him that he was about
to go to St. Luke’s hospital in the city of
New York to havean operation performed
for hernia, and that he was apprehensive
he might die from the results of the opera
tion, and said to him that if he did not
return he gave him the box and its con
tents. He went to the hospital on the
next day, and on the 5th day of October
an operation was there performed for in
guinal hernia. The operation was not
dangerous. and was apparently success
ful. But on the 16th day of October he
suddenly died from heart disease. with
which he was afllicted when he went to
the hospital. He had not returned from
the hospital. and had not recovered from
the disease for which the operation was
performed, nor from the results of the
operation. The defendants claim that
the circumstances were such that a valid
gift was not made, mainly because Ed
wards did not die from the disease on ac
count of which he went to the hospital,
and from which he apprehended death
might ensue. The case is novel in some
of its features, and interesting. I have
carefully considered the able argument
submitted on behalf of the appellants, and
.am satisfied that the judgments of the
courts below upholding the gift are right.
The gift was sufliciently proved. The
facts which took place at the time of the
gift on the 1st day of October were testi
fied to by the plaintiffIs wife. There were
16 bank-books, and they represented about
$40,000 of deposits. Such a gift should be
proved by very plain and satisfactory evi
dence, and, if the case depended upon the
evidence of the wife alone, any court
might well hesitate to uphold the gift.
But on the previous day (September 30th)
Edwards wrote the following letter ad
dressed to the plaintiff: “Friend Jim:
Should I not survive from the effects of
the operation about to be performed on
me at St. Luke’s Hospital, this is my last
will and request, that you will take
charge of my body, and have it placed in
my family plot in Greenwood Cemetery;
and also that you will take full charge of
all my personal effects of every kind, and
to have and hold the same unto yourself,
your heirs and assigns, forever. You will
. \ Y“. x‘ ( ~
Jr.’ for appella s.
d "m. D. Veeder, for
find my papers and all my accounts in the
box. C. H. EowAans." This was inclosed
in an unsealed envelope, addressed to the
plaintiff, and placed by Edwards in the bu.
reauin the room occupied by him in plain"
tiff’s house, where it was found about a
week after his burial by plaintifl’s wife and
his aunt, both of whom proved the hand
writing to be that ofthe donor. Thcgenu
ineness of this letter was not disputed upon
the trial. While, standing alone, it would
not have been sufficient to establish the
gift, it furnishes strong confirmation of
the evidence of plaintiffs wife as to the
gift, and leaves no reason to doubt that
it was made as she testified. It was com
petent as corroborating evidence, just as
the oral or written declarations of the
donor previously made would have been,
showing the intention to give, and thus
corroborating the evidence as to the act
ual gift subsequently made. I have found
no authority condemning such evidence.
In all cases where probate of a will is con
tested on the ground of undue influence,
fraud, incompetency, or forgery, the pre
vious declarations or statements, in any
form, of the testator,showing anintention
in harmony with the instrument offered
for probate, have always been held com
petent, not as sufficient, standing alone,
but as corroborating the other evidence
offered by the proponent.
The gift was consummated by the deliv
ery of the books, and no other formality
was needed to constitute the actual deliv_
ery of the bank deposits needful to vest
.the possession and title in the donee. in
savings banks in this state such deposit
books are issued as evidence of the indebt
edness of the banks. Withdrawals of de
posits are entered in the same books. so
that the deposit book always, with the
addition of any interest, shows the actual
state of the accounts between the depos
itor and the bank, and the whole indebt
edness of the bank. It answers the same
purpose in the case of a savings bank that
is answered by a certificate of deposit in
the case of other banks. The decisions
are not entirely narmonious as to the
sufficiency of the mere delivery of such de
posit books to constitute a valid gift,
either inter vivos or causa mortis. But
the general rule in England and in this
country, and particularly in this state, is
that any delivery of property which trans
fers to thedoneeeither thelcgalorequitabie
title is sufficient to effectuate a gift; and
hence it has been held that the mere deliv
ery of non-negotiable notes. bonds, mort
gages, or certificates of stock is sufficient
to effectuate a gift. 2 Hedf. Wills, 312;
Westerlo v. De Witt, 36 N. Y. 340; Champ
ney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 111; Penfieid v.
Thayer, 2 E. D. Smith, 305; Walsh v. Sex
ton. 55 Barb. 251; Johnson v. Spies, 5
.Hon, 468; Allcrton v. Lang, 10 Bosw. 362;
Camp’s Appeal, 36 Conn. 88; Bates v.
Kempton, 7 Gray, 382; Chase v. Bedding,
13 Gray, 41%; Pierce v. Bank, 129 Mass.
425; Tillingnast v. Wheaten, 8 R. I. 536;
In re Mead, 15 Ch. Div. 651; Moore v.
Moore, L. R. 18 Eq. 474.
But the learned counsel for the appel
lants calls our attention to one of the by
laws of the bank printed in the deposit
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book in question in this action, and claims
.that the delivery was not effectual with
out the written order of the donor. The
by-law is as follows: “ Draits may be
made personally or by the order, in writ
ing. of the depositor. if the bank have the
signature of the party on their signature
book, or by letters of attorney duly au
thenticated; but no person shall have the
right to demand any part of the principal
or interest without producing the pass
book, that such payments may be entered
therein. If the person giving the order or
power of attorney cannot write, he or she
must make his or her mark, in the pres
ence of a subscribing magistrate or some
one whose signature is known at the
bank, and any person presenting said or
der or power of attorney must be known
or made known to the bank as the one
authorized to receive the money." This
by-law requires an order or power of at
torney when some one seeks to draw mon
ey for the depositor or the deposltor’s
money. But the depositor can draw the
money without making an order, simply
by the presentation oi the deposit hook.
and so can any owner of the hook. Sup
pose the plaintiff had purchased the book,
and had thus become the absolute owner
thereof. He could have drawn the money
/as owner on presenta tion of the book.and
the bank could not have required. as a
condition of payment, that he should pro
cure a power of attorney or an order from
one having no interest, legal or equitable,
in the deposit. The owner in sucha case
should produce satisfactory evidence of
his ownership of the book, and if the bank
refused to pay he would be obliged to es
tablish such ownership by any competent
evidence, and nothing more; and his
rights as purchaser would be no greater
'than his rights as donee. He has the same
right to enforce a payment that he would
have had if he had been the donee of any
non negotiable chose in action, ora certifi
cate of deposit or unindorsed note. He
could establish his right to payment in
such a case by any proof showing that he
was the absolutelegal orequitabie owner.
The claim is also made that the donor
could not make the gift in the apprehen
sion of death from a surgical operation to
be performed in the future, to which he
intended voluntarily to expose himself.
But, without takinga broader view,death
from asurgical operation, made necessary
by a present disease, is, in a proper sense,
death from the disease, and the gift may
in such case be upheld as made in the ap
prehension of death from the disease.
We now come to the question, was the
gift invalid because the donor did not: die
of the same disease from which he appre
hended death? Gifts causa mortis, as well
as gifts inter vivos, are based upon the
fundamental right every one has of dis
posing of his property as he wills. The
law leaves the power of disposition com
plete, but, to guard against fraud and im
position, regulates the methods by which
i it is accomplished. To consummate a
“gift, whether Inter vivos or causa mortis,
~the property must be actually delivered,
-and the donor must surrender the posses
!slon and dominion thereof to the donee.
In the case of gifts Inter vfvos, the mo
ment the gift is thus consummated it be
comes absolute and irrevocable. But in
the case of gifts causa mortis more is
needed. The gift must be made under
the apprehension of death from some pres
ent disease, or some other impending peril,
and it becomes void by recovery from the
disease or escape from the peril. It is also
revocable at any time by the donor, and
becomes void by the death of the donee
in the lifetime of the donor. It is not
needful that the gift be made in extremis
when there is no time or opportunity to
make a will. In many of the reported
cases the gift was made weeks, and even
months, before the death of the donor,
when there was abundant time and op
portunity for him to have made a will.
These are the main features of a valid gift
ca usa mortis as they are set forth in many
text-books and reported cases Just. last.
lib. 2, tit. 7, § 1; Mack. Rom. Law, § 793;
CivilCodeCal. §§ll49,ll5l ; 1 Rep. T.eg.2(l; 2
Schouler. Pers. Pro .§ 157: 2 Kentzunnm.
444; 1 Story, Eq. ur. §§ 606, 607; 8 Pom.
Eq. Jur. § 1146; Grymes v. Hone, 49 N. Y.
17; Williams v. Guile. 117 N. Y. 343. 22 N.
E. Rep. 1071; Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S.
602, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 415.
Counsel for the appellants would add
one more prerequisite to an effectual gift,
and that is that the donor. when the gift
has been made in the apprehension of
death from disease, must: have died of the
same disease, and he calls our attention
to expressions of judges to that effect. I
have examined all the cases to which he
refers.and many more. and find that these
expressions were all made in cases where
the donor died from the same disease from
which he apprehended death when he
made the gift, and that none of them
were needfful to the decisions made. The
doctrine meant to be laid down was that
the donor must not recover from the dis
ease from which he apprehended death.
I am quite sure that no case can be found
in which it was decided that death must
ensue from the same disease. and not from
some other disease existing at the same
time, but not known. There is no reason
for this additional prerequisite. The rul
is that the donor must not recover from \
l the disease from which he then appre'
headed death. If he recovers, the giftls
void; if he does not recover, and the gift
is not revoked. it becomes effectual. In
this case the condition was that if he did
not recover from the consequences of the I
operation and return from the hospital,
the gift should take effect. That was a
perfectly lawful condition for him as the
owner of the property to impose, and no
reason can be perceived for refusing to up
hold a gift made under such circumstances.
A donor may have several diseases, and
may in making a gift apprehend death
from one and not from the others, and
shall the gift; be invalid if, before he re
covers from the disease feared, he dies
from one of the other diseases? In such a
case it might be, and generally would be,
difficult, if not impossible, to tell what
share any of the diseases had in causing
the death. No medical skill cIould ordi
narily tell that thedonor would have suc
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diseases had not been present.
cumbed to the disease feared, if the other
Here the
immediate cause of death appeared to he
heart disease, and the autopsy did not dis
close that there was any connection be
tween the hernia or the operation and the
heart disease. But who could tell that
the death would have ensued from the
heart disease at that particular time but
for the operation? No medical skill can
tell that the shock from the operation, and
the debility and disturbance caused there
by, did not hasten death; and the death.
thereffore, in a proper sense, may have en
sued, and probably did ensue, from both
causes. Sound policy requires that the
laws regulating gifts causa mortis should
not be extended, and that the range of
such gifts should not be enlarged. We
therefore confine our decision to the pre
cise facts of this case. and we go no
iurther than to hold that when aglit is
made in the apprehension of death lrom
some disease irom which the donor did
not recover, and the apparent immediate
cause of death was some other disease
with which he was afifiicted at the some
time, the gilt becomes effectual. The judg
ment should be aflirmed, with costs. All
concur.
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, dence of deliberation and intention.
DREW v. HAGERTY.
(17 Atl. 63, 81 Me. 231.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Jan. 18, 1889.
Exceptions from supreme judicial court,
Androscoggin county.
Action for money had and received;
(zrought
by Franklin M. Drew, administra
r, etc., of Daniel Hagerty, deceased, against
Mary Hagerty. Defendant claimed the prop
erty, which was money deposited in a sav
ings bank, under an alleged gift causa mor
tis of the savings bank book made by the in
testate on the day of his death. Verdict for
plaintifl which defendant moved to set aside,
and also excepted to the charge of the court.
Newell ct- .ludkins, for plaintiff. Frank
L. Noble, for defendant.
WALTON,J. Tnemostimportantques
tion is whether the gift of a savings bank
book from husband to wife, causa mortis,
is valid without delivery, provided the book
is at the time of the alleged gift already in the
possession of the wife. The action was tried
before the chief justice, and he ruled that, to
constitute a valid gift causa mortis, there
must be a delivery; that, if the property "be
at the time already in the possession of the
donee, the donor’s saying to the donee, ' You
may have it,’or'You may keep it; it shall
be yours,’—does not pass the property in
the case of a gift causa mortis."
We think tnis ruling was correct. If the
act of delivery was for no other purpose than
to invest the donee with possession, no rea
son is perceived why it might not be dis
pensed with when the donee already had pos
session. But such is not its only purpose.
.It is essential. in order to distinguish a gift
causa mortis from a legacy. Without an act
of delivery, an oral disposition of property.
in contemplation of death, could be sustained
only as a en ative will, and in the man
ner and with th
e
limitations provided for
such wills. Delivery is also important as evi
lt is a
test of sincerity, and distinguishes idle talk
- from serious purposes; and it makes fraud
and perjury more diflicult. Mere words are
easily misrepresented. Even the Change of
an emphasis may make them con veya mean
ing different from what the speaker intended.
Not so of an act of delivery. Like the de
livery of a turf, or the delivery of a twig, in
the ancient mode of conveying estates, or
the delivery of a kernel of corn, or the pay
ment of one cent of the purchase money, to
make valid :1 contract for the sale of a cargo
of grain, an act of delivery accomplishes that
which words alone cannot accomplish. Gifts
causa mortis ought not to be encouraged.
They are often sustained by fraud and per
jury. It was an attempt to sustain such a
gift by fraud and perjury that led to the enact
ment of the statute for the prevention of fraud
and perjury. See Mathews v. Warner, 4 Ves.
187, 196, note; Leathers v. Greenacre, 53
Me. 561. 569. As said in Hatch v. Atkinson,
56 Me. 326, it is far better that occasionally a
gift of this kind should fail than that the
rules of law be so relaxed as to encouraget
fraud and perjury.
We are aware that some text writers have
assumed that, when the property is already
in the possession of the donee, a delivery is
not necessary. But the cases cited in sup
port of the doctrine nearly all relate to gifts
.
inter vivos, and not to gifts causa mortis.
A gift inter vivos may be sustained without
a distinct act of delivery at the time of the
gilt, if the property is then in the possession
of the donee, and the gift is supported by
long acquiescence of the donor, or other en
tirely satisfactory evidence. This court so
held in Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383, and
the jury were so instructed in this case, and
the defendant had the benefit ot’ the instruc
tion. But the question we are now consid-\
ering is not whether a gift inter vivos can be
sustained without a distinct act of delivery,
but whether such a relaxation of the law can
be allowed in the case of a gift causa mortis.
We think not. Reason and the weight of au
thority are opposed to such a relaxation.
Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 326; Lane v.
Lane, 76 Me. 521; Parcher v. Savings Inst.,
78 Me. 470, 7 Atl. Rep. 266; Dunbar v. Dun
bar, 80 Me. 152, 13 Atl. Rep. 578; Miller v.
Jeffress. 4 Grat. 472; French v. Raymond,
39 Vt. 623; Cutting v. Gilman, 41 N. 11.147;
Delmotte v. Taylor, 1 Redf. Sur. 417; Eger
ton v. Egerton, 17 N. J. Eq. 419; Kenney v.
Public Adm’r, 2 Bradf. Sur. 319; 2 Kent,
Comm. (10th Ed.) 602, and note; Dickeschied
v. Bank, 28 W. Va. 340; Walsh’s Appeal,
(Pa.) 15 Atl. Rep. 470, and note.
It is the opinion of the court that the gift
of a savings bank book causa mortis, to be
valid, must be accompanied by an actual de-
I
livery ot the book from the donor to the
donee, or to some one for the donee, and that
the delivery must be made for the express‘
purpose of consummating the gift, and that
a previous and continuing possession by the
donee is not sufificient; and that in this and
in all particulars the rulings in the court be
low were correct and that no cause exists for
granting a new trial. Motion and exceptions
overruled.
PETERS, L'. J., and DANFORTH, VlR
GIN, EMERY, and HASKELL, JJ., con
curred.
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JONES v. WEAKLEY.
(12 South. 420, 99 Ala. 441.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 6, 1893.
Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson coun
ty; James B. Head, Judge.
Action by John H. Jones against S. D.
XVmkley, as administrator of the estate of
Nat Jenkins, deceased, to recover money had
and received. From a judgment for defend
ant, plaintifff appeals. Aflirmed.
White & Howze. for appellant. Cabaniss
& Weakley, for appellee.
STONE, C. J. This case was tried by the
court, without a jury, and presents a single
question: Does the testimony prove that
the deceased, Nat Jenkins, made a valid, ex
ecuted gift causa mortis to John H. Jones,
the plaintiff, of the money he had on deposit
with the First National Bank of Birming
ham? There is no material conflict in the
testimony. The first National Bank of Bir
mingham was a bank of issue, discount, and
deposit, and was not a savings bank. Nat
Jenkins was a colored man. was lying se
riously wounded from a railroad disaster, be
lieved he would die of his wounds, and did
in fact die therefrom two days afterwards.
He had a deposit account with the First Na
tional Bank. He had in his possession a
pass book, in which was an account with
the caption, "Dr. The First National Bank,
in acc’t with Nat Jenkins, 0r." In this
pass book were items of debit and credit,
but the account was not balanced. There
was in fact a balance due the depositor of
-near $900. Jones was a nephew of Jenkins,
and was visiting the latter as he lay in the
hospital, the effect of his injuries. He gave
Jones the key to his box, and requested
him to go and bring to him his pass book
and other articles. On the next day, and in
the presence of witnesses, Jenkins, after
stating he wa going to die, handed to plain
tiff, Jones, the bank book, keys. and papers,
and said to him: “Take this book. I give
you this money, and all I have got. Go and
get it. 1 don't want the old man or any of
hi folks to have anything that I have got.
All I want is for you to see that I am de
cently buried." Jones took possession of the
tendered pass book, keys, and papers, and
retained them. After Weakiey was appoint
, ed administrator, he checked the money out
of the bank, and this action was brought by I
Jones to recover the same as so much mon
ey had and received for his use.
The general rule is that to constitute a
valid gift, whether inter vivms or causa
mortis, the donor must part with dominion
over the thing attempted to be given; must
do the act or acts which are, or appear to
be, the most pronounced and decisive of the
intention to part with possession and con
trol; and the acts must of themselves
amount to a parting with the possession and
control. Authorities on this question are
very abundant, and they cover almost every
conceivable phase 01I the question. McHugh
v. O'Connor, 91 Ala. 243, 9 South. Rep. 165;
Dacus v. Streety, 59- Ala. 183, 8 Amer. 62
Eng. Enc. Law, p 1341 et seq., and the nu
merous authorities cited by counsel.
The direct question presented by this rec
ord has been many times considered. A
pass book issued by a savmgs bank, it is
held, rests on a peculiar footing. Such book
is the record of the customer’s account, and
its production authorizes control of the de
posit. Like the key of a locked box, it de
livery is treated as a delivery of all it con
tains. It follows that the delivery in this
case, accompanied by the declared intention
to give, if the deposit had been in a savings
bank, would have been a valid gift causa
mortis of the money on deposit, of which it
was the evidence. It would furnish the key
to the locked contents. 8 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 13.24. 1325; Pierce v. Bank, 129 Mass.
425;
I Curtis v. Bank, 77 Me. 151; Hill v.
Stevenson, 63 Me. 364; Camp’s Appeal, 36
Conn. 88. Not so, however, with the present
book. The First National Bank. as we have
seen, was a bank of issue. discount. and de
posit. The money couid be withdrawn from
the bank, not by the production of the pass
book, but on the check of the depositor. It
was not the best delivery available un
der the circumstances. It did not give domin
ion and control of the money,—the thing
claimed to have been given,—for the money
was as subject to check without the pro
duction of the book as with it. Thomas’
Adm’r v. Lewis (Va) 15 S. E. Rep. 389;
Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422; Hillebrant v.
Brewer. 6 Tex. 45; Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns.
52; Jones v. Brown, 34 N. H. 445; Beak v.
Beak, L. R. 13 Eq. 489; 8 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
Law, p. 1345, note 2. There is no error in
the record. Aflirmed.
a“
/ MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL. -’ -t ’1} 1”?"
WADDING’I‘ON v. BUZBY.
(45 N. J. Eq. 173, 16 At]. Rep. 690.)
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
Feb. 1, 1889.
Appeal from prerogative court; McGill, 0r
dinary. 43 N. J. Eq. 154, 10 Atl. Rep. 862.
A written instrument alleged to be the
last will and testament of Ruth W. Buzby
was offered to the orphans’ court of Salem
county for probate, by George G. Wadding
ton. executor therein named, and probate
was refused on objections raised by Nathan
W. Buzby. On appeal the order refusing
probate was aflirmed by the ordinary, and
the proponent appealed to this court.
W. T. Hilliard and W. E. Potter. for ap
pellant. C. H. Sinnlckson, for appeilee.
SCUDDER, J. A careful consideration of
the facts in this case has changed my first
impression, and led me to a different result
from that reached in the courts which have
made the prior examinations of the questions
presented. It appears, in my judgment, that
sufificient weight has not been given to the
extent of the right which the law gives to
the owners of property to dispose of it by
will, the moderate capacity required for the
exercise of this right, and the aid they may
invoke from others in giving order and legal
form to their wishes without subjecting
them -to the charge of fraud and undue in
fluence. At the date of this writing and its
execution. April 20, 1882, Ruth W. Buzby
was about 83 years old, and she died in 1886.
She was feeble and forgetful to the extent
that persons ordinarily are at such an ad
vaIuced age, and she was nearly blind, so
that she could not read, or did so with difli
culty. But she could at that time go about
the house, knew the members of the family,
talked about her business affairs, remem
bered the amount of her property and where
it was invested, objected to the reduction of
the percentage of interest, took a part in the
routine of the house and the payment of
bills, and conversed with visitors whom she
knew. She had been an intelligent woman,
at not of very strong will, rather reticent
than talkative, and became more silent and
bsent-minded as she grew old. She was in
jured by a fall, and failed in physical and
mental strength from that time gradually un- -
-tif her death. The opinions of witnesses as
to her mental capacity are of no weight un
less sustained by facts on which such opin
ions are founded; and those who saw her
seldom, or but once, and say she was silent.
and appeared absent-minded, give little aid
in determining this question. Lowe v. Wil
liamson, 2 N. J. Eq. 82; Sloan v. Maxwell,
3 N. J. Eq. 581; Whitenack v. Stryker, 2 N.
J. Eq. 8; Andress v. Weller, 3 N. J. Eq. 605;
Stackhouse v. Horton, 15 N. J. Eq. 202; Pan
coast v. Graham, Id. 294; Stevens v. "an
cleve, 4 Wash. C. C. 262; Den v. Vancleve, 5 Ilook for other circumstances.
I.
N. J. Law, 589; Harrison v. Rowan. 3
O. C. 580; Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N. J. Eq.
243; Eddy’s Case, 32 N. J. Eq. 701, 33 N. J.
Eq. 574; Collins v. Osborn, 34 N. J. Eq. 511;
and others that might be cited.—are cases in
our state where persons who were aged. dis
eased, blind. and infirm have executed wills,
and the rule of capacity by which they may
be sustained has been enunciated.
It is shown to my satisfaction that the tes
tatrix, at the time she executed this writ
ing, was capable of recollecting the property
she was about to dispose of, understanding
the manner of distributing it therein set
forth, the objects of her bounty, and the na
ture of the business in which she was enga
ged. If so, she had the requisite testamen
tary capacity. The paper was in fact exe
cuted by her as her last will and testament,
in the presence of two witnesses present at
her house at the same time. The attesting
clause does not say that they signed in the
presence of the testatrix. One of these sub
scribing witnesses is dead; the other is liv
ing, but does not remember the circumstan
'ces. He is certain as to his signature, and
that of the other witness is proved by his
son. - It is shown by the testimony of the oth
er two persons who were present at the sign
ing of the paper that they were all together
in the dining-room when she signed and re
quested them to sign as witnesses to her will.
This completes the attestation. It also ap
pears that the will was read to her before
signing. She took the will after execution,
herself, up stairs, put it in a box with her
other papers in a drawer of her room where
she slept, and it remained in her possession
until her death. about five years after its date.
0f the fact of its due execution, and her
capacity to make it, there eems to me to be
satisfactory proof offered.
The more serious question in the case is
whether Ruth W. Buzby executed this writ
ing, purperting to be her last will and tes
tament, through the undue influence of
George G. Waddington, the proponent. The
influence that will vitiate a will must be such
as in some degree destroys the free agency
of the testator, and constrains him to do
what is against his will, but what he is un
able to refuse, or too weak to resist. I Jarm.
Wills, § 37; Lynch v. Clements, 24 N. J. Eq.
431; Moore v. Blauvelt, 15 N. J. Eq. 367.
It is claimed that this appears in several
particulars. The proponent wrote the will,
in which he was made sole executor, and his
son and wife were favored legatees. In Rus
ifng v. Rusling, 35 N. J. Eq. 120, 36 Nl’J. Eq.
603, it was said that the fact that the will
was drawn by a favored legatee, while it
calls for suspicious scrutiny of the circum
stances, does not, of itself, invalidate the
will. The same rule would apply where the
legacies were given, not to himself, but to
those who stand in such near relationship to
him as a son and wife. We must therefore
Each case
0 0
J! - F :5.:
12
must be judged by its own circumstances,
and no general rule can be made applicable
to all cases. The testatrix had three chil
dren,—Mary Buzby, Beulah Gaskill, and Na
than Buzby. The son had died some years
before her death, leaving a son of the same
name, who is the caveator against the pro
bate of this will. Mary Buzby lived with
her mother until she died, on March. 29, 1882.
She cared for her in their home, aided her in
the management of her property, but there is
no evidence that she exercised undue influence
over her. Her entire property was the sum
of $5,200 invtsted in bonds and mortgages,
and some household furniture of no great
value. Some years before her death she
made a will by which she bequeathed $1,200
to Beulah Gaskill, and the residue to Mary
Buzby. That will was drawn by Aaron
Fogg, a neighbor. 0n the evening before
Mary died, a codicil was written by Aaron
Fogg to this will. He went to the testatrix’s
house, at the request of the proponent, and
it was there executed by Ruth W. Buzby and
witnessed by him and his daughter, who
went with him for that purpose. The exact
form of the codicil is not given, but it was
for the benefit of Mary B. Waddington, the
proponent’s wife, who is the daughter of Ben
lah (,'askill, and granddaughter of Ruth W.
Buzby. She was taken by the testatrix when
an infant, named after her daughter Mary,
brought up by them with care and affection,
and remained with them until her marriage.
By the will in controversy $1,500 is given to
Beulah Gnskill, and some furniture; $100 to
Ann B. Gaskill, and some silver-ware; $100
to Isabella P. Gaskill, and some silver-ware;
$600 to Asher B. Waddington, her great
grandson; $600 to Martha Hancock, in lieu of
any charge for services or otherwise she
might make against her estate; and the resi
due to Mary B. Waddington, her granddaugh
ter. Her reason for giving no legacy to her
grandson Nathan W. Buzby, the caveator, is
stated in her will in these words: “My grand
son Nathan W. Buzby heired a legacy for one
thousand dollars by the will of nis grandfa
ther, Asher Buzby. By the failure of my co
executor, George W. Ward, I have been
compelled to pay the greater part of said
legacy out of my own resources, and this is
the reason my said grandson Nathan W. Buz
by is not mentioned as a legatee in this in
strument." This payment was demanded of
her by her grandson when it was said that
she had but $10 left in the house for their
present support; and there is evidence that,
although she was patient at the time, and
afterwards treated him with kindness and
affection, she was displeased with his de
mand for the money, and his extravagance
in spending it after he had received it.
Beulah Gaskill went to live with her moth
er after Mary’s death, and remained with her
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until her death, with the promise that she
would be provided for. She also received
$1,500 by the will of her sister Mary. From
this disposition of the property it will appear
that all, excepting $600 given to .\iartha Han
cock for services in the family from the time
she was a child, was bequeathed to Beulah
Gaskill and her children; Mary B. Wadding
ton and her son, Ashen namesake of his
grandfather, receiving the greater portion of
the estate. The exclusion of Nathan W.
Buzby was in the former will drawn by
Aaron Fogg, with which Waddington had
no connection, and Beulah Gaskill’s individ
ual portion was largely increased after the
death of her sister, Mary, by her will and
by the terms of this will, though in these
proceedings she is hostile to the proponent.
These dispositions appear more like the nat- ‘
ural operation of the mind and affection of
the testatrix than results of the fraudulent
contrivance or undue influence of Wadding
ton, who wrote this will. His conduct, his
character, and relationship to her do not war
rant such charges against him without more
direct and certain evidence. Until about the
time of Mary’s death it does not appear that
.
he took any interest in her business. He
lived at Elsinboro, two and a half miles from
the testatrix's home in Salem. After MaryIs
death, he attended to her money matters, col
lected her interest, and deposited it for her,
advised the investment of her money when
the security was changed, and with her con
sent reinvested it for the best rate of interest
she could obtain. He was the husband of
her granddaughter. and apparently the near
est connection with whom she could advise,
and on whose judgment she could rely, as
the infirmities of age increased. While it
would have been more delicate and prudent
for him, under the circumstances, to secure
the services of a stranger to prepare a will
for the testatrix, yet, if she had suflicient
capacity to make it, and this is the volun
tary expression of her wishes in disposing of
her property, his mistake or even ofificious
ness in tenderirg his services should not be
allowed to defeat her purpose, long entertain
ed and expressed in a former will, to ex
clude the caveator from any portion in her
property. The decree should be reversed.
and the will admitted to probate.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this
case the caveator will be allowed $250 in lieu
of costs, expenses, and allowances in all
courts; and the executor will be given his
costs and expenses out of the estate.
Decree reversed.
KNAPP and PATERSON, JJ., for atilrm
ance. The CHIEF JUSTICE, DEPUE. DIX
ON, GARRISON. SCUDDER, VAN SYCK
EL, BROWN, CLEMENT, COLE, and Mc
GREGOR, for reversal.
I
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MIDDLEDITCH et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.
(45 N. J. Eq. 726, 17 Atl. Rep. 826.)
Prerogative Court of New Jersey. June 17,
1839.
Appeal from orphans’ court, Essex county;
Kirkpatrick, Buttner, and Ledwith, Judges.
Francis E. Marsh, for appellants. J. Frank
Fort, for respondents.
VAN FLEET, Vice Ordinary. The ques
tion presented by the appeal in this case is
whether a decree made by the orphans’ court
of Essex county, on the 4th day of June, 1888,
admitting to probate a paper purporting to
be the lag will of William H. Livingston, de
ceased, is such a decree as the court should,
in view of the facts of the case and the law
applicable to them, have made. The paper
in question was executed on the 11th day of
January, 1887, in the city of New York, where
the testator then resided. It appears to have
been executed in strict conformity to the re
quirements of our statute regulating the exe
cation of wills. After the execution of the.
paper in question, Mr. Livingston removed
to the city of Newark” in this state, where
he died, on the 4th day of February, 1388.
His wife died in August, 1886, and after
that date, up to the time of his own death,
his family consisted of himself, his daughter,
Lillian, (his only surviving child,) and his
mother-in-iaw, Marie C. Williams. His daugh
ter, at the time of her mother’s death, was
five or six years of age. The testator, by the
paper in question, gives all his property, of
every kind and description, to his mother-in
iaw, and at her death to her son William
P. Williams, in trust for his daughter, to be
held until his daughter has attained the age
of 25 years, when, in the language of the will,
"said property shall be handed over intact to
her: provided, however, that in consideration
of taking care of Lillian till twenty-five years
of age, or until her marriage, said Marie C.
Williams shall be supported and maintained,
in her ordinary manner of living, out of the
income derived from said property; and
should Marie C. Williams be living when Lil
lian shall arrive at twenty-five years of age,
then Lillian shall give unto Marie C. Williams
a satisfactory bond or guaranty for securing
to Marie means for her support during the
balance of her life. Should my daughter,
Lillian, die before Marie C. Williams, then my
property shall belong to the latter; and
should both Lillian and Marie die before Wil
liam P. Williams, then my property shall be
long to the last named, William P. Williams."
Mrs. Williams and William P. Williams are
appointed executors. It is not shown who
drew this paper, nor where, nor under what
circumstances, it was drawn. One of the
subscribing witnesses says that he thinks the
testator wrote it himself. That is the only
information we have respecting its prepara
tion or origin.
The validity of this paper, as the will of
William H. Livingston, is contested on two
grounds: First, it is said that it is shown to
he prod of an insane mind; and, s9;
@151, that it is shown to be the result of the
exercise of undue influence. And it is claim
ed that the contents of the paper itself fu_r-~
nish strong evidence of the truth of both
these objections. A will may be contrary
to the principles of justice and humanity,
its provisions may be shockingly unnatural
and extremely unjust; nevertheless, if it
appears to have been made by a person of
suflzicient age to be competent to make a will,
and also to be the free and unconstrained
product of a sound mind, the courts are
bound to uphold it. The courts must so
treat papers of this kind, in_order to maintwsimislwlimjaon
very ewnWi1g13d,
wwmwaalefiesssolong as he not ttempt to apply i propI
erty oan immora or unlawfulppgpose. But
in cases w want of testamentary capaci
ty or undue influence is alleged, it is the duty
of the court to scan the provisions of the will
to see whether or not they furnish any evi
dence of the truth of the charges made
against its validity.
The feature of the paper under considera
tion which is most likely to attract attention,
as tending to show that the disposition which
the testator made of the property is both un
natural and unjust, is the fact that he has,
either inconsiderately or designedly, mani
fested an unnatural preference for his moth
er-in-law and brother-in-law over the issue of
his daughter. On scanning the will, it will
be observed that it contains no indication
whatever that the testator intended, in case
his daughter should have issue, but did not
survive her grandmother and her uncle. that
her issue should take his property. On the
contrary, if the will be read according to its
plain words. it would seem to be entirely
clear that he intended, if his daughter died
in the lifetime of either her grandmother or
her uncle, that his property should go, even
if his daughter left issue, not to her issue,
but first to her grandmother, if she was then
living, but, if not living, then to her uncte.
Such I understand to be the plain direction
of the will. It says: “Should my daughter
Lillian die before Marie C. Williams, then
my property shall belong to the latter; and,
should both Lillian and Marie die_ before
William P. Williams, then my property shall
belong to the last named, William PL. Wil
liams." Death is here spoken of generally,
and without restriction as to time. The tes
tator does not say, “If my daughter Lillian
shall die without leaving lawful issue surI
viving her, before attaining twenty-five years
of age, then my property shall go either to
her grandmother or her uncle;" but what he
says is, if Lillian shall die before her grand
mother or before her uncle, then his property
shall go to her grandmother, if living, but, if
14 MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL.
not, then to her uncle. Liflinn’s issue is not
mentioned, nor is any provision made for it,
either expressly or constructively, though the
possibility that she might have issue be
fore attaining 25 is a thing which, it would
seem, must have been before the testator’s
mind; for in making provision for her care
he limits the period that her grandmother]
shall take care of her to the time when she
attains 25, or until her marriage. But sup
pose we say that, according to the settled rule
of construction in such cases, the true mean
ing of the will is that neither the grandmoth
er nor the uncle will take unless Lillian shall
die before attaining 25 years of age—sud
that, I think, is the construction which shou1d
be adopted,—stifif it is apparent that under
this view the will is not such a one as a fa
ther, having an only child, and in the full
possession of his senses, and with the in
stincts and affections common to our nature,
would, when entirely free from any sinister
influence, have been likely to make; for un
der this view it will be seen that if Lillian
marries, has issue, and dies before attaining
25, her grandmother or her uncle will take
the property given by the will to the exclu
sion of her issue. The will in this res ct is,
ipgmLjudgmengté’fg’r1jgfl-mtflwlust~But thii‘st’a'n‘ g a one, constitutes no rea
son why the paper should not be given effect
as the will of the testator. It may help to
show that the testator lacked testamentary
capacity, or that his will is not the free ex
pression of his mind and heart, but in a case
where it appears that he had the requisite
capacity, and that his will is the unfettered
expression of his wishes, it amounts to noth
ing at all. The paper in question is, how
ever, assailed on other grounds. It is char
gged that it is the direct product of an in
iIsane delusion. The testator was a believerI
in spiritualism; that is. he believed the spir
its of the dead can communicate with the liv
ing, through the agency of persons called
"mediums," and who possess qualities or gifts
not possessed by mankind in general. The
proofs show that the testator stated to several
persons, prior to the execution of his will,
that the spirit of his dead wife had requested
him, through a medium residing in Forty
Sixth street, in the city of New York, to
make provision for his mothcr-in-iaw in his
will. To one person he said that his wife’s
spirit had requested him to give all his prop
erty to her mother, and to do it in such a way
that none of his relatives could get it away
from her. To the same person he said. at
another time, that the spirit of his wife was
constantly urging him to make a will in fa
vor of her mother. To another person he
said that the spirit of his wife had requested
him to be good to her mother, and see that
she was made comfortable during the re
mainder of her life, and he also said that he
intended to make a will, leaving enough to
his mother-in-iaw to make her comfortable,
because his wife wanted him to do so. The
testator’s wife, by her will, gave all her prop
erty to the testator, subject, however, to an
annual payment of $500 to her mother, and a
like sum to her brother, William P. Williams,
during their joint lives, and, after the death
of either, then to the payment of $1,000 an
nually to the survivor during his or her life.
The evidence shows, I think, beyond doubt,
that the testator believed, fully and thorough‘
ly, that the messages which were delivered
to him, as communications from his wife, ac
tually came from her spirit, and that her
spirit knew constantly all that he was doing.
The important question which this branch
of the case presents for decision is, was such
belief an insane delusion? The prevailing
doctrine in Englandkup to the time the court
of queen’s bench decidedIBanksrv. Goodfci
low, L. R. 5 Q. B. 549, was that any degree
of mentaiunsoundness, however slight, aml ‘
evén if it exercised no influence over the tes—
tator in making his will, and was wholly .
unconnected with the disposition he had
made of his property, would, nevertheless,
be fatal to the validity of..his"Iwili.. The
course of reasoning which led to the adop
tion of this doctrine is stated as follows by
Cockburn, C. J., in Banks v. Goodfellow,
(page 559): "To constitute testamentary ca
pacity, soundness of mind is indispensably
necessary. But the mind, though it has va
rious faculties, is one and indivisible. If it
is disordered in any one of these faculties,
if it labors under any delusion arising from
such disorder, though its other faculties and
functions may remain undisturbed, it can-I
not be said to be sound. Such a mind is un
sound, and testamentary incapacity is the
necessary consequence." A different doc
trine was established by Banks v. Goodfel
low. It was there held that if a testator
possesses sufficient mental power to take in
to account all the considerations necessary to
the proper making of a will, though he is
subject to some delusion, yet if
. it appears
that such delusion did not influence him, and
was not calculated to influence him, in mak
ing his will, his will is entitled to be regard
ed as a valid testamentary act, and should
be upheld. The principle established by that
case is expressed in the following sentence
of Chief Justice (.'ockburn’s opinion: "If it
be conceded, as we think it must be, than,
the only legitimate or rational ground for de
nying testamentary capacity to persons of
unsound mind is the inability to take into ac
count and give due effect to the considera
tions which ought to be present to the mind
of a testator in making his will, and to influ
ence hi decision as to the disposal of his
property, it follows that a degree or form
of unsoundness which neither disturbs the
exercise of the faculties necessary for such
an act. nor is capable of influencing the re
sult, ought not to take away the power of
making a will, or place a person so circum-j
stanced in a less advantageous position than
others with regard to this right." All sub
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sequent cases arising in England have been
decided according to this principle, and it is
now the established law of that country.
Boughton v. Knight, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div.
64; Jenkins v. Morris, 14 Ch. Div. 674; Smee
v. Smee, 5 Prob. Div. 84. The same principle
has, in its substance, been recognized by the
court of errors and appeals of this state.
Chief Justice Beasley, in pronouncing the
judgment of that court in Lozear v. Shields.
23 N. J. Eq. 509, declared that partial in
sanity was insufificient of itself to justify
a decree setting aside a sale of real property
or any other act. He said: “Mania does
not, per se, vitiate any transaction; for the
question is whether such transaction has been
affected by it. Where a pure defense of men
tal incapacity is interposed. I think the true
test in this class of cases is whether the
party had the ability to comprehend. in a
reasonable manner, the nature of the affair
in which he participated. This is the rule,
in the absence of fraud; for fraud, when
present, introduces other principles of deci~
sion." My own view as to the true rule on
this subject may be stated as follows: Even
if it appears that a testator was subject to
an insane delusion when he made his will,
but it is also made to appear that his delusion
was not of a character likely to influence
him, and did not influence him, in the disposi
tion which he made of his property, his will
houid be declared valid.
But this is somewhat aside from the ques
tion mainly in contest on this branch of the
‘
case, namely, is a belief in spiritualism an in
sane delusion? Sir John Nicholl, in the cele~
brated case of Dew v. Clark, 3 Addams, Ecc.
T9, (2 Eng. Ecc. R. 441.) defined "insane de
lusion" as follows: “Wherever the patient
once conceives something extravagant to ex
ist, which has‘still no existence whatever
but in his own heated imagination, and when
ever, at the same time, having once so con
ceived, he is incapable of being, or at least of
being permanently, reasoned out of that con
ception, such a patient is said to be under a
delusion, in a peculiar, half-technical sense
of the term, and the absence or presence of
delusion, so understood, forms, in my judg.
ment, the true and only test or criterion of
present or absent insanity." Dr. Haggard’s
report of the opinion pronounced in Dew v.
Clark attributes somewhat different language
to Sir John Nicholl. The following is the
definition, as he reports it: “When persons
believe things to exist which exist only, or
at least in that degree exist only, in their
own imagination. and of the non-existence
of which neither argument nor proof can con
vince them, they are of unsound mind; or,
1
. .as one of the counsel accurately expressed it,
'it is only the belief of facts which no rLQQJr
5 g} person would have believed, that is insane
delusion.”’ 1 \Villiams, ExIrs, 35; 1 Redf.
Wills, 71. Sir James Hannen in Boughton
v. Knight, L. R. 3 Prob. & lJrv. (H438, adopt
ed the definition as reported in 3 Addams
as the true one. He said he believed it
would solve most, if not all, the difficulties
which could arise in investigations of the
kind now under consideration. Chief Judge
Denio, in Society v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 619-
624, said: “If a person persistently be
lieves supposed facts, which have no real ex
istence except in his perverted imagination,
and against all evidence and probability, and
conducts himself, however logically, upon the
assumption of their existence, he is, so far
as they are concerned, under a morbid de
lusion; and delusion, in that sense, is in
sanity." And Cockburn, O. J., in Banks v.
Goodfellow, (page 560,) says: "When delu
sions exist which have no foundation in
reality, and spring only from a diseased and
morbid condition of the mind, to that extent
the mind must necessarily be taken to be un
sound."
According to these definitions, it is only a
delusion or conception which springs up spon
taneously in the mind of a testator, and is
not the result of extrinsic evidence of any
kind that can be regarded as furnishing evi
dence that his mind is diseased or unsound;
in other words, that he is subject to an in-
sane delusion. it, without evidence of any
kind, he imagines or conceives something to
exist which does not in fact exist, and which
no rational person would, in the absence of
evidence, believe to exist, then it is manifat
that the only way in which his irrational be
lief can be accounted for is that it is the prod
uct of mental disorder. Delusions of this
kind can be accounted for upon no reason
able theory except that they are the crea
tions of some derangement of the mind in
which they originate. To illustrate: In
Smee v. Since. 5
I) Prob. Div. 84, the testator
imagined himself to be the son of George
1V., and that when he was born a large sum
of money had been put in his father’s hands
for him, but which his father, in fraud of
his rights, had distributed to his brothers;
and in Smith v. Tebbitt, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div.
398, the testatrix imagined herself to be one
of the persons of the Trinity, and her chief
iegatee to be another. The delusion, in both
instances, as will be noticed, was indisputably
a wild and baseless fancy, not the product
of evidence of any kind, but obviously the off
spring of a disordered condition of mind.
But where a testator is induced, by false evi
dence or false statements, to believe a fact
to exist which does not exist, or where, in
consequence of his faith in evidence which is
true, but which is wholly insuflicient to prove
the truth of what he believes, he believes a
fact to exist which in reality has no exist
ence, his belief may show want of discern~
ment, that he is overcredulous and easily
duped, or that he lacks power to analyze and
weigh evidence, or to discriminate between
what is true and what is false. but it fur
nishes no evidence whatever that his mind is
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diseased. His belief may show lack of judg
ment or want of reasoning power, but not
that his mind is unsound.
I The testator’s belief in spiritualism was not
a morbid fancy, rising spontaneously in his
\mind, but a conviction produced by evidence.
The proofs show that when he flrst commen
ced attending what are called “séances" he
was inclined to be skeptical. Afterwards his
mind seemed to be in an unstable condition,
—he sometimes believed and at others doubt
ed; and that it was not until the spirits gave
an extraordinary exhibition of their power,
by printing or painting on a pin, worn by his
motber-in-law on her neck, in brilliant let
ters, which sparkled like diamonds, the word
“Dickie," a pet name of his dead wife, that
his last doubts as to the reality of the mani
festations were removed. Believing, as I do,
that these manifestations were correctly de
scribed by ViceChancelior Giffard, in Lyon
v. Home, L. R. 6 Eq. 655-681, when he called
them "mischievous nonsense, well calculated,
on the one hand, to delude the vain, the weak,
the foolish, and the superstitious, and, on the
other, to assist the projects of the needy and
of the adventurer," still it seems to me to be
entirely clear that it cannot be said that a
person who does believe in their reality is,
1 because of such belief, of unsound mind, or
\ subject to an insane delusion. No court has
as yet so held. No cases on this subject were
cited on the argument. Those which I have
examined uniformly hold that a belief in
spiritualism is not insanity. The court in
Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, said: “Be
lief in spiritualism is not insanity, nor an in
sane delusion. ' ‘ ' The term 'delusion,’
as applied to insanity, is not a mere mistake
of fact, or the being misled by false testi
mony or statements to believe that a fact ex
ists which does not exis ." And in Brown v.
Ward, 53 liid. 376, it was said: “The court
cannot say, as matter of law, that a person
is insane because he holds the belief that he
can communicate with spirits, (of the dead,)
and can be and is advised and directed by
them in his business transactions and in the
disposal of his property." Substantially the
same view was expressed in Otto v. Doty, 61
Iowa, 23, 15 N. W. Rep. 578, and also in the
matter of Smith’s Will, 52 Wis. 543, 8 N. W.
Rep. 616, and 9 N. W. Rep. The utmost
length to which any court has as yet gone
on this subject is to declare that a belief in
spiritualism may justify the setting aside of
a will when it is shown that the testator,
through fear, dread, or reverence of the spirit
with which he believed himself to be in com
munication, allowed his will and judgment to
be overpowered, and in disposing of his prop
erty followed implicitly the directions which
he believed the spirit gave him; but in such
case the will is set aside, not on the ground
of insanity, but of undue influence. Thomp
son v. Hawks, 14 Fed. Rep. 902.
There is no evidence in this case which
ill support a conclusion that the testator,
(
~at the time he executed his will, was subject
to an insane delusion. Nor do I think there
is any evidence in the case which will sup
port a judgment declaring that the will in
question is the result of undue lnfluence.(
There is no proof tending to show what in
fluence the spirits or the medium exercised
over the testator in making his will, except
that which proceeded from the testator’s own
mouth. His declarations are competent to
show the condition of his mind, but not to
prove undue influence against either persons
or spirits. Rusling v. Rusling, 36 N. J. Eq.
603-607. For the purpose of proving undue
influence, they are without the least force.
Neither the medium, nor Mrs. Williams, (the
mother-in-law,) nor any other person who
was present at any of the seances, has been
examined as a witness. No legal evidence of
what occurred at any of them is before the
court. The charge of undue influence is main
ly directed against Mrs. Williams. She is
said to be a believer in spiritualism, and the
proofs show that she went with the testator
frequently when he went to the medium to
consult the spirit of his dead wife. There
are some things in her conduct which are cal
culated to create strong suspicion. Without I
apparent cause she seems to have entertained?
feelings of strong dislike towards all the tes
I
tator’s relatives. On the day of his wife’s'
funeral she ordered his sister out of the
house, without cause or right, and in utter.
defiance of the proprieties of the occasion.)
and after his sister refused to go she put her
self so near to the testator and his sister
as to be able to overhear everything they said.
Front that time forward, up to the time of
testator’s death, Mrs. Williams continued to
reside with him, and his sister never, after
the funeral, went to his house, nor, so far
as appears, did any of his other relatives.
When the testator died Mrs. Williams not
only neglected to send notice of his death to
any of his relatives, but did what she could
to conceal his death from them. After the
testator’s death she admitted that she had
persuaded or gotten him to insert the clause
in his will which defers the turning over of
his property to his daughter until she is 25,
stating that the reaon she did so was be
cause she thought that when the daughter
was of age some old fool might come after
her for her money, and she wanted to pro
tect her against such persons; and it also ap
pears that she was present when the spirits
gave the testator such evidence of their pres
ence as he regarded conclusive, by printing
on a pin on her neck, in brilliant letters, the
pet name of his wife. These things natural
ly breed suspicious and create fears. They
show that it is possible that every message
the testator received, purporting to come
from the spirit of his dead wife, came, not
from the dead, but frotu the living, and that
everything that was done to dispel the testa
1
..
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tor’s doubts, and to induce him to believe in
the reality of the spiritual manifestations
which he witnessed, was, from beginning to
end, a prearranged scheme of deception and
fraud. But there is no proof in the case
which will support a judgment that such was
the fact. There is enough to raise a strong
suspicio but not enough to produce con
v .n. I ence, like fraud, can
not, in a case where no relation of trust ex
ists, be presumed, but must be proved. I
strongly suspect that the testator was duped.
LAw $1100. —2
It may also be true that he was unduly influ
enced. I believe that the examination of
Mrs. Williams, or the medium, as a witness,
would, in all probability, have made many
things which now seem dark and obscure,
plain and clear. The question, however,
whether or not the paper in question is the
will of the testator, must be decided by the
evidence before the court. Taking that as
the sole guide to the judgment to he pronoun
ced, I think it is the duty of the court to at
firm the decree made below.
l8 MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL.
* ( In re MacPHERSON’S WILL.
(4 N. Y. Supp. 181.)
may be valid, but the facts establishing intel
ligent action must be shown. The nature
and character of the instrument, and of its
Surrogate’s Court, New York County. Jan. 2, dispositions, have great influence’ : ' a
1889- and it is important to ascertain whether the
The will of Sara J. MacPherson, deceased, contents of the will harmonize with the state
was offered for probate by John MacPherson, ’ of the decedent’s affections and intentions
father of the executrix therein named, who otherwise expressed." In the case at bar the
was an infant. Elizabeth Hammond
con-i
subscribing witnesses prove the due execu
tested it on the ground of want of testamen- ~tion of the will, and that at the time the tes
tary capacity. The letter referred to in the l tatrix bad mental capacity to make a will.
opinion as having been left at the house of‘One of the subscribing witnesses was a law
Judge Angell, consisted of disconnected and ‘ clerk, and presumably familiar with the le
irrelevant expressions, wholly without mean- , gal requisites. The will was drawn by Mr.
lng.
flnrk
Blair & Rudd, for proponent. James R.
Angeli, for contestant.
RANSOM, S. A perusal of the testimony
taken in this case must lead any mind to
the conclusion that the testatrix, for a con
siderable period before her death, was an
excitable, sickly woman, who, on slight prov
ocatpn, and often with no apparent cause.
flew into fits of passion, and displayed many
symptoms of a diseased mind. Conversation
upon topies connected with certain of her rel
atlves invariably excited her to some out
burst. No person in the enjoyment of her
senses would have composed the letter which
appears to have been left at the house of
Judge Angeli by the deceased. Nevertheless,
the unanimous testimony of the witnessess
(with, possibly, the single exception of Mrs.
Angeli) is to the effect that, while these man
ifestations of an unhealthy mind were chronic
from the date of her first illness, she was
sometimes,‘ for continued periods of time, in
the possession of her faculties. In the light
of these facts, the law as laid down in
the case of Gombanlt v. Public Administra’
tor, 4 Bradt. Sui‘. 226, migfiit be taken as the
text upon which to write a decision of this
cause, viz.: “A will made in a lucid interval
after an interview with testatrix, who
~ca e at his office for the purpose of giving
instructions therefor. Thereafter he receiv
ed a note from testatrix, containing substan
tially similar directions, and the will was
drawn accordingly, and sent to her by a mes
senger, who superintcnded its execution at
l the house of decedent. At this interview with
M. Rudd he testifies that she conversed ra
tionally upon the subjects introduced. That
the will is in accord with her expressed in
tentions appears by the testimony of her
brother, as well as by the evidence of Mr.
Rudd. In the case 01 Chambers v. Queen's
Proctor, 7 Eng. Ecc. R. 164, cited in Gom
bault v. Public Administrator, supra. the de
cedent died by his own hand the day after he
executed the will. There had been indica
tions of insanity immediately before and aft
er its execution. The court said: “If done
during a lucid interval, the act will be valid.
notwithstanding previous and subsequent in
sanity,"—and the will was upheld mainly on
the ground of the reasonable dispositions con
tained in the instrument, the absence of proof
of delusion at the time of the factum, and
the rational manner in which the act was
performed. Every incident specified in that
case is supplied here for the purpose of sup
porting the will. and I am of opinion that the
will should be admitted to probate.
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BANNISTER et al. v. JACKSON.
(45 N. J. Eq. 702, 17 Ail. Rep. 692.)
Prerogative Court of New Jersey. May M,
1889.
Appeal from orphans’ court, Essex county;
Kirkpatrick, Buttner, and Ledwith, Judges.
Proceedings for the probate of the will of
George M. Bannister, oftered by John Jack
I
son, executor, named therein, contested by
Caroline F. Bannister and Caroline J. Marsh,
clheirs at law. The orphans’ court admitted
the will to probate, and contestants appealed.
C. W. Riker, for appellants. M. T. Barrett
and Henry Young, for respondent.
McGILL, Ordinary. This appeal is from
a decree of the orphans’ court of Essex coun
ty, which directs that a paper purporting to
be the last will and testament of George M.
Bannister be admitted to probate. The pa
per was executed in accordance with the re
quirements of the statute. on the 24th of
April, 1884, and on the 22d of March, 1887,
the testator died of chronic alcoholism at
the German hospital, in the city of Newark.
The appellants are his widow and only child.
By the disputed paper. $500 is bequeathed
to the widow, and declared to be in addi
tion to her dower right, and $500 is given to
the daughter, Caroline J. Marsh, who was
then a widow, and provision is made that
that sum shall be her own property, free
from the control of her husband, Edward
Marsh. The residue of the estate is divided
equally between the four brothers of the
testator, who reside in England; with the
proviso that, in case two of the brothers,
who are named. should die before the tes
tator, without leaving issue, then their share
shall be divided equally between the surviv
ing brothers or their heirs. John Jackson, a
friend and former business agent of Mr. Ban
nister, is named as the executor of the will,
and power is given him tosell real estate.
The estate disposed of is valued at from $1. -
000 to $15,000, and consists entirely of per
sonal property. When the will was made
the testator and Mr. Jackson were the equi
table owners of a farm at Brookdale, in this
state, the legal title to which was in the
name of one McCartney, who held it in trust
for him, and the testator alone was the
equitable owner of a house and lot in the
city of Newark, the legal title to which was
then held in trust for him by Mr. Jackson.
The admission of the will to probate is re
sisted upon the ground that at the time of
its execution Bannister did not possess tes
tamentary capacity. It is insisted that he
had become a‘ habitual drunkard, was at
flicted with chronic alcoholism, and at the
very moment of the paper’s execution was
so far intoxicated that he did not comm-p
hend the act in which he was engaged. Ban
nister was married to the appellant Caroline
F. Bannister, in 1855. She had been married
before, but was then a widow. By her he
had a daughter, the appellant Caroline J.
Marsh. Until 1875 he was a prosperous slip
per manufacturer in Newark. In that year
he commenced to use intoxicating liquors
to excess. and a year later left his wife
and daughter. to live with a woman of dis
reputable character, and from that time un
til his death he continued in excessive indul
gence in intoxicating drink. Witnesses de
sci‘be the quantity of liquor that he consum
ed as “enormous." When sober he was nerv
ous, sleepless, and irritable. His hand trem~
bled continuously. He spoke of seeing
strange figures and imps, and otherwise ex
hibited characteristies oi.’ the habitual in
ebriate. Yet, notwithstanding his condition
he managed to keep his business together,
and, at about the time of making the paper
in question, to sell it at considerable advan
tage. Sometimes he appeared to be afiifcted
with dullness and loss of memory, and at
other times he exhibited a keen, shrewd ca
pacity for business, and a strong will. In
the spring of 1884 he declared that he had
determined to go to Europe for the benefit
of his health, and then made the advan
tageous sale of his business above spoken
of, and at about the same time transferred
to his mistress, in settlement of all her
claims upon him. the furniture of the house
in which they had lived together. He then
made the will in dispute, and then, for the
benefit of his health, went for two weeks to
his Brookdale farm, and then to England. .
During all the time that he was separated
from his wife and daughter. except while he
was in England, he contributed to their sup
port, remitting to them weekly a certain al
lowance. While he was in England his
daughter wrote to him for assistance, and
he answered her by the following letter,
which should be inserted here because of
its value in ascertaining his condition of
mind and capacity at the time he wrote it:
"London, July 12th, 1&4. Carrie: Your let
ter just received. Glad to hear that all is
well. You will please to understand that I
am so placed that I cannot occupy but one
home. I have for over nine years gave you
and your ma 9. good living. Now there is a
change. If your mother wants me, I will
make arrangements to come, and I will make
her as happy as a man can make his loving
wife. Yours, G. M. B. P. S. I have sent
by mail to Mr. Jackson to carry out all ar
rangements that you might make. Now, to
you, my D. Can you lay your head on your
pillow at night, and say to your God that
you have been a loving, faithful child? If
you can, then your God is not mine. G. M.
BR’, 11 August of the same year he re
turn to Newark, and immediately took up
is residence with his wife and daughter,
and remained with them until some time in
the following December. He had not been
able to break his pernicious habits, and while
he thus lived with them he was seldom so
her. In December he returned to his mis
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tress, and resided with her until he died, in
the spring of 1887. For some years before
he went to England he had been the vice
president and a director of the Mutual Build
ing & Loan Association of Newark. When
he went to England he resigned those of
fices, but upon his return from England was
reeiected a director of the corporation. The
president of that association says that he
was valued as a man of excellent judgment,
and was frequently selected to act upon com
mittees to audit accounts and appraise the
value of property upon which loans were to
be placed. He was not thought by this wit
ness to be incompetent to transact business
until a month or two before his death. Aft
er his return he was employed by Thomas
Phaup, a slipper manufacturer, as the man
ager and foreman of his business, and for
fifteen months was paid $15 a week in that
capacity. During this employment he loan
ed Phaup $1,000, taking security for the loan,
and so managed that he ultimately became
the owner of Phaup’s business. Up to the
time of his death he kept a bank account rn
his own name. His money was chiefly in
vested in mortgages placed by himself, the
interest from which he or his friend Jackson
collected. While he was in England Jack
son managed his affairs, and rendered him
regular accounts. His securities were al
ways kept in Jackson’s safe.
The proofs satisfy me that at the time the
will was made Bannister had become ad
dicted to the excessive use of intoxicating
liquors, and that to some extent such indul
gence had impaired both his mental and
physical powers, and had probably contrib
uted to the degradation of his moral char
acter, but at the same time I am satisfied
that the impairment of his mental faculties
did not extend so far as to render him in
competent to perform a legal act when he
was not under the immediate influence of
intoxication. ‘The test of testamentary ca
fpacity in this state is that the testator can
'comprehend the property he is about to dis
pose of, the objects of his bounty, the mean
ing of the business in which he is engaged,
Ithe relation of each of these factors to the
others, and the distribution that is made by
the will. The capacity required is moderate,
and, though the testator be subject to many
infirmities. though he be feeble, absent-mind
ed, forgetful, aged, diseased, blind, or other
wise infirm, if he yet possess the powers re
quired by this test. he will be held to have
testamentary capacity. Waddington v. Buz
by, 43 N. J. Eq. 154, 10 Atl. Rep. 862 I am
entirely satisfied that Mr. Bannister had tes
tamentary capacity when he made the docu
ment in dispute. Much stress was laid by
the counsel for the appellant upon the fact
that the will provided that the money which
was left to the testator’s daughter was to be
free from the control of her husband, when
in fact, at the time the will was made, that
husband had been dead two years. The
daughter’s marriage, her separation from her
husband, the husband’s death, and the mak-
ing of the will, all occurred while Bannister
lived apart from his wife and daughter. The
testimony that he had been informed of the
death of his son-in-law comes from the
daughter alone. Possibly she may be wise
taken as to her statement of it, or possibly
it may have been conveyed to him at a time
when he was under the influence of strong
drink, and incapable of appreciating or re
membering the information. His separation
from his wife and daughter, and the daugh
ter’s separation from her husband, created a
situation of affairs in which the death of
the son~in-law would fail to disturb existing
relations, so as to emphasize it and impress
it upon his memory. I cannot but believe
that the testator’s failure to remember the
death when he made his will must be attrib
uted to other causes than disease of mind or
incapacitating failure of memory.
The remaining inquiry is whether at the
very time of the making of the will the tes-
}tator was under the influence of liquor. The
three persons present at the execution of
that paper have been sworn. John Otto, the
justice of the peace and conveyancer who
drew the will, was not directly questioned.
upon the subject, but he says that Bannister
came to his office at about 10 o’clock in the
morning, and told him that he was going to
Europe, and that he desired to arrange his
afl’airs before he left, and then gave Otto di
rections for the will, and, as Otto says, the
ideas to put in it. Otto then told him that
he' must have another witness, and he went
out, saying that he would get Frank J. Merz.
Mr. Merz was a saloon-keeper near by. He
says that Bannister came in his saloon at
about 11 oIclock in the morning, and called
him aside, and asked him if he would be a
witness to his will, and that he (Merz) as
sented, and went with him. He further says
that Bannister was a little excited, and that
he (the witness) thought that he had been
drinking a little, for he smelt the liquor up
on him, and Bannister seemed to be nervous.
John Jackson, who was also present at the
execution of the will, states that Bannister
either came to him or met him that morning,
and requested him to accompany him (Ban
nister) to Mr. OttoIs office, where he pro
posed to have his will drawn. He told Jack
son that he was going to’Europe, and that he
wished Jackson to be the executor of the
will. Jackson says that the testator was
sober, and knew what he was doing. When
the will was completed Mr. Otto read it, and
after it had been executed Bannister paid
Otto for drawing it, and handed the will to
Jackson. It niay be that Bannister had
been drinking immediately before his will.
Merz says that he had been drinking a lit
tle,—wus a little excited; to use his expres
sion, was "kind 0I nervous."—but he does
not pretend to say that Bannister did not ap
preciate the business in which he was on
MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL. 21
gaged. To Jackson he seemed to be sober,
and that which he did and said throughout
the transaction seems to clearly indicate that
Ihe was not intoxicated; at all events, to such
fa degree as to disorder his faculties or per
vert his judgment. In Peck v. Cary, 27 N.
Y. 9, 23, Chief Justice Denio said: “It is
not the law that a dissipated man cannot
make a contract or execute a will, nor that
one who is in the habit of excessive indul
gence in strong drink must be wholly tree
from its influence when performing such
acts. If fixed mental disease has superven
ed upon intemperate habits, the man is in
competent and irresponsible for his acts.
I. f
4
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' ‘ ' If he is so excited by present intoxi
cation as not to be master of himself, his
legal acts are void, though he may be re
sponsible for his crimes." My conclusion,
after a careful examination of this case, is
that at the time the will in dispute was
made Mr. Bannister’s habitually excessive
indulgence in strong drink had not produced
a fixed mental disease suflicient to destroy
his testamentary capacity, and that at the
very moment of the execution of that docu
ment he was not so intoxicated that the act
in which he was engaged was vitlated. I
will therefore aflirm the decree of the or
phans’ court.
22 UNDUE INFLUENCE.
if
ROLLWAGEN v. ROLLWAGEN et al.
(63 N. Y. 504.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 18. 1876.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
First department.
Instruments purporting to be the last will
and testament of Frederick RollwagenI, de
ceased, and a codicil thereto, were, by the
executors therein named, offered for probate
to the surrogate of New York county, and
probate was refused. On appeal to the su
preme court. the decree of the surrogate was
aflirmed, and the proponents appealed to this
court.
In 1871 testator, an uneducated man, who
could neither read nor write, worth about
$700,000 in real estate, married a niece of
his deceased wife. who for several years had
been his housekeeper. At that time he was
a confirmed invalid, having nearly lost the
power of speech, and his infirmities increased
until his death, in October, 1873. In the
year 1872 it appeared from the evidence of
his intimate friend that he could not speak a
word nor utter an intelligible sound. In
April, 1873, he discharged his old business
agent, and employed a brother of his wife, a
man of no business capacity, to take charge
of his property, and a large and expensive
residence was purchased and furnished. In
the fall of 1872, and again in June, 1873, the
brother employed attorneys to draw wills for
, testator in favor of the wife, by which the.
reslduary estate was tied up until his young
est grandehild should come of age, the broth
er being made trustee. The wife gave all
the directions for making the will, claiming
to understand the sounds made by testator,
none of which were intelligible to the attor
ney, nor did testator at such time utter any
word or intelligible sound. In September,
1873, a codicil was drawn under similar cir
cumstances, increasing the gift to the wife.
None of testator’s children or grandehildren
were present at the execution of the wills or
codicil, nor did it appear that they knew of
them.
Wm. H. Arnoux and Wm. A. Beach, for
appellant. Henry L. Clinton and George F.
Langbein, for respondents.
EARL, J. The decedent probably had suf
ficient mind to make a will, and this is not
denied by contestants’ counsel. His mind
was, however, undoubtedly impaired and his
will enfeebled by paralysis and disease; to
what extent we are unable to determine. If,
therefore, the only objection to the probate of
this will was mental incompetency to make
it, the objection could not prevail. A party
who offers an instrument for probate as a
\will must show satisfactorily that it is the
will of the alleged testator, and upon this
question he has the burden of proof. If he
falls to satisfy the court that the instrument
speaks the language and contains the will of
the testator, probate must be refused. The
laws in reference to the distribution of the
estates of persons dying intestate are found
ed upon principles of public policy and jus
tice, and must regulate the transmission of
property, unless a' person before death has.
in the mode prescribed by law, himself pro
vided how his property after death shall be
disposed of. As said by Judge Davies in
Delafield v. Parish, 25 N. Y. 9, 35: “It is not
the duty of the court to strain after probate.
nor in any case to grant it. where grave
doubts remain unremovcd and great diflicul
ties oppose themselves to so doing." And
this was substantially the language of Lord.
Bro ham in Panton v. Williams, 2 Curt. Ecc.
530 Ordinarily, when a testator subscribes
and executes a will in the mode required by
law, the facts of such subscription and ex
ecution are sufi‘icient proof that the instru
ment speaks his language and expresses his
will; but when a testator is deaf and dumb.
or unable to read or write and speak, some
thing more is demanded. There must then
not only be proof of the factum of the will,‘
but also that the mind of the testator accom- ‘
0
)
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panied the act, and that the instrument ex- .
ecuted speaks his language, and really ex
presses his wI his will is somewhat com
plicated in its terms, and I am satisfied that
there was no time in the year 1873 when the
decedent could utter the words or give ex
pression to the language therein contained.
Even if, according to some of the evidence,
he could at times talk some, it was only at
intervals, and to a limited extent. However
it may have been at other times, he could not
talk or utter an intelligible sound on the days
when the will and codicil were executed, and
the attorney who drew the will could not hold
any conversation with him, and received all
his instructions from his wife. It is true
that the will and codicil were read to him,
and that he is claimed to have assented by ~
the nod of his head, and the nasal sound
I
without meaning; but it was shown that
when in health he had a habit of nodding \
with his head when he did not mean assent.
and hence that furnished no certain indica
tion of his assent to what was read. The
will disposes of a large estate in a method
by no means simple and direct; and the proof \
that he understood and assented to its pro
visions should be quite clear and satisfac
tory before it should be admitted to probate.
Barry v. Butlin, 1 Curt. Ecc. 639; Chaffee v.
Baptist Miss. Con., 10 Paige, 90; Boyd v.
Cook, 3 Leigh, 35; Van Pelt v. Van Pelt, 3O
Barb. 134; Longchamp v. Fish, 2 Des. & P.
415.
It is said in 1 Jarm. Wills. 29, “that, in pro
portion as the lnfirmities of the testator ex
pose him to deception, it becomes imperative
ly the duty, and should be anxiously the care,
of all persons assisting in the testamentary
transaction, to be prepared with the clearest
proof that no imposition has been practiced.
but that the testator did in fact fully under
,
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stand every portion of Ihe paper which be ex
ecuted as his will." I1" Weir v. Fitzgerald,
2 Bradf. Sur. 42, the learned surrogate says:
“Something more is necessary to establih
the validity of the will. in cases where. from
infirmities of the testator, his impaired ca
pacity, or the circumstances attending the
.tralnsaction, the usual inference cannot be
drawn from the mere formal execution. Ad
ditional evidence iswtherefore required that
the testator’s mind accompanied the will;
that he knew what he was executing, and
was cognizant of the provisions of the will."
Satisfactory evidence of this kind has not
been produced in this case, and hence probate
was properly refused.
But if we assume that the will and .codlcil
,were formally executed, and that the mind of
‘the testator accompanied the act, and that the
.contents of the instruments were known to
him and assented to by him, probate would
Istill
have to be refused on account of undue
a influence. It is impossible to define or de
scribe wlth precision and exactness what is
undue influence, what the quality and the ex
tent of the power of one mind over another
must be, to make it “undue" in the sense of
the law, when exerted in making a will. Like
the question of insanity, it is to some degree
open and vague, and must be decided by the
application of sound principles and good
sense to the facts of each given case. Lynch
v. Clements, 24 N. J. Eq. 431. But the in
fluence exercised over a testator which the
,Ilaw regards as undue or illegal must be such
"
las to deitgoy his freeagency; but, no matter
how little the influence, if the free agency is
destroyed it vitiates the act which is the re
sult of it. In 1 Jarm. Wills, 36. it is said
"that the amount of undue influence which
will be sufificient to invalidate a will must, of
course, vary with the strength or weakness
of the mind of the testator; and the influence
which would subdue and control a mind nat
urally weak, or one which had become impair
ed by age, sickness, disease, intemperance, or
any other cause, might have no effect to over
come or mislead a mind naturally strong
and unimpaired." The undue influence is not
often the subject of direct proof. It can be
shown by all the facts d circumstances
sunIounding the testator, he nature of the
will, his family relations, the condition of his
health and mind, his dependency upon and
subjection to the control of the person sup
posed to have wielded the influence, the op
portunity and disposition of the person to
wield it, and the acts and declarations of
such person. Marvin v. Marvin, 3 Abb. Dec.
192; Reynolds v. Root, 62 Barb. 250; Tyler
v. Gardiner, 35 N. Y. 559; Forman v. Smith,
7 Lans. 443; Lee v. Dill, 11 Abb. Pr. 214;
Dean v. Negley, 41 Pa. St. 312.
It is not suflicient to avoid a will that it is
obtained by the legitimate influence which
affection or gratitude gives a relative over
the testator. A competent testator may be
stow his property upon the objects of his af
fection, and he may. from gratitude, reward
those who have rendered him service; but if
one takes advantage of the affection or grat
itude of another to obtain an unjust will in
his favor, using his position to subdue and
control the mind of the testator so as, sub
stantially, to deprive him of his free alzency,
then the fact that affection or gratitude was
the moving cause makes it no less a case of
undue influence. In this case, in the space
of about a year, we find the testator execut
ing three successive instruments, in which
the share of his wife goes on increasing. We
cannot presume that his bounty to his wife
and her relatives was prompted by affection.
On his part, his marriage was a matter of
convenience, and he had lived with his wife
less than two years when the last instrument
was executed. and less than one when the
flrst was executed. It is not a case where
husband and wife had lived together for
years after a marriage prompted by mutua
affection, which had been increased by years
of tender care and a thousand acts of love
and kindness, until the husband deemed no
bounty he could bestow upon his wife too
great. It i the case of a scheming woman,
marrying an old man, her uncle, broken in
body and enfeebled in mind, and then schem
ing to secure an undue share of his property
for herself and her relatives. We cannot
presume that the testator was influenced by
gratitude. It is true that she rendered him
faithful and valuable service. She was dil
igent and kind in her constant attention to
his wants; so she was before her marriage,
at $14 per month. By his marriage with her
he had elevated her to a condition of inde
pendence, and had secured to her, by opera
tion of law, an income by law far in excess
of her reasonable wants. A change from
$14 per month to $12,000 per year was cer
tainly all the reward which mere gratitude
would prompt or be expected to bestow.
How, then, is this will to be accounted for?
She was the constant attendant of the testa
tor; his only organ of communication with
others. He was entirely dependent upon her
for all his wants. She procured the ap
pointment of her brother as his agent, and
thus had the entire control and management
of his estate. She introduced her brother and
mother into the household, and his own chil
dren, though not formally shut out of his
house, were probably not welcome visitors,
judging from the death~bed scene, when she
refused to send for them to see their dying
father. Upon all occasions, so far as dis
closed in the evidence, he was submissive to
her will. She procured the will to be drawn,
instructed the scrivener, and had it executed
when he was speechless. Besides the large
bounty conferred upon her, the corpus of the
estate is tied up, and placed in the control of
her brother. She was alone with him, and
had every opportunity, in the helpless condi
tion of his body and the enfeebled condition
of his mind and will, to impese upon him,-
JI
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and subdue him entirely to her~will. We
have no direct proof of what she did, because
no witnesses were present, and she was not
sworn. These and the other circumstances
above alluded to, and all the inferences to be
drawn from the immense mass of evidence
given before the surrogate, convince us that
this will and the codicil were the result of
undue influence, imposition, or fraud of some
kind, and that they should not be admitted
to probate. It matters not that she did not
take for herself and relatives a larger share
of his estate. She took enough to show her
grasping disposition and overpowering influ
ence.
I freely admit that there are some diflicul
ties standing in the way of the conclusion
which we have thus reached, and that strong
arguments were urged, with great ability,
for the proponents by their learned counsel;
but the diffificulties lying in the pathway of
the proponents are still greater. An immense
estate should not be disposed of by a will
more or less unjust, and tied up by compli
cated provisions, except upon clear and satis
factory proof that it is really the will of a
competent testator, exercising his free agen
cy. As said by Load Brougham in Panton
v. Williams, supra: “It is much less material
that those who seek to impeach a testament
ary instrument should be unable to explain
certain things in their case, and should be
forced to admit that their argument is not,
in everypoint, consistent with all the facts,
than that they who seek to establish the will
should give no rational, consistent, or intelli
gible solution of those difliculties which in
cumber their supposition and obstruct the
path towards the conclusion they would have
us arrive at."
Our attention is called to certain rulings
of the surrogate excluding questions put to
witnesses by the counsel of proponents, and
.
the claim is made that gross errors were
committed prejudicial to the proponents. I
have carefully considered all of them, and be
lieve that most of the rulings were clearly
right, and if any of them were wrong they
were not of such a character as materially to
affect the case, and hence are not grounds
for reversal upon this appeal. Clapp v. Ful
lerton, 34 N. Y. 190; Gardiner v. Gardiner,
Id. 155, 164.
The judgment must be aflirmed, with costs.
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MONROE et al. v. BARCLAY et a1.
(17 Ohio St. 302.)
.Supreme CourtIof Ohio. Dec. Term, 1867.
Error to district court, Mahoning county.
Action brought by George Monroe, Cath~
erine Monroe, and Erastus Jae/obs against
John McCiellaud and Francis Barclay in the
court of common pleas to set aside the will
of Mary McClellan deceased, on the ground
\ of fraud, undue infiu ace, and want of testa
mentary capacity. it appeared at the trial
before a jury that deceased married Erastus
Jacobs in 1838, and that they lived together
until 1852, when he went to California; that I
deceased and McClelland were married by
defendant Barclay, a justice of the peace,'
in 1856, and lived together as husband and ~
wife until her death. The plaintiffs gave'
evidence tending to show that
MCUlQllflDtimarried Mary for her property only; the
he combined with others to induce her to,
make a will; that she was advised to marry
him, and that she had a right so to do; that
McClelland was about 35 years of age at
the time of the marriage, and that Mary
was over 57; that she was deformed, filthy,
drunken, profane, and lewd; and that they
lived together mot unhappily. The defend- '
ants gave evidence tending to establish her
capacity to make a will, and to show that'
before and ever since her marriage with
Mccielland she expressed her determination
not to give her property to the plaintiffs.
They further gave evidence tending to rebut
all fraud or undue influence upon the tes
tatrix. Verdict and judgment for defend
ant. On error to the district court, the
judgment was aflirmed, and plaintiffs filed
their petition in error.
Geo. M. Tuttie and John M. Stuli, for
plaintiffs in error. i’I E. Hutchlns, for de
fendants in error. J
DAY, C. J. The original case was a pro
ceeding in the court of common pleas, to
contest the validity of the last will of Mary
McClcliaud, deceased, upon three grounds:
(1) That at the time of executing the will
she was not of sound mind and memory;
(2) that she was fraudulently induced to
make the will; (3I) that the will was pro
cured by undue influence of defendants upon
the testatrix. The issues joined by the par
ties upon these grounds were tried to a jury,
and a verdict was rendered in favor of the
defendants, sustaining the will.
The testimony is not fully set forth in the
bill of exceptions.
sumed that the finding of the jury was,
under the charge of the court, warranted by
the evidence.
The only errors insisted on here arise upon
exceptions taken by the plaintiffs to the
refusal of the court to charge the jury as
requested by them and to the charge as giv
en. The plaintiffs submitted to the court
It is therefore to be pre ,
21 propositions in writing, which they re
quested the court to give in its charge to the
jury. It is stated in the record that “the
court refused to charge as requested, except
as stated" in the charge given to the jury;
and that the plaintiffs excepted to the “re
fusal to charge as requested, and to the
charge, so far as the same is contrary to
said request."
The charge and the propositions submitted
by the plaintiffs are fully set forth in the
bill of exceptions, but no reference is made
in the charge to any one of the propositions;
so that it is not specified in the record which
one of the propositions the court refused to
give as requested. This is left to be dis
covered, by seeing what part of the plain
tifffs’ requests were not embraced in the
charge given. It will be seen, moreover,
that the plaintiffs excepted to the charge so
far only as the court omitted to adopt the
written proposition submitted by them, and
so far as the charge was contrary thereto.
It is not deemed necessary, for the purpose
of presenting the questions made by the
exceptions, to recite here said propositions
or the charge in full. Suifice it to say that
most of the propositions were substantially
given in the charge to the jury as requested.
This does not seem to be strenuously contro
verted by the counsel for the plaintiffs, ex
cept as to the propositions numbered from
16 to 20, inclusive. Indeed, the whole con
troversy, arising out of the neglect of the
court to charge as requested, and upon the
‘ charge as given, may be fairly presented by
stating these five propositions, and the
charge relating to them. The propositions
are as follows: “(16) If, previous to the will
. being made, John McCleliand, or any person
acting in concert with him, took advantage
of imperfect, though not absolutely unsound.
judgment on the part of the testatrix, and,
by advice known by them to be false, in
duced her to believe that she owed to Eras
tus Jacobs no duty as a wife, and she made
the will under the continued influence of
that persuasion, the will is void. (17) That
for this purpose it makes no diffference
whether it relates to matters of fact merely,
or whether it related to matters of judg
ment only, provided it related to matters
about which she. in her imperfect condition of
judgment, might be, and actually was, mis
led by the advice. (18) If, at the time of
making the will in question, Mary Jacobs,
the testatrix, from false advice, knowingly
given by John McCleiland. or by any other
person acting with him, believed that Eras
tus Jacobs was not her lawful husband.
when in fact he was, and that John Mc
Clelland was her lawful husband, when in
fact he was not, the will is void. (19) it
makes no difference whether the false advice
thus given was in relation to some matter
of fact or in relation to some matter of law.
concerning her relation to Jacobs and Mc
Clelland, provided she, being then possessed
of impaired powers of judgment. believed
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the advice to be true, and acted accordingly.
(20) It a man knowingly and wrongfully
marries and cohabits in a state of adultery
with a woman who is the lawful wife of an
other man, and whose husband has not for
felted his claims to her comfort and society.
and, by the influence of such marriage and
cohabitation, procures a will from her in
his favor, and disinheriting her real husband,
that will is void for illegal influence."
It is to be observed that these propositions
make no allowance for any other facts or
circumstances which might modify the as
sumed facts, but assert that the facts as
sumed would, under any circumstances, in
validate the will.
Under the sixteenth proposition, it is as
sumed that it would make no difference
when, or for what purpose, the testatrix
was induced to believe that she owed to
Erastus Jacobs no duty, no matter if it was
for a purpose having no reference to a dispo
sition of her property; still it is assumed
that, if the advice was ever given for any
purpose, and the false belief continued, the
will is void, although the advice had no
effect whatever in producing the will. Un-.
der the seventeenth proposition it is claimed
that the will would be void if the testatrix
was misled by the false advice, without
assuming that she was thereby induced to
make the will, or that such advice had the
least influence on the testamentary act. In
deed, these two propositions, taken together,
assume that, if the testatrix was, at any
time and for any purpose, misled by the
false advice of McCleiland as to her duty to
Jacobs, and remained under such false im
pression when the will was made, though it
had no relation thereto, and in no way
tended to produce it, still the will was
void.
The same may be said, substantially, as
to the eighteenth and nineteenth proposi
tions. In the nineteenth, which is the most
explicit, it is not assumed that, in acting
upon the false advice, she did so in relation
to the will. 1lt is undoubtedly well settled
that, to invalidate a will for fraud or undue
influence, it must appear that the fraud or
undue influence had some effect “upon the
( testator in producing the very act of making
his will.’f.!IRedf. Wills, 516, 524, 525, 527.
But, however this may be, the most that
can be claimed of these four propositions is
that they are based on that kind of undue
influence which amounted to fraud upon the
testatrix. This is the gist of them; and up
on a fair construction of the charge, so far
as they tended to induce the will, they
were substantially given to the jury. It is
difficult, therefore, to see wherein the plain
tiffs were not permitted to have all the hen
eflt of these propositions, to which they
were entitled. Upon this point the court
charged the jury "to inquire whether any
fraud or misrepresentations were resorted to
to induce the execution of this will. If
Isuch fraud was exercised, then it would.
ihowever slight, destroy the validity of the
iwifl; that is, if it was suflicient to and has.
‘l
in your judgment, tended to induce the ex
iecution." Here the court, in reply to these,four requests, told the jury that if “any
jfraud or misrepresentations were resorted
lto to induce the execution of the will,
1
' ' ‘ however slight, ' ' ' if it tend
~ ed to induce the execution" thereof. the will
lwas void. If these requests are construed
as relating to the act of the testatrix in
‘ making the will, then the plaintiffs had the
full beneflt of them in the charge. In that
case, the record does not show atfirmatively
that they were refused by the court, or that
they are embraced in the exceptions taken by
the plaintiffs.
Q But the point that seems to be chiefly relied
i0r1 by the plaintiffs is made on the twenti
ieth proposition. Upon the facts there as
-sumed, it was claimed, as a presumption of
the law, that the will was produced by il
Ilegal~ and therefore undue influence. The
court did not accede to this proposition, but
left the question of undue influence to be
determined by the jury, under the follow
,ing instructions relating to this and other
propositions: “Inquire whether, through the
exercise of force, or by fear produced, or in
any manner, such an influence was ex
erted over her as to induce her to make a
disposition of her property contrary to her
own will and inclinations; or whether such
an undue and overruling influence was ex
ercised upon her mind as to control or over
power her own inclinations and judgment,
or induce her, without or contrary to her
own intention and will, to execute the paper.
If either of these propositions are found in
the atfirmative, it would defeat the will."
Construing the charge strongest against the
plaintiffs, it would seem that the court in
tended to be understood as holding the law
to be that, in the absence of fraud, no mat
ter by what influence a testator may be
exercised. so long as it does not overpower
his inclinations and judgment, and induce
a disposition of his property contrary to his
own wishes and desires, his will cannot be
invalidated for undue influence. Indeed, it
is not denied but that the charge. as ap
plied to ordinary cases, may be sustained
by both reason and authority; but it is
claimed that a distinction is to be taken be
tween influences that are lawful and those
that are unlawful.
The gist of the claim is that the will was
void because it was induced by influences
growing out of an unlawful relation. No
matter for what reason the testatrix may
have been abandoned by her husband, or
why she may desire to dlsinherit him and
her kindred, or what obligations may have
arisen from the unlawful relation: no mat
ter if the will was made without any in
fluence of the devisee other than that which
sprung from their association; and no mat
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ter if it was made in accordance with her
own inclinations and judgment,--still it is
assumed that the will would be void. If no
I
other objection than this was urged against l
a gift of property between living parties, it
would hardly be contended that it would be
void. it is difficult to see why a bequest
or devise should be subjected to a more
stringent rule. Every will, it may fairly be
presumed, is prompted by influences strong
enough to induce its provisions, and it would
seem, therefore, that the most that ougnt to
be claimed from such influences in the con
test of a will is to have them submitted to
the jury, to enable them to determine wheth
er the testator was misled, or so influenced
thereby as to affect his own free choice and
judgment in the disposition of his property.
The power to make a will is granted by the
statute to "any person of full age and sound ‘
memory"; and, under its provisions, the will
.
is to be admitted to record as valid when
“duly attested and executed, and the testa
tor at the time of executing the same, was of
full age and sound mind and memory, and i
not under any restraint." Swan 8: C. St. p.
I
1615, §§ 1, 15. BesnIicflonsarelnposed up
on none, but all are alike left to the exercise
of their own free wills and inclinations in
the disposition of their property. The pow
er thus given to dispose of property does
not depend upon the disposition made there
of, nor is it restricted to those who may
employ it only for just and wise purposes;
but all upon whom the right is conferred
may use it without "any restraint." Indeed,
it is contemplated by the statute that this is
the only way in which it can be exercised.
Freedom from restraint is essential to the
validity of a will. So careful is the law in
this respect, that it will not uphold a will
that has been induced by restraint upon the
testator, whether in the form of fraud prac
ticed upon him or any other influence that
destroys the free exercise of his own will.
Redf. \Vills, 524, 527. It would be incon
sistent with the right conferred by the stat
ute, and with the spirit of the construction
it has hitherto received, to sanction re
straints upon a testator, based alone on the
character of the motives or causes that may
have induced any disposition of his prop
erty that he may make while in the free ex~
ercise of his own inclinations and judgment.
He may give his property to whomsoever he
pleases; and his motives or reasons therefor,
so long as he is “not under any restraint."
are matters of his own conscience. for which
he is not accountable to the law. His will,
executed in conformity to the statute, if it
be his own, and not in any sense the will
of another, cannot be invalidated, however
much its provisions may be disapproved by
others.
It is claimed in the proposition under con
sideration that the will, upon the facts there
in assumed, would be void for “illegal in
fluence." In the solution of the question
made by this proposition, much of the diffi
culty disappears when we consider what
“influence," as applied to the invalidation of
wills, is “illegal." Every will. as before re
marked, is the result of influences strong
enough to produce it. Since, then, it is the
policy of the law to secure to every one the
right to dispose of his property in accord
ance with his individual will, that influence
alone is illegal which places the freedom of
a testator’s will under some kind of re
straint. If this be so, it follows that it
matters not what may be the origin or char
acter of any influence operating upon a tes
tator, if it does not place him "under any
restraint." It would seem to follow, also.
that it would be equally immaterial how an
individual may have acquired an influence
over a testator, unless such influence is ex
erted in a manner that tends to restrain the
free exercise of his will in the disposition
of his property. It is claimed in this prop
osition that the influence that produced the
will was illegal only because it sprung from
an unlawful relation. If this be so, then the
principle would be equally applicable to any
other unlawful relation, and would destroy
a will made under influences springing there
from, although the testator, without being
placed under restraint, could not be per
suaded to make a will otherwise than as
prompted by such influences. However rep
rehensibie such influences may be, if a tes
tator voluntarily chooses to be actuated by
them, it is a privilege he may enjoy under
the law that secures to every one alike the
right to dispose of his property without re
straint upon his own judgment and con
science. Et is undoubtedly well settled that
a will cannot be invalidated because it was
produced by influences springing from aiaw~
fui marital relation, unless such influence
has been unduly exerted. The influenc
arising from an unlawful marital relatio
may be as strong as that of the other; but,
unless it impairs more than the other the
free exercise of the testator’s will, it is dif
flcult to see how the influence arising from
the unlawful relation is necessarily such up
due influence as will invalidate a will, while
that of the other will not. It would seem,
upon the principles already stated, that the
question would be essentially the same in
either case, whether the influence had been.
in fact, exerted in restraint of the testator’s
will. How I an adult s
relation may be reprobated, it by no means
follows that every will produced by in
fluences arising from that relation is tainted
with such turpitude that to uphold it would
“do violence to the morality of the law."
This is the theory upon which the claim of
the plaintiffs rests. W111i
not in W If the principle be
correct, it makes no difference which party
makes the will; whether the devise be from
the woman to the man. or the man to the
woman, it would be equally void. It would
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be easy to suppose cases where considera
tions of moral obligation, as well as that of
public duty, would require a man to make
suitable provision for a woman with whom
he had sustained this relation. In such cases
it would do no violence to the morality of
the law to sustain such provision, though it
be made by will, and induced solely by in
fluences springing from the unlawful cohab
itation.
It may, however, be admitted that the in
fluences growing out of an unlawful marital
relation do not stand, and should not be per~
mitted to stand, upon an equal footing with
those coming from the lawful relation; but
the question recurs whether the difference
is in matter of law or of fact. If it be the
former, then every will induced by an un
lawful relation is void, though the testator
might not have been “under any restraint";
but this, it has been shown, is contrary to
the general policy of the law. If it be the
latter, then the proof of the unlawful rela
tion should go, with the other evidence, to
the jury, to enable them to determine the
question of undue influence. We think this
would be in accordance with the law, and,
in general, best subserve the ends of justice.
We have not been furnished with author
ifies, nor do we see any suiflclent reason, to
warrant us in making this class of cases an
exception to the general principles relating
to the validity of wills. It is true that the
position of the counsel for the plaintiffs is
strongly supported obiter in the able opinion
delivered in the case of Dean v. Negley, 41
Pa. St. 312. The point there ruled. how
ever, went to the extent only that proof of
the making a will under and in the direction
of an unlawful relation like that in this
case was such evidence of undue influence
"that it may justify a verdict against the
validity of the will"; and it was held, there
fore, that it was error to exclude it from the
jury. That the same court must hold the
question to be one “of fact, merely," and
not “a presumption of law," is shown in a
still more recent case, where it was declared
that "undue influence, to avoid a will, must
be such as to overcome the free agency of
the testator at the time the instrument was
made." Eckert v. Flowry, 43 Pa. St. 46;
Redf. Wills, 534. The propositions which the
counsel for the plaintiffs requested the court
to give in its charge to the jury, although
separately numbered. were in fact, many of
them, a connected series of propositions, de
pendent one upon another, some of which,
we have shown, the court could not properly
give. Other independent propositions were
properly refused. as has been shown, and the
remaining ones were embraced in the charge.
There was, therefore, no error in refusing
Ito charge as requested. For the reasons
already stated we think that there was no
error in the charge as given to the jury by
the court of common pleas. It follows that
the district court rightfully aflirmed the
judgment of that court, and that the judg
ment of the district court must therefore be
aflirmed.
WHITE, WELCH, BRINKERHOFF, and
SCOTT, JJ., concurred.
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WINGROVE v. W’INGROVE et al.
(11 Prob. Div. 81.)
Court of Probate. Nov. 19, 1885.
,
Plaintiff, as a legatee, offered for probate
the will of Elizabeth Wingrove, dated Sep
tember 15, 1869, and alleged that a codicil,
dated October 9, 1880, which revoked some
of the gifts to him, was procured by undue
influence of defendants. Defendants denied
that the codicil was procured by undue in
fluence, and claimed probate of it together
with the will. The action was tried by a
common jury, who found a verdict for the
plaintiff, which was subsequently set aside,
and a new trial ordered by a special jury.
Mr. Murphy, Q. C., and Mr. Gye, for plain
tiff. Mr. Inderwick, Q. C., and Mr. Pritch
ard, for defendants.
Sir JAMES HANNEN, (President,) in ad
dressing the jury said:
Gentlemen of the jury, I must ask your
particular attention to the exposition which
I am about to give you of the law upon this
subject 0! undue influence, for I find, from
now a long experience in this court, that
there is no subject upon which there is a
greater misapprehension. The misapprehen
sion to which I have referred arises from
the particular form of the expression. We
are all familiar with the use of the word “in
fluence." We say that one person has an
unbounded influence over another, and we
speak of evil influences and good influences;
but it is not because one person has un
bounded influence over another that, there
fore, when exercised, even though it may be
very had indeed, it is undue influence in the
legal sense of the word.
To give you some illustrations of what I
mean: A young man may be caught in the
tolls of a harlot, who makes use of her in~
fluence to induce him to make a will in
her favor, to the exclusion of his relatives.
It is unfortunately quite natural that a man
so entangled should yield to that influence,
and confer large bouiyties on the person with
whom he has been brought into such rela
tion; yet the law does not attempt to guard
against those contingencies. A man may be
the companion of another, and may encour
age him in evil courses, and so obtain what
is called an "undue influence" over him, and
the consequence may be a will made in his
favor. But that, again, shocking as it is,
perhaps even worse than the other, will not
amount to undue influence. To be undue
influence in the eye of the law there must
be—to sum it up in a word—coercion. it
must not be a case in which a person has
been induced by means such as I have sug
gested to you to come to a conclusion that
he or she will make a will in a particular
person’s favor, because, if the testator has
only been persuaded or induced, by con
siderations which you may condemn, really
and truly to intend to give his property to
another, though you may disapprove oi.’ the
act, yet it is strictly legitimate, in the sense
of its being legal. It is only when the will
of the person who becomes a testatoris co
erced into doing that which he or she does
not desire to do that it is undue influence.
The coercion may, of course, be of different
kinds. It may be in the grossest form, such
as actual confinement or violence; or a per
son in the last days or hours 01’ life may
have become so weak and feeble that a very
little pressure will be suflicient to bring
about the desired result; and it may even
be that the mere talking to him at that stage
of illness~ and pressing something upon him.
may so fatigue the brain that the sick per
son may be induced, for quietness’ sake, to
do anything. This would equally be coer~
cion, though not actual violence.
These illustrations will sufliciently bring
home to your minds that even very im
moral considerations, either on the part of
the testator or of some one else oifering
them, do not amount to undue influence un
less the testator is in such a condition that.
if he could speak his wishes to the last, he
would say: "This is not my wish, but I must do
it.“ If, therefore. the act is shown to be the
result of the wish and will of the testator
at the time, then, however it has been
brought about,—for we are not dealing with
a case of fraud,—though you may condemn
the testator for having such a wish, though
you may condemn any person who has en
deavored to persuade and has succeeded in
persuading the testator to adopt that view,
still it is not undue influence. ’i'here re
mains another general observation that I
must make. and it is this: That it is not
suflicient to establish that a person has the
power unduly to overhear the will of the
testator. It is necessary also to prove that
in the particular case that power was ever
cised, and that it was by means of the ex
ercise of that power that the will, such as it
is, has been produced.
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In re GOODS OF HUNT.
(L. R. 3 Prob. & Div.-250.)
fact was not her will. If I were to attempt
to read it as her will, it would lead to a va
_ riety of absurdities. She leaves to her sis
court of Probate. May 4, 187°’ ter, Sarah, that is, to herself, a lifeinterest
Application to probate will. in a portion of her property, and all the fur
Sarah Hunt and Ann Hunt, spineters and niture, plate, etc., which she holds in part
sisters. residing together, in 1873 agreed to with herself. I am asked to treat this as a
make their respective wills, the object being
I
misdescription. It by accident a wrong name
that, in the event of the death of either Oflhad been introduced, and it was clear what
them, the survivor should enjoy the joint person was intended. the court would give et
property for life. Two wills were prepared | feet to the instrument. providing the mistake
in the handwriting of Sarah. The
legaciesicould
be corrected. But it would be con
in each were identical, save that where one ~trary to truth in this case if I acted on’such
gave a legacy to a certain charitable insti~ i an assumption~ If 1 were to put such a Con
tutlon the other gave a similar legacy to an- l struction upon this will, I should be assum
other charitable institution; and in each case l ing, in order to do substantial justice, what
a lifeinterest was given to the survivor in-every one who hears me would know is con
the bulk of her sister’s property. After the,trary to the fact. And no court ought: to
.death of Sarah Hunt the two wills
werelbase
its judgment on something wholly arti
found together, indorsed, “The wills of Sarah , ficial, and contrary to what every one must
and Ann Hunt;" but on opening them it was l see is the real state of the circumstances. It
discovered that each sister had executed the - is enough to say that there has been an un
wili prepared for the other. Most of the per fortunate blunder. A paper has been signed as
sons interested in an intestacy consented that the lady’s will which, as it happens, it treat
the document executed by the deceased ed as her will. would to a great extent, al
should be recognized as her will, and probate though not entirely, carry out her wishes.
thereof be granted to the executors named in ' But in one respect it does not, for by it a
it; but some Of the Persons were abroad, and legacy is bequeathed to one charity which she
could not be communicated with- intended to leave to another. As regards this
Mr- Bayford, for the motion. legacy, it is suggested that it might be treat
ed as if the deceased did not know and ap
Sir J. HANNEN. I should be glad to give prove of that part of the will. But she did
effect to the intentions of the testatrix, by
granting probate of this instrument, if I
could, but I must not allow myself to be led
not in fact know and approve of any part of
the contents of the paper as her will; for it
is quite clear that if she had known of the
away from what appears to me to be very
plain ground by such a desire. No doubt
there has been an unfortunate blunder. The
lady signed as her will something which in
contents she would not have signed it. I re
gretr the blunder, but I cannot repair it. I
reject the motion, but I allow the executors
costs out of the estate.
~
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GIFFORD v. DYER.
(2 R. I. 99.)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. March Term.
1852.
Appeal from court of probate, Little Comp
ton county.
Abigail Irish, who died December 6
,
1850,
made a will two days prior to her death,
by which, after making small bequests to
the children of Robin Gifford and to others,
she gave the residue of her property to her
brother-in-law, John Dyer, and her two neph
ews, Jesse and Alexander Dyer. Robin Gif
ord, her only child, was not mentioned in
he will. The will was offered for probate by
John Dyer, executor therein named, and was
contested by Robin Gifl?ord. It appeared in
evidence that at the date of the will he had
been absent from home, leaving a family,
for 10 years, unheard from, and was gener
ally considered dead. his estate having been
administered upon. Testatrix had resided
with John Dyer for some time previous to
her death. The scrivener who drew the will
testified as follows: ..After I had read the
will to her. she asked if it made any differ
ence if she did not mention her son. I ask
ed if she considered him living. She said
she supposed he had been dead for years.
She said. if it would make any difference,
she would put his name in, 'for they will
break the will if they can.’ I think that was
the expression she used. I think she said
what she had given to her grandehildren
was in lieu of what he would have, but am
not positive. I think her son left in 1841,
and was not heard of, to my knowledge.
She was speaking of a home at Mr. Dyer’s
and said what she had given him would pay
him well. She said her grandehildren had
not been to see her while she was sick."
The court of probate admitted the will, and
Robin Gifford appealed.
Mr. Sheffield, for appellant.
for appellee.
A. C. Greene,
GREENE, C. J. It is very apparent in the
present case that the testatrix would have
made the same will had she known her son
was living. She did not intend to give him
anything if living. But if this were not ap
parent, and she had made the will under a
mistake as to the supposed death of her
son, this could not be shown dehors the will.
The mistake must appear on the face of the
will, and it must also appear what would
have been the will of the testatrix but for
the mistake. Thus. where the testator re
vokes a legacy, upon the mistaken suppo
sitlon that the legatee is dead, and this ap
pears on the face of the instrument of revo
cation, such revocation was held void.
Campbell v. French. 8 Ves. 321.
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In re CAWLEY’S ESTATE.
(136 Pa. St. 62S, 20 Atl. 567.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Oct. 6, 1890.
Certiorari sur appeal to orphans’ court,
Union county.
The facts are thus stated in the opinion of
the court below: “This case arises in the
following manner: On the 16th of March,
1886, Benjamin Cawiey and his sister, Mary
\Cawley, both unmarried, made what may be
termed a Ijoint will and testament,' duly exe
cuted, and by which it is directed that, 'upon
the death of either, the survivor shall pay all
the debts of the decedent if the estate will
reach, and bury decedent properly, and pro
vide tombstones. Secondly. If Benjamin
should be the first to die, or if Mary should
be the first to die, each gives to the survivor
all the rest and residue of his or her estate
for life, and, if needed, the body of the es
tate so far as is necessary, and at the death
of the survivor, after burial, tombstones, and
so forth are paid for, the residue is divided
into nine parts, and given to relatives and
parties named; and Horace C. Cawley named
,, executor. Benjamin Cawley died the 12th of
August, 1887, and on the 2".’d August, 188?,
the joint will was duly proved as the will of
Benjamin, and its provision as to his estate
carried into effect; Mary, the survivor, re
ceiving Benjamin's estate for life, as provid
ed in his will. Mary Cawley, however, on
the 5th of September, 1887, made a separate
/will, and revoked the joint will, and died on
the 29th January, 1888; and the joint will
was offered as MaryIs will, and admitted to
probate by the register, on the 1st of Febru
ary, 1888, and letters testamentary issued to
Horace B. Cawiey, the executor therein named.
But, on the same day, Mary’s second will,
of the 5th of September, A. D. 1887, was also
-
\/offered for probate; but the register refused
to consider it, and treated the joint will as
irrevocable, and that it must stand as Mary’s
last will and testament. From this decision.
and admission of the joint will as Mary Caw
iey’s will, and the refusal to allow the prov
ing of her second will, this appeal has been
taken to the orphans’ court."
J. Merrill Linn and S. H. Orwig, for appel
lants. Charles S. Wolfe, P. L. Hackenburg.
and Andrew A. Leiser, for appeliees.
WILLIAMS, J. The question presented by
this appeal is one that has not arisen in
Pennsylvania until now. It is important to
a correct understanding of the real ground of
controversy to bear in mind the peculiar char
acteristies of a contract, and those of a will.
A contract is an agreement between partie
for the doing or not doing of some particula
thing. The undertaking of one party is made
in consideration of something to be paid or
done by or on behalf of the other party, so
that the obligation to do and the right to re
quire performance are reciprocal. A will, on
the other hand, is simply a statement of a
purpose or wish of the maker as it exists at
the time. As often as his purpose or wish'
changes, he may change the expression of it. v
When and why a change shall be made de
pends on himself alone. He is answerable
to no one for his determination to make one
rather than another disposition of his proper
ty. After he has written out his will, and
executed it in accordance with the forms of
the law, it does not bind him; but, so long
as he lives, he may change his own purpose
with or without a reason, and his last pur
pose properly written out and executed is his
"last will and testament," because death
makes any further change impossible. The
binding force of a contract comes from the
aggregatio mentium of the parties. The bind
ing force of a will comes from the fact that
it is the last expressed purpose of the testa
tor in regard to the disposition of his proper
ty after his own death. While he lives, it is
without force or value, but it begins to speak
when he ceases to do so, and thereafter is
heard in his stead. Although these instru
ments are so unlike, they may be, and some
times are, combined so as to give a testamen
tary character to what purports to be a con
tract, or to convert a will into an irrevocable
agreement. Whether any given writing is
the character of its contents, rather the
from its title, or any formal words with whicl
it may begin or conclude. The familiar form
of a will is that by which the testator directs
how his property shall be disposed of after
his death, and may be distinguished or de
scribed as the simple will of the maker. If
two or more persons own property in com
mon, they may convey it by joining in a deed.
or by executing separate conveyances at their
convenience. They may transmit the title,
each for himself, by a separate will; and
there is no objection, on principle, to their
joining in a testamentary disposition of it.
Such a will might be properly called a "joint
will," because executed jointly by several
owners, as a means of transferring their
several titles to one devisce. The validity of
a joint will was at one time denied in Eng
land, and has been denied in some of the
United States, but the reasons for such d
nial relate rather to questions of probate that
to the power of the several testators, and d
not seem to have been regarded as settling
the question in the countries where the deci
sions were rendered. 1 Williams, Ex'rs, 10.
Whether after the death of one or more of
the makers of such a will the surviving mak- I
er may make a valid revocation as to his own '
title or share of the property devised is an
unsettled question, and is not involved in the \
case before us, for the property to which this
will relates was not held in common by the
testators. Another class of questions is pre
sented when two or more persons make re
ciprocal testamentary provisions in favor of
each other, whether they unite in one will or
each executes a separate one. Such wills
a will or a contract must be determined
b
q
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may be described as "mutual" or "recipro
cal." Their validity does not seem to be
doubted after the death of the respective tes
tators; but the extent of the power of revo
cation in the survivor after the death of one
or more of the testators is a question still in
controversy, and upon which different con
clusions have been reached. In Evans v.
Smith, 28 Ga. 98, the will was signed by two,
and presented by the survivor for probate.
No revocation was attempted, and the only
question really before the court was the
validity of the paper as the will of the de
ceased signer. The court held it valid, char
acterizing it as a “double will." In Lewis
v. Scofield, 26 Conn. 452, a similar will was
presented, and its validity upheld by the
court. In Betts v. Harper, 39 Ohio St. 639,
the testators were tenants in common. Aft
er the death of both, it was probated as the
separate will of each, and the earlier case of
Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157, which
had denied the validity of such a will, was’
distinguished and qualified. The will of a
husband and wife making reciprocal provi~
sions for each other, and executed by both,
.was sustained in DiezIs Will, 50 N.
in Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, two
persons, who describe themselves as “friends
of many years standing," joined in a will uy
which the survivor was to take the property
of the one dying first. Auerback, one of the
joint makers, made a later will, with a dif
ferent disposition of his property, and died.
The survivor insisted on the irrevocability of
the first will, and claimed the estate, but the
court upheld the last one. The point in con
troversy was stated in the opening sentence
of the opinion of the court as follows: “\Vas
the writing between Schumaker and Auer
back a compact, and not a will, or a will con
taining a compact, and therefore isrevoca
ble?" The conclusion of the court was that
the writing was not a compact, but a will,
and therefore revocable at pleasure. It is
worthy of note that the only consideration
expressed for the mutual provisions made by
the first will was the "mutual esteem" which
each entertained for the other. This might
change in degree, or cease altogether, at any
time. While it existed, it explained the mu
tual or reciprocal provisions contained in the
will. It afforded not a consideration, but a
reason, for them.
The will now before us was executed by a
brother and sister. They were single, had
lived many years together, and were feeling
the infirmities of age. One owned a house
and lot worth about $3,000. The other owned
bank-stock of about the same value. Their
household goods seem not to have been the
exclusive property of either. They appear to
have lived together in the house, and used
the income from the bank-stock without keep
ing an account with each other. By their
will they provided that the survivor should
have the property of the one first to die dur
ing life, and that it should then go over to re
LAw SUCC.—-3
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mainder-men named. The learned gentleman
by whom it was drawn seems to have had
Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio St. 157, in his
mind, and to have drawn the paper with the
purpose of steering clear of the difliculty sug
gested by it. To this end the will is made
to speak for each devisor separately, thus:
"1, Benjamin Cawley, should I be the first
to die, and I, Mary Cawley, should I be the
first to die, give, devise, and bequeath and to
the survivor of either of us, all the rest and
residue of the decedent’s estate, both real
and personal, to have and to hold and enjoy
the same during the life of the survivor, with
out impeachment for waste, and with leave
to use the body of the estate for necessity."
After the payment of debts and expenses, and
the expiration of the lifeestate, the will di
rects that the residue be divided into nine
parts, and then proceeds: “Three of which
parts i give and bequeath to John Cawley;
two parts to Hepburn Cawley; one part to
Horace Cawley; one part to Mary Henson;' ' ' one part to Ada Gilmore; ' ‘ *
and one part to Emma Harter." H. C. Caw
ley was made a trustee for Ada, and her
share was devised to him thus: "I give and
bequeath to H. C. Cawley, in trust," etc;
and the will then defines the nature of the
trust, and uses the words, “I distinctly de
clare that the above trust is an active one."
The singular number is invariably used
throughout the will, each testator speaking
for himself or herself only, and neither at
tempting to speak for the other or of the oth
er’s property. Each seems to have desired
to make the same disposition of what he or
she owned. Both adopted the same written
expression of that desire, and executed it.
The will so made must be regarded, there
fore, as the separate will of each testator, as
fully as though the will of each had been
separately drawn up and signed. There was
no joint property or joint devise. It is not,
therefore, a joint will. It is not a contract
between the makers in form or in effect. No
consideration passed from one to the other,
and none is suggested, except the affectionate
interest which this aged brother and sister
felt for each other. This moved them to
provide for each other’s comfort by a life
estate in the survivor, but beyond that each
gave to the remainder-men only what each
owned.
the phrase in Evans v. Smith, supra, as a
“double will." It must be construed and
treated as the separate will of each testator
who signed it, in the same manner as though
a separate copy had been executed by each.
It was therefore revocable by both. Benja
min Cawlcy did not revoke, and his will is
to be executed in accordance with its terms.
Mary Cawley has exercised the power of
\
\r
Such a will is properly described by \
revocation, and changed the ultimate Idestina- ,
tion of her property. Her last will must be
followed, therefore, in the distribution of her
estate. The decree of the court below is af
firmed, at the cost of the appellant.
i
f
34 1 WHAT CONSTITUTES A \VILL.
/
SHARP et al. v. HALL.
(86 Ala. 110, 5 South. 497.)
Supreme Court of Alabama. Feb. 26, 1889.
Appeal from probate court, Oolbert county;
John A. Steele, Judge.
Proceedings to probate an alleged will of
Ann E. Hornsby, deceased. The instrument
in question was signed by Mrs. Hornsby, un-l
der seal, attested by two witnesses on an ac
knowledgment of her signature, February 23,
1886, and was in the following words: “The
state of Alabama. Colbert county. Thesel
presents show that, in consideration of thel
love and affection I have to Julia M. Hall, 1|
do here now give and deliver to her the fol-I
lowing property. to wit, a certain lot, or part'
of lot, situated in the city of Tuscumbia,
known as part of lot No. 317, according to the
plat of said city, [describing it by meteS
and bounds], together with all the tenen
ments and hereditaments thereunto apper
tainlng, all of which I now hold and possess.
.
But I do hereby reserve the use, control, and
consumption of the same to myself, for and‘
during my natural life; and this is done in.
part to do away with the necessity of tak-.
ing out letters of administration after my~
death. Teste my hand and seal, this
day of February, 1886." Mrs. Hornsby diedt
in July, 1887. Letters of administration on'
her estate as an intestate were granted soon
after her death, to Robert B. Lindsay, who,
while searching among her papers, found the.
above instrument in a locked drawer. inclosed
in an envelope on which were written the
words “Not to be opened until after my‘
~death." Mrs. Hornsby’s name was not sign-i
it was propounded for probate by her. G.l
A. and U. M. Sharp, who claimed as next of
kin, contested the probate on the following
I grounds: “(1) Because said written instru-|/ ment is not in fact the will and testament of the grantor stipulates to hold in trust for
l
i
\\ was not executed as required by law of a
said Ann E. Hornsby: (2) because said in-.~
strument was not duly executed, so as to
pass title to said real estate under the laws‘
of Alabama; (3) because said instrument was§
not executed by said Ann E. Hornsby; (4)
because said instrument is not testamentary
in its character; (5) because said instrument
’
"last will and testament.., An issue was duly
formed. 0n the trial of the cause the con
testants objected. and excepted to the ad
mission in evidence of the circumstances of
the making of the instrument, contested; of i
the relation the petitioner bore the deceased,
Ann E. Hornsby; of the non-delivery of the
instrument; and of the other facts as shown
by the opinion. There were also separate ex
ceptions reserved to the admission of the tes
timony of the witness Davis to the effect
that he considered the instrument a will, and
that he intended to draft a will. The de
fendants requested the following charge in
writing, and excepted to the court’s refusal
to give the same: "(6) The fact, if it be a
fact, that Mrs. Hornsby did not dispose of all
the property, must he considered with the
other evidence by the jury to ascertain
whether or not the instrument was intend
to he a will."- There was a trial by jury,
and a verdict for the proponent, followed by
a judgment admitting the will to probate
Contestants appeal.
Kirk & Almon. for appellants. J. B.
Moore, for appellee.
STONE, C. J. There are few, if any, ques
tions less clearly defined in the law-books
than an intelligible, uniform test by which
to determine when a given paper is a deed,
and when it is a will. \Deeds, once execut
ed, are irrevocable, unless such power is re
served in the instrument. Wills are always
revocable so long as the testator lives and re
tains testamentary capacity.) Deeds take ef
fect by delivery, and are operative and bind’
ing during the life of the grantor. Wills are
ambulatory during the life of the testator.
and have no effect until his death. Out of
this has grown one of the tests of testamen
tary purpose, namely, that its operation hall
be posthumous. If this distinction were car
ried into uniform, complete effect. and if it
were invariably ruled that instruments which
confer no actual use. possession, enjoyment,
or usufruct on the donee or grantee during
the life of the maker are always wills, and
never deeds, this would seem to he a simple
rule, and easy of application. The corollary
would also appear to result naturally an
'ed to the memorandum. nor was it in herinecessarily that if the instrument, during th
I handwriting. The administrator delivered the. -
l paper to Julia M. Hall, August 2, 1888, and ‘ tee any actual use, possession, enjoyment, or
lifetime of the maker, secured to the gran
usut’ruct of the property, this would stamp it
irrefutably as a deed. The authorities, how
ever, will not permit us to declare such inflex
ible rule. A declaration of trust by which
himself during life, with remainder to a do
nee, or succession of donees, certainly secures
no use, enjoyment. or usufruct to the remain
der-man during the grantor’s life. Yet it is
a deed, and not a will. 1 Bigelow, .iarm.
Will, 17, and notes; Glilham v. Mustin, 42
Ala. 365. Can a tangible distinction be
drawn between such case and a direct con
veyance, in form a deed, by which A. con
veys to B., to take effcct at the death of A.?
The human mind is not content with a dis
ltinction that rests on no substantial differ
ence. Conveyances reserving a lifeestate to
the grantor have been upheld as deeds. 2
Deviin, Deeds. § 983; Robinson v. Schly. 6
Ga. 515; Elmore v. Mustin, 28 Ala. 309;
Hall v. Burkham, 59 Ala. 349. In Daniel v.
Hill, 52 Ala. 430, 436, this court said: “A
deed may be so framed that the grantor rc
serves to himself the use and possession dur
ing his life, and on his death creates a re
mainder in fee in a stranger." Almost every
.n. ...-...
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:tever
the paper contemplates posthumous op
* to the nature of the paper he was expected
. a will, whenever it is so framed as to post
-son. 6 Dana, 257.
conceivable form of conveyance, obligation,
or writing, by which men attempt to convey,
bind, or declare the legal status of property
have, even in courts of the highest charac
ter, been adjudged to be wills. The form of
the instrument stands for but little. When
eration, the inquiry is, what was intended?
I Bigelow, Jarm. Wills, 20, 25; Habergham
v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jr. 204; Jordan v. Jor
dan. 65 Ala. 301; Daniel v. Hill, 52 Ala. 430;
Shepherd v. Nabors, 6 Ala. 631; Kinnebrew
v. Kinnebrew, 35 Ala. 638. The intention of
t‘lggakenJLthamutmliinLiaquii-n.
and
t at intention is to be gathered IprhIugiily
from the language _otvt_he instrument itself.
Dunn v. Bani‘? Ala. 152. The intention
cannot be proved by a witness speaking di
re’ctly thereto. But this does not, in cases of
inapt phraseology,—such as the present in
strument discloses,—preclude proof of instruc;
tions given to the draughtsman, in reference
to prepare. In Green v. Proude, 1 Mod. 111I,
3 Keb. 310, the paper had striking character
isties of a deed; but the court said: “Here
being directions given to make a will. and a
person sent for to that end and purpose, thisl
is a good will." Speaking of this case, Jar-.
man (1 Bigelow’s Ed. p. 19) says: “The
court seems toIhave been influenced by the
circumstance that the person who prepared it
was instructed to make a will." In Ware
ham v. Sellers, 9 Gill & J. 98. the court de
cided that testimony should have been re
ceived of “conversations ot the deceased,
made .at the time of executing the said paper,
and from the other circumstances. that the.
said P. S. made and executed the said paper
as and for his last will and testament, and in
tended it as such." In this case-the contro
versy was whether the paper was a deed or
a will. To the same effeet is Witherspoon v.
Witherspoon, 2 McCord, 520. So all the at
tending circumstances may be put in proof
as aids in determining whether the maker in
tended the paper should operate as a deed or
pone actual enjoyment under it until the
death of the maker. Gillham v. Mustin, 42
Ala. 365; Daniel v. Hill, 52 Ala. 430; Camp
bell v. Gilbert, 57 Ala. 569; Jordan v. Jor
dan, 65 Ala. 301; Rice v. Rice, 68 Ala. 216;
Lee v. Shivers, 70 Ala. 288; 1 Bigelow~
Jarm. Wills, 25; Gage v. Gage, 12 N. H.I
371; Mealing v. Pace, 14 Ga. 596, 630; Sym.
mes v. Arnold, 10 Ga. 506; Jackson v. Jack
Another pertinent inquiry:
It a paper cannot have operation as a deed,
but may as a will, then in doubtful cases.
we should pronounce it a will, at res magis,
valeat. Bigelow, Jarm. Wills, 21, 22, 24, 25;.
Attorney General v. Jones~ 3 Price, 379;"
Gage v. Gage, 12 N. H. 371; Symmes v. Ar
nold. 10 Ga. 506.
The instrument sought to be established as
a will is in form a nondescript. It clearly]
shows on its face that the donee or grantee
was to have no actual enjoyment of the
property—no usufruct—during the life of the
maker. Its language is: “I do hereby re"
serve the use, control, and consumption of the
same to myself for and during my natural .
life." We hold that the paper, on its face.
falls within the indeterminate class, which,
according to circumstances, may be pronoun
ced a deed or a will. We also hold that, on
the trial of the issue, it was competent to
prove that the maker was without lineal or
other very near relatives; that she was at
tached to the donee, who was a member of ' i
her household; that she sent for the draughts
man of the paper, and employed him to
write her will, and that, in pursuance of such }
employment. he wrote the paper in contro
versy; that she signed it with a knowledge
of its contents, and had it attested; that she
did not deliver it, but had it placed in an en
velope, and indorsed, “Not to be opened till
after my death?’ and that she carefully pre
served it in such envelope until her death.
Now, all these facts and circumstances, if _,
proved and believed, were competent and
proper for the consideration of the jury in de- .,
termining the issue of devisavit vei non. And
the fact. if believed, that the paper had never
been delivered, and therefore could not take
effect as a deed, should also be considered in \
arriving at the maker’s intention.
In excluding from contestants’ exceptive al
legation the averment that the paper is a deed,
the probate court committed a technical er
ror. That was the real issue in the case.
This ruling, however, did the contestants no
injury, as they had the benefit of the de
fense it: sought to interpose. 3 Brick. Dig. p.
405. § 20.
0 O
The paper over which the present conten
tion arose contains the following clause:
"And this [the execution of the paper] is.
done in part to do away with all need or ne ‘
cessity of taking out letters of administration I
after my death." This clause is a circum
stance which the jury may look at and con- i
sider in determining whether Mrs. Hornsby ~
inteflded that Julia M. Hall should take or
enjoy any interest during the former’s life.
It is not conclusive, but must beweighed
with the other evidence. It would probably
be more weighty ii.
I it made provision for
Mrs. Hornsby’s entire estate. Attempts
fruitless, of course—are sometimes made to
dispense with administration, even in docu
ments that are unmistakably testamentary.
Charge No. 6~ asked by contestants, should
have been given. The remaining charges
asked by them were, in the light of the evi
dence, calculated to confuse or mislead, and
were rightly refused on that account.
We have now considered all the questions
we deem necessary. In a very few of the
many rulings the probate court erred.
Reversed and remanded.- .
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\VHAT CONSTITUTES A WILL.
In re KEIIOE.
/ (L. R. 13 Ir. 13.)
Court of Probate. Jan. 28, 1884.
Motion for probate, and that certain di
rections be ordered to be incorporated in the
will of the testator, the Rev. J. Kehoe. An
afifidavit of the Rev. Simon McWry was filed,
as follows: “That, to the best of my knowl
edge and belief, the paper writing marked
'A,’ now produced and shown to me, en
titled 'Directions to the executors of my last
' will and testament, executed this 13th day of
February, 1879—How they are to manage
my affairs,’ signed John Kehoe, P. P., and
dated February 13, 1879, which is all in the
handwriting of the said Rev. John Kehoe,
was written out by him previous to the ex
ecution of his will; and immediately after
such execution copies of said will and said
direction, previously made by the said tes
tator, and by one Maurice Kealy, were
placed by testator in an envelope, and hand
ed to me for safe custody." The Rev. Pat
rick F. Nolan, who was appointed executor
of the will by the codicil of the 20th of July,
1883, made the following affidavit: “The tes- .
tator, by his will having bequeathed all his
property in trust to be disposed of in such
manner as he might direct, did give a direc-~
tion in writing as to the disposal of the
same, as of same date as of the will, viz.,
the 13th of February, 1879, and upon which
direction. marked with the letter 'A,I I have
indorsed my name."
William P. Ball, for executor.
WARREN, J. The Rev. John Kehoe, the
testator, made a will dated the 13th of Feb
ruary, 1879, which contained this clause: “I
hereby bequeath to the Right Rev. James
Walsh and the Rev. Michael Conroy all
property I die possessed of," “in trust to be
disposed of in charity in such manner as I
may direct them; and, in case I may not
leave directions or instructions, then they
may dispose of it in charity in such manner
as they may think fit;" and the same per
sons are named executors. One of the@ ex’
eentors—Mr. Conroy—having died, the testa
tor made a codicil, dated the 20th of July,
1883, by which he nominated the Rev. Pat
rick Nolan an executor of this will. The
testator signed a paper bearing the same'
date as the will, containing directions for'
the management of his affairs for charitable
purposes. This paper is in the handwriting
of the testator, and is headed, "Directions
to the executors of my last will, executed
on the 13th day of February, 1879—How they
are to manage my affairs." The court has
been moved for probate of the will and
codicil of the testator, with the paper of di
rections incorporated.
The law of the subject of the incorporation
of papers, so far as it is necessary to con
sider it on the present application, is thus
stated in Jarman on Wills, (volume 1, p.
90:) "Three things arenecessary: (1) That
the will should refer to some document as
then in existence; (2) proof that the docu
ment propounded was in fact written before
the will was made; and (3) proof of the iden-_
tity of such document with that referred to
in the will." The afifidavit of the Rev. Simon
McWry is slightly ambiguous, (In re Ash, 11
Ir. R. Eq. 60, note,) in consequence of the
introductory words, “to the best of my
knowledge and belief;" but still. if that
, it sufificient to prove that the paper of direc
tions was in existence when the will was ex
ecuted. It is certainly sumcient proof that
it was in existence before the execution of
!the codicil; and the cases, including that
iof Lady Truro, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 201,
i to which I was referred by Mr. Bail, have es
tablished that, in considering this question
of incorporation, the words of the will which
refer to directions must be taken as if
brought down to the date of the codicif~-~
as if repeated in the codicil. It does appear
admissible, the evidence is sufificient to iden
.testator as the directions to which he re
ferred in his will. Therefore, if this aflida
.vit is admissible, two of the requisites for
incorporation are found in the case before
the court, viz., proof of the fact .of the ex
istence of the paper when the will was
made, and proof of the identity of the paper
with that referred to in the will. As to the
necessity of these two of the elements men-,
tioned in Jarman there can be no doubt. I
may refer to Singleton v. Tomlinson, L. R
3 App. Gas. 404, in the house of lords.
It remains to consider the third circum
stance mentioned in the passage 1 have
quoted from Jarman. Does the will refer
to or describe this paper of directions as then
existing? If it does not, can the court re
ceive any parol evidence on the subject of
these directions? As a matter of construc
tion, it i clear that the will does not refer
to any document as then in existence. The
words are, “as I may direct," “in case I may
not have directed." But “may" and “may
not" imply that at the time the will was
written any directions had not been given or
written, and certainly do not suggest that
any existed at the time of execution. In
Sunderland’s Case, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 198,
the words. “as shall be ticketed in papers
in my own handwriting," were held in
point of construction not to describe as then
,existing certain papers which did then exist
as a matter of fact. If, then, this will does
not refer to any papers as then existing, can
the court receive parol evidence,—that is to
say, as Sir C. Cressweli puts it, (3 Swab. &
T 12,) “to aid in the construction of what
the testator has written?" In my opinion,
‘the cases of Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore, P.
iC. 427; Van Straubenzee v. Monck. 3 Swab.
,afifidavit be admissible in evidence, I
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&: T 12; and The Goods of Sunderiand, L.
R. 1 Prob. & Div. 198,—establlsh the law
as laid down by Lord Penzance at the conclu
sion of his judgment in the last-mentioned
case: "In order to let in parol evidence to as
certain the truth, so far as it can be as
cenained by such evidence, with regard to
an unexpected testamentary document, the
passage in the will by which reference is
made to it must describe it as a written doc
ument then existing." The paper of direc
‘.
.
,9
tions in the present case is not so described, I’
’
and it must be excluded from probate.
It is ordered by the court that the said
Rev. Patrick F. Nolan, one of the executors
in said codicif named, be at liberty to apply
for probate of the said will and codicil, dat
ed, respectively, the 13th day of February,
1879, and 20th of July, 1883, without incor
porating in such probate the said paper writ
ing dated the 13th of February, 1879, and
marked "A." ,
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HUBBARD v. HUBBARD.
.
(8 N. Y. 196.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March, 1853.
Appeal from supreme court. second judi
cial district.
Proceedings before the surrogate of Suffolk
county by Maria J. Hubbard to establish an
alleged nuncupative will of her deceased hus
band, William L. Hubbard. William L.
Hubbard was master and owner of a coast
ing schooner of Greenport, Long Island.
While on a return trip from Philadelphia
with a load of coal. and lying at anchor in
side the Delaware breakwater on account of
head.winds, he was taken sick with Asiatic
cholera, and died the same day. The ves
sel was anchored in tide~water about a mile
from the main-land, the same distance from
the open sea, and three miles from the near
est place of settlement on shore. While de
ceased was suffering from his disease, and
about an hour before he died, being of sound
mind and memory, .he was asked if he had
a will, and replied that he had not. He was
then asked as to the disposition of his prop
erty, and in reply stated, in the presence of
~ the surrounding seamen, that he wished his
wife to have all his personal property. Beck
with, his mate, asked him if he wished her
to have his real property too, and he replied,
“Yes, all." Beckwith then asked him what
he should tell his wife, and he replied, “Tell
her I loved her to the end." Beckwith again
asked him whom he wanted to settle his af
fairs, and he replied, “I want you to do it."
He did not ask any one to bear witness that
what he stated was his will. These conver
sations being proved by four witnesses, the
surrogate adjudged them a good nuncupa
tive will. Elias Hubbard, father of the de
ceased and his heir at law, appealed to the
q special term, where the decree of the surro
gate admitting the will to probate was re
versed. On a further appeal the judgment
of the special term was reversed, and Elias
Hubbard appealed to this court.
S. D. Craig, for appellant. G. Miller, for
respondent.
MASON, J. It is provided in this state by
statute that no nuncupative or unwritten
will, be'queathing personal estate, shall be
valid, unless made by a soldier while in ac
tual service. or by a mariner while at sea.
2 Rev. St. p. 60, § 22. As to the wills of sol
diers in actual service and mariners at sea,
they are left entirely untrammeled by our
statutes, and are governed by the principles
of the common law, The exception in our
statute of wills in favor of soldiers and mar
iners was taken from the 29 Car. II. c. 3,
and is precisely the same, and the same ex
ception is retained in England by their new
statute of wills. 1 Vict. c. 26, § 11. The
testator was a mariner, within the meaning
[of the statute. The courts have
given a
very liberal construction to tnis exception in
behalf of mariners. and have held it to in
clude the whole service, applying equally to
superior oflicers, up to the commander in
chief, as to common seamen. In re Goods
of Hayes, 2 Curt. Ecc. 338; 1 Williams,
Ex'rs, 97. It has been held to apply to the
purser of a man of war, and embraces all
seamen in the merchant service. Morrell v.
Morrell, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 51; In re Goods of
Hayes, 2 Curt. Ecc. 338; 1 Williams, Ex'rs,
I97. This will was made a sea. In legal
~parlance, waters within the ebb and flow of.
the tide are considered the sea. Bouv. Law
Dict. tit. “Sea;" Aug. ’I'ideWaters, 4H9;
Thackarey v. The Farmer, Gilp. 528; The
Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428; Baker v.
Hoag, 7 N. Y. 561. Lord Hale says the sea
is either that which lies within the body of
the county or without it; that an arm or
branch of the sea within the "fauces terrae,"
where a man may reasonably discern bo-
tween shore and shore, is, or at least may
be, within the body of a county, but that
part of the sea which lies not within the
body of a county is called the main sea. or
ocean. Harg. Law Tracts, c. 4, p. 10; Smith,
Const. § 588. He adds, “That is called an
arm of the see. where the sea flows and re
fiows, and so far only as the sea flows and
reflows;" and in this he follows the exact
definition given by the Book of Assizes, 22
Id. 93; and this is the doctrine recognized
by the courts of this country. -Thackarey
v. The Farmer, Gilp. 524; U. S. v. Grush, 5
Mason, 290; U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat.
76-94; U. S. v. Robinson, 4 Mason, 307; U.
S. v. Ross, 1 Gail. 626.
The courts in England have gone to the
utmost verge of construction in extending
this exception in behalf of seamen. In a
case which came before the prerogative
court of Canterbury in 1840, when the de
ceased was mate of her majesty’s ship Cal
liope, and while the vessel was in the bar
bor of Buenos Ayres, he obtained leave to
go on shore, when he met with a serious fall,
and was so severely injured that he died on
shore a few days after. Immediately after
the accident he wrote on a watch bill with
a pencil his will, and which was unattested,
but which was cut out and certified to by the
oflicers on board the ship, and the court held
it a good will of a seaman at sea, and or
dered it to probate. In re Goods of Lay, 2
Curt. Ecc. 375. The common-law doctrine
in regard to nuncupative wills was borrowed
from the civil law. Drummond v. Parish, 3
Curt. Ecc. 522, 531, et seq. By the civil law,
the strict formalities. both in the execution
and construction of nuucupative wills of 501
diers, were dispensed with; and although
they should neither call the legal number of
witnesses, nor observe any other solemnity,
yet their testament was held good if they
were in actual service. Just. Inst. lib. 2, tit.
11; 1 Lomax, ExIrs, 40. The civil law was
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extremely indulgent in regard to the wills
of soldiers. If a soldier wrote anything in
bloody letters upon his shield, or in the dust
of the field with his sword. it was held a
good military testament. 1 Bl. Comm. 417;
1 Lomax, Ex'rs, 40, 41. The common law,
however, has not extended this privilege so
far as the civil. 1 Bl. Comm. supra. Black
stone says that soldiers in actual military
service may make nuneupative wills, and
dispose of their goods, wages, and other per
sonal chattels without those forms, solem
nity, and expenses which the law requires in
other cases.
The rules, however, which are to be ob
served in making wills by soldiers and mar
iners, are the same by the common law and
yet it must he confessed that the formalities
which are necessary to be observed in the
making of wills by soldiers and seamen are
not defined with any very satisfactory pre
cision in any of the English elementary
treatises upon the subject of wills. Swin
borne says that those solemnities only are
necessary which are jurls gentium. Swinb.
Wills, pt. 1, § 14. Before the statute the ec
clesiastical courts to whose jurisdiction the
establishment of personal testaments belong
ed required no ceremonies in the publication
thereof, or the subscription of any witnesses
to attest the same. 1 Bob. Wills, 147. A
will of personal estate, if written in the tes
tator’s own hand, though it had neither his
name nor seal to it, nor witnesses present at
its publication, was held effectual, provided
the handwriting could be proved. 1 Rob.
Wills, 148. And so if written by another
person by the testator’s directions, and with
out his signing it, it was held good. Id. 148.
It is laid down in books of very high author
ity that a nuneupative testament may be
made, not only by the proper motions of the
testator, but also at the interrogation of an
other. Swinb. Wills, pt. 1, § 12, p. 6; Lo
max, Ex'rs, 38; 1 Williams, Ex'rs, 102. And
Swinborne says, “As for any precise form
of words, none is required. neither is it ma
terial whether the testator speak properly
or improperly, so that his meaning appears."
t2 Swinb. Wills, pt. 4, § 26, p. 643;) and he
says, concerning the solemnities of the civil
law to be observed in the making of testa
ments, soldiers are clearly acquitted from
the observation thereof, saving-that, in the
opinion of divers writers. soldiers, when
they make their testaments, ought to require
the witnesses to be present. 1 Swinb. Wills,
pt. 1, § 14, p. 94. it is necessary, however,
that the testamentary capacity of the de
ceased and the animus testandi at the time
of the alleged nuncupation should be clearly
and satisfactorily proved in the case of nun
cupative will. 1 Williams, ExIrs, 102: Le
mann v. Bonsall, 1 Addams, Ecc. 389, 390.
In the present case the evidence most clear
ly shows that the deceased was of sound
mind and memory, and I think the evidence
in the case satisfactorily establishes the ani
mus testandi at the time of the alleged nun
cupation. He told his mate, Beckwith, to
tell his wife that he loved her till the end.
He was extremely sick, and undoubtedly ap
prehending death; and, when asked if he
had a will, he replied that he had not; and,
on being asked what disposition he wished
to make of his property, he said he wished
his wife to have all of his personal property,
and at the same time requested Beckwith
to settle his aftairsgind see to his business.
It should be borne in mind that as well the
testator as all of the witnesses present were
seamen, and were undoubtedly acquainted
with the rights of mariners in regard to mak
ing their wills. They evidently understood
it to be a will, and spoke of it as such; and
I think the animus testandi is satisfactorily
established. The evidence is quite as strong
in the case under consideration as it was in
the case of Parsons v. Parsons, 2 Greenl. 298,
300, where the testator was asked to whom
he wished to give his property, and replied,
“To my wife; that is agreed upen;" and the
supreme court of Maine sustained the will
in that case. I am aware that it is said in
some of the books that it is essential to a
nuneupative will that an executor be named.
But this is_-nqo more essential than in a writ
ten will. Rolle, Abr. 907; How v. Godfrey,
Finch, 361; Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns.
522. I am inclined to think, however, that
the evidence is suflicient, in the present case,
to show that the testator intended to make
Beckwith his executor, but it is not neces
sary that he should have named one. It is
not necessary to decide whether the mariner
must make his will in his last sickness and
in extremls, as was held to be the case under
our former statute of wills, (Prince v. Hazle
ton, 20 Johns. 503,) and as is required under
the statutes of several of our sister states,
(Boyer v. Frick, 4 Watts & S. 357; Baker v.
Dodson, 4 Humph. 342; Offutt v. Offutt, 3 B.
Mon. 162: In re Will of Yarnall, 4 Rawle,
46; Werkheiser v. \Verkheiser, 6 Watts 8|
S. 184; Winn v. Bob, 3 Leigh, 140: Mason
v. Dunman, 1 Munf. 456; Portwood v. Hun
ter, 6 B. Mon. 538; Tally v. Butterworth, 10
Yerg. 501; Parsons v. Parsons, 2 Greenl.
298;) for there can be no doubt, upon the
evidence in this case, but this will was
made/both in extremis, and in the last sickness
and under circumstances which precluded
the making of a written will. I think that
the factum of this nuneupative will is clear
ly established by the evidence in the case,
and also the testamentary capacity of the
deceased, and that the animus testandi at
the time of the alleged nuncupation is suffi
ciently apparent from the evidence in the
case, and that the Judgment of the supreme
court should be affirmed.
Judgment aflirmed.
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PRINCE, Public Administrator, v. HAZLE
TON et ux.
(20 Johns. 502.)
Court of Errors of New York. Nov. 11, 1822.
. Appeal from court of probates.
(“Application
by Benjamin Prince, public ad
inistrator in the city of New York, for ad
'vninistration on the estate of William Jones,
who died in New York city, April 17, 1820.
Mary Hazleton appeared before the surro
gate, with her husband. George Hazleton,
and offered to robate an alleged nuncupa
tive will of Jones, with the deposi
tion of four witnesses thereto, taken ex pa rte
before a commissioner, May 4, 1820, as fol
iows: “The last will and testament of Wil
liam Jones, late of the city of New York,
gentleman, by word of mouth, made and de
clared by him, on or about the eleventh day
of April, last past, in presence of us, the un
dersigned, Jacob S. Arden, William Lee,
George Wateres, and Ellen Taylor, who have
hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses
to such last will and testament: 'I now say,
as I have repeatedly said before, that I leave
all the property I am possessed of to Mary
Hazleton. I do this in consequence of the
good treatment and kind attentions I have
received from her during my sickness. She
is worthy of it. No other person shall in
herit my property. I wish you all in the
room to take notice of this.’ In witness
whereof we have hereunto set our hands, this
seventeenth day of May, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and twen
ty." The surrogate refused to sustain the
alleged nuncupative will, under Laws N. Y.
Sess. 36, c. 23, § 14. which provided that a
nuncupative will shall not be good unless
“made in the time of the last sickness of the
deceased." Proponents appealed to the court
of probate, where the decree of the surrogate
was reversed, and the will admitted. Prince
appealed to this court.
Hoffman and '1I. A. Emmet, for appellants.
Henry & Van Buren, for respondents.
KENT, Oh. The question to be discussed
is, whether the nuncupative will of William
Jones, as stated to have been made on the
I
11th of April, 1820, can be admitted to pro
bate as being valid in law. It becomes a
complicated question, under the circumstan
ces, and involves in the inquiry matter of fact
mixed with matter of law. I shall consider
it to be my duty to speak frankly and freely
on the whole subject of the case, but, at the
same time, with a sincere respect for the char
acter of the court whose opinion is now under
review, and from which I shall be obliged
very greatly to dissent.
William Jones was an Irishman by birth,
and a religious Catholic by profession. He
was born in the county of Dublin. in Ire
land, and received a school education about
30 years before his death, and which carries
us back to the year 1790. He had then liv
ing parents, brothers and sisters, and he was
the youngest of the family. He was appren
ticed to a housecarpenter in the city of Dub
lin, and served a regular apprenticeship of
seven years. When this service expired, he
worked as a journeyman, for nine or twelve
months, and then emigrated to the United
States. This brings us, in the history of his
life, to year 17:», and perhaps that fact may
enable us to give some probable solution of
the only circumstance that seems (if we ex
cept the will) to cast any shade over the mem
ory of this man. I allude to the change of
his paternal name, O’Connor, for that of
Jones. It does not appear, precisely, when
he changed his name, but I refer it back to
that period as the probable time, and pre
sume that he and his family were more or
less implicated in the peril of the rebellion,
which broke out in Ireland in 1798, in conse
quenee of an ill-fated attempt to effect a
revolution in that kingdom. It is probable
that he may have emigrated for safety; and,
for greater safety. laid down the name of
O’Connor, which was then memorable in the
Irish annals, on the side of the unfortunate.
But, be this conjecture as it may, we find him
first at New York, then for two years at
Savannah, then living. for 12 or 14 years, in
the island of Cuba, and learning the Spanish
language, and where he probably made his
fortune. He is next traced, on his return in
the United States, to the cities of Baltimore.
Philadelphia, and New York; and in all of
them he seems to have had business, pecuni
ary concerns, and friends.
These are the few and imperfect sketches
of his biography to be selected from the case.
before we find him rich in the fruits of his
enterprise, but sick with a disease of the
liver, at the boarding-house of Mrs. Fox, in
Cherry street, in New York, the latter end of
March, 1820. Jones, while at the house of
Mrs. Fox, claimed to be worth. altogether,
$65,000, in property existing in New York,
Pmlphia, Baltimore, and the island of
Cuba; and, to show that this claim had pret
ty fair pretensions to truth, there was actual
ly found at his lodgings, at his death, bank
books. showing deposits to his credit, in one
or more banks of New York, to between thir
teen and fourteen thousand dollars. He had
been sick at Mrs. Fox’s about five weeks.
when he is said to have made the will now
under consideration. During that time he
had one Ellen Taylor, a colored woman, for
his hired nurse; and there was a Mrs. Hazle
ton, who had rooms, and boarded in the
same house, who also acted as his nurse.
Whether Jones ever saw or heard of Mrs. ll.
before he came to board at Mrs. Fox's does
not appear, nor have we in the case any dis
tinct lineaments of the character which Mrs.
H. sustains, or the business or purpose of
her life. She rented the two front rooms in
the boarding-house, and yet, her brother says,
’ 1 n: 1"r.
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she followed no kind of business.
I
She has
had two husbands, and her present one is
said to be a seafaring man by one of her
witnesses, and another of them says that he
had been voyages at sea, and had been on the
gaol limits, and was then following his trade
of a whitesmith at Savannah. Why she lives
in this detached situation, without a family
of her own, and a husband to live with and
provide for her, as is quite common with
married persons, must be left to conjecture.
She was able, all at once, and, as it would
seem, without any adequate cause, and with
out any remarkable display of goodness, or
even of attention, to gain a wonderful as
cendency over the affections of this sick
man. If her story be true, and the will gen
uine, she obliterated from Jones’ breast the
sense of friendship, the charities of religion,
the deeprooted traces of national affection,
every tender recollection of the ties of blood,
of his natal soil, of the school-fellows of his
youth, of father and mother, brother and sis
ter, relative and friend. He was persuaded,
at one nod, to pour the accumulated treas
ures of his varied life into the lap of this
mysterious woman,—the acquaintance of a
day.
The will, as certified by the four witnesses,
is in these words: “I now say, as I have
repeatedly said before, that I leave all the
property I am possessed of to Mary Hazle
ton. I do this in consequence of the good
treatment and kind attentions I have received
from her during my sickness. She is worthy
of it. No other person shall inherit my prop
erty. I wish you all in the room to take
notice of this." This will carries marks of
fraud on its very face. Let us examine it at
tentively. This sweeping donation is made
for what? For good treatment and kind at
tention received from her during his sick
ness. This sickness had lasted only flve
weeks, and it was not so bad but that he was -
able occasionally to ride out. No person an
prehended any immediate danger. He had
a hired nurse, a colored woman,. who was by
him totally forgotten. What could this other
woman have possibly done, in the course of
five weeks, to awaken, in any rational mind,
a sense of such enormous obligation, or to
call forth such stupendous remuneration? I
am forcibly struck with the folly and false
hood of the motive assigned. But the will
goes on, and adds, “she is worthy of it." And
where does her great merit appear, and from
what circumstance does she entitle herself
to this extravagant eulogy? The very dec
larationthat she was worthyto possess all his
estate proves that Jones must have been in
sane, or that the whole is a base fabrication.
The will goes on further. and says,~..No other
person shall inherit my property." And why
these words of special exclusion of the rest
of the world? They seem to imply a heart
lessness and misanthropy, very unnatural
and very improbable for any man to express
in the contemplation of death, and who was in
the enjoyment of the comforts and the smiles
of fortune; and especially for a nativehorn
Irishman, who was in the midst of his emi
grant countrymen, and could not but have
heard and felt the claims of religion, of chari
ty, of the widow, and the orphan. He then
adds, “I wish you all to take notice of this,"
—a speech which looks so much like contriv
ance that it does, of itself, throw a suspicion
over the whole piece. This man must have
been previously told that the statute required
that, in making a nuncupative will, the testa~
tor must bid the persons present to bear wit
ness that such was his will. It was made in
the middle of the day, when he was quite
comfortable, and far from the apprehension
of death, and, in this respect, with all punc
tllious and technical adherence to forms. It
had the requisite number of witnesses and the
address to the by-standers. Jones must have
deliberately determined on a nuncupative in
stead of a written will, and have previously
known and studied all the circumstances that
were requisite to make it valid, or else this
will has been since got up for him, like a
puppet-show by the art and cunning of some
juggler behind the scene.
[His honor here went minutely, and at
large, into the examination of the testimony
in the cause, and particularly of that of the
four witnesses to the will, and observed
that, from the nature, the improbabilities.
the inconsistencies, and the absurdity of the
story, and the character and conduct of the
witnesses, he drew the conclusion that the
testimony of those witnesses was uttterly
unworthy of credit, and that the will was
evidently the production of fraud and per
jury. After having disposed of the question
of fact, his honor proceeded as follows:]
But if we were to admit, against the truth
of the fact, that the will of the 11th of
April was actually and fairly made, accord
ing to the certificate of the four witnesses,
it would then become a question of law
whether it amounted to a valid nuncupative
will. A “nuncupative will" is defined by
Perkins, (Conv. s. § 476,) in his book which
was published under Henry VIII., to be
properly when the testator "lieth languish
ing for fear of sudden death, dareth not t
stay the writing of his testament, and there
fore he prayeth his curate, and others, his 1
neighbors. to bear witness of his last will.
and declareth by word what his last will .
is." So, again, in Swinburne, (\Vills, p. 32.)
whose treatise was published in the time of
King James 1., it is said that this kind of
testament is commonly made when the tes
tatorls now very sick, weak. and past all
hope of recovery. I do not later from these
passages that unwritten wills were always
had at common law, unless made in a case
of extremity~ when death was just overtak
ing the testator. In ignorant ages, there
was no other way of making a will but by
words or signs. Reading was so rare an
accomplishment in the earliest ages of the
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common law that it conferred great privi
leges, and the person who possessed it was
entitled, under the name of benefit of clergy,
to an exemption from civil punishment. But
these ancient writers mean to be under
stood that in the ages of Henry VIII.. Eliz
abeth, and James letters had become so
generally cultivated, and reading and writ
ing so widely diffused, that nuneupative
wills were properly, according to Perkins,
and commonly, according to Swinburne. con
fined to extreme cases, and to be justlfled
only upon the plea of necessity. And this
has been the uniform language of the Eng
lish law-writers from that time down to
this day, so that it has become the ac
knowledged doctrine that a nuneupative will
is only to be tolerated when made in ex
tremis. Thus in Bacon’s Abridgement,
which was first published in 1736, and com.
piled chiefly from materials left by Lord
Chancellor Baron Gilbert, a nuneupative will
is taken from Perkins, and defined to be
when a man is sick, and for fear that death,
or want of memory or speech, should sur
prise him, that he should be prevented, if
he stayed the writing of his testament, de
sires his neighbors and friends to bear wit
ness of his will, and declares the same
presently before them. 7 Bac. Abr., by
Gwillim, 305. The same definition is adopt
ed by Wood in his laborious work on Con-
veyancing, (volume 6, p. 574;) and in Black
stone’s Commentaries, (volume 2, pp. 500,
501,) a nuneupative will is defined to be one
declared by the testator in extremis before
a suflicient number of witnesses. After re
citing the substance of the provisions of the
statute of 20 Car. 11., .(and which we have
reenacted,) he adds: “Thus has the legis
lature provided against any frauds in set
ting up nuneupative wills by so numerous
a train of requisites that the thing itself
has fallen into disuse, and hardly ever
heard of, but in the only instance where
favor ought to be shown to it,—when the
testator is surprised by sudden and violent
sickness." And, while I am citing so many
English definitions of nuneupative wills, it
cannot be thought useless, and will not be
deemed unacceptable, that I should also re
fer to the very respectable opinion of the late
chief justice of Connecticut. who declares,
when speaking of nuneupative wills as un
derstood in the English law, that they are
allowed only in cases where, in extreme
and dangerous sickness, the testator has
neither time nor opportunity to make a
written will. 1 Swift, Syst. 420.
It appears to me that these various writers
must be satisfactory to every one, as to the
true sense and meaning of a nuneupative
will under the English law. It is not easy
to recur to more accurate sources. The pro
bate of wills being in England a matter of
ecclesiastical cognizance, cases on that point
rarely appear in the reports of decisions in
the courts of common law. I have, how
ever, been able to select two or three cases
of nuneupative wills, which I shall submit
to the consideration of the court.
Cole v. Mordaunt, 4 Ves. 106, note, was
the case of a nuneupative will, in the 28th
year of Car. 1l., and it is well worthy of
notice that this was only one year before
the 29th Car. 11., when the statute relating.
to nuneupative wills was passed, and is said
to be the principal case which gave rise
to that statute. The case was this: Mr.
Cole, at a very advanced age, married Ia
young woman, who, during his life, did
not conduct herself with propriety. After
his death, she set up a nuneupative will,
said to have been made in extremis, (for
those are the words used in the report of
the case,) and by which the whole estate
was given to her, in opposition to a writ
ten will made three years before, giving
3,000 pounds to charitable uses. The nun
eupative will was proved by nine witnesses.
but the court of probate rejected the will,
and. on appeal to the delegates, a trial was
had at the bar of the king’s bench, and it
appeared that most of the witnesses for the
nuneupative will were perjured, and Mrs.
Cole herself was guilty of subornation of
perjury. It was upon the occasion of this
shocking and foul conspiracy that Lord.
Chancellor Nottingham said “he hoped to
see one day a law that no written will
should ever be revoked but by writing."
He was gratified in seeing such a law the
succeeding year; and I will venture most
respectfully to add that, if this nuneupative
will be established, I should also hope to see
one day a law that no nuneupative will
should be valid in any case. The case I
have cited contains a monitory lesson; and
it very much resembles, in its principal
features, the one before us.
In Philips v. Parish of St. Clements’ Danes,
1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 404, pl. 2, which was cited
upon the argument, and arose in 1704, one
Doctor Shallmer, by will, in writing, gave
£200 to the parish, and Prew, a reader in
the church, coming to pray with him, he.
said, he gave £200 more towards building
the church, and died on the next day. This
was a case of a nuneupative will which only
failed for want of three witnesses. But
this testator was evidently in extremis. The
particulars are not stated, except only that
tin ofiicer of the church came to pray with
him, and that he died the succeeding day;
but those two circumstances well warrant
the inference. There is a very close analogy
between these nuneupative wills and a gift
upon the death-bed or a donatlo causa
mortis; and these gifts are defined by the
court of chancery in Hedges v. Hedges.
Finch, Prec. 269, Gilb. 12, in the very terms
of a proper nuneupative will. A donatlo
causa mortis is where a man lies in ex
tremity, or being surprised by sickness, and
not having an opportunity of making his
will, but lest he should die before he could
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make it, gives away personal property with
his own hands. If he dies, it operates as a
legacy. If he recovers, the property reverts
to him.
Upon the strength of so much authority,
I feel myself warranted in concluding that
~1nuncupative will is not good unless it be
made by a testator when he is in extremls,
or overtaken by sudden and violent sickness,
and has not time or opportunity to make
a written will. The statute of Car. 11., so
often referred to, and which we have lit
erally adopted, requires a nuncupative will
to be made by a testator in his last sickness.
and in his own dwelling-house, or where he
had been previously resident for 10 days,
unless surprised by sickness onajourney, or
from home. The last sickness, in the pur
view of the statute, has been always under
stood (for so I infer from the cases cited) to
apply to the last extremity mentioned in
the books; and it never was meant to up
hold these wills, made when there was no
immediate apprehension of death, and no
inability to reduce the will to writing. A
case of necessity is the only case, according
to Blackstone, in which any favor ought to
be shown them. If they are alleged to
have .been made in a case unaccompanied
with necessity, the presumption of fraud
attaches to the very allegation. Let us
suppose, by way of illustration, the instance
of a person gradually declining under the
operation of some slow-paced disease, as the
affection of the liver, or the consumption of
the lungs. or the dropsy, or the cancer.
The patient is himself, we will suppose, un
der no immediate apprehension of death,
nor is any such alarm excited in others. He
is comfortably seated in his chamber, in the
midst of a populous city, and with ample
means to command every kind of assistance.
He has had a fair common education, and
knows well how to read and write. He has
been a man of good understanding, habits
of business, and of successful enterprise, and
has accumulated a fortune. He is well
versed in the knowledge and in the affairs
of mankind. He has pen, ink, and paper
at hand, with an adroit physician at his
elbow, and a favorite friend at his side, on
whom he wishes to bestow his fortune. He
is in the middle of life, with his intellect
perfectly sound. He proposes, or it is pro
posed to him, to make his will. Would such
a man, in such a case, ever dream of mak
ing a nuncupative will? Would any honest
or discreet friend ever advise him to it?
If that should be his wish, or if that should
be the suggestion of others, would the law
tolerate such an indulgence, under the no
tion that he was in his last sickness? Sure
ly, the good sense of the law, as the books
explain that law, and the cautious and jeal
ous provisions of the statutes of frauds,
never intended a nuncupative will for such
an occasion. The law wisely discriminates
between written and unwritten wills, and
permlts the latter only in cases of urgent
necessity. To abolish that distinction would
be to abolish protection to property, to en
courage frauds and perjuries. and to throw
us back upon the usages of the unlettered
ages.
It nuncupative wills can be permitted at
all, in the cases of chronic disorders, which
make silent and slow, but sure and fatal,
approaches, it is only in the very last stage
and extremity of them. In no other period can
such a disorder be deemed, within any rea
sonable construction of the statute of frauds,
a man’s last sickness. Such diseases con
tinue for months, and sometimes for years.
In one of Captain Cook’s voyages, he states
that he lost his first lieutenant, Mr. Hicks,
near the conclusion of the voyage of three
years, and almost within sight of the Eng
lish coast. But he adds, that, as his disease
was the consumption, and as it existed when
he left .England, it might be truly said
that he was dying during the whole voyage.
What would the law call that man's last
sickness? Not the whole voyage, surely, and,
probably, it would be narrowed down to the
last day, and to the last hour, of his ex
istence. We must give a reasonable inter
pretation to the statute in reference to the
mischief and to the remedy. We cannot
safely apply a man’s last sickness to the
whole continuance of a protracted disease,
without giving to the statute an absurd con
struction. I do, therefore, most confidently
insist that Jones was not in this last sick
ness on the 11th of April, within the sense
or within the policy of the statute, and that
he was not then entitled to make a nuncu
pative will.
There is one other consideration that im
parts to this subject of nuncupative wills a
momentous character, and ought '00 incline
us to give to them as little countenance as
possible. As soon as a nuncupative will is
made, it becomes the interest of the legatee
that the party’s sickness should prove to be
his last sickness; for, if he recovers, the will,
of course, falls to the ground. Not so with
a written will. That remains good until re
voked, and it cannot be revoked but by
writing. Let us for one moment pause over
this consequence of nuncupative wills, and
observe with what a deleterious influence
they must suddenly act upon the heart, and
what a powerful appeal they at once make
to the selfish and dark passions of the hu
man mind. The title of the legatee de
pends altogether upon the precipitate death
of the testator. Every day that his life is
prolonged more and more impairs the char
acter of the will, and it vanishes if he be
comes convalescent. Suppose the testator
was understood to possess a large amount
of cash in hand, and that he gives it all,
by a nuncupative will,
whom the law would not have given it.
Suppose that stranger to be his physician,
or, as in the present case, his nurse, what
to a stranger to.
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hold has the testator on her fidelity, her
kindness, or her integrity? Her interest and
her wishes (if indeed her wishes procured
the will) must be to destroy, and not to heal,
her benefactor. The legacy operates as a
bounty upon his death. One cannot con
template a nuncupative will under this as
pect without sensations of horror. Well
might such a man exclaim, as Jones is said
to have done, repeatedly, “My life depends
upon that woman."
I am accordingly of opinion, both upon the
law and upon the fact1 that the decree of
the court of probate, directing the nuncupa
tlve will of William Jones to be admitted to
probate, was erroneous, and ought to be re
versed; and that the decree of the surro
gate of the city and county of New York, of
the 17th October, 1820, directing the appli
cation to admit the said nuncupative will to
probate to be dismissed, and that letters of
administration of the goods. chattels, and
credits which were of William Jones, de
ceased, be granted and issued, according to
law, as in cases of intestates, be confirmed.
Decree of reversal.
For reversal, 23.
For aflirmance, 7.
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/ COOK v. WINCHESTER et al.
(81 Mich. 581, 46 N. W. Rep. 106.)
Supreme Court of Michigan. July 2, 1890.
Case made from circuit court. Kent coun
ty; Grove, Judge.
Petition by Arlston J. Cook to admit to
probate the alleged will of Alzina Page. (1e
ceased. Contested by Laaden \Vinehester
and Clarissa Winchester.
fused by the probate judge, and, on appeal
to the circuit court. this action was affirm
ed. Proponent appealed to this court.
Maiter & Felker, for appellant. Butter
field’ & Keeney and Thompson & Temple, for 1
.to see the table or any one sitting at it.respondents.
MORSE, J. This controversy involves the‘
validity of a will, the sole question being
whether or not it was duly executed, or
rather witnessed, under the laws of this
state. There is no question of fraud or un
due influence in the case, nor did the tes
tatrix lack mental capacity to execute a will.
It must be conceded from all the testimony
in the case that the will was drawn by an
honest, disinterested, and trustworthy man;
that he was the chosen instrument of Mrs.
Page to draft it; that she had frequently
consulted and advised with him before as
to the disposition of her property, and had
told him how she intended to bequeath it;
that the will as made was just as she want
it; that it was read to her before she signed
it and after she signed, at both of which
times she expressed herself as fully satis-i
fied with it; that she signed it in the pres-’
ence of the persons who witnessed it, and
that she requested them to witness it; that
she asked them after it was executed if they
had witnessed it, and received an aflirmative
answer, and was then shown their signa
tures, and their names were read over to her.
If the will is not sustained, the property
will certainly go, under the law. where she
did not wish it to go. It is therefore the
duty of the courts to uphold it if possible.
It is claimed that the requirements of our
statute were not complied with in the wit
nessing of this will. The statute provides
(How. St. § 5789) that three things are
requisite to the validity of a will: (1) That
it shall be in writing; (2) that it shall be
signed by the testator, or by some person in
his presence, and by his express direction;
(3) that it shall be attested and subscribed.
in the presence of the testator, by two or
more competent witnesses.
The will was drawn by James Toland, su
pervisor of the townhlp of Byron, Kent
county, who lived only a few rods from Mrs.
Page. and with whom she had frequently
talked about making her will. and how she
wished it drawn. On June 30. 1338. she sent
qas ~she had before told him to draw it.
Probate was rc-F
for him. Mrs. Page had been an invalid for
many years, and at this time was confined
to her bed, and unable to leave it without
help. Toland found her in a bedroom ad
joining, and opening by a door into, the
kitchen,—a kitchen bedroom,—which C0111
munieated with no other room. He asked
Mrs. Page, who said that she was ready to
make her will, and wished him to draw it.
if she wanted it drawn in the same manner
She
said, "Yes," and he proceeded. There was
no table in the room where Mrs. Page was.
and he drew the will on a table in the kitch~
en. This table was near the bedroom door~
but when the door was open it was impos
sibio for any one lying squarely on the bed
Mrs. Page could not move in bed, and was
not able to see the table. Toland drew the
will, and took it into the bedroom, and read
it to Mrs. Page. She was satisfied with the
will. Not being able. to handle a pen Very
well, she requested‘ Toland to write her
name. He went to the kitchen table and
wrote it. He then came in, and she made
her mark. Three ladies were present in the
room, Mrs. Weaver, Mrs. McConnell, and
Mrs. Miller. Mrs. Page requested Mrs.
Weaver and Mrs. McConnell to witness the
will. Mrs. Weaver did not wish to sign it
for some reason, and Mrs. Page then signi
fied that she wished Mrs. Miller to witness
it. Mrs. Miller and Mrs. McConnell then
stepped into the kitchen and signed the
,will as witnesses. Mr. Toland and the wit
ed it, and as he had long intended to make i nesses then went into the room again, and
Toland read the will over to her again, and
asked her if it suited her. She said it was
all right,—just as she intended it should be.
Toland showed the names of the witnesses
to her, and also read them to her. He tes
tifled that previous to his showing it to her
she asked the witnesses if they had signed
it. and they told her they had. The door
was open between the kitchen and bedroom
when the witnessing was done. Mrs. Mil
ler’s testimony agrees with Toland, except
she says that she stood in the door when
the will was being read over after the wit
nesses had signed it, and did not hear Mrs.
Page ask her or Mrs. Council if they had
signed as witnesses, but heard Toland tell
her that they had witnessed the will, and
read their names to her. Mrs. McConnell
(now Mrs. Merritt) states that when they
went back into the bedroom after witness
ing the will, and Toland read it all over to
Mrs. Page again, she said it was all right,
and just as she wanted it; the witnesses
and everything were all’ right. “She asked
me if we had signed it, and I told her we
had. Mrs. Miller and Mr. Toland were
there." The room in which Mrs. Page was
lying was eight feet square. The kitchen
was about fifteen feet square. The distance
from where the witnesses sat while signing
the will to the bed of Mrs. Page was about
twelve feet. The will was denied probate
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.by the judge of probate of Kent county,
and on appeal to the circuit court his action
was aflirmed.
It is claimed that the will was not execut
ed—witnessed—in the presence of the testa
trix. It is true that it was physically im
possible for her to see the witnesses when
they were in the act of signing it without
moving herself upon the edge of the bed,
which she was unable to do. And it is ar
gued by counsel for the contestants that
there are no cases to be found in the books,
except possibly two, which can be claimed
as authority for the admission of the will
to probate. That the statute has been uni
formly held to require that “the condition
and position of the testator when his will
is attested, and in reference to the act of
signing by the witnesses, and their locality
when signing, must be such that he has
knowledge of what is going forward, and is
mentally observant of the specific act in
progress, and, unless he is blind, the signing
by the witnesses must occur where the tes
tator, as he is circumstanced, may see them
sign if he choose to do so. If in this state of
things some change in the testator’s posture
is requisite to bring the action of the wit
nesses within the scope of his vision, and
such movement is not prevented by his phys- ,
ical infirmity, but is caused by an indispo
sition or indifference on his part to take
visual notice of the proceeding, the act of
witnessing is to be considered as done in his
presence. If, however, the testator’s ability
to see the witnesses subscribe is dependent
upon his ability to make the requisite move
ment, then if his ailment so operates upon
him as to prevent this movement, and .on
this account he does not see the witnesses
subscribe, the will is not witnessed in his
presence." Aikln v. Weckerly, 19 Mich.
504, 505. A large number of cases are cited
in .support of the counsel’s claim, to wit:
Mandeville v. Parker, 31 N. J. Eq. 242;
Wright v.IManifold, 1 Maule & S. 294; Reyn
olds v. Reynolds, 1 Speers, 253; Robinson
v. King, 6 Ga. 539; Brooks v. Duffell, 23 Ga.
441; Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294; Jones v.
Tuck, 3 Jones (N. C.) 202; Eccleston v.
Petty, Carth. 79; Broderick v. Broderick, 1
P. Wms. 23!); Lamb v. Girtman, 33 Ga. 289;
Neil v. Neil, 1 Leigh, 6; Orndorff v. Hum
mer, 12 B. Mon. 626; In re Downie’s Will,
42 Wis. 66; Dutfie v. Corridon. 40 Ga. 122;
Edelen v. HardeyIs Lessee, 7 Har. & J. 61;
Russell v. Falls, 3 Bar. & Mcii. 457; Gra
ham v. Graham, 10 Ired. 219; In re CoxIs
Will, 1 Jones (N. C.) 321; ltagland v. Hunt
ingdon, 1 Ired. 561; Chase v. Kittredge, 11
Allen, 49; Compton v. Mitton, 12 N. J. Law,
71; Combs v. Jolly, 3 N. J. Eq. 625; Mickie
v. Matlack, 17 N. J. Law, 86; Hindmarsh v.
Carlton, 8 H. L. Cas. 160.
It must be conceded that these cases all
fully support the contention that the will
must be witnessed in the same room with
the testator, or, if out of the room, where
he can see them sign if he desires to do so;
he must be in a position where it is possible
to see them. The fact that the will, after
being witnessed out of the testator’s sight,
is brought to the view of the testator, and
he looks upon the signatures of the witness
es, and they then acknowledge the witness
ing of it before him, will not cure this de
feet in its execution, according to the au
thority of some of these cases. See Chase v.
Kittredgc, 11 Allen, 61; In re Cox’s Will, 1
Jones (N. C.) 321; Graham v. Graham, 10
Ired. 219; Russell v. Falls, 3 Her. & McH.
457; Lamb v. Girtman, 33 Ga. 289; In re
l Downie’s Will, 42 Wis. 66.
, The extreme rule laid down in some of
‘ these cases cited by counsel for contestants,
notably Graham v. Graham, supra, a North
Carolina case, was criticised, and I think
~justly so, by Justice Champlin in Maynard
v. Vinton, 59 Mich, at pages 148, 149, and
26 N. W. Rep, at pages 405, 406, but for the
Lpurposes of that case the doctrine of Aikin
v. Weckerly was adhered to. In Maynard v.
Yinton, the testatrix was in a position where
lshe might have seen the witnesses sign, as
.they were within the range of her vision if
she saw fit to look, as was also the case
with the testator in Aikin v. Wcckerly. The
precise question raised by the record in this
case has never been presented to this court.
and neither of the two cases above mention
ed seems to stand in the way of a just and
liberal construction of the statute in this
case in favor of the validity of the execu~
tion of this will of Alzina Page. I agree
.with Judge Champlin that “presence," as
used in the statute, has been too narrowly
construed by many of the courts as meaning
that the witnesses must be under the eye of
lthe testator. I find two cases referred to on
’the argument where the facts are almost
identical with those found by the circuit
'judge Iin this case, and in both of which the
twill was sustained. In the first, (Sturdivant
Iv. Birchett, 10 Grat. 67,) the will was attest
led by the witnesses subscribing their names
as such in a different room from that in
which the testator was lying at the time of
such signing. The testator could not see
.the witnesses in the act of signing, either
from the bed on which he lay or from any
lother place within the room. The testator
lsigned the will in the presence of the wit
nesses, and requested them to attest it.
They went together into another room for
ithat purpose, it being inconvenient to do so
in the room where the testator was lying.
When they subscribed their names no other
person was in the room, and they immedi
lately returned to the room where the testa
tor was. They were gone from that room
’
not over two minutes. They took the will to
the testator, who was lying in bed, and,
both of the witnesses being together, one of
them said to him, “Mr. Sturdivant, here is
your will witnessed;" at the same time
pointing with his finger to the names of the
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bed, and he read their names as signed, and
I
witnesses, and holding the will open before
him, the names of said witnesses being on
the same page, and close to that of the tes
tator. He took the will in his hands, and
looked at it as if he was examining it. He
then closed or folded it. On being told that'
he was ill, and had better give the will to'
some one to keep for him, he asked whether
if he got well he could take it back from the
person to whom he might give it. Being an
swered in the aflirmative. he said: “It lsi
my will, and I wish it to stand~ but I may
hereafter, on getting well, wish to make
some slight alteration in it." He then hand
ed the will to a friend. In the other case,
of Riggs v. Riggs, 135 Mass. m, (decidedl
June 21, 1883,) the witnesses to the will.
saw the testator sign it, and were in the
room with him at the time. They signed it
as witnesses in a room adjoining the one tes- i
tator was in, and at a distance of about nine l
feet from him, the door being open. The|
testator was in bed, and in such a positionl
that if he had been able to turn his headl
round he might, by so turning it, have seen I
the witnesses when they signed their names. ,
and also the will itself, unless during a
part of the time when their bodies obstruct-I
ed the view; but from the effect of an injury
which he had received he could not in point
of fact turn his head sufificiently to see them
and the will at the time when they were
signing their names as witnesses. After the
witnesses had signed the will it was hand
ed to the testator as he was lying upon the~
said he was glad that it was done. ,
These cases differ from the one at bar only i
in the fact that the will was taken, after
witnessing, into the hands of the testator,.
who in one case looked at it, and in the oth
er read the names, while in Mrs. Page’s case
the names were shown her while the will
was in the hands of the scrivener and read
to her, as well as the names of the witness
es to it. The difference is unimportant. in
if three of the cases the maker of the will
knew what he or she was doing, and what
was being done, being conscious of all that
took place, and no claim of fraud is made
or entertainable in any of them. The major
ity of the Virginia supreme court (three out
of five judges) sustained the will in the first
case. and held that the statute was substan
tially complied with, in a very able and ex
haustive opinion by Justice Lee. In his
opinion the learned justice shows conclusive
ly from the authorities that the words “in
presence of" do not necessarily imply that
the testator and the witnesses must be in
the same room, nor that actual sight or in
spection of the process of signing is peremp
torily required. because it is well settled that
a blind man may make a will. He holds
that the recognition by the witnesses of
their signatures to the will made within
the immediate sight and presence of the tes
tator, immediately after they have signed
it in an adjoining room, furnishes as com
plete a security against the frauds and im
positions sought to be guarded against by
the statute as the actual manual operation
,of writing their names by the witnesses un
der his eye. The identity of the witnesses
is also equally assured In both modes. In
the Massachusetts case the court was unani
mous in sustaining the will. In referring to
the holding by some of the courts that an at
testation was lnsufificient when the testator
did not and could not see the witnesses sub
scribe their names, Chief Justice Morton,
speaking for the court, says: “We are of
opinion that so nice and narrow a construc
tion is not required by the letter, and would
defeat the spirit, of our statute. ' ' '
validity of a will to be that the testator must
see the witnesses subscribe their names.
They must subscribe 'in his presence,’ but in
cases where he has lost or cannot use his
sense of sight, if his mind and hearing are
not affected, if he is sensible of what is
being done, if the witnesses subscribe in the
same room, or in such close proximity as
to be within the line of vision of one in his
position who could see, and within his hear
ing, they subscribe in his presence. ‘ ' '
In a case like the one before us, there is
much less liability to deception or imposi
tion than there would be in the case of a
blind man, because the testator, by holding
the will before his eyes, could determine by
sight that the will subscribed by the witness
es was the same will executed by him.
' ' * The door was open, and the table
was within the line of vision of the testator,
if he had been able to look, and the wit
nesses were within his hearing. The few
The statute does not make the test of
th
e
y
' tator could hear all that was said, and knew
and understood all that was done; and, aft
er the witnesses had signed it, ' ' ' it
was handed to the testator, and he read
their names as signed, and said he was glad
it was done. For the reasons before stated,
we are of opinion that this was an attesta
.tion in his presence, and was suflicient."
So, in this case, the witnesses were in the
line of the testatrix's vision if she could
have moved to one side of the bed, which
she could not do, as in the Massachusetts
case the witnesses were in the range of
the testator’s vision if he could have turned
his head. but he could not. I am better sat-
isfied with the liberal construction of the
statute and the reasoning of these two
cases than I am with the authorities cited
to the opposite, and sustaining the "nice
and narrow" interpretation of the statute;
and in the case at bar, such holding, as it
will in most cases, reaches the justice and
equity of the case, which adds to my satis
faction. No fraud was perpetrated, and none
well could have been, under the circumstan
ces of the execution of this will. But in
holding the will invalid, a fraud is commit
ted upon the testatrix, as well as her chosen
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beneficiary, by the law, and her property is
disposed of contrary to her wish and inten
tion, to those from whom she sought to keep
it away. It is not the purpose or province
of the law to do this when it can be avoid
ed. In the definition of the phrase “in the
presence of" due regard must be had to the
circumstances of each particular case, as it
is well settled by all the authorities that the
statute does not require absolutely that the,
witnessing must be done in the actual sight
of the testator, nor yet within the same
room with him. If. as before shown, they
sign within his hearing, knowledge, and un
derstanding, and so near as not to be sub
stantially away from him, they are consider
ed to be in his presence. But we hold that
the execution of this will was valid express
ly upon the ground that not only was the act
of signing by the witnesses within the hear
ing, knowledge, and understanding of the
testatrlx, but after such signing the wit
nesses came back into the room where she
was with the will, which was on one sheet
of paper; that the will was then again all
read over to her by the scrivener, and the
names of the witnesses read to her and their
signatures shown to her, and she informed
by the witnesses, or one of them in the pres
ence of the other, that the will had been
signed by them; and that she then said it
was all right, "just as she wanted it; wit
nesses and everything was all right." This
seems to us to have been a substantial com
pliance with the statute. and a witnessing
in the presence of the testatrix. The cir
cuit judge returns in his findings of fact
that his decision was based entirely on the
ground that the will was not properly wit
nessed under the statute; that, the will not
being admitted in evidence for this reason,
the case proceeded no further, the proponent
taking an exception, and resting. The con
testants announced that they were prepared
to show that the testatrix was incompetent
to make a will. The judgment of the cir
cuit court will be reversed. and a new trial
granted. The other justices concurred.
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/ ADAMS v. FIELD.
(21 Vt. 256.)
Supreme Court of Vermont. Feb. Term, 1849.
' This is an appeal from a decree of the pro
bate court of the district of Fairhaven, which
approved and allowed an instrument in writ
ing presented as the last will and testament
of Samuel Adams, deceased. It was object
/ed
by the appellant (1) that said instrument
by .any other person in his presence, and with
is express direction; (2) that it was not sub
scribed by three credible witnesses in the pres
ence of said Samuel Adams and of each oth
er; and (3) that it was not the last will and
testament of said Samuel Adams. The in
strument commenced: “I, Samuel Adams, of
Westhaven, ' * " do hereby make this,
my last will and testament;" and concluded
as follows: “In testimony whereof I have
hereunto set my band and seal, and publish
and declare this to be my last will and tes
tament, this 12th day of September, in the
year of our Lord eighteen hundred and thirty
seven. Signed, sealed, published, and de
clared by the said Samuel Adams, as his last
will and testament, in presence of us, who
have hereunto subscribed our names as wit
nesses thereof, at the request and in the
presence of the testator, and in the presence
of each other. [Seal.]" This last clause pur
ported to be signed by three witnesses; but
the name of Samuel Adams did not appear
in any place upon the instrument, except in
‘t
h
e first clause of the will, and in the attest
ing clause, as above shown. The case wa
tried before a jury, and evidence was receiv
ed which tended to prove that the will, though
.written at diffferent times, was wholly in tne
ktmstatgrfs handwriting, and that it was sub
scribed by the three attesting witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each oth
er, and at his request, he declaring it at the
time to be his will. The judge instructed
the jury that the writing by Samuel Adams
of his name in the attestation clause was a
suflicientand legal signing underthe statute of
the state; also that it was not necessary that
the writing of his name in the beginning of
the instrument should have been one simul
taneous act with the writing by him of the
whole instrument, in order to constitute the
same a legal or suflicient signing, nor was it
necessary that the whole act or intended in
strument should have been in his contempla
tion when he so wrote his name; and that,
even if the diffferent parts of the instrument
were written at different times, yet if the
jury should find that the instrument com.
menced in his name, and was wholly written
by him, and that, after it was completed, he
produced the same to the three witnesses, and
declared it to be his will in their presence,
and requested them to witness it as his will,
and that they subscribed their names to the
instrument in his presence,Iand in the pres
LAW sum. --4
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not signed by said Samuel Adams, nor
ence of each other, as witnesses to his last
will, the jury should also find that the instru
ment was sufliciently signed and executed
by him as a will. The jury found that the
instrument was signed by Samuel Adams.
and that it was attested and subscribed
agreeably to the statute, and is the last will
and tetament of said Samuel Adams, de~
ceased. Exceptions by appellant.
L. C. Kellogg and E. N. Briggs, for appel
lant. R. Pierpoint and I. T. Wright, for ap
pellee.
BENNETT, J. ' ' ' Questions arise un
der the charge of the court; and the first is,
what will satisfy the statutory requirement
of signing? Was the name of this testator
in the beginning of the will a suflicient sign
ing to satisfy the statute? in the case of
Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1
, the will was in
the handwriting of the testator, and such a
signing was held sufficient, within the stat
ute of 29 Car. 11., which required all wills
of land to be signed. In that case, as in
this, the will commenced, “I, John Stanley,
make," etc. After that decision the law was
regarded as settled in England; and the case
of Lcinayne v. Stanley has not only since
been followed in that country, but also in our
sister states which have, by legislative enact
ment, adopted the statute of Car. II. The
rule was so effectually established that courts
of justice, though repeatedly solicited, could
not be induced to break in upon it. In Eng
land they have found that a statute was nec
essary to change the law in this particular;
and in the reign of the present queen one
has been passed requiring a will to be signed
at its foot. The same has been done by some
of our neighboring states. It was said in
England, and the same has been said in the
argument of this cause, that the case of Le
mayne v. Stanley was an evasion of the stat
ute, and opened a door for the perpetuation
of frauds, and was so nonsensical that it
ought not to be followed. If that decision
had the effect to open a door for the commis
sion of frauds, this certainly is a cogent rea
son why it should not have been made in the
first place, or since followed. But I am not
aware that such has been its efifcct. Where
the whole will is in the handwriting of the
testator, and is attested by three witnesses
in the presence of the testator, and published
by him as his last will, in their presence, it
is difficult for me to see how the fact that
the signing at the top of the will is held a
sutficient signing can open a door to fraud.
It must be shown that the will possesses
finality before it can be operative; and, to
give it this quality, the testator must, at
least, at the final execution of the will, adopt
the writing of his name, at the beginning of
the will, as a signing, and so intend it. I
think in New York they have, or have had, a
statute which requires a will to be subscribed
by the testator; and this, their courts have
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said, requires a will to be signed at the foot.
This was doubtless according to the etymol
ogy of the word "subscribed;" though. if I
mistake not, the supreme court of that state
held that the introduction of the word "sub
scribe" in their statute, instead of “sign,"
should not change the construction from that
which had been given to the statute of Car.
11.; but the court of errors thought otherwise.
The etymologyof the word "sign" does not
necessarily require the signing to be at the
bottom of the instrument, and it is much a
matter of taste as to the place of signing. If
the question were res integra, we might think
the bottom of the will was the place where
the statute intended it should be signed by
the testator; but to me it seems rather imma
terial in which place the will is signed, pro
vided it is shown to have the necessary au
thenticity. The law, as established in the
Case of Stanley’s Will, has become a rule of
property, and stare decisis seems wiest to
me. When our statute of wills was enacted,
the statute of Car. II. had received a long,
fixed, and well-known construction; and
when we adopt an English statute we take
it with the construction which it had receiv
ed, and this upon the ground that such was
the implied intention of the legislature. We
think the case of Lemayne v. Stanley should
be binding upon this court. To impugn or
overthrow it would be to impugn or over
throw a rule of property which has long been
settled and acted upon. This should never be
done unless upon the most urgent necessity.
The case of Lemayne v. Stanley does not
stand alone. In Knight v. Crockford, 1 Esp.
190, it was held that where a writing began,
“I, A. B., agree," etc, it was a suflicient sign
ing, within the statute of frauds; and there
are other cases to the like effect, which, in
principle, are like the case of Lemayne v.
Stanley. See 1 Jarm. Wills, TO.
The counsel for the appellant seem con
strained to admit, in substance. that the sign
ing of a will at the beginmng may, if so de
signed, be a suflicient signing, within the
statute of Car. 11.; but they insist that, in the
case before us, the testator intended to sign
this will at the foot, and that consequently
the will was incomplete and wanting in final
ity until it was so signed. I think it is hard
ly possible not to see that, at the time the
testator inserted his name at the beginning
of the will, a further signing of it was in
contemplation before it should have authen
ticity; and if the jury have not, by their ver
dict, found the will to be complete and finish
ed at the time of its publication, it should not
have been established. In the treatise Mod
ern Probate of Wills (page 154) the writer
says: “Although the.testator may have com
menced his will thus, .I, A. B., make,’ etc.,
with an intent of repeating his signature at
the end of the will. yet if he subsequently
acknowledge the instrument as his will to the
attesting witnesses. without allusion to the
signature, we presume that the will was sufli
elently signed." In 1 Jarman on Wills (page
70) it is said: “If the testator contemplated
a further signature, which he never made.
the will must be regarded as unsigned;" and
so, doubtless, are the authorities, as well as
.
the reason 0! the thing. But he well re
marks that the reasoning seems only to apply
where the intention of repeating the signa
ture remained unchanged to the last; for a
name, originally written with such design,
might afterwards be adopted by a testator
as the final signature; and such, the writer
says, "would probably be the presumed in
tention, if the testator acknowledged the in
strument as his will to the attesting wit
nesses, without alluding to any further act of
signing." We think this is a sound view of
the subject. If the will, as the jury must
have found in this case, was attested by
three witnesses in the presence of the testa~
tor, and in presence of one another, and pub
lished by the testator in their presence as his
last will and testament, it was to all intents
and purposes an adoption of such a signature
as was then aflixed to the will; and if the
will then had such a signature as could be
.
held sufliclent imder the statute, nothing fur
ther need be done. The will then becomes
complete, and possesses all the duality which
can be required. It is the same thing. in
effect, as if the signature had been originally
made animo signandi. The case of l-lubert
v. Treherne, 42 E. C. L. 388, is regarded by
the appellant’s counsel as a leading case to
show that this will was incomplete. The
names of the parties to the agreement were
stated in the beginning of the articles; and it
concluded, "as witness our hands," but no
signatures followed. The court, it is true,
held that this agreement was not signed,
within the statute of frauds, for the reason
that the words, “as witness our hands," im
ported that a further signing was intended.
i fully accord with this decision; but it
should be remembered that there was noth
ing in that case to show an adoption of the
signatures in the commencement of the ar
ticles as the final signatures. Tindal, C. J.,
says: “There was no sufificlent original sign
ing, and no subsequent recognition." Colt
man, J., remarks that “there was no suiti
cient authority to give out the copy in behalf
of the party to be charged with the agree
ment;" and Erskine, J., says he is "not pre
pared to say that, if the articles had been
delivered by any proper authority. the sign
ing would not have been sufliclent." Had
the case shown a subsequent recognition of
the articles, I can have but little doubt the
decision would have been different. The
cases of Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & P.
238, and Schneider v. Norris, 2 Maule & S.
286, rest upon the ground of a subsequent
recognition. Though the case of Johnson v.
Dodgson, 2 Mees. & W. 659, is much relied
upon by the appellant, yet it recognizes all
the principles necessary to sustain the charge
of the county court. Lord Abinger remarks
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that the cases have decided that, although the
signing be in the beginning or middle of the
instrument, yet it is as binding as if it were
at the foot; the question being always open
to the jury whether the party, not having
signed it regularly at the foot, meant to be
bound by it as it stood or whether it was left
so unsigned because he refused to complete
it. This principle we apply to the case be
fore us. The jury have found that the testa
tor produced the will in question to the wit
nesses, and declared it to be his will, and
requested them to witness it as his will.
This shows that the testator did not then con
template a further signing of the will, and
is, in effect, a finding by the jury that the
testator adopted the instrument as it was
then signed as his will; and, if so, then the
signing was suflicient to satisfy the claims of
the statute. It might, perhaps, have been
urged with some propriety that, though this
will contains the usual ad testimonium
clause, yet that, upon its face, it furnishes no
evidence from that circumstance that a fur
ther signing was intended at the time the
testator drew up his will. This clause is
written on the original will, it appears, so
close to the seal that there is no room for his
signature opposite to the seal, or very near
to it; but, as the case was not put to the
jury upon any such ground, it is not neces
sary to consider it. The case is right, going
upon the ground that the ad testimonium
clause to this will furnished evidence prima
facie that at the time it was written a fur
ther signing was in the mind of the testator.
The case of Waller v. Waller, 1 Grat. 454, has
been pressed upon us; but we cannot accede
to the doctrine of that case. It is there said
that the finality of the testamentary intent
must be ascertained from the face of the pa
per, and that, to constitute a suflicieut sign
ing under their statute, it must appear from
the frame of the instrument, and upon its
face, that the signing was intended to give
it authenticity as a signature, and tnat it
was complete without any further signature,
and that the paper itself mustIshow all this.
We think that unless there is something pe
culiar in the statute of that state, this case
is unsound and stands opposed to the whole
current of decision under the statute of Car.
11. The case of Sarah Miles’ Will, 4 Dana,
1
-- which the appellant has referred the court
to, contains the sound doctrine on this sub
ject. Her will was drawn by a neighbor, at
her request, and under her dictation, and
commenced thus, “In the name of God, 1,
Sarah Miles," etc., and concluded with the
usual ad testimonium clause. It was read
to and approved by her, but not then signed
or attested. After this she acknowledged
the paper as her will, in the presence of the
witnesses who attested it in her presence and
at her request; she being at that time unable
to write. The principle adopted by the court
was that though her name in the beginning
of her will was not intended, when written,
to be her signature, yet, as it was so design
ed at the time of the publication, and there
was then no intention on her part further to
sign her will, it was a suflicient signing with
in their statute, which was a copy of the
English statute. This is in accordance with
the English cases.
It has been argued that the writing of the
testator’s name in the beginning of the will
could not be an act recognizing the whole
substance of the instrument, unless the whole
factum was simultaneous with it, and was
also in the contemplation of the testator at
the time he wrote his name. It may be true
that when the signing of the name in the be
ginning of the will is, in and of itself, to
be taken as a signing of the will within the
statute, without any subsequent recognition,
it must appear that the testator had the
whole object of the instrument in prospect
when he wrote his name, and that the in
strument must be completed by one simulta
neous act; yet, suppose it to be so, it cannot
apply to a case like this. Here the signa
ture did not become a suflicient signature,
within the statute, until it was adopted as
such at the time 01516.h? publication of the';
will; .and “then the whole .subject-matter 3
of the will was in the mind of the testator, "
and the will was completed by one simulta
neous act. Since the cases of Ellis v. Smith,
1 Yes. Jr. 11, and Carleton v. Gritfin, 1 Bur
rows, 549, the law has been settled that the
testator need not in fact sign the will in the.
presence of the attesting witnesses; and it
is there held, if the will be so signed that it
can in any event satisfy the statute, and the
teswtor declare it to be his will before three
witnesses, that this is equivalent to signing
it before them, and satisfies the statute. This
case has been very fully examined by the
counsel, and every consideration has been
urged that could bear upon the question be
fore us; and we may well admire the learn
ing and ability which have been displayed
in the argument, yet we do not feel at liber
ty to depart from well-established landmarks.
The statute of Car. 11. had received a settled
construction when our statute was passed,
and we must regard that construction as
binding upon us. If we should change a rule
of property, because we might think that the
more obvious and popular meaning of the
word "sign" might import a signing of the
instrument only at its foot, we should, in my
opinion, be far from duty.
The result is, the judgment of the county
court is atflrmed. ’
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In re O’NEILIS WILL./ (91 N. Y. 516.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March 6,
1883.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
Proceedings before the surrogate of Essex
county for the probate of an instrument pur
porting to be the will of James O’Nell, de
ceased. The will was drawn upon a printed
blank of four pages, with a printed heading
and formal commencement at the top of the
first page, and a printed formal termination
at the foot of the third page, where the tes-,
The inter-itutor and the witnesses signed.
vening blank spaces on the first, second~ and
third pages were filled with the peculiar pro
visions of the will, but, being insufificient for
all of the writing, about: two-thirds of the
last written article was carried over to the
fourth page.
bequests, hereiubefore named and mentioned.
either at private—[Here followed, at the endq
of the third page, the appointment of execu
tors, the signature of the testator, the attes
tation clause and signatures of subscribing
witnesses, and then at the top of the fourth.
page appeared the following paragraph:]—0r
public sale, and in the manner which they
will deem the most profitable and advanta
geous to my said estate; but in no case
shall my said executors be process by law or
otherwise to sell and convey and dispose of
my said real property before the lapse of five
.
years after my death, unless my said execu
tors shall see fit: and proper to sell and dis
pose of the same by virtue of the power and ,
authority hereinbefore given them as afore
said."
tor, the portion written at the top of the.
fourth page being read as if written in the:
blank space preceding the printed matter on
the third page. The surrogate admitted the
will to probate, and contestants appealed to
the general term, where the decree of the
surrogate was reversed. Proponents appeal
ed to this court.
Matthew Hale, for appellants. Samuel
Hand, for respondents.
RUGER, C. J. The matter in controversy
arises between some of the heirs at law and
the executors over the alleged improper exe
cation of what purports to be the will of
James OINeil. The instrument was drawn
upon a printed blank, consisting of four pa
ges, the formal commencement being printed
on the first page, and the formal termination,
also printed, appearing at the foot of the
third page; and the intermediate space be
ing originally left blank for the insertion of
such special provisions as the testator might
Such article was as follows:
“(13) And I authorize and empower my ex-i
ecutors hereinafter named to sell, convey, as- -
sign, and transfer my real property for theq
The will so drawn was read to testa..
desire to make. When presented for pro
bate, the entire blank space was filled in,
and, it being apparently insuflicient in ex
tent to contain all of the provisions sought to
be introduced into the will, the thirteenth
seems to have been carried over and fin
ished on the first eight or ten lines of the
fourth page. That portion of the will seems
in no way to be authenticated, and leaves a
blank space of two-thirds of a page below
the written lines. The names of the testa
tor and of the witnesses were subscribed to
wards the bottom of the third page, below
the formal printed termination of the will,
land there only. The portion of the thirteenth
paragraph. immediately preceding the printed
termination, was manifestly incomplete, and
lthe lines written on the fourth page were ob
viously a continuation of this broken para
graph. The two portions were not, however,
sought to be connected by means of a refer
ence, an asterisk, words, or symbol, indicat
ing the relation to each other. Material pro
visions are contained in the writing on the
fourth page. Upon this state of facts, the
|question is raised that this is not such a sub
iscription and signing by the testator and wit
.nesses, at the “end of the will," as is re
quired by our statute. 2 Rev. St. p. 63~ § 40.
The application of some of the elemen
tary principles governing the interpreting of
statutes would seem to furnish a safe and
certain guide for the determination of the
question presented. The words of the stat
ute must be construed in their plain. obvi
ous sense, according to their signification
‘among the people to whom they were direct
ed. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 312; Sto
ry, Coast. § 449. Also that construction must
be adopted which will effectuate, as far as
possible, the intent of the framers of the
statute, and obviate the anticipated evils
which were the occasion thereof. Tonnele v.
. Hall, 4 N. Y. 140. The legislative intent was
doubtless to guard against frauds and uncer
tainty in the testamentary disposition of
property, by prescribing fixed and certain
rules by which to determine the validity of
all instruments purporting to be wills of de
ceased persons. Reviser’s notes, Willis v.
Lowe, 5 Notes Cas. Adm. & Ecc. 428. The
question, then, arises whether the “end of the
will" referred to in the statute means the
actual physical termination of the instru-~
ment, or that portion thereof which the tesI
tator intended to be the end of the willl
While it is possible that. in isolated cases;
the latter construct:ion might sometimes pre-
clude the perpetration of a wrong, it certainly
would not satisfy the general object of the
statute of furnishing a certain fixed and defi
nite rule applicable to all cases. While the
primary rule governing the interpretation of
wills, when admitted to probate, recognizes
and endeavors to carry out the intention of
the testator, that rule cannot be invoked in
the construction of the statute regulating
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their execution. In the latter case courts do
not consider the intention of the testator, but
that of the legislature.
In considering the question stated upon au
thority, some cases are found which appar
ently sustain the contention of appellant’s
counsel. In all of them, however, there was
a failure to observe the rules of construction
which we consider controlling. We think,
however, that the weight of authority favors
the theory that the statute fixes an inflexible
rule by which to determine the proper execu
tion of all testamentary instruments. The
cases cited from the English Reports, except
certain ones hereinafter referred to, do not
afford much assistance in construing our stat
ute, from the fact that they cover a period
during which material changes were wrought
in their statutes, and the further fact that
those statutes differ in material respects from
our own.
The statutes of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 24. among
other things, provided that no signature
“shall be operative to give effect to any dis
position or direction which is underneath, or
which follows it, nor shall it give effect to
any disposition or direct-ion inserted after the
signature shall be made."
might be deduced arguments suflicient to dis
pose of the question involved in this case, if
our statutes contained similar provisions.
As early as 1847, Sir Jenner Fast, in the
case of Willis v. Lowe, supra, says: "Cases
have occurred before the real purpose of the
act had been ascertained, in which the court
has given construction to the statute. as far
as possible, to fulfill the real intention of the
parties;
The court was of the opinion, at first, that
the intention of this part of the act was to
remove the difliculty which had arisen un-.
der the statute of frauds, by the construction
of which the signature at the commencement
of a will was equally good wit-h the signa
ture at its end. But there was another rea
son for the provision, viz., to guard against
fraud. The act required the signature to be
at the foot or end of the will, to prevent any
addition to the will being made after its exe ~
cation in presence of witnesses." In Dal
low’s Case, L. R. 1 Prob. 8: Div. 189, imme
diately following the signatures of the testa
tor and the witnesses was the clause, “My ex
ecutors are," A., B., and C. The will con
tained clauses in the body referring to the ex
ecutors as "hereinafter named," but they
were named in no other place except after
the signature. It was held that the clause
naming the executors could not be admitted
to probate, Sir J. P. Wilde saying: “The
question is whether, under St. Leonard’s act,
(15 & 16 Vict., ) the clause appointing execu
tors can be admitted to probate. Althoughl
parol evidence may show that the clause ap
pointing executors was written before the
signature, it is not made manifest by any
From this alone I
but the court is under the necessity'
of looking at the clear intention of the act.'
words in the will of the testator so describ
ing that clause when he referred 'to my ex
ecutors hereinafter named.' And parol evi
dence cannot be received for that purpose;
and it seems to me, also, that it would be
directly contrary to the statute, which re
quires the will to be signed at the foot or
end, to permit probate of this clause." In
Sweetland v. Sweetland, 4 Swab. & T. 6, Sir
J. P. Wilde says: “I have no doubt‘ the tes
tator did intend to execute in proper form
the will; the question is whether he has
done so." In Hays v. Harden, 6 Pa. St. 409,
Gibson. C. J., says: “Signing at the end of
the will was required to prevent evasion of
its provisions." In Glancy v. Glancy, 17
IOhio St. 134, Day, C. J., says: “The testa
tor is required by this portion of the statute
to sign his will at the end thereof. The rea
son of this requisition is obviously to pre
vent improper alterations of a will.“ The
provision is a judicious one, and care should
ibe taken not to break in upon it by a lax in
terpretation.
We think this question has been substan
.tially determined in this court in the case of
Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 409.
Folger, J.. says: "Can we say that the end
of the will has been found until the last
word of all the provisions of it has been
‘reached? To say that where the name is,
‘there is the end of the will. is not to observe
the statute. That requires that where the
end of the will is, there shall be the name. It
is to make a new law to
sagthat
where we
find the name, there is the ad of the will.
IThe statutory provision requiring the sub
scription of the name to.be at the end is a
wholesome one, and was adopted to remedy
'real or threatened evils. It should not be
, frittered away by exceptions."
It will be seen, in all of the cases cited,
.there was no reason to doubt the testator’s
qintention to make a valid disposition of his
property; and yet in each case the will was
denied probate. because in the execution
thereof the testator did not conform to the
'provisions of the statute, in failing to place
.his signature at the physical end of the will.
It is claimed by the counsel for appellant
, that the clause in question may be regarded
,.as an interlincation, and thus held to be con
‘structlvely a part of the body of the will.
iWe think that this claim cannot be support
led
without opening the door to all of the
’evils which the statute was intended to pre
lvent, and substantially abrogaiing its whole
some provisions. The same argument would
validate the addition of a fourteenth para
,graph to the unauthenticated lines appearing
on the fourth page, and lead, by logical de
lduction, to indefinite extension.
I It is said, also, that the cases holding that
a paper or document referred to in the body
of a will may be considered as a part there
of, afford support to the construction claimed
by appeliant’s counsel. It is not believed
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that any paper or document containing testa
mentary provisions not authenticated accord
ing to the provisions of our statute of wills
has yet been held to be a part of a valid tes
tamentary disposition of property, simply be
cause it was referred to in the body of the
will. It was held in Tonnele v. Hall. 4 N. Y.
140, that a map appearing after the signature
upon a will, and said to be a reduced copy
of a map made by the testator of his real
estate and filed in the county clerk’s oflice of
New York. and which was referred to in the
body of the will, did not require the signa
ture of the testator and witnesses to follow
it in order to make it a part of the will. It
is to be observed that the paper there in
question was referred to merely to identify
the subject devised, and contained no testa
mentary provisions. It is further to be oi}
served that the will in the case cited was
complete without such additions, and that
the maps could probably have been used as
evidence to identify the property devised.
even if no reference had been made thereto in
the will. Independent of authority, the ar
gument, upon principle, leads inevitably to
the conclusion that the will was improperly
executed. The signatures to it are confess
edly between the various operative and dis
posing parts of the instrument, and in no
sense at the literal or physical end of the
will. That the signatures are where the
testator intended the will should end, we
have already seen, is not a material circum
stance. A blank space covering two-thirds of
a page of foolscap paper is left immediately
after the language we are invited to insert in
the will, and no possible guard is provided
against the addition thereto of any such pro
vision as the person in possession of~ this
paper may be tempted to make. There can
be no answer to the proposition that to up
hold this will is to defeat the object of the
statute in requiring a will to be subscribed
at the end. The opportunity of adding in
definitely to a testamentary provision will b6
legalized by so holding. and the statute, in-
stead of establishing an inflexible rule by
which to determine the proper execution of a
will, will be open to as many different cou
structions as varying circumstances may in
vite.
We thus arrive at the conclusion that the
will in question was not properly executed,
and it cannot, therefore, be admitted to pro
hate. The claim that such parts of the will
as precede the signatures may be received,
and the remainder rejected, cannot be sup
ported. The statute denies probate to a will
not executed in accordance with its provi
sions. It is either valid or invalid, as an en
tirety, as far as its execution is concerned
It is undeniable that the portion following
the testator’s signature contains material pro
visions, and formed part of his scheme in
lmaking a will. At all events, we have no
,way of determining the extent to which he
deemed them materiar, and cannot give effect
to one part, and deny force to another. This
point was decided adversely to the appel
lant in Sisters of Charity v. Kelly and other
cases above cited. The judgment should be
aflirmed.
All concur, except RAPALLO, J., not vot
ing.
Judgment aflirmed.
a_.
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'/ In re MACKAY’S WILL.
(110 N. Y. 611, 18 N. E. Rep. 433.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 26, 1888.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
Application to surrogate’s court of St. Law
rence county to probate the will of James
Mackay, deceased. From a decree refusing
probate the executors and legatees appealed
to the general term, where the surrogate’s
decree was aflirmed, and they appeal to the
court of appeals. For opinion of the general
term, see 44 Hun, 571.
Louis Hasbrouck, for appellants.
Sawyer, for respondent.
Wm. H.
EARL, J. The subscribing witnesses came
to the dwelling-house of the deceased by pre
vious appointment, and, while seated at his
writing-desk, he said to them: "Gentlemen,
what I sent for you for was to sign my last
will and testament." Thereupon he took
from his writingrdesk the instrument offered
for probate, and, laying it before the wit
nesses, said: “It is now all ready, awaiting
your signatures." He then presented the in
strument-to the witness McCarrier for his
signature, and he signed it, saying. as he did
so, “1 am glad, Father Mackay, you are mak
ing your will at this time; I donIt suppose
it will shorten your life any," to which he re
plied, "Yes," he wanted it done, and oil! his
mind; and then the witness Mulligan, who
had joined in this conversation, signed the
instrument, as a witness. At the time of ex
hibiting the instrument to the subscribing
witnesses he told them it was his will; but
he handed it to them so folded that they could
see no part of the writing. except the attesta
tion clause, and they did not see either his
signature or seal.
'
There would undoubtedly have been a
formal execution of the will, in compliance
with the statutes, if the witnesses had at the
time seen the signature of the testator to the
will. Subscribing witnesses to a will are re
quired by law, for the purpose of attesting
and identifying the signature of the-testator,
and that they cannot do unless at the time
of the attestation they see it. And so it has
been héld in this court. In Lewis v. Lewis,
11 N. Y. 221, where the alleged will was not
subscribed by the testator in the presence of
the witnesses, and when they signed their
names to it it was so folded that they could
not see whether it was signed by him or not.
and the only acknowledgment or declaration
made by him to them, or in their presence.
as to the instrument, was, “I declare the
within to be my will and deed,“ it was held
that this was not a sufificient acknowledg
ment of his subscription to the witnesses
within the statute. In that case Allen, J.,
writing the opinion, said: “A signature nei~
ther seen, identified, nor in any manner re
ferred to as a separate and distinct thing,
cannot in any just sense be said to be ac
knowledged by a reference to the entire in
strument by name to which the signature
may or not be at the time subscribed." In
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 16 Hun, 97, afifirmed in
this court in 77 N. Y. 596, the deceased came
into a store where two persons were, and
produced a paper, and said: “I have a pa
per which I want you to sign." One of the
persons took the paper, and saw what it was
and the signature of the deceased. The tes
tator then said: “This is my will; I want
you to witness it." Both of the persons there
upon signed the paper as witnesses, under
the attestation clause. The deceased then
took the paper, and said, “I declare this to
be my last will and testament," and delivered
it to one of the witnesses for safekeeping.
At the time when this took place the paper
had the name of the deceased at the end
thereof. It was held that the will was not
properly executed, for the reason tnat one of
the witnesses did not see the testator’s sig
nature, and as to that witness there was
not a suflicient acknowledgment of the signa
ture or a proper attestation. It is true that
in Willis v. Mott, 36 N. Y. 486, 491, Davies,
C. J., writing the opinion of the court, said
that “the statute does not require that the
testator shall exhibit his subscription to the
will at the time he makes the acknowledg
ment. It would therefore follow that when
the subscription is acknowledged to an at
testing wltness it is not essential that the sig
nature be exhibited to the witness." This is
a mere dictum, unnecessary to the decision in
that case, and therefore cannot have weight
as authority. The formalities prescribed by
the statute are safeguards thrown around the
testator to prevent fraud and imposition. To
this end the witnesses should either see the
testator subscribe his name, or he should,
the signature being visible to him and to
them, acknowledge it to be his signature.
Otherwise imposition might be possible, and
sometimes the purpose of the statute might
be frustrated. We think, therefore, that pro
bate of the will was properly refused, and
that the judgment below should be aflirmed,
without costs. All concur. I
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I SIMMONS et al. v. LEONARD et a1.
(18 S. W. 230, 91 Tenn. 1S8.)
Supreme Court of Tennessee. Feb. 2, 1892.
Error to circuit court, Marshall county;
RonER‘r CAN~rmcLL, J udge.
Bill by D. P. Simmons and
othersflagainst John M. Leonard and others. ex- -'
ecutors under the will of Margaret Sim
mons, deceased, to set aside the will and
for an accounting. From adecree in favor
of defendants. complainants bring error.
Reversed.
W. W. Walker, P. C. Smithson. and W.
N. Cowden, for plaintiffs in error. Jones
& Murray, J. H. Lewis. Z. W. Ewing. W.
Leonard, and L. A.Thompson, for defend
ants in error.
CALDWELL,J. This is a contested will
case. in February. 1577, Miss Margaret
Simmons. who was both old and illiter
ate. died at her residence in Marshall coun
ty, leavingavaluable tract of land and
some personalty. In March following a
certain paper writing. alleged to be her
last will and testament, and making dis
position of her entireestate. was admitted
to probate. in common form. in the coun
ty court of that county. Dr. John M.
Leonard. the principal devisec. was quali
fied as executor. at the same time. In
July, 1887, D. P. Simmons.a brother of the
deceased. and other relatives. filed a bill in
the ehancery court. alleging that the said
instrument was not her last will and tes
tament, and seeking an account with the
executor. in pursuance of the direction
of the chancellor in interlocutory order,
complainants sought to make up and try
an issue of llevisa vit vel non in the circuit
court: but the circuil. judge refused to
take jurisdiction because of the pendency
of the suit in the chancery court. (in ap
peal in error this court decided (89 Tenn.
622, 15 S. W. Rep. 444) that the circuit
court alone had jurisdiction to try an is
sue of devisavit vel mm, and thereupon re
manded the case. The honorable circuit
judge thereafter tried the issue without a
jury. and pronounced judgment in favor
of the will. Contestants have appealed in
error.
Our first inquiry shall be whether or not
Eleazar Cochran and W. F. McDaniel,
whose names appear on the propounded
instrument as those of subscribing wit
nesses. make out a case of due and formal
execution under the statute. How that
is can be determined only by a careful con
sideration of what they say occurred at
the time. the certificate to which their
names are attached being in proper form,
and reciting all necessary facts. McDaniel
testified that he was notified by Dr. John
M. Leonard that Margaret Simmons
wanted him to witness her will; that he
afterwards went by Leonard’s house. and
they went together to her house. that she
brought a paper out on the porch and
told him she desired him to witness her
will, whereupon he then and there, in her
presence, and at her request. signed his
name to the paper as a subscribing wit
ness; that he, at that time. saw the
namesoi .\iargaret Simmons. the testatrix,
~make it.
and Eleazar Cochran. the other subscrib
ing witness. upon the paper; that no one
was then present except the testatrix, Dr
Leonard, a small negro. and witness;
and. finnlly, the paper in contest being
produced. the witness said it was the
same to which he subscribed his name at
the time and under the circumstances al
ready detailed. This witness shows him
self to have been competent, and by his
testimony makes a case of due execution,
so far as one subscribing witness can
It was not at all necessary that
he should see the testatrix sign the paper“
nor that heshould subscribe it in the pres
nce of the other witness. Logue v. Stan
ton. l') Sneed. 98; Rose v. Allen. 1 Cold. 24;
Bartee v. Thompson. 8 Baxt. 512: Beadles
v. Alexander, 9 Baxt. 606: 2 Greeni. Ev. §
676: 1 Jarm. Wills. (Rand. & T. Ed.) 212.
213; Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 349;
Jauncey v. Thorne. 2 Barb. Ch. 40; Bur
well v. Corbin. l0 Amer. Dec. 494: Eia v.
Edwards. 16 Gray, 92: Tilden v. 'l'llden. 13
Gray. I10; Ellis v. Smith, 1 Ves. Jr. 16;
Eelbeck v. Granherry. 2 Amer. Dec. 624;
Johnson v. Johnson. (ind. Sup.) 7 N. E.
Rep. 201; 4 Kent. Comm. "516; Rosser v.
Franklln.6Grat.i. Cochramtheothersub
scribing witness. died before the trial. and
therefore could not be examined in the
presence of the court: but his deposition.
which had been taken in the chancery
cause. was used as evidence in this case.
He deposed that he was a neighbor of
Margaret Simmons. deceased; that Dr.
John M. Leonard called on him twice, and
told him she wanted him to witness her
will: that a negro man. living on her
place. was subsequently sent for him, and
he then went to her house; that he found
her alone, and when he first got there she
told him she wanted him “to sign a will" ,
for her. though she did not then produce
it. or say more about it; that Dr. Leon
ard afterwards came and "got the will out
of the bureau. or off the top of it,"and
then, at the request of witness. signed the
name of witness to it; that this request
was made by witness because he was so
nearly blind that he could not see well
enough to sign his own name; that he
(witness) did not have the will in his own
hands. or see the testatrix have it in her
hands. at any time; that she did not sign
it in his presence. and he did not know
whether she signed it before he went to
her house or after he left. if atali; that
he did not have the will read. or learn its
contents. His name. without more, is
attached to the certificate. It isI“ELEA
zAR CUCHRAN," simply. and not “ELEA
his
zAR X COCHRAN.” as is usual when a per’
mark.
men, unable to write, has another sign his
name for him. There is no mark or sign
to indicate that Cochran did not sign
his own name. though the fact is. as he
states himself. that it was written by Dr.
eonard. at his request. Clearly Cochran
was not a proper subscribing witness.
He was competent in the sense of being
disinterested. but the part he took in the
execution of the alleged will did not give
him the full character and functions essen
tial to a subscribing witness. His evi
dence does not establish such a subscrip
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/ the other.
tfon as the law requires. To constitute a
valid will of real estate the instrument
must be subscribed by two witnesses, at
least, neither of whom is interested in the
devise. Code. (Mill & V.) §3003; Maxwell
v. Hifl,89 Tenn. 588.15 S. W. Rep. 253;
Guthrie v. Owen, 2 Humph. 202; Davis v.
avis.6 Lea.543. The attempted subscrip
tion by Cochran is incomplete, because
his name, being signed by another person.
- s not accompanied by some mark or sign
indicating his adoption of that other per
son’n net. This court has gone no further
in liberal construction of the word "sub
scribe" than to hold that a person whose
name is written by another, and who
makes his mark thereto, is a good attest
ing witness to a will. Ford v. Ford, 2
Humph. 96, 97. Though a mark so made,
is held to be a suflicient subscription, it is
never advisable, where it can be avoided,
to employ marksmen as witnesses. 1
Jarm. Wills. 213. It seems to have been
deemed suilicient, not only because the
name of the witness is written by his au
thority, but; also because, in making his
mark, be has a share in the writing; as
when another person guides his hand and
he makes his own signature. Chase v.
Kittredge, 87 Amer. Dec. 694; Jesse v.
Parker. 52 Amer. Dec. 102: Montgomery
v. Perkins, 74 Amer. Dec. 419. By statute
the word “ ' signature ’ or ' subscription ’ in
cludes a mark. the name being written near
the mark. and witnessed." Code, (Mill. &
V.) §48. There is even a greater objection,
If possible, to Cochran as a subscribing wit
ness, though not interested in the devise
himself. Dr. Leonard,who wrote his name
for him, was theprinclpal devisee under the
will. This made the subscription utterly
ineiiectual. fCochran, though legally com
petent to become a subscribing witness,
could not eifectively perform the act of
subscription through another person, who
was legally incompetent to become such
witness in his own name and right. To
permit the devisee to write the name of
the subscribing witness would expose the
will to little less danger of wrongful alter
ation and substitution than would existlf
the devisee himself were allowed to be_
:ome the witness. The same evil conse
quences would follow in the one case as in
it he may sign the name of one
subscribing witness, hemaysign thenames
of both. and in that way become a more
potent factor in theexecution and probate
of the will than if he were allowed to be
come a subscribing witness himself.
He may not lawfully take the matter so
largely into his own hands. A proper
/ construction of the statute excludes the
the subscribing witness, which is essen
tial to a valid subscription. Again,
though identification has always been the
main reason for requiring subscribing
witnesses in the execution of whim-Coch
wags-not asked to identify the paper
propounded in this case as the one he
claims to have witnessed for Margaret
Simmons. Presumably he could not have
done so if asked. Indeed. he shows
affirmatively that he could not. He made
niLinspection" oLlheJnstsumenh- to-which
’he requested Dr. Leonard to sign his
name; did not have sufiicient eyesight to
&devisee
from the doing of any act, even for
inspect it, hence he could not afterwards
recognize it by its physical appearance.
No name, mark, or sign did he impress
upon it, that subsequent recognition
might be assured, or even rendered possi
ble. Nor was he informed of its contents,
so that he might thereby preserve its iden
tity in his memory. Oi course, it was not
essential that the witness should be in
formed oi the provisions of the will, (Hig
don’s Will, 6 J. J. Marsh. 444; Jauncey v.
Thorne, 2 Barb. Ch. 40; Ela v. Edwards,
16 Gray, 92; ~l'ilden v.Tllden, 13 Gray, 110;
lJarm. Wills. 231;) yet, it the information
had been imparted, it might have served
him as one means oi future iden tiflcatlon.
It was necessary, however, that some
thing should occur, and that he should do
some act, (and that according to law,)
which, it remembered, would thereafter
enable him to swear to the identityenqhe
paper. If no such thing occurred, and do
such act was done, then there was no
valid subscription. We do not hold that
the fact of due subscription can be shown
alone by the subscribing witness; on the
contrary, it Is well settled that such fact
may be established by other persons,
though his recollection fall him, or he be
come openly hostile to the will. Rose v.
Allen, 1 Cold. 23; Jones v. Arterburn, l1
Humph. 9%: Alexander v. Beadle. 7 Cold.
12S: Dewey v. Dewey, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 349;
Jauncey v.Thorue. 2 Barb. Ch. 40. But
the~ proof of other persons will not suflice,
unless it in truth shows that all formali
ties requisite to a valid subscription were
observed. There is no such prooi of other
persons in this case. Cochran states the
whole transaction, so far as he had part
in it, without lapse of memory or un
frlendliness to thecause oi proponent; and
no one discloses any additional fact oc
curring at the time he is said to have sub
scribed the wlll. Whether the paper pro
pounded is the same he attempted to sub
scribe or a different one cannot possibly
be determined from the complctest narra
tion of all that was then said and done.
Speaking alone from the part he took in
the matter. lrr. Leonard says it is the
same. He recognizes his own handwrit
ing in the name of the witness,and in
that way, by something he did himself,
and not by anything the witness did,is
enabled to make the statement. The ne
cessity and use of his evidence for so im
portant a purpose furnish a striking illus
tration of the correctness of our conclu
sion that Cochran’s attempted subscrip
tion was inoperative in law,becausehia
name was written by a devisee under the
will.
Aside from the questions already dis
cussed. it is by no means clear that the
paper referred to by Cochran was ready
for subscription when he was called upon
to witness it. 0 does not know whether
the ~tcatatrix~hal 'oigned it or not. He
did not see her signature. and no one told
him it was on the paper. Since it is the
signature of the testator that subscrib
ing witnesses are to attest. there can be
no valid attestation or subscription un
less it be a fact; that the testnior has act
ually signed his name, or caused it to be
signed, before they subscribed their
names. There is no will to witness until
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it has been signed by the testator. Chase
v. Kittredge, 11 Allen. 49. See, ai 0, Reed
v. Watson, 271ml. 448; 1 Jarm. Wills, 253,
254: Shaw v. Neville, 33 Eng. Luw & Eq.
615; Lewis v. Lewis, 11 N. Y. 220; Rag
lund v. Huntingdon. l Ired. 565; Cox’s
Will, 1 Jones, (N. C.) 324. It is not essen
tial that the testator sign his name in
the presence of the subscribing witnesses,
nor that they actually see his signature
at all. Ellis v. Smith, 1 Ves. Jr. ll; 1
Jarm. Wills, (Rand. & T. Ed.) 212. 213:
Dewey v. Dewey, 35 Amer. Dec. 367; Ein v.
Edwards. 16 Gray, 92: Tifden v. Tifden,
i3 Gray, 110. The production of the will
with his name signed to it, and in such a
way that; his signature may be seen by
the witnesses, accompanied by a request
of the testator that they witness it as his
will, is a sufficient acknowledgment of
the signature to render the will vultd.
ld.: Jauncey v. Thorne. 45 Amer. Dec. 432;
1 Jarm. Wills, 254. in Tllden v. Tifden. 13
Gray, 110, the last of three subscribing
witnesses neither saw the testator’s sig
nature, norheard him make any allusion
to it. Yet in that case it was held that
the words, “I wish you to witness this,"
constituted a sufficient acknowledgment,
when considered in connection with the
fact that the testator, who used the ex
presslon, at the same time presented to
the witness, for attestation, a paper,
which he had already signed as his will,
and to which he had procured the names
of two other witnesses, who did see his
name before they signed their own names.
Giving the facts disclosed in this record
the most favorable construction of which
they are fairly susceptible, it may well he
gravely doubted that the name of the al
leged testatrix had been signed to the
particular paper propounded at the time
Cochran attempted to become a witness.
It is true. she is shown to have said to
the witness that she desired him “to sign
a will" for her; but she did notoay any-.
thing about having already signed it
herself, nor did she produce it then or
afterwards. After she made that request
she seems to have done nothing, except
acquiesce in the production of some paper
from her bureau, by another person. and
its presentment by him to the witness for
the latter’s name,—that other person be
ing the principal beneficiary, and the sup
posed testatrix being old and illiterate.
Though allowed the same weight in this
court as the verdict oi a Jury, (Eiler v.
Richardson, 89 Tenn. 576. 15 S. W. Rep.
650,) the finding oi the trial judge on the
main question in this case is without
legal support. That the contested paper
was duly executed as the will of Margaret
Simmons is not established by sufificient
competent proof. Ordinarily the testi
mony of one witness is entirely sufficient
to sustain the finding of the court or ver
dict olajury upon an issue of fact; but
that rule is not controlling in a case like
this, where the law requires two witnesses
to make out thematterin issue. ’ifhcstat
ute requires two competent subscribing
\Vitnessesin every devise oilund, and noth
ing less than that wllljustify ajudgmentln
favor of the will. The law prescribes the
quantum of proof requisite in such a case;
and neither the jury, nor court sitting asa
jury, is allowed to find in favor of the will
on less evidence than that prescribed.
There is no dispute as to the facts with
reference to Cochran’s attempted sub
scription. Whether under those facts he
was a competent subscribing witness is a
question of law. We think he clearly was
not. Then~ in legal contemplation, there
was but one subscribing witness, and the
judgment in favor of the will was neces
sarily erroneous. Reverse and enter judg
ment here.
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NEWCOLIB v. WEBSTER et al.
(113 N. Y. 191, 21 N. E. Rep. 77.)
Court of Appeals of New York. April 16, 1889.
Appeal from a judgment of the general
term, fifth department, of the supreme court,
aflirming a judgment of Monroe county spe
cial term, upon trial by the court without a
jury. There was no dispute about the facts.
It appeared that Angeline B. Walker died
on the 7th of June, 1884, leaving real and
personal property in Monroe county; that by
her will, dated April 23. 1881, she, by its
first clause, gave to her sister Olive, for life,
house No. 89 Frank street; remainder to Mrs.
A. B. Johnson, Mary A. Hatch, and Mififcent
J Johnson. By the second clause. to Anna
Newcomb, for line, house and lot No. 14
Spencer street; remainder to the surviving
children of Anna. Third. She directed house
No. 89% Frank street to be sold, and its pro-
’
ceeds applied in part to the erection of a
monument on “my lot in Mt. Hope;" $100 to
the Mt. Hope commissioners to keep the
same and lot in order; and the residue to
Emeline Soper, William Springstead, Huber
Herrick, Nelly Soper. Frances Spencely, and
Elliot Hodges, of Rochester, N. Y., share
and share alike, after first paying $100 each
to Mrs. Rose Chrichton, of Rochester. N. Y.,
and to Charles P. Hodges. of Cleveland, Ohio,
which “I bequeath to them." The legacy of
William Springstead to be deposited in the
Monroe County Savings Bank, and paid over,
with its accumulations, when he arrives at
21 years of age. Fourth. Directs No. 102
Jones street to be sold, and proceeds to be
divided between the six children of George
Walker. Fifth. She gives her piano to Rob
ert P. Newcomb, son of Anna L. Newcomb; .
and all her household furniture and house
hold goods and effects to her nieces. Mrs.
Adelia Johnson, Mary Hatch, Anna New-I
comb, Ida Springstead, of Rochester, and
Minerva Herrick, of Watertown, N. Y., and .
also all residuary interests and estate; and'
flnaliy appoints Aaron N. Newcomb and Ed
ward Webster executors of the will, with
power to sell and convey real estate. It fur
ther appeared that in the year 1882 she sold
lot 14, referred to in the second clause of the
will. and also sold 102 Jones street, referred
to in the fourth clause. Afterwards. in 1884,
she executed an instrument in these words:
"I. Angelina B. Walker, of the city of Roch
ester, county of Monroe, and state of New
York, do make, publish, and declare this first
codicil to my last will and testament, here
'
by revoking so much of my said last will
and testament as is inconsistent with the pro
visions of this codicil: Item First. I direct
one hundred dollars to be set aside and paid
over to the commissioners of Mount Hope 21$
a perpetual fund, the interest of which shall
be annually expended to keep the lot in said
Mount Hope belonging to my late husband,
Robert Walker, and my brother, Perry Hodg
es. Second. I give and bequeath to the Roch
ester Home for the Friendless one hundred
and fifty dollars. Third. I give and bequeath
to the Frank Street (otherwise Sixth) Meth
odist Episcopal Church of Rochester, to be
expended by the trustees thereof towards
erecting a parsonage for the use of their pas
tor, the sum of five hundred (500) dollars.
Fourth. I give and bequeath to the Roches
ter Orphan Asylum three hundred dollars,
to be expended for the rearing and educa
tion of an orphan, Belle Peer by name.
Fifth. 1 give and bequeath to Hubert Her
rick, of Rochester, five hundred dollars, to
be placed on interest in the Monroe County
Savings Bank, paid over to him on arriving
at twenty-one years of age. If he shall die
before that date, then said legacy shall go
to his mother, Minerva Herrick. Sixth. I
give and bequeath to my sisters, Emeline
Soper and Olive J. Hatch, each the sum of
five hundred (500) dollars. Seventh. I give
and bequeath to the six (6) children of my
brother-in-law, George Walker, each the sum
of two hundred (200) dollars. Eighth. I give
and bequeath to my four nieces, Mrs. Anna
Newcomb, Frances Spencely, (of Canada)
Adelia B. Johnson, and Mary N. Hatch, all
the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate,
both real and personal. to be divided equally
between them, and share and share alike."
The trial judge found “that no part of said
will is revoked by said codicil, except the
second and fourth clauses thereof, and the
residuary devise in the fifth clause of said
will, but that all other legacies and devises
in said will and codicil ought to be carried
into effect."
D. C. Barnum, for appellants. Roy 0.
Webster, for respondents.
DANFORTII, J., (after stating the facts as
above.) Both will and codicil were admit
ted to probate by the surrogate of Monroe
county, and administration granted to the
persons named in the will as executors, and,
some difference having arisen as to the effect
of the codicil, this action was brought by
Executor Newcomb and others against Ex
ecutor Webster and others, for the purpose
of obtaining a judicial construction of its
provisions. The plaintiffs contend that the
- codicil revokes all the provisions of the will,
except those relating to the appointment of
executors, while the defendants suppose that
both instruments can stand, and the legacies
and devises in each take effect. The court at
special and general terms have substantially
sustained the view of the defendants. and
from that decision the plaintiffs appeal. It
may be taken as a well-settled general rule
that a will and codicil are to be construed to
gether, as parts of one and the same instru
ment, and that a codicil is no revocation of
a will, further than it is so expressed. \Vest
cott v. Cady. 5 Johns. Ch. 343. But if, re
garded as one instrument, it is found to con
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taln repugnant bequests in separate clauses, I
one or the other, or both, must fail; and there
tore the rule is that of the two the bequest
contained in the later clause shall stand.
The same principle applies with greater force
where there are two distinct instruments re
lating to the same subject-matter. in such
a case an inconsistent devise or bequest in
the second or last instrument is a complete
revocation of the former. But if part is in
consistent. and part is consistent. the first
will is deemed to be revoked only to the exI
tent of the discordant dispositions, and so
far as may be necessary to give effect to
the one last made. Nelson v. McGifYert, 3
Barb. Ch. 158. In the case under considera
tion it appears that the testatrix. in her life
time, and after the making of the will, so
dealt with the principal real estate describ
ed in it as by sale to revoke the gifts men
tioned in the second and fourth clauses. She
also acquired other real estate, and en
tertained a desire that beneficiaries other
than those first selected should share in her
bounty. These circumstances would natural
ly require a redistribution of her estate, and
in view of them we think it clear that the
testatrix intended to make new disposition
of her entire property. Such is, at any rate,
the effect of the language employed by her.
There is, moreover, an express revocation of
so much of the will as is inconsistent with
the provisions of the codicil. If we apply
this language literally, it is obvious that the
entire will is to be discarded, except so much
as appoints executors and defines their pow
ers. The codicil does not deal with that sub
ject, and to that extent the testatrix was jus
instrument. The codicil does, however, make
the decedent, either by special legacy or re.
siduary clause. It is capable oi.' operation
without aid from the will, and in fact is en
tirely independent of it. The property, di
vided according to its terms, would leave
nothing to apply upon the legacies or be
quests of the will. The codicil, moreover, in
troduces new beneficiaries; and, while it pro
vides also for persons already named in the
will, does so, not by referring to the will or
by way of increase or addition to shares giv
en by it. but evidently by substitution; and
then by formal and explicit language the tes
tatrix gives to her four nieces all the rest
and remainder of her estate, both real and
I
personal, to be divided equally among them.
The remainder here spoken of is that which
is left after satisfying the legacies provided
for in the same instrument, and it is impos
sible for the disposition made by the will to
stand with that made by the codicil. Both
instruments were, however, properly admit
ted to probate, for the appointment of exec
C
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by the will holds good, although the es
tate is to be administered aceordim,r to the
revisions of the codicil. The plaintifrs are,
we think, entitled to a decree to that effect.
and, so far as the judgment appealed from
is to the contrary, it should be reversed, with
costs to the appellant. But as the defend
ants have heretofore succeeded, they also
should have one bill of costs, both to be paid
out of the estate. All concur.
flaw _A--
tified in regarding the will as a subsisting ‘
a complete disposition of all the property oi.I i
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RICH a al. v. GILKEY.‘
I
(73 Me. 595.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov. 28,
1881.
Appeal from judge of probate.
Sylvanus Rich, having made his will dated
April 9, 1872,.,_mad~e a_c-0dicii-g_t_hereto in
March", ‘I879, giving to his niece, Mary A.
Gilkey, during her life, the income of certain
property of the value of $10,000. On March
16, 1880, he dmyed this codicil, and made
another, by which he mass a different dis
position of the property, which by the for
mer codicil was given in wtrust to pay the
income to his niece. He died April 18, 1880.
In proceedings for probate of his will, the
judge of probate upheld the destroyed cod
icil, and admitted it to probate. At the
trial of the cause on appeal from his deci
sion, the following entry was made by mu
tual agreement of the parties: “Referred to
the presiding judge, who may decide all
questions upon the merits as affected by
considerations of expediency and compro
mise, including costs, and enter all and any
decrees necessary to carry his decision into
effect."
A. W. Paine and John Varney, for plain
tiffs. Barker, Vose & Barker, for defendant.
PETERS, J.. When this cause was re
ferred to me for decision, in view of the fact
that the jury trial might be broken off by
the sickness of a juror, I hardly comprehend
ed the extent of the duties which have been
cast upon me. I had supposed my office
would be performed by the recommendation
of some sum which the estate had better
pay, and the other party had better receive,
in a spirit of compromise, than to pursue the
case to an end upon the strict application of
legal principles and a close sifting of all the
facts that might be produced in evidence.
Had I anticipated that the respective parties
would adhere so closely as they have to sup
posed legal rights, I should not have so read
ily taken upon myself a self-imposed respon
sibility. Having, however, examined and
considered all the issues of law and fact suf
ficiently to form as satisfactory conclusions
as it is probable I ever could arrive at, I file
in the case the following opinion:
There is no doubt that Capt. Rich, the tes
tator, destroyed the codlcil in favor of Mary
Gilkey in his lifetime. The questions of
fact are these: First. Was the testator at
the date of the destruction of the codicil pos
1 Foot-note in 73 Me. 595: “This case was
heard at nisi prius, and the reportof it is l:erc 1n
serted because of the great learning employed in
I
the preparation of the opinion, its literary merit,
and the importance of the question discussed,
together with the fact that other members of the
court were consulted upon these questions, and,
having carefully considered them, they con
curred in the views expressed by Judge Peters
in all particulars."
sessed of testamentary capacity? Second.
If he had testamentary capacity, was he in
duced to do the act by undue influence? It
would not be inconsistent to find that a tes
tator was not possessed of sufficient mental
capacity to make a will, and also that he.
was operated upon by undue influence. The
questions of law are: First, whether, if the
codicil was destroyed by the testator, while
lacking the possession of testamentary ca
pacity, it can be legally upheld and probated
by means of oral evidence; and, secondly.
whether the same result follows, if the de
struction was induced by undue influence
alone.
An examination of the questions of law
comes first in the natural order. I feel clear
in the belief that a person who has not tes
tamentary capacity cannot revoke a will in
any manner whatever. He can neither make
nor unmake a will. A codicil stands upon
the same footing as'a will. A will, legally
made, stands’lIl~ntil’ legally revoked. It can
not be revoked by any act of destruction, un
less the act is done with an intention to re
voke; and a person not having testamentary
capacity cannot have an intention to revoke
a will; he is legally incapable of it. In such.
case the burning of the will can have no ef
fect whatever, provided the contents can be
clearly and certainly proved by other evi
dence. The written instrument may be
burnt, the surest and best evidence of the
will may be thus destroyed, but the will it
self, if a draft of it can be proved, outlives
the act of destruction, and the testamentary
dispositions stand. This is a common prin
ciple in the law, applicable to the los or
destruction of papers and records generally.
For instance, A. gives B. a deed of land.
The deed is lost or accidentally destroyed;
but the conveyance stands, if the contents of
the deed can be proved by satisfactory evi
dence. It is said that this opens a wide
field for error and fraud, to establish wills
upon oral evidence. To my mind, many
more frauds would be committed if the con
trary rule were admitted. It is upon proof
complete and undoubted, and not‘ upon less
than proof, that wills may be orally estab
lished, it is to be noticed.
The counsel for the executors contend that.
if a will destroyed after a testator’s death
can be upheld and established by oral evi
dence, one destroyed before his death cannot
be. I do not concur in this view of the
learned counsel. I do not find the distinc
tion admitted by the authorities, excepting,
possibly, where the law is so enacted in one
or two of the states. Nor do I see the force
of any such attempted distinction. I cannot
well perceive that the act of wrongfully de
stroying a will five minutes before death
would be valid, and the same act be not
valid, if done by the same hand and in the
same way five minutes afterwards.
It is said that a wrongful or accidental de
struction of a will might take place many
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years before a testator’s death, and in the
" mean time the testator might become satis
fied with the fact of destruction, and in his
mind ratify the act, and still the instrument
be established as his will after his death, if
this doctrine be tenable. But the answer to
this apprehension of danger consists in the
requirement of the law that any person pro
poundlng for probate a will destroyed in the
testator’s lifetime has upon himself the bur
den to prove that, notwithstanding destruc
tion, the will continued to be the will of the
testator, unrevoked, up to the testator’s
death. The presumption would be that the
will was destroyed animo revocandi, and the
burden would be upon the proponent to
show. by circumstances or otherwise, that
the will was not revoked by the destruction,
or by a ratification of the destruction, while
the testator lived.
I think these views are sustained by the
great current of authority. The English
cases, earlier and later, are that way. The
old work on Wills by Swinburne, who com
piled his book as long ago as during the
reign of Queen Elizabeth, gives this excep
tion to the cases where a will becomes void
by canceling or defacing: "Where the tes
tament was canceled by the testator himself
unadvisedly, or by some other person with
out the testator’s consent, or by some other
casualty." Jarman, the best authority on
Wills, English or American, (volume 1, p.
131),) says: “The mere physical act of de
struction is itself equivocal, and may be deI
prived of all revoking efficacy by explana
tory evidence, indicating the animus revocan
di to be wanting." He further says: "Thus
if a testator inadvertently throws ink upon
his will, instead of sand, or obliterates or at
tempts to destroy it in a fit of insanity, or
tears it up under the mistaken impression
that it is invalid, it will remain in full force,
notwithstanding such accidental or involun
tary or mistaken act." Mr. Bigelow, the
American editor of Jarman's work, in his
notes fully approves the doctrine quoted, cit
ing many American cases in its support.
The same doctrine is maintained by Prof.
Greenleaf in his work on Evidence, (section
681, vol. 2,) and notes. Redfield, in his trea
tise on Wills, in many places resiates the same
rule; and upon page 323, vol. 1, (1st Ed.,)
says: “The soundness- of the mind and
memory is requisite to the valid revocation
of a will as to its execution. It follows, of
course, that the performance of the mere
act of tearing, canceling, obliterating, burn
ing, etc., without the animo revocandi, and
which could not exist unless the testator
were in his sane mind, could have no legal
operation upon the instrument." In Bacon's
Abridgment (vol. 10, p. 546) it is laid down
“that the destruction of a will, even by the
testator himself, does not amount to a revo
cation, if the testator had not capacity.
Though the instrument is not in being, if its
contents are known lt can be proved." Mr.
Wharton expresses it this way: “Revoca
tion will not be complete unless the act or
spoliation be deliberately effected on the
document animo revocandi. This is express
ly rendered necessary by the will act, and is
impliedly required by the statute of frauds."
In Smith’s Probate Law, a Massachusetts
work of merit, at page 51, the author says:
“It may be that the will was destroyed by
the testator in a fit of insanity, or that it
was lost, or accidentally or fraudulently de
stroyed. Such accidental or fraudulent de
struction will not deprive parties of their
rights under its provisions, if they can pro
duce the evidence necessary to establish the
will." In Clark v. Wright, 3 Pick. 67, a cod
icil fraudulently destroyed in the testator’s
lifetime was established upon parol proof
of its contents by the Massachusetts su
preme court of probate.
was afifirmed by the same court in the case
of Davis v. Sigourney, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 487,
and reaflirmed in Wallis v. Wallis, 114 Mass.
610. In Newell v. Homer, 120 Mass. 277, the
petitioner was held to prove a destruction of
the will after the death of the testator, mere
ly because he in his petition had so alleged
the fact.
The New York cases are in accord with
the foregoing cases. In Smith v. Wait, 4
Barb. 28,. it was ruled that, if a testator was
incompetent to make a will, he was incom
petent to revoke a will made before, and
that an insane man can have no intent such
as is necessary to revoke a will.
Bowen, 11 Wend. 227, it was held that 0. rev
ocation by burning the will by the testator
could be impeached by showing the incom
petency of the testator at the time of the
act. Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N. Y. 653, is an
instructive case to the same effect. In Nel
son v. McGiffert, 3 Barb. Ch. 158, Chancellor
Walworth held it was competent to show
that a will had been destroyed by a testator
when his mind had become so far impaired
that he was incompetent to perform a testa
mentary act. The case of Johnson’s Will, 40
Conn. 587, strongly supports the same view.
So does the case of Coliagnn v. Burns, 57 Me.
449, as far as it goes. Many other cases in
the state courts do.
Late cases in the English court of probate .
are emphatical in the same direction. In
one case it is said: “The act done [burning
a will] by the testator can in no sense be his
act, for he was out of his mind." In another
case the court said: "All the destroying in
the world, without intention, will not revoke
a will; nor all the intention in the world..
without destroying; there must be the
two." In another case,—the famous case in
volving the will of Lord St. Leonards,—de
cided as late as 1876, the late Chief Justice
Cockburn said: "The consequences of a con
trary ruling would be in the highest degree
mischievous. To disallow oral proof might
lead to the defeating of justice in many, if
not in as many, instances as might arise
The same doctrine
In Idley v. I
REVOCATION. REPUBLICATION, AND REVIVAL OF \ViLLS. 63
rpoint, I am of the opinion that the same re
, suit follows where the act of destruction is
I produced by undue influence as where inca- I
\ pacity exists.
from the court acting upon such testimony."
Much more could be profitably quoted from
late English cases, in elucidation of this le
gal question, dld these limits allow. \
The English cases have gone so far as to
decide that a revocation of a will by spoila
tion may be of a conditional character. A
testator destroyed a codicil not knowing that
it disturbed a previous will. The court said:
“Where there has been a physical destruc
tion of a testamentary paper, the court has
often been called upon to form an opinion as
to the intention of the deceased at the time
he did the act. In this case we have come
to the conclusion that the testator destroyed
the codicil with no intention of revoking the
will, and that the court should give no more
effect to the act than it would do if the tes
tator had destroyed the paper under a mis
take as to the instrument he was destroying.
t was not done animo revocandi." The fol
owing cases will verify the foregoing propo
sitions: Brunt v. Brunt. L. R. 3 Prob. &
Div. 37; Cheese v. Lovejoy, 2 Prob. Div.
251; Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, 1 Prob.
Div. 154; James v. Shrimpton. 1 Prob. Div.
431; Brown v. Brown, 8 El. &.Bl. 876; Pow
ell v. Powell. L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 209. Iq
therefore have no doubt that a will destroy
ed by a person not possessing testamentary
capacity is not a revocation-of such will.
There must be animus revocandi; and such
a person does not and cannot possess an in
tention of revocation any more than an in
sane man can.
As to the question of law secondly stated,
namely, the eflfect of the exercise upon the
mind of the testator of undue influence, al
though at first having doubts about the "
There can hardly be a logi
aal difference whether the act of destruction
be accomplished by a testator who has no
wind to exercise, or, having a mind of his
own, is prevented from exercising it. In
sanity takes away testamentary power,,
while undue influence does not allow it to?
act. There must be animus revocandi. In
the one case, Providence prevents it; in the
other case, it is prevented by the wrongful
act of man. In each case the hand of the
testator acts, but the mind does not go
w
it
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the act. The hands survive the head. I
the rule were otherwise, the law would al
low one man to cancel another man’s will.
without his consent. It must be borne in
mind that, where undue influence is prac
ticed, the testator’s will is overpowered and
subverted, and the will of another is substi
tuted in its stead. He is not his own mas~
ter. He does not act voluntarily, for his
own volition does not play a part. Proper
influences merely persuade the will, while
undue influences take it away. The first are
an appeal: the last are a usurping and con
quering force. The old tree, forsooth, sends
‘7, c. 64, Rev. St.. reads thus:
out its life, but the graft incorporated upon
it turns it into unnatural fruit.
This is the more apparent from another
view of the same facts. A man makes a le
gal will. In a codicil he undertakes to cancel
the will. But if he has not mental capacity,
or if he is induced by undue influences to
attempt a revocafion, the codicil is of no
avail, and the will stands unrevoked. Sup
pose, however, instead of revoking the will
by a codicil, the attempt is made to do it
by destroying the will. Must not the act in
this way be as free and unconstrained as if
done in the other way? Does not the. same
principle apply? It.I the mind or will of the
testator be held in imprisonment by undue
influence, can it revoke a will in one way
when it cannot in another? Can a testator
accomplish by burning what, under the same
conditions, he cannot do with pen and ink?
I think not. The question in this phase has
not so often arisen as in the form first dis~
cussed, namely, a want of capacity; but no
particular distinction between the two is
found in the cases, nor does. in my judgment.
a valid distinction exist.
Then comes a question whether the gen
eral or common law is changed by any
oi.I our statutes. I think not. Section 3,
c. 74, Rev. St., our statute of wills, is this:
“A will so executed is valid until destroyed,
altered, or revoked by being intentionally
burnt, canceled, torn, or obliterated by the
maker, or by some person by his direction and
in his presence, or by a subsequent will, codi
cil, or writing, executed as a will is required
to be," etc. This is substantially like the
English statute of wills, and similar to stat
utes in most, if not all, the American states,
and is in precise accordance and consistency
with the views already expressed and the
cases cited. Nothing can be much plainer.
To revoke, there must be an intention to re
voke. If a testator has not a sound or sane
intention, he has no intention. If his lnten~
tion is supplanted by another man's intention,
then legally be has no intention.
But another statute is relied upon as up
setting or qualifying this statute. Section
“When the
last will of any deceased person, who had
his domicile in this state at the time of his
death, is lost, destroyed, suppressed, or car
ried out of the state. and cannot be obtained
after reasonable diligence, the execution and
contents thereof may be proved by a copy,
and the legal testimony of the subscribing
witnesses to the will, or by any other evi
dence competent to prove the execution and
contents of a will; and, upon proof of the
continued existence of such will up to the
time of the decease of said testator unre
voked, letters testamentary shall be granted
as on the last will of the deceased, the same
as if the original had been produced and
proved." The latter statute was first enact
ed in 1861. The former has existed ever
since we were a state. Even if the phrase,
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“continued existence of such last will,"means
physical existence, which I do not agree to,
even then the two acts are not inconsistent,
and do not clash with each other. One
would not repeal or limit the other, any more
than the other would the one. One would
go further in some respects than the other,
and the other further in other respects. Each
occupies its own ground. The 1861 act al
lows oral or parol proof of a will not de
stroyed, but which is merely suppressed or
carried out of the state, while the other is
silent about such a case. The act of 1861 is
declarative and cumulative only, and does
not abrogate, or undertake to abrogate, any
other act. If the act of 1861 had been passed
to alter the great body of the law of the
world upon this subject-matter, its terms
would have been more positive and signifi
cant. It directly admits “other evidence com~
petent to prove the execution and contents of
a will" than the will itself.
But my judgment inclines strongly to the
belief that the phrase, "continued existence
of such last will up to the time of the de
cease of such testator unrevoked," does not
mean the continued physical existence of the
will. The word “existence“ sometimes
means a physical and sometimes a legal exist
ence. A will may have a physical and not
a legal existence, and vice versa, or it may
have both. A deed may be destroyed so as to
have no physical existence, and still have a
legal existence, if its contents can be proved.
So a will may exist although the written
instrument be destroyed, and oftentimes a
will does not exist as a will although not
destroyed. By the statute first quoted, “a
will so executed is valid until destroyed by
being intentionally burnt." If unintention
ally burnt, it is still valid, is still a will, and
still has a legal, but not a physical, existence.
I think the phrase, “continued existence' ‘ ‘ um-evoked," means no more than
that the will shall continue or remain unre
voked. The statute in this respect merely re
peats the requirement of the common law,
that a person setting up-a destroyed will shall
show that such will had a continued legal
existence down to the testator’s death; that
is, that the testator continued in the same
mind down to the day of his death. The
phrase “continued existence" is explained in
Betts v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 173, to mean that
the testator permitted it to stand as his will
till his death; and it is there said: “The ex
ecution of the will not only must be proved,
but there must be also satisfactory evidence
of its existence at the death of the testator,
or of his intention that it should exist, and
"stanuntil his death; that the mere fact of
due exec is not evidence of such exlst-
ence or intentio . ed ctlon is that if
a will is made and adhere o by a testator
till his death, and he desires it to exist, or
supposes it to, then it does legally exist till
his death, unrevoked, though prior thereto it
has been lost or mislaid, or accidentally or
fraudulently despoiled. The writing or script
may be gone, but the will remains. But, in
either interpretation of the statute of 1861,
the conclusions reached will stand. I am
happy to add that I have consulted some of
my judicial associates upon these questions,
who have carefully considered them, and
concur in the views expressed by me in all
particulars.
So much for the law of the case;
a jury. In deciding facts which are suitable -
for the jury tribunal, I feel a disposition to be
somewhat influenced by what I think an in
telifgent and fair-minded jury, properly in
structed, would be likely to do upon the same
testimony. Certain important facts appear to
me to be unquestionable, namely: That for
Miss Gilkey, the beneficiary under the de
stroyed codicil, the testator had the fondest
and warmest affection. Its depth and
strength are disclosed by a continuous stream‘
of evidence in his letters produced, which I
think could never have been fully appreciat
ed, had it come merely from the mouth of
witnesses. He spoke it; wrote it; acted it.
She seemed, partially at least, to fill a void
in his heart created by the loss of a dearly
loved wife, to whom she alone, of all the fam
ily about him, was related. This affection
continued from her childhood to womanhood. |
It never abated. It baflled all family oppo-
sition. He educated and supported her, and
seemed desirous to make her dependent upon
’
him for all her wants. His letters held up be
fore hervision the rainbow of promise against 'want in the future. In consonance with
all this, when he found the sun of his life de
scending,althoughin full health and strength,
unasked by her, uninfluenced by anybody
that I can see, with much deliberation,
against family wishes, he made this codicil.
He took his executors as trustees of the fund,
but fortified himself against doubt by adding
another trustee. He resolutely adhered to
the codicil till his last sickness, at least.
Now, after he had lain a month on his death
bed, a very aged man, weighed down and
weakened by disease, so far into the sunset
of his life that the shadows of its twilight
were fast settling over his understanding,
urrounded by persons naturally disturbed
by the existence of the codicil, with no notice
to the beneficiary, with no after mention of
it to her, the affection between her and him
lasting till his last sands of life ran out,—
be destroyed the codicil. What cause was
there for this change which so suddenly came
over his mind? I think the inference is irre
sistible that the act was caused by another
or others, whether the influence exerted over
his mind was an undue influence or not.
What his strength did, his weakness would
not have repudiated. How much truth in
the situation scripturally described: “Verily.
verily, I say unto thee, when thou wast
young. thou girdest thyself. and walkest
whither thou wouldst; but when thou shalt
then as
to the facts. Here I possess the functions of
REVOCATION, REPUBLlCATION, AND REVIVAL OF WILLS. 65
be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands,
and another shall gird thee, and carry thee
where thou wouldst not." Nor was it un-
natural that the heirs should have unwilling
ly seen this bestowment upon one not an
heir, or that they should have resisted it.
Perhaps it would have been unnatural in
them if they had not resisted it. Undoubted
ly they did no more than seemed proper to do,
looking at the matter from their stand-point.
Nor do I, possessing plenary powers, under
the terms of the reference, feel bound to de
clare whether there was an undue influence
exercised or not, or declare an absolute con
clusion one way or another upon the issues,
whether the testator was incapacitated from
having a reasonable or intelligent intention
of revocation, or whether the will was de
stroyed by him through some misunderstand
ing or mistake.
Sutfice it to say that, under all the circumI
stances and conditions of the case, I deem it
expedient to uphold the codicil in favor of
Miss Gilkey as unrevoked, and allow it to be
probated, allowing to the other side some
concessions and considerations therefor. First
of which (concessions and considerations) is
that the last codicil shall also be probated.
Logically, perhaps, if the first codicil stands,
the second should fall. But as there is no
contradiction between the two, except a re
cital in the last which ignores the first, both
may stand. Precisely the same point occur-I
red in an English case. Robinson v. Clarke,
2 Prob. Div. 269. The court there said: “In
a. testamentary suit where the parties have
LAw SUCC.—/5/
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come to an arrangement, under the terms of
which the court is applied to, to grant probate
of two testamentary instruments, it will do
so, provided such documents are not entirely
inconsiswnt with one another." In Goods
of Honywood, L. R. 2 Prob. & Div. 251, the
ccurt thought improper words in the recital
of a will could be corrected by an explana
tion upon the record.
Another concession is that the taxable costs
of the appellee, claimed to be several hun~
dred dollars, shall not be recovered from the
estate.
Another concession is that the estate shall
not pay the expense of counsel fees to the ap
pellee, thougih claimed, upon the ground that
the estate should be taxed to pay for the ex
pense of. sustaining a codicil which by law
should be sustained. But the bill therefor,
$500, which seems not an unreasonable
amount for entire services, shall be paid by
the executors. and charged to the earnings
of the trust-estate now on hand. Or, if both
parties should prefer it, I should award as
above, and, instead of the life annuity, order
an absolute conveyance to Miss Gilkey of the
$5,000‘ of Boston 8,: Albany stock, together
with the earnings of the $9,000 of stocks nam
ed in the codicil, which have been due and
payable since the death of the testator to this
time. Or I would make any other commuta
tion of the lifeestate into ready money or
absolute property which the parties may
agree to. And whatever conclusion may be
accepted, suitable decrees will be entered ac
cordingly.
66 REVOCATION, REI’UBLICATION, AND REVIVAL OF WlLLS.
ESCHBACH v. COLLINS et al.
(61 Md. 478.)
Court of Appeals of Maryland. March 26, 1884.
Appeals from circuit court of Baltimore
city.
Action by Elizabeth H. Collins and Richard
Bernard, administrators with the will an
nexed, and trustees under the will of John
Eschbach, late of Baltimore city, deceased,
for the purpose of obtaining a judicial con
struction of said will. The will contained
the following provisions: "First. [I hereby
appoint my sons Leo Eschbach and John E.
Eschbach executors of this, my last will
and testament,] and direct them to pay my
Just debts and funeral expenses; giving them
power, as executors, to sell, to such extent
as may be necessary to make such pay
ment, such parts of my estate, real or per
sonal, as may be necessary, and the like
power to any administrator of my estate.
Second. I give. devise, and bequeath all the
rest and residue of my estate, of every
kind and description, which I may leave at
the time of my death, to my said sons, [Leo
Eschbach and John .E. last-limes] and their
successors in the trust thereby reposed in
them; it being my will that there shall at
all times be at least two trustees, and that
one alone shall not be competent to act, and
that, in case of death, refusal to act, inabil
ity from any cause, or resignation, that a
successor or successors shall be appointed by
some court having jurisdiction over trust
estates, in trust to and for the following
uses and purposes: That the amounts which
I have advanced or may advance up to the
time of my death, to any of my sons or
daughters, or to any son-in-law, evidenced
by notes or otherwise, shall be ascertained
by the said trustees, or their successors, as
speedily after settling in the orphans’ court
as possible; and that the entire amount
thereof shall be added to the rest and resi
due of my estate bequeathed as aforesaid;
and the aggregate amount thereof shall be
divided into ten equal parts, the number of
my present living children. by three disin
terested persons, to be appointed by some
court having jurisdiction over trust-estates,
the decision of a majority of whom to be
final, and such appointments to be continued
until a division shall have been had; each
of my sons to have one share, and to be
charged with advances made or to be made
to him; and each daughter to have one
share, and to be charged with advances
made or to be made to her or her husband;
and the portion of each son and daughter
in the said rest and residue to be reduced to
the extent of such advance made, or to be
made, as aforesaid; the division to be so
made as aforesaid to be reduced to writing,
and to show the share or portion of each,
and each piece of property to be separately erasures;
valued; the said division to be acknowl
'l
parties making the same as their act and
deed, and to be recorded in the court having
jprisdictlon of trusts making the said ap
pointments, and also recorded among the
land record of Baltimore city; the share
of my sons [Leo] and [John E. Eschhach]
t0.be held by each of them who may survive.
me, absolutely, and the trust hereby created
to‘ cease as respects them, or the one who
may survive me. The shares of my other
children to be held for their respective lives,
my daughters’ shares to be for their and
each of their sole and separate use, freed
from the control of any husband, and in no
way liable for his debts. In case any of my
said children, exclusive of [Leo] and [John
E. Eschbach.] should die, leaving a child or
descendant, then such share shall pass to
such child, children, descendant, or descend
ants per stirpes, and not per capita; but. in
case of the death of any such child, leaving
no child or descendant at the time of such
death, then the part or share of the one so
dying shall pass to my surviving children
and descendants of any deceased child per
stirpes, absolutely and forever. ' ' ' in
case any of my ten children now living
should die before me, leaving no child or
descendant living at the time of my death.
then my said estate shall be so divided as
to reduce the number of shares, and to make
the number equal to the number of my chil
dren who may survive me; and of such of
my children as may have died before me.
leaving a child or descendant surviving me,
it being my will that in the case now sup
posed the descendant of a deceased child
shall take the share of the parent; it being
also my intention to pass lifeestates to
all my children and descendants of a de
ceased child, who may take at the time of
my death, with the exception that my sons
[Leo] and [John E. Eschbach] shall each.
if he survives me, take absolute feesimple
estates in their respective shares."
When the will was found, after the death
of the testator, the words in brackets in
the foregoing extracts had been marked over
with pen strokes, as if for the purpose of
erasure, but were still legible. The testa
tor left no widow, but he left ten children,—
seven sons and three daughters.
The court (Dobbin, J.) adjudged and de
creed that the true construction of the will
as it stood affected by the erasures, which
it was shown by the evidence that testator
made therein, was that Leo Eschbach and
John E. Eschbach were to be omitted as
executors and trustees; and that the com
plainants were, under the order of 27th Sep
tember, 1881, appointing them trustees un
der said will, in place of said Leo Eschbach
and John E. Eschbach, to hold the estate
of said testator for the-trust purposes men
tioned in said will, as affected by said
that is to say, for the .use of all
the children of said John Eschbach for and
edged before a justice of the peace by the ! during the term of their respective lives, the
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shares of the daughters to be for their sole
and separate use, freed from the control of.
any husband, and in no way liable for his
debts; and in case any of the said children
of said testator die, leaving a child or de
scendant, then such hare should pass to
such child, children, or descendant or de
scendants, per stirpes, and not per capita;
but, in case of the death of any child leaving
no child or descendant at the time of such
death, then the part or share of the one
so dying should pass to the testator’s sur
viving children, and descendants of any de
ceased child, per stirpes, absolutely and for
ever, freed from any further trust.
From this decree three appeals were taken.
—one by the widow of Joseph A. Eschbach,
a son; one by the executor of the said
Joseph; and a third by judgment creditors
of John E. Eschbach, another son.
A. Leo Knott, for Annie Maria Eschbach
and executor of Joseph A. Eschbach. Ber
nard Carter and Arthur W. Machen, for
Burke and Reddington, judgment.,credltors
of John E. Eschbach. Richard Bernard, for
appellees.
YELLOTT, J. The bill of complaint in
this cause invokes a judicial construction of
the will of John Eschbach, the meaning of
which having been rendered ambiguous, ob
scure, and in some places apparently in
comprehensible, by obliterations made by
the testator a number oi. years subsequent
to the date of its execution. The will was
originally executed in conformity with the
requirements of the statute prescribing the
formalities to be observed in making a tes
tamentary disposition of real estate. In the
first clause two of the testator’s sons, Leo
Eschbach and John E. Eschbach. are ap
pointed executors, with the usual directions
in regard to funeral expenses and the pay
ment of debts. In the second clause, the
whole estate, real and personal, is devised
and bequeathed to the said Lee and John
wE. Eschbach in trust. The testator then
proceeds to declare the nature and purposes
of the trust thus created, and the mode and
manner in which it shall be executed, with
a multitude of provisions not necessary to
be here recited, as they involve no questions
now presented for adjudication. The corpus
of the estate is to be divided into 10 equal
parts, corresponding to the number of the
testator’s children. Leo Eschbach and John
E. Eschbach are each to take onetenth, en
tirely exempted from the operation of the
trust, and to be held by them absolutely
or. in feesimple. To the other sons and
the daughters lifeestates are given with
remainders as prescribed by the terms 01!
the will. It becomes important, in the con
struction of this will, to observe that none
.of the children of the testator are mentioned
by name except Leo and John E. Eschbach.
The others are simply designated as sons or
daughters.
After the death oi.’ the testator the will
was discovered with certain words written
below the signatures of the attesting wit
nesses. This writing is somewhat deficient
in perspicuity, which is, perhaps, attributa
ble less to the imperfection of human lan
guage than to the peculiarity of the diction
employed. It was not there when the will
was executed. It has no attestation, but is
supposed to be in the handwritingIof the
testator. and was signed by him. It is in
these words: “February 3, ’80. For Good
& soun Reason, I arrest John E. Eschbach
Name, and Leo Eschbach his Name, the
above date, in Good Health and Reason,
Signed the above date. John Eschbach."
In each clause of the will, wherever the
names of Leo Eschbach and John E.
Eschbach occur, a pen has been drawn
across, leaving the names legible, but the
writing partially defaced by the attempted
obliterations. Two important changes in the
will result from these erasures. The first
is the removal of Leo and John E. Eschbach
as executors and trustees. No question here
arises for the determination of this court;
the said Lee and John E. having declined
to act as executors, and their formal re
nunciation being embodied in the record.
The circuit court has also, in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and in conformity with
the provisions of the will, appointed trus
tees. and Leo and John E. Eschbach have
admitted and averred in their answer that
said trustees have been duly appointed. But
another and more material change has been
effected by these erasures. The will, as
originally executed, gave lifeestates to all
the sons except Leo and John E. Eschbach.
The erasure of the two names operates to
confer estates in feesimple on all the sons.
The testator says in the second clause: “The
shares of my sons Leo and John E. Esch
bach to be held by each of them who may
survive me, absolutely, and the trust here
by created to cease as respects them, or the
one who may survive me. The shares of my
other children to be held for their respective
lives," etc. The testator had other sons be
sides the two specially mentioned by name.
Omit the words erased, and it will be seen
at a glance that all the sons take absolutely,
and the. words “my other children" apply
only to the daughters. Again, in the con
cluding portion of this clause, the testator
says: “It being also my intention to pass
lifeestates to all my children and descend
ants of a deceased child who may take at
the time of my death. with the exception
that my sons Leo and John E. Eschbach
shall each, if he survives me, take absolute
feeslmple estates in their respective shares."
He has erased the names of Leo Eschbach
and John E. Eschbach, and this obliteration
manifestly creates a feesimple estate in
each son, and renders the word “children"
applicable only to the daughters.
The first question presented for adjudica
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tion is whether a testator can, by the oblit
‘ eration of certain words in his will, cause the
'
transmutation of a lifeestate into a feesim
ple. This is the converse of the proposition
presented by the case of Swinton v. Bailey,
1 Exch. Div. 112. There the cffect of the
obliteration was to diminish an estate in
fee-simple, and convert it into an estate for
life. Chief Baron Kelly in the exchequer
held that this could not be done. The judg
ment of the exchequer was reversed in the
court of appeals. Cockburn, C. J., saying:
“Although it is a devise in feesimple, I think
that is (so far as it is a matter of revoca
tion) divisible into two parts, and that the
man who has given the larger estate may re
voke the gift to that extent, and cut it down
to the smaller gift or devise of an estate for
life. It may be that you cannot add to the
will."
by the erasure of certain words, and any gen
eral observations~ made by judges, which ex
tended beyond the scope of the question in
controversy, could hardly be recognized as
establishing a safe precedent, even within
the jurisdiction where the decisions of that
court must be received as authoritative. In
Larkins v. Larkins, 3 Bos. & P. 20, Lord Al
vanley, C. J., said: “If the remaining de
vises were to acquire any estate which they
had not before, something beyond a mere rev
ocation would be necessary."
A careful analysis of either the English or
the Maryland statute would seem to lead ir
resistibly to the conclusion that every testa
mentary act by which property is transmit
ted should be authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the legislature. A man may
devise the whole of his estate in feesimple.
This is one testamentary act. He may sub
sequently change his intention, and, as the
fee is susceptible of subdivision, he may de
termine to give a less estate. This ~would
certainly be another and a distinct testamen
tary disposition, and, when it is alleged that
he has so determined, the adduction of the
proper proof is requisite. It is apparent that
this proof~ must be supplied by the produc~
tion of another will or a codicil properly
attested and executed. Hence it would
seem to have formerly been the settled doc
trine in England that “any alteration that
amounts to a new devise of the land re
quires that the will should be reexecuted
according to the statute." Love. Wills, 349.
The American cases fully recognize this
doctrine. and, when an attempt has been
made by interlineation or obliteration to
make a different disposition of the estate,
the attempt has been held to be abortive,
and the will operated as originally executed.
In Jackson v. Holloway, 7 Johns. 395, a tes
tator, having made his will devising his
lands then in possession to his four sons,
subsequently acquired other lands, which, by
The decision of the court of appeals .
was aflirmed in the house of lords, (48 Law 1
J. 57.) The only principle determined in this .
case was that an estate might be diminished
I
the statutes of the state, did not pass by a
will executed antecedently to the seisin. He
attempted an alteration by erasuresand inter
lineations, so as to make the devise extend
to all the lands of which he should die seised,
and lndorsed a memorandum to that effect
on the will, stating the alterations which he
had made. This memorandum was attested
by two witnesses only. It was held that the
erasures and interlineations did not destroy
the original devise, but that the alterations.
not having been attested by three witnesses,
could not operate. The court said: “The
obliterations in the will were made, not
with an intent to destroy the devise already
made, but-to enlarge it, by extending it to
lands subsequently acquired. The testator,
however, failed in making iuterliueatlons
and corrections which could operate, from
not having the amendments attested accord
ing to law. The obifteratious cannot. tnere
fore, destroy the previous devise, for that
wasI not the testator’s intention." In Me
Pherson v. Clark, 3 Bradf. Sur. 99, the testa
tor attempted to revoke the devise to his
daughter by striking out the words “my
children," and inserting “my two sons."
The court said: “This insertion is inopera
tive for want of reexecution and attestation;
and, the intent failing as to the substitution
intended, it must fail likewise as to the rev
ocation intended. Enough remains on the
face of the will to show that the word erased
was Ichildren,’ and the will must be so re
corder ." In the case of Wolf v. Bollinger, 62
Ill. 372, the testator, after having devised his
estate to one person, afterwards attempted
to transfer it to another. The alteration was
made by an interlineation which was not. at
tested in the presence of the testator. The
court said that, for want of a compliance
with this statutory requirement, the instru
ment did not operate as a disposing will.
The cancellation was not made with intent
to revoke the devise to the complainant sim
ply, but with intent to substitute in her
stead the defendant; and, the ultimate ob
ject of substitution having failed of accom
plishment, the canceling,- which was done
only in the view of and in order to effect
that object, should be esteemed for nothing,
and be considered as not having been made
absolutely, but only conditionally, upon the
attempted substitution being made effectual.
To give it effect, under the circumstances,
would seem to be to thwart the intention of
the testator, and make him intestate when
he manifested a contrary intent by his will.
In the case of Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass.
102, there was an entire obliteration of the
sixth and thirteenth clauses of the will by
ink lines drawn through and across every
word constituting those clauses. This was
held to be a revocation of these two clauses,
leaving intact the other clauses in the will.
The court said: “He revoked the sixth and
thirteenth clauses. and purposely and intel
ligently left the other provisions to stand as
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his will." “The argument that this view is
in conflict with the provisions of law which
require that a will disposing of property
should be executed in the presence of three
witnesses is not sound. It is true that the
act of revocation need not be done in the
presence of witnesses; but such act does not
dispose of the property."
If this was simply a case of revocation, its
determination would involve aI construction
of section 302 of article 93 of the Maryland
Code of General Laws, which prescribes the
mode by which a revocation may be effected.
The language of the statute is: “No devise
in writing of lands, tenements, or heredita
ments, or any clause thereof, shall be rev
ocable" except in the manner designated.
An entire will can thus be revoked, or any
clause thereof. What, then, is a clause?
Does it consist of two or three words which,
disjoined from the context and transferred
to a separate sheet of paper, would be devoid
of sense or meaning? Do the mere names of
two persons constitute a clause? Is not a
clause always understood to mean one of
the subdivisions of a written or printed doc
ument? Is the word ever used in any other
sense? Wills are frequently subdivided in
to a number of clauses. In one, the testator
may provide for the payment of his debts;
in another, dispose of his personal property;
in a third, devise his real estate; in a fourth,
leave legacies; and then there may be a
residuary clause.
.the statute has reference to one of these
\subdivisions of awill when the word “clause"
’is used in connection with “revocation?" It
is true that a whole will might be revoked,
or any clause thereof, by obliterating all the
words necessary to give them meaning. To
deprive a will of all meaning would be a
effectual a revocation as if it had been con
sumed to ashes. .
It is manifest that in the construction of
this will a question is encountered that in
volves something more than mere revocation./The will has not been revoked; it has been
Kaltered. It cannot besupposed that when the
legislature uses the word “revocation" it is
to be construed to mean “mutation." "Rev:
ocation" is certainly not a synonym of “al
teration." To revoke a testamentary dispo~
sition plainly means to annul it, and the
revocation of a clause implies the destruction
of that clause. In legal contemplation, it
ceases to exist, and is as inoperative as if
it had never been written. ‘It is not nec
essary that the words erased should be
wholly illegible, but the act of the testator
must be such as to clearly indicate an inten
tion to expunge the whole clause, so that it
shall no longer constitute a subdivision of
the will. rBut when, by the obliteration of
.certain words, a different meaning is im
parted, there is not a mere revocation.
There is something more than the destruc
tion of that which has been antecedently
done. There is a transmutation by .which
Is it not apparent
th
a
t}
a new clause is created. There is another
and a distinct testamentary disposition,
which must be authenticated by the ob
servance oi.’ the statutory requirements. The
statute, after designating the modes of rev
ocation. whereby that which has already
been done is rendered inoperative by being
destroyed, says, in language wholly free
from ambiguity, and therefore needing no
construction:I “Or unless the same be alter
ed by some other will or codicil in writing.
signed in the presence of three or four wit
nesses, declaring the same." There can
therefore be no alteration in a testamentary
disposition of real estate except by an ob
servance of the formalities prescribed by the
statute. In the will now to be construed,
the obliterations, so far from operating as a
mere revocation, by destroying the sense of
the context, impart to the clause a different
and more important significance. Not only
does this become apparent, but it is also
evident that the construction which has been
contended would be productive of the very
evils which the legislature intended to pro
vide against. The obliteration of two or
three words might wholly change the char
acter of a devise. As aptly illustrated by
learned counsel in argument, if the words
were, “To my son William I give nothing,
and give all my estate to my son John," the
will could be made to read, without the ln
sertion of any additional words, “To my son
William I give all my estate." But, as al
ready intimated, the record .does not present
a question-of revocation. It is clear that
the testator did not contemplate an intes
tacy. He evidently intended to make a testa
mentary disposition of the whole of his prop
erty. It was supposed by the learned judge
of the circuit court that he intended by the
obliterations to diminish the feesimple es
tates of Leo and John E. Eschbach to life
estates. If such was his purpose, he has
attempted to make another and a different
devise of onefifth of his whole property.
He transfers the legal title, vested in Leo ’
and John E. Eschbach, to trustees, and
carves out the feesimple equitable lifees
tates, with remainders to the children of the
lifetenants. This is a new will, as respects
onefifth of his property. Let it be sup
posed, by way of illustration, that the entire
estate had been devised to Leo in feesimple.
How could the testator subsequently vest the
legal title in trustees, and create an equita
ble lifeestate, with remainders? Not cer
tainly by obliterations and interlineations,
without attestation or the observance of any
of the formalities prescribed by the statute.
And is a testamentary disposition of the
onefifth of an estate governed by a dlfferent
principle? The intention of a testator is only
to be regarded when the law sanctions the
means he has adopted to carry it into effect.
If what he has done is invalid, the intent
cannot be respected.
In the formation of a judicial opinion, the
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calm investigating faculty of reason should
exercise a paramount control; but in an
effort to ascertain, by an inspection of this
mutilated will, the real intention of the tes
tator. the aid of imagination seems to be
come necessary. The aged testator declined
to seek the advice and assistance of those
whose professional learning and experience
would have afforded safe guidance, and, re
lying solely upon his own judgment, failed
in the accomplishment of an intent which
he has left involved in obscurity. The true
construction of this will is that the attempt
ed obliteratlons are inoperative, and that
the will must be read just as it was orig
inally written and executed. The renuncia
tion of Leo and John E. Eschbach as execu
tors, and the appointment of the complain
ants as trustees, by the order of September
27, 1881, from which no appeal has been
taken. render a construction of the first
clause of the will unnecessary. The trus
tees appointed in conformity with a provi
_-__-I-,_‘.__.__..,
sion in the second clause, and by a competent
court, having jurisdiction of trusts. have the
control over the estate given to the trustees
by the will as it was executed. The shares
of Leo and John E. Eschbach are exempted
from the operations of the trust thus cre
ated, and are to be held by them absolutely
and in teeslmple. The learned judge of the
circuit court having sought to give effect to
the supposed intention oi.' the testator to
diminish the estates of Leo and John E.
Eschbach, his decree is, in this respect, erro
ueous. But no other error is perceptible in
said decree, which must therefore be aiflrm
ed in part and reversed in part.
Decree aflirmed in part and reversed in
part, and cause remanded.
STONE and BRYAN, JJ., concurred. AL
VEY, C. J., and MILLER and IRVING, JJ..
concurred in the conclusion, but not the rea
soning of YELLOTT, J. ROBINSON, J.,
dissented.
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HOITT v. HOITT.
/
(63 N. H. 475, 3 Atl. 604.)
Supreme Court of New Hampshire. March 12,
1886.
Appeal from probate court.
Alfred Holtt duly executed a will, hearing
date February 12, 1864. At that date his
family consisted of his wife and their six
sons and seven daughters, of whom ten were
of age. His wife died April 25, 1877, and
one of his sons. who was one of four ons
named in the will as residuary legatees, died
unmarried in 1877. He married a second
wife January 6, 1879, who survived him.
There was no issue of the second marriage.
The testator died November 9, 1883. At the I
time of making the will his estate amounted
to some $26,000, about two-thirds of which
was realty, and consisted of eight different
parcels. Included in the personalty were 60
shares of the Boston & Maine Railroad, and
20 share in the Langdon Bank. These
stocks were specifically bequeathed, but,
with the exception of four shares of the rail
road stock, were subsequently sold by the‘
testator, and not replaced. All of the realty
was specifically devised, but the testator aft- .
erwards disposed of the greater portion oiI.
it. He subsequently acquired by purchase.
and was possessed at his decease of other
real estate of the value of about $52,000. His
entire estate, at the time of his death, was
appraised at $70,951.82. Four sons were
named by the testator as reslduary lega
tees, one of whom died unmarried in 1877.
All the other children survived the testator.
When the will was executed, the residue of.
the estate was inconsiderable. After the
testator’s decease the will was found in his
safe, in a bundle of papers of no pecuniary
value. Included in this bundle were several
apparently incomplete drafts or memoranda
of wills, never executed, without date, some
of which were apparently made since the
date of said will.
In the trial court the appellee offered evi
dence of the oral declarations of the testator
to show that it was his understanding that
the will was revoked, and also to show that
it was not his intention to pass by his will
after-acquired real estate. To this the up
pcllant objected. The court sustained the
objection, and the appellee excepted. The
decree of the probate court disallowed the
will.
Augustus Russ, Jeremiah Smith, and
Dodge & Caverly, for appellant. Marston &
Eastman and Frink & Batchelder, for appel
lee.
BLODGETT, J. No express revocation ap
pears in this case. The will of the testator,
executed in accordance with the statute for
malities, has not been revoked hv any sub
sequent "will or codicil, or by some writing
executed in the same manner, or by cancel
ing, tearing, obliterating, or otherwise de
,‘
stroying the same by the testator, or by
some person by his consent and in his pres
ence," as required by Gen. Laws, c. 193, § 14.
On the contrary, it was found in his safe
‘after his decease, and in its original condi
‘tion. It is true that it was in a bundle of
ipapers of no pecuniary value. and that "in
cluded in this bundle were several appar
ently incomplete drafts or memoranda of
wills never executed. without date, some of
which were apparently made since the date
'of said will." But Fellows v. Allen, 60 N.
'H. 439, 441, is a recent and direct authority
that the fact of a will being found among
worthless papers works no revocation of it;
and the authorities. as well as reason, dem
onstrate that the memoranda, which, at
most, are merely evidentiary facts of an in
choate intention to make another will, have
',no legal significance as acts of revocationI,
.for, although the purpose of the mind al
qways gives character to the act done, still.
the legislature having established certain
modes by which a will may be revoked, it
,ls not within the legitimate power of courts
to dispense with such requirements, and ac
, cept even a definite intention to perform the
prescribed act for the act itself.
Neither has the will become inoperative,
as a whole, from necessity, either by an en
tire loss of the testator’s estate, or its total
isees without descendants, and so leaving
nothing upon which it can operate. if,
therefore, there has been a validIrevocation,
it must be one arising from legal presump
tion or implication; and this in fact is the
principal contention.
The existing statute as to the revocation
of wills, which was originally adopted in
1822, after pointing out the modes by which
a will may be revoked, expressly excepts
any revocation implied by law from changes
in the circumstances of the testator, his fam
ily, devisees, or estate, occurring between
the time of making the will and his death.
Gen. Laws, c. 193, §§ 14, 15. But what those
changes are, section 15 does not in any man
ner attempt to define; and the effect conse
quently is to leave the matter of revocation
by legal implication just as it stood before
the enactment of that section. That is to
‘ say, section 15 (which in the act of 1822 was
a proviso to what is now section 14) is to be
ttaken, not as a recognition and adoption of
.the common-law doctrine of implied revoca
ltion, but as a recognition and adoption of
the English decisions under sections 5, 6,
and 22 of the English statute of frauds rela
tive to the revocation of wills, passed in
1676; for the common law as to such revo
cations was abrogated by that statute. The
English statute was doubtless the basis and
model of our statute, directly or indirectly,
and the proviso in the latter~ we think, is to
be regarded as merely explanatory of the
precedin part of the section prescribing the
manner f express revocation. Practically
l
,
)
\
alienation, or by the decease of all the dev- . ~
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and in effect it was an adoption, under then a child is lacking. 1 Jam. Wills, (5th Amer.
existing conditions, of such implied revoca- Ed.) 272; 1 Retif. Wills, 293; Pars. Wills,
tions as had been introduced and established ‘59; Worth. Wills, ‘528.
by the English courts, contrary to the plain
meaning of the English statute. and solely
through the usurpation of legislative pow
cr. But the English courts did not go the
length of establishing a rule that revocation
might be shown by any change of circum
stances affording satisfactory evidence of the
testator’s revoking intention, but stopped far
short of it, and restricted its application toI
a few exceptional cases, as to which it was
held the statute did not apply. Hence thereI
is no tenable ground for holding that any
causes of revocation were intended by our
legislature to be embraced in the proviso to
the act of 1822, aside from the existing ex
ceptions established by the English courts
upon supposed equitable considerations; and
much less can it be held that any alteration
was effected or intended by the Revision of
1842, making the proviso a separate section,
and slightly changing its phraseology. And,
as strongly tending to show that the purpose
of the legislature was such as has been in
dicated, and that such has been the univer
sal understanding of the bar of this state, it
is a significant fact that no litigation has
arisen as to the legislative intent, or the
meaning of the language used in its expres
sion, during the more than 60 years which'
have elapsed since the statute was first en
acted.
No new cause of revocation being intro
duced by the statute, the true inquiry is
whether the facts of this case bring it with
in any of the exceptions upon the subject of
implied revocation recognized by the Eng
lish courts after the adoption of the statute
of 1676, which were quite limited in number,
and reasonably well defined and understood
at the time our statute was enacted. The
causes assigned upon this point as ground of
revocation are subsequent changes in the cir
cumstances of the deceased, his family and
estate. \They are, substantially, the death
of his wife and his son Franklim both of
whom were legatee (his second marriage,
but without issue (the alienation of ’the lar
ger portion of hs estateaqrnd its nearly
threefold increase in value through natural
causes and judicious investments)
But total revocation cannot be implied
from the death of the wife and the son.
“The death of a devisee is a contingency al
ways in view." Shaw. C. J., in Warner v.
Beach, 4 Gray, 1132, 164. “I know of no
case," said Denman, (I. J., in Doe v. Edliu..
4 Adol. & E. 586, “wherelt has been held
that the removal of an object of affection
and bounty, by death,-has been taken to be
an implied revocation of a will, and, in my
opinion, it does not operate so." And see
l‘'cllows v. Allen, supra.
Nor can it be implied from the testator’s
remarriage. because the indispensable corn
mon-law requisite of the subsequent birth of
“This principle of
law is incontrovertibly established." 4 Kent,
Comm. 522. And in this connection it should
also be borne in mind that the rule never
applied except in cases where the wife and
after-born children, the new objects of duty.
were wholly unprovided for in the will, and
where there was an entire disposition of the
whole estate to their exclusion and prejudice;
therefore, inasmuch as the widow and chil
dren of a testator not provided for in a will
are, under our statute, entitled to the same
share of the estate as if he had died intes
tate, the sole reason upon which the rule
was grounded no longer exists. and so the
rule itself has become inoperative and obso
lete in this jurisdiction. ’
The inquiry thus becomes restricted to the
effect of the changes in the testator’s prop
erty; the phrase “circumstances of the tes
tator," etc., relating to new family ties, and
not to changes in property. 4 Kent, Comm.
521, and authorities generally. But if it
Iwere apparent, as it certainly is not, that in
the case of a testator an entire revocation by
legal implication resulted, either before or
after the statute of 1676, from any change
whatever of condition or circumstances ex
cept that of a subsequent marriage and
child~ it is the undoubted general rule that a
partial revocation only produces what is in
aptly and inaccurately termed a revocation
pro tanto, instead of an ademption, of the
subject of the devise, and thus necessarily
limits the operation of the will to the extent
of the alienation; not, however, by reason
of any defect in the will itself, but because
it pleased the testator to make a disposition
of such part of his estate diffcrent from
what he originally intended, which it is al
ways competent for him to do either by a
conveyance, or a new will or codicil. See
Fellows v. Allen. supra; Carter v. Thomas,
4 Greenl. 341, 343, 344; Graves v. Sheldon,
2 D. Chip. 71, 75; Blandln v. Blandin, 9 Vt.
210, 211; Havves v. Humphrey, 9 Pick. 350;
Terry v. Edminster, 1d. 355, note; Webster
v. \Vebster, 103 Mass. 538, 542; Balliet’s Ap
peal, 14 Pa. St. 451; Brush v. Brush, 11
Ohio. 287; Floyd v. Floyd, 7 B. Mon. 290; In
re Nan Mickel, 14 Johns. 324: McNaughton
v. McNaughton, 34 N. Y. 201; Warren v.
Taylor, 56 Iowa, 182.9 N. \V. Rep. 1%; \Veils
v. Wells, 35 Miss. 638; Brydges v. Duchess
of Chaudos, 2 Yes. Jr. 417; 4 Dane, Abr.
576, 577; Love. Wills, 358; 1 Redf. Wills,
335; Pars. Wills, “Conveying a part of
the estate upon which the will would other
wise operate, indicates a change of purpose
in the testator as to that part; but sufleIr
ing the will to remain uncanceled evinces
that his intention is unchanged with Fespec
to other property bequeathed orJdevised
therein.“ Weston, J., in Carter v. Thomas.
supra~ 344.
The remaining circumstance, that of the
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increase of the estate, upon obvious consider
ations of public policy, has no weight; and
to this effect is the great preponderance of
authority, Warner v. Beach, Webster v.
Webster, Graves v. Sheldon, Blandin v.
Blandin, and Balliet’s Appeal, supra; Brush
v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. 507, 518, 519; WIo
gan v. Small, 11 Serg. & R. 141, 145; Vande
mark v. Vandemark, 26 Barb. 416; Verdier
v. Verdier. 8 Rich. Law, 135. “A merely
general change in the testator’s circumstan
ces, as it regards the amount and relative
value of his property, will not in general, if
ever, have the effect to revoke a will, since
the testator, by suffering it to remain un
canceled, does in effect reaffirm it, from day
to day, until the termination of his conscious
existence." 1 Redf. Wills, 298.
The conclusion, then, is that the subse
uuent changes in the circumstances of the
testator, his family and estate, do not imply
a revocation of his will. To effect a news
cation both the English and New Hampshire
statutes
which are lacking in this case, to be done,
and not merely contemplated or even ac
tually intended to be done. It is true that
at an early day the English common-law
courts fell into the error of exercising legis
lative power. and materially amending the
statute of 1676 by enlarging its specific meth
ods of revocation so as to include revoca
tions founded upon new family ties and ob
ligatlons on the part of the testator, arising
from subsequent marriage. issue, and leav
ing wife and child without provision; and
that, inasmuch as our statute must be re
garded as a substantial reenactment of that
statute 'in the sense in which it had been in
terpreted by the English courts anterior to
1822, full effeet must be given to their deci~
sions, although plain eneroachments upon
legislative power; yet no rule was expressly
established, and none can be inferred from
the decisions, that makes it our duty to tres
pass still further upon the legislative do
main, and so far judicially repeal the statute
as to hold that the present case does not
come within the purview of its fourteenth
section. Even the English courts had come
to a halt prior to 1822, and refused to extend
the rule as to implied revocations beyond the
precedents, and so have the American courts
quite uniformly. See Doe v. Barford, 4
Maule & S. 10; Tilghman. C. J., in Wogan v.
Small, supra, and authorities generally.
The rule for which the appellee contends is
that a revocation may be proved or disprov
the testator’s intention; but the precedents
do not support the contention.K
e
ri
by any circumstantial evidence showing
On the con
trary, after a most thorough examination of
the cases repoi'ted before the enactment of
the New Hampshire statute, it was unani
mously held in Marston v. Roe, 8 Adol. & E.
14, by the 14 judges sitting in the cause, that
implied revocation takes place in onse
quence of a rule or principle of
lawlinde
require certain specified things,
pendentl altogether of any question of in
tention; and there is no reason to suppose
that the legislature of 1822 took a different
view of the reported cases. If their purpose
was to make intention of itself a ground of
revocation, and thus inevitably incite litiga
tion and “produce infinite uncertainty and
delay in the settlement of estates," the pre
sumption is that the statute would have been
.drawn
accordingly. Even Johnston v. John
ston, 1 Phillim. Ecc. 447, upon which great
stress has been laid by the appellee, while
holding the subsequent birth of a portionless
child to be an indispensable requisite which
would effect a revocation when aided by oth
er circumstances, and a subsequent marriage
not to be an essential requisite, does not
hold that the revoking intent may be inferred
from a general change of circumstances sim
ply, but makes the controlling principle rest
upon new moral obligations and family ties
arising after the making of the will, and thus
limits its application to cases of subsequent
marriage or birth in which the wife or child
would otherwise be left without provision for
support. This case. however, is not rele
vant, the will being one of personalty only,
and the decision being made by an ecclesi
astical court, unincumbered by statute provi
sions; and if it were relevant, its governing
principle, when applied to this case, would
be fatal to the appeilces. for the reason that
-no child was born to the testator subsequent
ly to the execution of his will. This being
so, it is of no practical consequence here
whether the doctrine of implied revocation
rests upon the fact of a changed intention, as
held in Johnston v. Johnston, or takes place
in consequence of a rule or principle of law
founded on a tacit condition annexed to the
will itself when made, independently alto
gether of any question of intention, as held
in Marston v. Roe; for the application of
either principle to the facts of this case
leaves the will unrevoked, because they fail
to bring it within any of the exceptions in
troduced by the ecclesiastical or common-
law courts.
But in respect of intention there is another
consideration which may properly be ad
verted to. If the circumstantial evidence
appearing in the case were competent. in law
and sufficient in fact to show a change of in
tention on the part of the testator as to his
final disposition of his property, it would
not appear that his intention would be less
defeated by disallowing this will than by al
lowing it. The only issue is testacy or in
testacy. To this issue the inquiry as to the
testator’s intention is limited; and, what
ever testamentary change he may have
thought of making, he had no thought of dy
ing intestate. and leaving his property to be
disposed of by the statutory rule of descent
and distribution. There is no authorized
conjecture that, if the alternative of intes
taey or the unaltered will had been present
ed to him, he would have preferred the for
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mer rather than the latter. Hence, if all the
circumstantial evidence were admissible,
and if it proved all the appellee claims, the
question it would present would be, not how
the testator’s intent could be carried into ef
feet, but how it should be defeated. The
choice would be restricted to two modes of
violation, one testute, and the other intes
tate; and the former, supported by the writ
ten and uncanceled evidence, which the law
regards as the best, would prevail over the
latter, which would be sustained by- no proof,
competent or incompetent, and by no pre
sumption of law or fact. The testator not
intending to die intestate, the decree of dis
allowance for which the appellee contends
would be an intestate reversal of a testa
mentary purpose. “But Gen. Hoitt intend
ed to change his will." Suppose he did; the
change could not now be made. The intend
ed alteration (if there was one) is not known,
and the altering power has ceased.
The proffered oral declarations of the tes
tator to the effect that he understood the
will was revoked, were rightly rejected. The
mere understanding of a testator cannot re
voke his will, for legal requirements cannot
be thus abrogated; nor can his oral declara
tions, for wills cannot be revoked by parol;
non-upon the great weight of authority, are
such declarations evidence, unless they ac
company some act of revocation, and there
by become a part of the res gestm. Jackson
v. Knifffen, 2 Johns. 31; Dan v. Brown, 4
Cow. 483; Clark v. Smith, 34 Barb. 140:
Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N. Y. 157; Ran
dall v. Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. 643; Lewis v.
Lewis, 2 Watts & S. 455; Hargroves v. Redd,
43 Ga. 142, 160; Gay v. Gay, 60 Iowa, 415,
14 N. W. Rep. 238; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 6
Heisk. 489; Smith v. liIenner, 1 Gail. 170;
Doe v. Palmer, 16 Adol. & E. 747; 2 Greenl.
Ev. (9th Ed.) § 690; Abb. Tr. Ev. 124; 2 Star~
kie, Ev. (3d Ed.) 1286; 1 Redf. Wills, 331.
Such declarations, also, were not compe
tent, upon the testator’s intention not to
pass by his will. after-acquired real estate.
If a contrary intent is inferable from the
will itself, it cannot be disproved by extrin
sic evidence. If it is not thus inferable, and
may be ascertained by the weight of com
petent evidence, his declarations are not a.
part of such evidence.
Decree of the probate court reversed. Will
allowed.
ALLEN, J., did not sit. The others con
curred.
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SWAN v. HAMMOND. .
(188 Mass. 45.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Oct. 23, 1884.
Appeal from probate court, Middlesex coun
W.
E. F. Dewing and G. L. Sleeper, for appel
lant. W. B. Gale and W. N. Mason, for ex
ecutrix.
q
COLBURN, .T. It appears by the record
and agreed facts in this case that Susan E.
Haven. an unmarried woman, made her will
May 20, 1853; that she was then possessed
of real and personal estate, all of which by
her will she devised and bequeathed to her
-ister, who was named as executrix: that on
October 3, 1861, she married Thomas I“.
Hammond, and lived with him until her
death, on January 18, 1883. Her husband
had no knowledge of the existence of the will
until after her decease. No child was born
of the marriage. The will was presented for
probate in Middlesex by the executrix therein
named. and was approved and allowed on
April, 1883, and the husband appealed. The
(only question presented is whether the will
was revoked by the marriage. It has been
well settled by common law, at least since
Fors~e and Hembling’s Case, 4 Coke, 60b, (de
cided in 1589,) that the marriage of a feme
sole revokes her will.[ In case of a man it is
equally well settled that marriage alone does
not revoke his will, but that marriage and the
birth-of a child do. I 1 Jarm. Wills, 122; War-
ner v. Beach, 4 Gray, 162. The reason why
the will ofa feme sole is revoked by her mar
riage is commonly stated to be that marriage
takes away her testamentary capacity, and
destroys the ambulatory nature of her will;
and it is urged in argument that since the
statutes allowing a married woman to make
a will, with certain limitations as to the
rights of the husband, were passed, the rea
son upon which the rule was founded, that
the will of a feme sole is revoked by mar
riage, no longer exists; and that her will,
like that of a man, should be held to be re
voked, not by marriage alone, but by marI
riage and the birth of a child. This argu
ment is not without force, but its force would
be much greater if we could see any good
reason why, in the use of a man, both mar
riage and the birth of a child should be held
necessary for the revocation of his will. The
rule was adopted from the civil law, and is
now firmly established as part of the com
mon law; but the reason upon which it is
founded is not obvious. Marriage alone, in
the case of a man or woman, would seem to
be a suflicient change in condition and cir
cumstances to cause an implied revocation
manner from that in the mind of the testator
when the will was made. The rights of the
husband or wife must greatly modify its pro
visions; and it can hardly be supposed that
an unmarried person would make the same
will he or she would make after marriage.
If we were under no restraint, we might well
hesitate to hold that, since testamentary ca
pacity has been given to women, a will made
by a woman when sole should be revoked
only by marriage and the birth of a child, as
in case of a man, for the sake of uniformity
only, when we are inclined to think a better
rule would be that in case of a man his will
should be revoked by marriage alone. But
sucn a rule can only be introduced by the
legislature. In England, by St. 7 Wm. 1V.
and 1 Vict. c. 26, § 18, and in many of the
states in this country, it has been provided
by statute that the wills of both men and
women shall be revoked by marriage. Sec
collection of statutes in 1 Jarm. Wills, (5th
Amer. Ed, by Bigelow,) 122, note.
But we are of the opinion that the question
now before us has been so far settled by stat
ute as not to admit of change by construc
tion. Section 8, Pub. St. c. 127, after provid
ing that no will shall be revoked, unless by
burning, tearing, etc., or some other writing
executed in the manner required in the case
of a will, goes on as follows: “But nothing
contained in this section shall prevent thr
revooation implied by law from subsequent
changes in the condition or circumstances of "
the testator." It is not apparent that an en
tire revocation, by implication of law, results
from any change of condition or circumstan
ces except that of a subsequent marriage.
See the discussion in Warner v. Beach, ubl
supra. This clause as to implied revocations
was first introduced into Rev. St. c. 62, § 9.
The other provisions as to revocation were
substantially taken from St. 1783, c. 24, § 2.
The commissioners in their note to this sec
tion say: “The clause as to implied revoca
tions recognizes and adopts the existing law,
as established and understood among us."
And their further discussion of this subject
shows clearly that they had in mind the rule
of the common law, that, ss
rria e n th birth f a child, and, in
case of a woman, marriage alone, revoked a
will previously made. We are of opinion that
this provision as to implied revocations, from
its language, and the reasons given for its
introduction, has substantially the force of
an express enactment of the rules of the com
mon law, which we are not at liberty to
change, even if the reason for the rule, in
case of a woman. no longer exists. This was
the view taken in Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y.
369, upon a similar question, under a statute
of New York. We are therefore of opinion
of a will previously made. A will made
before marriage, and taking effect after mar
riage, must take effect in a very different
that the will of Susan E. Hammond m; s not
properly admitted to ro ,_~ f
“w
Decree ate court reversed.
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BALDWIN et ai. v. SPRIGGS/
(65 Md. 373, 5 Atl. Rep. 295.)
Court of Appeals of Maryland. June 22, 1886.
Appeal from orphans’ court, Anne Arundel
county.
Proceedings to probate a will claimed to
have been revoked by the testator’s subse
quent marriage and the birth of surviving
issue. Decree for contestant, and proponent
appeals.
Edward C. Gantt, for appellants. James
Reveil and Daniel R. Magruder, for appellees.
STONE, J. There is no dispute about the
material facts in this case. James Spriggs,
of Anne Arundel county, on the 25th of July,
1865, duly executed his will. By that will
he disposed of all the property, real and per
sonal, which he then owned. James Spriggs,
at the time of theexecutlon of the said will,
had a wife, Ruth Spriggs, the ving, and
several children by her, also g. By his
said will he devised all his property to said
wife and children. His wife, Ruth, died in
1871, and said James, soon after the death of
said Ruth, about 1874, intermarried with
Maggie E. Vane, and also had by her sev
eral children. Said James Spriggs died in
January, 1886, leaving a widow, the said
Maggie E. Spriggs, and a child by the said
Ruth and children by the said Maggie E.
surviving him. After the execution of the
will the said James Spriggs purchased cer
tain other real estate which was unaffected
by said will. His will, as to his real estate,
contained no reslduary clause, but disposed
of all the real estate he owned at its date,
by specific description. After the death of
James Spriggs his will was offered for pro
bate in the orphans’ court of Anne Arundel
county, and a caveat was filed thereto by
his second wife, Maggie E. Spriggs, in behalf
of herself and her children, and upon such
caveat plenary proceedings were had, and
the orphans’ court ordered and decreed that
said will was revoked by hissubsequentmar
riage and the birth of issue, and refused to
admit the paper to probate. From this de
cree the daughter of the testator by his first
wife and two of his grandehildren have ap
pealed to this court.
These are all the facts necessary to eluci
date the legal proposition which we are called
upon to decide, and which is simply whether,
James Sprlggs has been revoked by opera
~tion of law. it would be a profltless task to
review all the English cases on the subject.
They may be found by the curious fully dis
cussed by Chancellor Kent with his usual
ability in the case of Brush v. Wilkins, 4
Johns. Ch. 506. It is enough for us to say
that, after a good deal of doubt and hesita
tion, it was finally settled in England, be
fore our Revolution~ that marriage and issue
taken together did amount to an implied rev
ocation of a -will previously made, and that
\{upon
this state of the facts, the will of
such implied revocations were not within the
statute of frauds, but that such implied rev
ocations might be rebutted and controlled by
circumstances. The final determination of
the matter seems to have been reached by the
cases of Christopher v. Christopher, 2 Dick.
445, (decided by the court of exchequer,
Parker, C. B., presiding, in 1771.) and in the
case of Spraage v. Stone, 1 Amb. 721, (de
cided in 1773.) These cases appear to have
definitely settled the law that a subsequent
marriage and birth of a child, standing alone,
and unaccompanied by other circumstances.
amount to an implied revocation of a will.
The whole subject, says Chancellor Kent,
has continued to receive great discussion in
the English courts since the era of our Rev
olution, growing out of new cases constantly
arising amidst the endless variety of human
affairs. The most important of the English
cases since the Revolution is the case of
Marston v. Fox, 8 Adol. & E. 14, (decided
in 1838 by 14 out of the 15 English judges.)
where the general doctrine we have stated
was reaflirmed. We will recur to this case
again for another purpose. But we are not
without decisive authority in our own state.
The unreported case of Sedwick v. Sed
wick, decided at June term, 1844, was a case
similar to the one at bar. And the court of
appeals decided that the subsequent mar
riage, and birth of a child, did revoke the
will, and they affirmed the decree of the or
phans’ court refusing it probate. No opinion
was filed in the case, although a large amount
of property was involved, and the case was
argued by some of the most eminent counsel
in Maryland. But they did flatly decide the
question by a decree declaring the will re
voked by the subsequent marriage, and birth
of a child.
But while such is the general rule, like oth~ .
er general rules, it has been held in England
subject to some exceptions.
ceptions is the one where the testator has
made provision for his children born after
the execution of the will. As the origin of
the rule was the duty of the parent to pro
vide for his offspring, this exception seems
right and proper. Another matter upon
which the English courts have exercised
themselves is the determination of the ground
upon which the doctrine of implied revoca
tion ought to be rested. This is of practical
importance in this case, and will require
some examination. Lord Mansfield, in the
case of B dy v. Cubitt, 1 Doug. 31, thought
the rule s ould rest on the presumption that
the testator intended to revoke his will, and
that it therefore followed that such presump
tion might be rebutted by even parol evi
dence,—to use his own words, that such pre
umptlou might be rebutted by “every sort
of evidence." But Lord Mansfieid’s view
seems to us irreconcilable with the statute
of frauds. It would in effect allow the will
to be revoked by the subsequent intention of
the testator, without such intention being evi
Among the ex- I
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denced by the positive acts so expressly re
quired by that statute. That view leads to
another difliculty: that the testator may
change his first intention, and adopt a con
trary one; and, if so, which of the two in
tentions is to prevail? The conclusion, how
ever, that Lord Mansfield reached, that ev
ery sort of evidence was admissible, was but
the logical consequence of the ground upon
which he rested the rule, namely, that of pre
sumed alteration of intention.. This case was
decided in 1778. But the courts there seem -
to have felt the diflienlties that would result
from such a view, and Lord Kenyon, in Doe
v. Lancashire, 5 Term R. 49, (decided in
1792,) placed the rule upon another ground.
namely. a tacit condition annexed to the will,
when made, that it should not take effect
if there should be a.total change in the situ
ation of the testator’s family. This view of
Lord Kenyon was afterwards adopted by
Lord Ellenborough in the case of Kenebel v.
Scrafton, 2 East, 534, (decided in 1802.)
Finally, the court, in Marston v. Fox, hereto
'fore cited, unanimously adopted the views of
Lord Kenyon, and it may now be considered
as settled in England that the doctrine of
implied revocation rests upon the ground of a
tacit condition annexed to the will, when
made, that it should not take eil'cct if there
should be a total change in the situation of
the testator’s family. In this we concur.
If we adopt the English rule that the _will
is-noifrevpkmheIjestator makes provi
sion 126Fh6 children of the subsequent mar
riaga-the question arises in the case at bar
wnenasi he can be considered to have made
such provision by the purchase of the prop
erty acquired by him between the date of his
will and his death. This question must be
nswered, both upon reason and authority,
in the negative. The testator disposed of all
the property he then owned, by his will; but
he lived 20 years after its date, and in the
mean time purchased other real estate, which
the children of the second -wife would share
with those of the first. But the mere ac~
pumulation of additional property cannot, up
/,on any ground of reason, be considered a
provision made by the testator for the second
set of children, any more than for the first
Wm
set, as the latter are equally benefited by it.
The injustice of considering after-acquired
property a provision for the second children
will be the more readily seen if we consider
a case—and such have frequently occurred
where the beneficiaries under the will were
ccmparative strangers. or remote collaterals.
Again, if after’acquired property should be
held a provision for the after-born children,
how much property must be so acquired? It
could hardly be said that the purchase of an
acre of poor land. or a cow or horse, could be
so considered; and, if not, by what rule
should the value of such property be estimat
ed? But we are not without authority on
this subject. In Maiston v. Fox, above cited,
the point was made that an after-purchased
estate did not pass by the will, but descend
ed to the son in fee, and thereby became a
provision for him, and prevented the revoca~
tion; but in answer to this objection, the
court said: “In the first place, we answer
that no case can be found in which after
acquired property descending upon a child
has been allowed to have that effect; and, in
deed, such a proposition seems incompatible
with the nature of a condition annexed to the
will."
To determine that after-acquired property
was a provision for the after-born child,
would be totally inconsistent with the theory
that the rule of implied revocation rests upon
the tacit condition annexed to the will, when
made, that it should not take effect if there
should be a total change in the situation of
the testator’s family. Instead of the change
in the family, it would make a change in the
property,—one of the essential elements to
determine the implied revocation. The will
of the successful testator would stand;that
of the unfortunate would be revoked.
Upon the whole case presented by the rec
ord before us, we are of opinion that, the tes
tator having disposed of the whole of the es
tate owned by him at the date of his will,
and having again married, and had children
by his second wife, and having made no pro
vision for such children, his will wasxre
voked by operation of law, and that the order
of the orphans’ pourt must be aflirmed; the
costs to be paid out of the estate.
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BROWN et al. v. CLARK et al. v!
(77 N. Y. 369.)
Court of Appeals of New York. May 20,
1879.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,.
fourth department.
Proceedings before the surrogate of Mon
roe county by Fortune C. Brown and others,
executors named in a codicil executed by
Mary J. Clark Proctor, deceased, for probate
of a will and codicil executed by said Mary
I J. Clark Proctor. The will was executed by
the deceased, then Mary J. Clark, on Au-I
gust %, 1873. She subsequently married
Truman A. Proctor, and after such marriage,
and on December 7, 1876, she executed a cod
icil. She died October 1, 1877. The surro
gate denied probate of the will on objection
by Warren C. Clark and others, and the ex
ecutors appealed to the general term, where
the decree of the surrogate was reversed, and
the objectors appealed to this court.
J. C. Cochrane, for appellants. H. R. Sel
den, for respondents.
ANDREWS, J. The evidence justifies the
conclusion of the surrogate that there was a
due execution of the will of August 25, 1873.
The will was drawn by Mr. Clark, who was
a lawyer by profession, and was executed
by the testatrix under his supervision. She
was his adopted daughter, and sole legatee
under his will. When her will was executed
she had 'little, if any, property of her own,
and her will was made to provide for the
disposition of the estate which she would re
ceive under the will of Mr. Clark in the
event of her surviving him. In substance,
the two wills constituted a scheme for the
disposal of. the property of Mr. Clark after
his death and the death of the testatrix.
The attestation clause is full, and recites all
the facts constituting a due execution, and
is signed by two witnesses. The witnesses
were not lawyers, and were not, so far as
appears, conversant with the statute require
ments for the execution of wills. and when
examined were unable to state that they sign
ed the will as witnesses at the request of the
testatrix, or that she at the time declared it
to be her will. But it is undisputed that the
testatrix executed the will in their presence,
and that they were requested by some one
to become witnesses to a will, and that they
attended on the occasion of the execution of
the will in pursuance of such request. There
is no evidence contradicting the recitals in
the attestation clause. Neither of the wit
nesses deny that it contained a true account
of what occurred when the will was execut
ed. The proof was taken five years after its~
execution. Mr. Clark was then dead, and no
.
persons were living who were present at the
execution except the two witnesses. The
case is therefore one where the attestation
clause recites all the essential acts to consti
tute a due execution and publication of the
instrument as a will, and the other circum
stances tend to corroborate the truth of the
recitals. The witnesses, after a lapse of sev
eral years, fail to recollect afifirmatively the
I
facts attested by them .over their own signa
tures. The mere non-recollection of witness
es, under these circumstances, would not jus
tify a finding that the statute requirements
were not observed. Their lack of memory
‘does not rebut the presumption of due publi
(cation
arising from the attestation clause and
he other circumstances. Brinckerhoot v.
Remsen, 8 Paige, 499, 26 Wend. 332; In re
Keilum, 52 N. Y. 517.
Li
v
e concur in the conclusion reached by the
surrogate that the will was revoked by the
bsequent marriage of the testatrix. It was
the rule of the common law that the mar
riage of a woman operated as an absolute
revocation of her prior will. Forse and Hem
blingIs Case, 4 Coke, 61. The reason of the
rule is stated by Lord Chancellor Thurlow in
Hodsden v. Lloyd, 2 Brown, Ch. 534. He
says: “It is contrary to the nature of the
instrument, which must be ambulatory dur
ing the life of the testatrix; and, as by the
marriage she disables herself from making
any other will, this instrument ceases to be
of that sort and must be void." The rule
’that the marriage of a feme sole revoked her
will was made a part of the statute law of
this state by the Revised Statutes, (2 Rev.
'St. p. 64, § 44.) The language of the statute,
that the will of an unmarried woman shall
be deemed revoked by her subsequent mar
riage, is the declaration of an absolute rule.
The statute does not make the marriage a
presumptive revocation, which may be rebut
ted by proof of a contrary intention, but
makes it operate e0 instanti as a revocation.
4 Kent, Comm. 528.
It is claimed by the contestants that the
testamentary capacity conferred upon mar
"ried women by the recent statutes in this
state takes away the reason of the rule of
,the common law, and that upon the maxim,
should be deemed to be abrogated. Upon the
same ground it might have been urged at
common law that the marriage of a feme
sole should only be deemed a revocation or
suspension of her prior will during the mar
iriage, and that when the woman’s testamen-
tary capacity was restored by the death of
her husband, leaving her surviving, the will
should be revived; but the contrary was set
tled. Forse and Hembling’s Case; 1 Jarm.
Wills, 106; 4 Kent, Comm. 598. But the
courts cannot dispense with a statutory role
because it may appear that the policy upon
which it was established has ceased. Tbe_
,married women acts confer testamentary ca
pacity upon married women, but they do not
,undertake to interfere with or abrogate the
'statute prescribing the effect of marriage as
cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipse, the rule .
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a revocation. It was quite consistent that
the legislature should have intended to leave
the statute of 1830 in force, although the new
statutes took away the reason upon which it
was based. The legislature may have deem
ed it proper to continue it, for the reason that
the new relation created by the marriage
would be likely to induce a change of testa
mentary intention, and that a disposition by
a married woman of her property by will
ould depend upon a new testamentary act
fter the marriage.
The remaining question is as to the legal
effect of the codicil of December 7, 1876.
This was executed after the marriage of the
testatrix, and refers to the will by its date,
and the names of the attesting witnesses;
and in the body of the codicil the testatrix
declares her intention thereby to republish.
reaflirm. and adopt the will as modified by
the codicil as her present will, in the same
manner as if then executed by her, and fol
lowing this declaration is this clause:
“Which, [codicil,]. in connection with and
amendment of my will, I now publish and de
clare together, as constituting my last will
and testament." The codicil was executed
with the formalities required by the statute.
It was signed by the testatrix in the pres
ence of two witnesses, and was attested by
them in her presence, by her request; and
she, at that same time, declared the instru
ment to be "a codicil to her last will and
testament, and a reaflirmation of the latter."
The original will was present when the codi
cll was executed. and the attention of the
witnesses was called to it, and one of them
examined and identified it.
The evidence .leaves no room for doubt that
the main purpose of the testatrix in making
the codicil was to reestablish the will,
which had been revoked by her marriage.
The inference from the proof is that she un
erstood the will had been revoked by her
marriage. The codicil made some provision
for a brother of the testatrix not contained
in the will. but the paramount intention of
the testatrix in executing the codicll was, as
appears by the codicil and the extrinsic cir
cumstances, to reaffirm the disposition of her
property made by the will, so that the bulk
of her estate should go according to its pro
visions. The contestants claim that the inten
I ion of the testatrix to reaflirm the will can
not take effect, for the reason that there was
no republication of that instrument after her
marriage, and that what occurred at the time
of the execution of the codicil was a publi
cation of that instrument only, and did not
operate to revive the will, or incorporate its
provisions with those of the codicil. The
general doctrine is well settled that a codicil
executed with the formalities required by
the statute for the execution of wills operates
as a republication of a will so far as it is not
changed by the codicil. Acherly v. Vernon,
1 Comyn, 381; Barnes v. Crowe, 1 Ves. Jr.
486; 'Mooers v. White, 6 Johns. Ch. 375; Van
Cortlandt v. Kip, 1 Hill, 590, 7 Hill, 346.
In Van Cortlandt v. Kip, 1 Hill, 593, Cowen,
J., said: “It seems to me that at this day
it would be a violation of all reliable author
ity to deny that a codicil, duly attested to
pass real estate, would per se, whether it re
lates to real or personal property, operate as
a republication of a devise, unless the testa
tor declares that he does not intend that it
shall have that effect." This doctrine was
attended with important consequences. .By
the English law prior to the wills act, (1
Vict. c. 26), a testator must have been seised
of the lands devised at the time of making
his will, and after-acquired lands would not
pass under a resitiuary devise; and this was
also the rule in this state prior to the Re
vised Statutes. 4 Kent, Comm. 601. But the
execution of a codicil was held to make the
will speak as of the time the codicil was exe
cuted. and to extend a general devise to lands
acquired intermediate the making of the will
and the codicil. The cases in 1 Ves. Jr. 486,
and 1 Hill, 590~ supra, proceeded upon this
doctrine. In each of these cases lands ac
quired by the testator, after making the will,
and before the execution of the codicil, were
held to pass under the will. It was not es
sential to the application of this rule that
the codicil should be annexed to the will, or
express an intention to republih the will or
refer to the devise. It was suflicient if the
codicil was executed with the formalities re
quired for the execution of a will of lands.
Goodtltle v. Meredith~ 2 Maule & S. 5; Jack
son v. Holloway, 7 Johns. 394; Jackson v.
Potter, 9 Johns. 312. The statute of frauds
(29 Car. II.) enacted that all devises of lands
shall be in writing, and signed by the devi
sor, or by some person in his presence, and
by his express directions, andIshall be at
tested and subscribed in his presence by three
or four credible witnesses, or else they shall
be void. Prior to 1830 this statute had been
substantially reenacted in this state, and gov
erned the execution of wills here. 2 Rev.
Laws, c. 23. § 2. It will be observed from
the cases cited that the attestation of a codi
cil by the requisite number of witnesses was
deemed a compliance with the statute, so as
to make the will operative upon after-ac
quired lands, although they were not men
tioned in the codicil, and there was no ex
press republication of the will. The attesta
tion of the codicil is, according to the deci
sions, an attestation of the will, within the
meaning of St. Car. II. So, also, it was held
that a will, revoked by marriage or other
wise, was revived by the execution of a codi
cil. Lord Walpole v. Lord Orford, 3 Ves.
402; Neate v. Pickard, 2 Notes of Cas. Adm.
8
.: Ecc. 406; 1 Jarm. Wills, 187; 1 Redf.
Wills, 367. This subject is now regulated in
England by the twenty-second section of the
wills act, (1 Vict. c. 26,) which provides, in
substance, that no will or codicif which shall
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in any manner be revoked shall be revived
otherwise than by the re~cxccution thereof, or
by a codicil executed in the manner prescrib
ed by the act, and showing an intention to
revive the same.
Upon the authorities cited, it is clear that,
under the law in this state as it stood prior
to 1830, there was a valid republication of
the will in question by the execution of the
codicil of December 7. 1876. The Revised
Statute changed, in several respects, the
ceremonies to be observed in the execution
of wills; and, among other things, it is ex
pressly required that the testator shall, at
thetimeof making or acknowledging his sub
scription to the will, declare the instrument
to be his lat will and testament. 2 Rev.
St. p. 63, § 40, subd. 3. There is nothing in
the statute indicating that it was intended
to change the rule that a codicil~ duly exe
cuted, was a republication of the will. The
codicil in the case of Van Cortlandt v. Kip, 1
Hill, 590. was executed after the present
statute was enacted. It referred to the will
executed in 1824. but did not in terms repub
lish it, and made no reference to the lands
acquired by the testator after the will was
made; but the court held. in accordance
with the law which existed before the Re
vised Statutes were passed, that the codicil
was a republication of the devise in the will,
and that the after-acquired lands passed to
the surviving devisee. The Revised Stat
utes did not affect the construction of wills
.made before the chapter relating to wills
took effect. 2 Rev. St. p~ 68. § 70. This
case seems to be a direct authority that the
due execution and publication of a codicil is,
under the Revised Statutes, as it was prior
thereto, a republication of the will to which
it refers. The codicil in this case refers to
the will, and expressly adopts and reaffirms
it. The testatrix, by publishing the codicil,
published the will, which was clearly iden
tified by the reference in the codicil and the
extrinsic proof. It is established by a long
line of authorities that any written testamen
tary document in existence at the execution
of a will may, by reference, be incorporated
into and become a part of the will, provided
the reference in the will is distinct, and
clearly identifies, or renders capable of iden
tification by the aid of extrinsic proof, the
document to which reference is made. I
will cite a few of them: Habergham v. Vin
cent, 2 Ves. Jr. 228; Smart v. I'rujean, 6 Ves.
565; Williams v. Evans, 1 Cromp. & M. 42I,
Alien v.. Maddock, 11 Moore, P. C. 427; Bur
ton v. Newbery, 1 Ch. Div. 234; Tonneil v.
Hall, 4 N. Y. 145. in Williams on Execu
tors (page 97) it is said: “If a testator in a
will or codicil or other testamentary paper,
duly executed, refers to an exiting unattest
ed will or other paper, the instrument so reI
ferred to becomes part of the will;" and Jar
man mys, (1 Jarm. Wills, 78:) “A codicil,
duly attested, communicates the efliciency of
its attestation to an unattested will or previ
ous codicil, so as to render effectual any de
vise of a freehold estate which may be con
tained in such prior unattested instrument;"
and further on, speaking of the incorpora
tion of documents by reference in the will.
he says this is permitted "without violating
the principle of the enactment which requires
an attestation by witnesses, the testator’s in
tention to adopt the contents of such instru
ment being manifested by a will duly at
testet ." Page 83. In this case, if the will
of Mrs. Proctor had been an unattested in
strument, it would, upon the authorities,
have been incorporated with and made a
part of the testamentary instrument original
ly executed. by reason of the reference to it
the codicil. I am of the opinion that the
ubifcation of the codicil was a publication
of the will. and that both papers together
are to be considered as the will of the testa
rix. There was no proof to sustain the al
legations of undue influence or want of tes
tamentary capacity in the testatrix when it
was executed. The only question before us
is one of law, upon substantially uncontro
verted facts; and the order of the general
term reversing the decree of the surrogate,
and remitting the proceedings to him with
directions to admit the will to probate,
should be aflirmed. Hoysradt v. Kingman,
22 N. Y. 372; Gilbert v. Knox, 52 N. Y. 125.
All concur. Order afiirmed. -
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(Read In re CawleyIs Estate. p. 82.nuprn.)
In re DIEZIS WILL.
(50 N. Y. as.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 12, 1872.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
second department. .
Proceedings by Ursula Diez before the sur
rogate of New York county for the probate
of an alleged will of Frederick Diez. The
testator was a naturalized citizen of New
York state, domiciled in New York city. He
went to Germany in May, 1868, and died at
Southofen, Bavaria, November 1, 1868. Pre
vious to his death the following instrument
was executed:
“Matrimonial and also testamentary agree
ment: G. K. N.. 898. This day, Sunday, No
vember 1st, 1868, (one thousand eight hun
dred and sixty-eight,) at eleven a. m., ap
peared before me, Francis Xaver Malor, roy
al notary at S_outhofen, in the house No. so
at Southofen, Iwhither I went at once, ac
cording to the request of the parties. (1)
The hotel proprietor, Mr. Frederick Diez,
from New York, in the United States of
America, at present being in Southofen, who,
although lying in bed in an upper room in
the abovenamed house. suffering from a
complaint in the stomach and very weak, is
in full possession of his mental faculties,
and therefore must be deemed fully compe~
tent to make dispositions, whereof I have
convinced myself by conversation with him.
(2) His wife, Mrs. Ursula Diez, born Trunk.
of the same place. Lastly, (3) the two inr
partial witnesses, whose presence had been
especially requested. and who, after exam
ination, have been found free of all excep
1person in case of a death. (IIL) Also all for
mer dispositions concerning .the hereditary
succession which may have been made by
.
us singly, or with the consent of both, how
ing, or for the case of death, are hereby set
‘aside
and declared null and void. (IV.) We
desire that a first exemplified copy of the
, foregoing matrimonial and also testamentary
7agreement be delivered to us, and we will
bear (V.) the expenses incurred jointly.’
l Hereupon the present instrument was drawn
up by special request of the parties, and aft
er it had been read to them in the presence
of the two abovenamed witnesses. and after
1their attention had been called to all such
legal relations as might possibly stand in the
|
way of such a contract. and after being ap
proved by them, it was ratified to the full
contents of it, and signed by them, by the
two witnesses, and by myself, the under
signed royal notary.
“Mark of Mr. Frederick Diez. who
is unable to write on account of
great weakness; wherefore the two
witnesses have subscribed for him.
‘
l'Ursula Diez.
i
X
"L. Stich, Physician.
"Max Mathes.
“Franz Xaver Malor, ,
"Royal Notary."[L. 8.]
This instrument was offered for probate
by Ursula Diez, the widow of deceased.
ik’robate was contested by Christian Supp, a
. residuary legatee under a former will. Con
testant appealed from a decree admitting
the will to probate. The general term of the
ifirst department sent the case to the second
-IYW~=w§'§:W ‘
ever and wherever made, between the liv--
tkmkm) The practicing physician, Dr. Le0n_ department, where the decree of the surro
nrd Stich. of Southofen; and (b) the mer- gate was aflirmed- and contestant appealed
chant, Mr. Max Mathes, of Southofen; both it
O this court.
of the latter I am personally acquainted| H. P. Townsend, for contestant and ap
with as to name, occupation, and residence, fpellant. F. S. Stallknecht and Elial F. Hall,
while the name, occupation, and residence of
i
for proponent and respondent.
the former two persons were only made
known to me by the two witnesses present.
And Mr. Frederick Diez and his wife, Mrs. ‘tions relied upon in the appellant’s points
Ursula Diez. requested me to reduce to writ- l are—Firt. that, not being under seal, the in
ing and certify in my ofificial capacity the strument cannot be regarded as a will of
following: 'Matrimonial and also testament- . real estate; and, second, that i
t is in form a
my agreement: (I.) We have made, as yet,
.
contract, and not a will.
no conjoint disposition of any kind concern-l The first objection is wholly unfounded; a
ing the hereditary succession in case of seal is not required to a will of real or per
death. (11.) Inasmuch as we have. by joint i sonal estate. The statute requires only tha
exertions, acquiried
the
prroperty
now
iin
our 1 it be subscribed by
theJtestat\tzrntitt tz
la
e end.
possess on; an( nasmuc as the offspr ng of 2 Rev. St. p. 63, § 40; 1 arm. s, , note.
our marriage, our only child, Mary Diez, The second objectionpresentsamore debat
has already, in the tenderest age, departed .able question. The instrument is entitled,
this life,—we hereby determine that, upon ‘and refers to itself in one place as, a matri
the decease of one or the other of us, the
.
monial and testamentary agreement, and in
!
RAPALLO, J. ' ' ' The two ohjec-
surviving husband or wife shall receive the.
entire property of the one having died first,
—that is to say, the existing jointly acquired
property,—to his or her unconditionally, free,
sole possession and sole ownership, and shall
not be boundito pay over anything to any
LAw SUCO.—6
another as a contract, and contains no ex
pression declaratory of its testamentary
character, except the words “testamentary
agreement," or. as translated in the first
deposition, "contract of marriage and in
lheritance," and, in the third, "marriage and
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inheritance contract." These designations
are not, however, conclusive as to the charac
ter of the instrument. That must be deter
mined by the dispositions which it makes.
1 Jarm. Wills, p. 13; Ex parte Day, 1
Bradf. Sur. 482, and authorities there cited.
' These dispositions are, in substance, that
Diez and his wife each declare that they
thereby determine that, upon the decease of
one or the other of them, the surviving hus
band or wife shall receive, unconditionally,
the entire property of the one having died
first; and that all former dispositions con
cerning the hereditary succession, which may
have been made by either of the parties
singly, or with the consent of both, are an
nulled. These provisions are preceded by a
declaration of the motives leading to such a
disposition of the property, which were that
it had been acquired by the joint exertions of
the parties, and that their only offspring had
in the tenderest age departed this life. It is
claimed that the fact that the property, up
on which the instrument~ was to operate, was
the product of the joint labor of the parties,
furnished a consideration for an agreement
between them that, on the death of either, it
should belong to the survivor, and that the
instrument in question was such an agree
‘ment, and not a will. The distinguishing
feature of a will i that it is not to take
effect except upon the death of the testator.
,An instrument which is to operate in the
lifetime of the donor, and to pass an inter
est in the property before his death, even
‘though its absolute enjoyment by the donee
ibe
postponed till after the death of the
.
donor, or even though it be contingent upon
a the survivorship of the donee, is a deed or
contract, and not a will. But if the instru
.ment is not to have any operation until after
‘death, then it is a will, notwithstanding
that it may have been executed in pursuance
of a previous promise or obligation appear
ing upon its face.
Testing the document now before us by
this rule, we think that it was the will of ’
that one of theI signers who should first die;
that it did not purport to convey any pres
ent estate or interest in the property, or to
deprive either of the parties of the absolute
power of disposition of his or her own prop
erty, during his or her life, but was an ar
rangement testamentary in its character, and
not intended to operate except upon the
death of one of the parties, and then only
as expressive of the intention of the one dy~
ing as to the posthumous destination of his
or her property. It does not use words of
grant or mutual contract, but states that the
parties have determined that, upon the death
of either, the survivor shall receive the en
tire property. The reasons given for this
determination do not necessarily make it a
contract. The fact that by the same instru
ment the husband and wife devised recip
rocally to each other, or, in other words,
that it was a mutual will, does not deprive
it of validity. There is no just objection to
such a form of testating. The instrument
operates as the separate will of whoever dies
first. Here, the husband having died first,
it can be proved as his will, and the eflicacy
of his dispositions is in no way impaired by
those portions of the instrument which, if
the wife had died first, would have consti
tuted her will, but which have now become
inoperative. The result is precisely the same
as if like reciprocal dispositions had been
made by the husband and wife by means of
two separate instruments. The combining of
such reciprocal dispositions in one instru
ment is sanctioned-by several authorities.
Ex parte Day, 1 Bradf. Sur. 476; Lewis v.
Scofieid, 26 Conn. 452; Evans v. Smith, 28
Ga. 98; 1 Redf. Wills, 182; Rogers, Appel
lants, 11 Me. 303; In re Stracey, Deane & S.
6; In re Lovegrove, 2 Swab. a T. 453; Du
four v. Pereira, 1 Dick. 419; 2 Harg. State
Tr. 310, 311.
The order should be aflirmed, with costs.
All concur. Order afifirmed. .
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just debts be first fully paid;
l
BETTS v. HARPER.
(39 Ohio St. 639.)
J‘an. Term, 1884.
Error to district court, Hocking county.
Agnes Harper and Penrose Harper, sisters
domiciled in Hocking county, each owning
personal property, and being owners as ten
ants in common of real estate in that county,
signed the following instrument, dated April
17, 1862: "We, Agnes Harper and Penrose
Harper, of the county of Hocking, in the
state of Ohio, do make and publish this, our
last will and testament, in manner and form
following; that is to say: First, it is our
will that our funeral expenses and all our
second, that
all of our property, both real and personal,
go to James Bette and John Drue Betts and
their heirs forever; lastly, we hereby consti
tute James Betts to be executor of this, our
last will and testament, revoking and annul
ling all former wills by us made, and ratify
ing and confirming this, and no other, to be
our last will and testament." This instru
ment was subscribed at the time of its execu
tion by two witnesses in due form; and Ag
nes having died in 1872, and Penrose in 1874,
the instrument was admitted to probate in
the probate court of Hocking county, as their
will, in April, 1875. In September, 1875, the
heirs at law of Agnes Harper and Penrose
Harper filed a petition in the court of com
mon pleas of Hocking county, against James
Betts and John D. Betts, to set the will aside.
0n the trial of the issue in the district court,
to which the cause was appealed. the court
charged the jury, in effect, that the will, be
ing joint. was void; to which charge the de
endants below excepted. A verdict having
een returned in accordance with .the charge,
judgment was rendered setting the will aside.
James Betts and John D. Betts filed this peti
tion in error.
M. A. Daugherty and J. R. Grogan, for
plaintiffs in error. J. H. Collins, for defend
ant in error.
Supreme Court of Ohio.
OKEY, J. The construction placed by the
majority of the court in Walker v. Walker,
14 Ohio St. 157, on the instrument there in
question, viewed in the light 01’ the facts ex
isting at the time of its execution, was that
the alleged will should be regarded as simply;
a compact, joint in form and substance, be
tween Walker and his wife, to treat their
several estates as one estate, and jointly dis-.
pose of it as such among the objects of their
bounty; that it was a matter of negotiation
between them, and the disposition which each
made of his or her property was influenced
and modified by the disposition made of the.
property of the other; that each devise and
bequest was, in fact, made in consideration
of each and all the rest; and that it was part
i
should revoke or cancel the instrument, or
any part of it, without the consent of the
other. Moreover, subsequently to the death
of Mrs. Walker, Walker, in violation of the
agreement, conveyed to others portions o1!
his lands so devised. The majority held that
the instrument was not valid as a will, and
that the remedy of the devisees and legatees.
if they had any, was in equity to enforce the
agreement.
'
Assuming, as we should,—more than 20
years having elapsed since the case was de
cided,—that the instrument received the prop
er construction, we are not disposed to ques
tion the decision. But it is said, in the opin
ion, that the policy of the state, as indicated
in our legislation, is opposed to joint wills;
and attention is directed to the language
of the wills act, which it is said plainly refers
to an instrument to be executed by one per
son only. It will be seen, however, that our
statute is not peculiar in this respect. The
provisions of the English statutes and the
statutes of the various states upon the sub
ject are precisely similar to our own; and
the conclusion that they indicate a policy
that two or more persons may not unite in
the same instrument in making their wills,
whatever the form of the instrument may be,
is only reached by a rigid, and, as we think,
altogether unwarranted, adherence to the
mere letter of the statute. The provisions
of the statute relating to the execution of
deeds are similar, and yet nobody has ever
doubted that any number 01! persons having
an interest in property may join in an in
strument conveying it.
The case before us is unlike the case of
Walker v. Walker. Agnes Harper and Pen
rose Harper were each the owner of personal
property, and they were owners as tenants
in common of real estate. Each desired to
bequeath her personal property to James
Betts and John D. Betts, and each desired to
devise to them her individual share of the
real estate. They could unquestionably have
done this by two instruments, but they could
do it as effectually by one. This instrument
was, in efi'ect, the separate will of each.
Either could have revoked it so far as it
was her will. On the death of Agnes, in
1872, the instrument might have been admit
ted to probate as her will; and in 1874 it
might have been admitted to probate as the
will of Penrose; but in 1875 it was properly
admitted to probate as the will of both. The
authorities, it will be seen, are in some con
flict; but the view we have stated is support
ed by reason and the manifest weight of au
thority. Ex parte Day, 1 Bradf. Sur. 481;
Diez’s Will, 50 N. Y. 88; Mosser v. Mosser,
I2 Ala. 551; Schumaker v. Schmidt, 44 Ala.
454; Wyche v. Clapp, 43 Tex. 544; March v.
Huyter, 50 Tex. 243; Breathitt v. Whittaker,
8 B. Mon. 530; Lewis v. Scofield, 26 Conn.
452; Evans v. Smith, 28 Ga. 98; In re Stra
ot the compact that neither of the parties1 cey, 1 Doct. & Stud. 6, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 1177;
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Re Raine, 1 Swab. & T. 144; Re Love Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408; Clayton v. Liver
grove, 2 Swab. 6: T. 453, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 442; man, 2 Dev. & B. 558; Hershy v. Clark, 35
and see Denyssen v. Mostert, L. R. 4 P. C Ark. 17, 23.
236, 8 Moore, P. C. (N- S.) 502: Gould v. Judgment reversed.
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WELLINGTON v. APTHORP. (
(145 Mass. 69, 13 N. E. Rep. 10.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suf
folk. Sept. 19, 1887.
On exceptions from superior court.
Action of contract by Darius Wellington
against John V. Apthorp, as administrator
with the will annexed of the estate of Mary
Chism, deceased, upon an agreement, as the
plaintiff alleged, made by her with the plain
tiff on or about May 23, 1878, to bequeath to
him, by her last will, the sum of $5,000, and
pay his expenses of a journey to California
and Nevada in accompanying her there in the
fall of 1878; and also, uponan account an
nexed, for services in managing her property.
in accompanying her to California and Neva
da, and for cash paid as expenses on said
visit. Hearing in the superior court for Suf
folk county, before Bacon, J., before whom
it appeared that plaintiff, after returning
from the visit to California and Nevada, mar.
ried without the knowledge of testatrix, and
that when she heard of such marriage she re~
voked a prior will leaving plaintiff $5,000,
I and made a new one leaving him nothlng sidcratlon of services thereafter to be render
The court fmmd for the defendant' and, up’: ed by the promisee to the promisor, provided
to pay him a sum of money if he will do a
particular act, and B. does the act, the protu
ise thereupon becomes binding, although B.,
at the time of the promise, does not engage
to do the act." This doctrine was quoted
with approval in Gardner v. Webber, 17 Pick.
407, 413, and in Bernstein v. Lans, 104 Mass.
214, 216; and it is also aflirmed in Goward
v. Waters, 98 Mass. 596. In Cottage Street
Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, 530, it was
held that “where one promlsw to pay another
a certain sum of money for doing a particular
thing, which is to be done before the money
is paid, and the promisee does the thing upon
the faith of the promise, the promise, which
was before but a mere revocable offer, them
by becomes a complete contract, upon__g__con-
sideration moving from the promises-to the
promisor; as in the ordinary case of the oiIer
of a. reward." See, also, Paige v. Parker, 8
Gray, 211, 213; Hubbard v. Coolidge, 1 Metc.
(Mass.) 84; Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 192;
Miller v. McKenzie, 1d. 575, 579. It is there
,fore in law competent for a valid oral con
on the plaintiff excepting, reported tne casel
for the determination of the supreme judicial
court.
T. J. Homer, for defendant.
C. ALLEN, J. It is not contended, on ne
half 0’.' the defendant, that a contract, found
ed on a suflicient consideration, to make a
certain provision by will for a particular per
son, is invalid in law. The contrary is well
settled. Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen, 128, 132;
Parker v. Coburn, 10 Allen, 82; Canada v.
Canada, 6 Cash. 15; Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N.
Y. 480; Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. St. 161;
Updike v. Ten Broeck, 32 N. J. Law, 105:
Caviness v. Rushton, 101 1nd. 500.
Nor is it contended that a contract to leave
{a certain amount of money by will to a par
'ticular person, though oral, is open to objec
tion under the statute of frauds. It is not a
contract for the sale of lands, or of goods:
and it may be performed within a year. Pe
ters 7. \Vestborough, 19 Pick. 364; Fenton
v. limblers, 3 Burrows, 1278; Ridley v. Rid
ley, 34 Beav. 478; Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y.
560; Bell v. Hewitt, 24 Ind. 280; Wallace v.
Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N. E. Rep. 666. Such
a contract differs essentially from a contract
to devise all one’s property, real and personal.
which comes within the statute of frauds.
Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408. The ob
ligation of such a contract is not impaired,
though the consideration is to arise wholly
or in part in the future, and though the per
son to whom the promise is made is under
no mutual, binding obligation on his part.
In Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 350, 385, it was said .
by Mr. Justice Wilde that "if A. promises to B.‘A I
tract to be made to leave a certain sum of
money by will to a particular person, in con
such services are in fact thereafter rendered
and accepted in pursuance of such contract,
. .although the prornisee did not bind himself
J. S. Patton, for plaintiff. A. M. Howe and
’
in advance to render them. The performance
of the consideration renders the contract bind
ing. and gives a right of action upon it.
The objection mostly relied on by ‘the de
fendant in the present case is that the audi
torIs report does not conclusively show such
a contract, upon such a consideration. The
auditor does not in terms, as he might prop
erly have done, make any specific finding
upon the question whether there was such
a contract; but he states the facts in detail
upon which he considered that question to
rest, and leaves the determination of it to the
court. The detailed facts stated by the au
ditor are not controverted, and the evidence
upon which they were found is not before us.
These facts are therefore to be taken as they
stand, with no further explanation than is
aflIorded by the circumstances. Looking at
them in this manner, it is to be determined
whether, on the whole, there is enough clearly
and decisively to show that there was a con
tract, so that the judge who heard the case
could not properly find the contrary; in other
words. whether it appears there was a prom
ise by the defendant’s testator sufliciently
definite to be enforced, and made with the
understanding and intention that she would
be legally bound thereby. A promise made
with an understood intention that it is not to
be legally binding, but only expressive of a
present intention, is not a contract. Thrus
ton v. Thornton, 1 Cash. 89; Chit. Comm.
(11th Amer. Ed.) 12, 13.
Ordinarily, when there is a distinct prom
ise for a sufliclent consideration to do a par
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ticular thing, such promise is to be consider
ed as a contract, unless there is something m
the subject of the promise, or in the circum
stances, to repel that assumption. But each
case must be examined in the light of its
own circumstances. In the present case it
appears that the plaintiff was the brother-in-
law of the defendant’s testator, who was an
unmarried woman,I that he was early in the
habit of advising with her about her business
affairs, and not at the outset, if ever, in the
expectation of being paid directly for his
services. Nevertheless, there soon came to
be a recognition on her part that the plain
tifff’s services were valuable in a money sense,
and an intention to pay him for them in some
form. By his advice, in 1866, she bought
real estate on Chauncy street, and sold it
again in 1868, at a profit of $10,000, the sale
being advised and negotiated by him. Prior
to the sale, she told him that, if such profit
should be made, he should have onehalf or a
part of it. In fact, nothing was paid to him
at this time, but it appears that she already
contemplated putting the relation between
them on a business basis; and shortly after
wards she told him that, if he would go on
and act as her agent and adviser respecting
her investments, she would make a will giv
ing his wife $5,000; and, in the event of his
wife’s dying before him, she would then, by a
new will or codicil, bequeath the legacy of
$5,000 to him. He assented to this, and she
made her will accordingly, bequeathing $5,000
to his wife. All this savored of a business ar
rangement. The sum mentioned was not
greater than she had talked of paying to him,
as a part of the profits on the sale of the
Chauncy street real estate; indeed, not so
great, for that was to be payable ln-1868,
while the bequest would not be payable till
after her death. In 1868 another purchase
was made of rail estate, which was sold at a
profit in 1869. In 1869 he admitted her to
share in a purchase of real estate on Bedford
street, which he had intended to make on his
own account; the whole of the money was
furnished by her; and in 1873 and 1874 the
estate was sold at a profit of between $4,000
and $5,000, over and above the allowance to
her of 7 per cent. interest on the purchase
money, and this profit was equally divided
between them. In 1876 a purchase was made
of real estate on Mt. Vernon street. All of
these purchases and sales were negotiated
and advised by the plaintiff, and were made
solely upon his judgment.
Such were the relations of the parties up to
1878. She had paid him nothing for his serv
ices; but her will, bequeathing $5,000 to his
wife, had stood during all this time according
to the understanding between them in 1868.
Nothing had been said or done to vary the
effect of her promise to bequeath the legacy
of $5,000 to him, in the event of his wife’s
dying before him. In 1878 a new arrange
ment was made. The plaintiffIs wife was fa
tally ill, and died in June of that year. A
few weeks before her death, and when it had
become apparent that she was fatally ill, the
defendant’s testator told the plaintiff that she
desired to visit California, and a brother, who
resided in Nevada, and, if he would accom
pany her there in the fall of that year, she,
in consideration of his so accompanying her,
and of the services he had rendered and might
thereafter render her respecting the manage
ment of her property, would make a will giv
ing him $5,000, and pay the expenses of the
journey. The plaintiff assented thereto, and
in May or June of that year she destroyed
the will then existing, and executed a new
one, wherein she gave to him a legacy of
$5.000. According to the terms of what she
had proposed in 1868, she was, by a new
will or codicil, to bequeath to him the legacy
of $5,000, in the event of which was now at
hand, if he would go on and act as her agent
and adviser respecting her investments. This
he had done up to that time. She now pro
posed to him that she would make a will
giving him $5,000 in consideration of his ac
companying her to California and Nevada.
and of the services he had rendered and
might thereafter render to her. There was
no stipulation binding him to render such
services for any particular length of time in
the future. The most that could fairly be
implied is that he should render them as re
quested, and as long as he should be able to
do so. Her proposition appears to have been
intended as in the nature of business. The
relations between the parties‘ in the past had
not been merely those of kindness and volun
tary aid. The services which he had already
rendered were substantial, and of a business
character. They did not consist merely of
advice. but he appears to have taken, to a
large extent, the responsible charge of her
business matters, and to have conducted them
successfully. In addition to continuing such
services, he was now asked to accompany
her to California, which he did, in the fall
of 1878 and the winter following,—a trip of
several months. She proceeded at once to
act upon his acceptance of her proposition,
and made a new will accordingly. This new
will remained unrevoked for two and a. half
years. In view of all these circumstances,
it seems to us that, upon a just construction
of the auditor’s report, there is not enough
to repel the ordinary assumption that the
promise of the defendant’s testatrix was a
contract, which, when made, was intended
and understood by both parties to be bindiufl1
upon her.
The present case materially differs in its
facts from Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. (388
-i67, 5 Exch. Div. 293, and 7 Q. B. Div. 174
In that case doubt was expressed whether
there was a contract, but the question was
not finally determined. It depended in part
upon a review of testimony, which is not
fully reported. The terms of the allei;ed
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promise and consideration dlflfered from those
in the case before us in certain respects,
which might be _1’o1Lnd_to‘be.material. But
the decision in that case turned finally upon
the question whether, assuming a contract, it
had been shown that there had been a part
performance sufficient to take it out of the
statute of frauds, and it was held-in the nega
tive.
Upon the auditor’s report in the present
case, we must now assume that the whole
consideration stipulated for was performed
by the plaintiff, and that it was suflicient.
It is expressly found that his advice was val
uable, -and his management judicious, being
given and rendered whenever requested or
required; that he has received no compensa
tion therefor, except as stated, respecting the
division of the profits arising on the sale of
the Bedford street real estate: that in the
fall of 1878 and the winter following he ac
companied her to Nevada and California,
“and then and thereafter in all respects com
plied with and fulfilled the aforesaid agree
ment."
It is also suggested in behalf of the de
fendant that, even assuming a contract, it
was not proved to be a contract to make a
will which should not be revoked. But, look
ing at the language used in the light of tin
circumstances existing and preceding, so nar
row a construction of the contract is not per
missible. The substance of it was that she
would bequeath to him the sum mentioned.
An instrument effectual as a will was clearly
contemplated; otherwise the promise was but
illusory.
The result is, in the opinion of a majority
of the court, that the plaintilif is entitled to
judgment for the sum of $5,000, and interest,
in addition to the amount found at the trial.
The defendant’s exceptions are overruled, and
the plaintiff’s exceptions are sustained. Or
dered accordingly.
LEGACIES.
ROQUET v. ELDRIDGE et al
('118 Ind. 147, 20 N. E. Rep. 733.)
April 2, 1889.
Appeal from circuit court, Vigo county;
Joshua Jump, Special Judge.
Action by Hugh D. Roquet, administrator
c. t. a., etc., of William B. Eldridge, de
ceased, against William G. Eldridge and
others, heirs, devisees, and legatees of said
decedent, to settle the estate. From a judg
ment declaring certain legacies adeemed,
the legatees, William G. Eldridge and others,
appeal. -
C. F. McNutt and Stimson 8r. Stimson, for
appellants. S. C. Davis and S. B. Davis, for
appellee.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
MITCHELL, J. After the issues wereI
joined in the court below, the judgment ap
pealed from was rendered upon an agreed~
statement of facts. The questions for deci
sion arise out of the facts agreed upon,
which, so far as they are material, are as
follows: In November, 1863, William B. ‘
Eldridge executed his last will and testa
ment, by the second clause of which he de
vised to his sons Hamilton Eldridge and
Abram A. Eldridge his homestead farm, to
be held by them jointly. To his daughters,
Amanda and Cynthia, and to his sons Wil-I
liam G. and Robert B., he bequeathed $500.
each, to be paid in cash, which sums were’
to be taken and considered as in full of each
of their respective interests in the homeI
stead farm. The will contained a recitaLt
the effect of which was that the devises and E
bequests thus made were to be considered as "
the disposition of the homestead farm
among the testator’s children, and were not
to aflect any other interest or estate. After
wards, and during the lifetime of the testa
tor, his sons Hamilton and Abram A. El
dridge, devisees of the homestead farm, fur
nished their father $2,000 in money, out of
which he paid to each of the four legatees
above named the sum of $500, and received
from each a receipt of the following tenor,
viz.: “Received of William B. Eldridge,
$500, in consideration of my interest in his
homestead farm, corresponding with hi last
will." One of the daughters was a married
woman at the time she received the money
and executed the receipt therefor, as above.
The testator died in February, 1881, having
had but the six children named above. He
had only about $500 in value of personal
property, which, with the farm above men
tioned, valued at about $6,400, comprised his
whole estate.
On behalf of the administrator with the
will annexed, it is insisted that the sums
paid to the several legatees by the testator
in his lifetime constituted a satisfaction or
, to be enjoyed in specie."
, ic when it can be satisfied only by the trans
ademption of the legacies provided by the
will, while the legatees insist that the lega
cies are specific or demonstrative in theiv
character, and that since it does not appear
that the money paid them was raised out
of, or derived from. the land comprised in
the homestead farm, the payment did not
work an ademption of the sums bequeathed
by the will. The legacies were, however,
neither specific nor demonstrative. Speak
ing upon the subject of specific legacies, the
lord chancellor in Fielding v. Preston. .1 De
Gex & J. 438, said: "There have been at
tempts ln various cases to determine the
meaning of a specific legacy, and what is
the test whereby such legacies may be dis
tinguished from general bequests. .There
are objections to most of the definitions, but
I think we are quite safe in treating that as
a specific bequest which the testator directs
A legacy is specif
fer or delivery of some particular portion of
or article belonging to the estate, which the
testator intended should be transferred to
the legatee in specie. 2 Redf. Wills, 122;
2 Rap. & L. Law Dict. tit. “Legacy." Lord
Hardwicke said, in Ellis v. Walker, Amb.
309: “The court leans against considering
legacies as specific." Unless, therefore, it
appears that the money or thing to be trans
ferred is so clearly identified and inherently
described as that the iegatee can say to the
executor that all or a portion of the very
fund or property in question was transfer
red by the will, the bequest will not be re
garded as specific. Sidebotham v. Watson.
11 Hare, 170.
While it is true the doctrine of ademption
does not apply to specific devises or legacies.
as a general rule, (Swails v. Swails, 08 Ind.
511,) yet,. even in case of a specific devise
or bequest, if the very thing devised or be
queathed had been transferred to the dev
isee or legatee in the lifetime of the testator,
so that there would be nothing left for the
will to operate upon, an effectual ademption
would have taken place.
Accepting the foregoing as the true cri
terion of a specific legacy, it b es clear
that the bequest of $500 in cas to each oi'
the sons and daughters named, and the fur
ther direction that this was to he considered
in full of their respective interests in the
homestead farm, and that the devises and
bequests previously made were not to af
fect any other interest or estate, did not con
stitute a specific bequest of any portion of
the testator’s estate to be transferred in
specie. Neither did the legacies belong to
! that intermediate class which are sometimes
denominated “demonstrative," and~ which
are peculiar, in that they are not ordinarily
liable to be adeemed or abated by an a11
vancement made in a general way. "A
demonstrative legacy is a bequest of a sum
of money payable out of a particular fund 01.
thing. It is a pecuniary legacy, 'given gen
erally, but with a demonstration of a par
ticular fund as the source of its payment.'
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it is therefore equivalent to, or in the nature
of, a devise or bequest of so much or such
a part of the fund or thing specified." Glass
v. Dunn, 17 Ohio St. 413; 5 Amer. & Eng.
Enc. Law, 541; 2 Redf. Wills, 140, 141.
While it is quite true the will plainly in
dicates that the sums bequeathed to the
sons and daughters named were to be tak
en in full of their respective interests in the
homestead farm, which was specifically de
vised to the two other sons named in the
will, there is no direction that the bequests
are to be paid out of any particular fund,
or that the fund out of which payment is
to be made is to be derived from the rents,
issues, or profits of the land, or that the
legatees are to have any interest, as such,
in the land itself. The implication is that
the bequests were chargeable against the
devisees of the land, or. at most, that they
should be chargeable upon the farm. More
over, since it appears by the agreed state
ment of facts that the sons to whom the
homestead farm was devised furnished the
money with which the legacies were paid,
lt is not apparent why this should not be
held to satisfy the bequests, even though it
should be conceded that they were payable
out of the land. It thus payable, it must
have been contemplated that the amount
should constitute a charge upon the farm,
to be removed by the devisees at some time,
by paying the several amounts to the lega
tees. We know of no authority which
would justify a holding that a general leg
acy which is payable out of a particular
fund, or in a specified manner, may not be
satisfied, in case the legatee receives the
amount thereof from the testator in his life
time, out of the very fund devoted to the
payment of the bequest, provided it clearly
appears that the amount was given and re
ceived with the intention that it should work
an ademption of the legacy. If we assume
that the homestead farm was to be the
source from which the fund was to be de
rived, out of which the legacies were pay
able, the conclusion follows that the dev
isees of the farm were to take it subject to
the burden of paying the legacies after the
testator’s death. Having furnished the
money to the testator during his lifetime
with which to pay oif the bequests, and the
money having been paid to the legatees and
received by them for that purpose, the lega
cies are effectually satisfied from the very
source contemplated by the will. An ademp
tion results where a parent or other person
standing in loco parentis, after having made
a bequest, gives a portion to the child to
whom the bequest is made, equal to or in
excess of the amount bequeathed, the por
tion given and the legacy being ejusdcm
generis. Weston v. Johnson, 48 Ind. 1.
Within the rule thus stated the legacies
were adeemed.
Whether a legacy be specific or demonstra
tive, if it clearly appears that the particular
thing or fund bequeathed has been irrevoca
bly delivered over to the legatee in the life
time of the testator, the legacy is adeemed
because the testator’s title to the thing or
fund has been divested by the gift, and has
become vested in the legatee during the life
time of the testator. Clayton v. Akin, 3b
Ga. 320.
The fact that one of the legatees was a
married woman at the time she received the
money from her father .and signed the re
ceipt is of no consequence. The receipt of
the money from the source contemplated by
the will satisfied the legacy by operation of
law, and not by force of any contract. Mon
ey paid to a married woman in ademption of
a legacy produces the same legal result as if
she were unmarried.
There was no error. The judgment is af
firmed, with costs.
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WYCKOFFI v. PERRINEIS EXIRS.
(37 N. J. Eq. 118.)
Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
1883.
On demurrer to bill.
Bill filed by Elizabeth Wyckoff against the
May Term,
executors, etc., of Matthias M. Perrine, de-.
ceased, to recover legacy.
Barker Gum-mere, for demurrants. Alan
H. Strong, for complainant.
VAN FLEET, V. C. This is a suit for a
legacy. The defendants have demurred to
the complainant’s bill, denying that on the
case made by it she is entitled to relief. The
complainant is a daughter of Matthias M.
Perrine. who died testate in the month of
October, 1878. She grounds her right of
action on the following clause of her father’s
will: "W~hereas, my son-in-law David B.
Wyckoff borrowed of me the sum of twenty
three hundred dollars, which sum I loaned.
him on interest, now, it is my will, in order
to do equal justice to and between my
children, that the same shall be considered
and taken as so much of the share of his
wife, Elizabeth, of my estate;
and bequeath to my said daughter Elizabeth
the furthersum of five hundred dollars, which
is to be in full of her share of my estate;'
and I make no further provisions for the
said Elizabeth Wyckoff in this my last will
and testament." The $500Ihave been paid.
The debt of David B. Wyckot‘f to the testa
tor was evidenced by a promissory note.
dated April 1, 1874, and payable one year
after date. A petition in bankruptcy was
filed against WyckotIf on the 3d day of May,
1876, on which he was subsequently, in the
language of the bill, in due course of law, 1
He was discharged
The testator.
adjudged a bankrupt.
on the 2d of April, 1878.
proved his debt, and received two dividends
out of the bankrupt assets,-the first June
15, 1877, of $384.50; and the second March
14, 1878, of $123.62.—making a total of
$508.12. The will bears date May 28, 1877.
It was executed, it will be observed, more
than a year after the commencement of the
proceedings in bankruptcy, and less than
three weeks before the testator received the
first dividend.
The complainant contends that the legacy
given by the clause under consideration is
not specific, but demonstrative; in other
words, properly construed, the clause means
this: that she is, under any circumstances,
to have a legacy of $2,300, the reference to
the debt of her husband being intended sim
ply to indicate the fund which should be
applied primarily to its payment. Such a
construction would, I think, not only do
violence to the language used by the testa
tor, but would attribute to him a purpose
certainly not expressed, and probably never
entertained. No gift is made by express
I
loaned on interest; and then he says:
words, but an intention to give is very
clearly expressed by words of direction or
command.
There can be no doubt that the thing
which was before the testator’s mind when
he made his will, as the subject of the gift
to the complainant, was a debt. He tells
who the debtor was,—his son-in-law David
Wyckofl; how be incurred the debt,—for
borrowed money; the amount of the debt,
$2.300; the terms on which it was held,—
"Now,
it is my will, in order to do equal Justice to
and between my children, that the same
[thatls the debt due to me from my son-in
law] shall be considered and taken as so
much of the share of his wife, Elizabeth. of
my estate."
In construing a will, the court must al
ways have regard to the circumstances, sit
nation, and surroundings of the testator. At
the time this will was made the son-in-law
had been adjudged a bankrupt. The testa
tor knew it. He knew, also. that the great
er part of his debt was hopelessly lost; and’
for that reason, unquestionably, he thought
it was his duty, in order that justice might
I
be done to all his children, to treat the debt
and I giveq
daughter, and to effect that purpose he gave
of his son-in-law as an advancement to his
her the debt. He intended to say by the
provision under consideration, as I think
he has quite clearly said: “I want each of
my children to have an equal share of my
estate. The husband of my daughter Eliz
abeth borrowed of me, some time ago, $2,300,
.which he cannot repay. In order to be just
to my other children, I give Elizabeth the
debt I hold against her husband, as part of
her share, and the further sum of five hun
dred dollars, but she is to have nothing’
more." In deciding whether a legacy is spe
cific or general, the intention of the testator 1
must control, as it must the decision of I
every other question involving the construc
tion of wills. There is no technical, arbitra
ry rule requiring the use of particular words I
or expressions to make a bequest specific.-
Such intention may be manifested either by
clear words, or by the general scope and
texture of the instrument; but in the latter
case, in the language of Lord Eldon, the in
ference should rest upon a strong. solid, and
rational interpretation of the will.
The rule of construction to be observed in
such cases is thus stated by Roper: “A court
of equity leans to the consideration that all
bequests are general; it therefore requires
expressions actually bequeathing the identic
al debt~ or such reference to it. appearing
upon a strong. solid, and rational interpreta
tion of the will, as to raise a plain inference
that the debt was the exclusive subject in
tended to be given by the testator to the leg
atee." 1 Rop. Leg. 234. In Norris v. Thomp
son. 16 N. J. Eq. 218, Chancellor Green held
that, in order to make a legacy speclfic.
there must be something on the face of the
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will to individuate the thing given, or some
form of expression must be used which clear
ly i dicates a purpose on the part of the
~tes r to give as cific, g, and nothingI; else!’ Here just. h'fioiiditiIohIif‘affairs
exists. The testator has marked out, with
great clearness and precision, just what the
complainant is to take,—she is to have the
debt of her husband and $500; and then he
declares she is to have nothing more. That
such was his intention seems to me to be so
obvious as to leave the complainant without
any substantial ground upon which to rest
the opposite contention. The words of ex
clusion must, I think, be regarded as fur
nishing an almost infallible test of-the mean
ing of the testator.
The case involves another question: Has
the legacy been adeemed? It is certain the
debt which was the subject of the legacy did
not exist at the time of the testator’s death.
So much of it as had not been paid to tne
testator out of the bankrupt’s assets was'
extinguished by his discharge in bankrupt
cy, so that the subject of the gift did notI
exist at the testator’s death. Some of the.
earlier decisions made a distinction between :
the effect of a voluntary payment and a
compulsory payment of a debt, which was
the subject of a specific legacy, in adeem
ing the legacy. They held that, where the
debtor came forward of his own volition,i
l623, 668; Theob. \Vills, 121;and without solicitation, and paid the debt
in the testator’s lifetime, the testator’s ac
ceptance of the money, under such circum
stances, did not indicate an intention to take
back the legacy; but if he, of his own will,
and in the absence of any other apparent
reason than that he wanted the debt paid,
constrained the debtor to pay, then his act.
was regarded as evincing an intention to
adeem the legacy. This distinction was rec
ognized by the supreme court in Stout v.
Hart, 7 N. J. Law, 414, 424. It was there
said: "A voluntary payment is not an
ademption, because accepting the money
when tendered does not imply any alteration
in the intentions of the testator; but when
the testator compels payment this fact may
or may not amount to an ademption, accord
ing to circumstances." The cases adopting
this distinction as the rule of judgment will
be found collected in 2 White & T. Lend.
Cas. Eq. (4th Amer. Ed.) 624. The distinc
tion, however, no longer prevails. The mod
ern decisions, both of this country and Eng
land, with almost perfect unanimity, repudi
ate it as unsound and fallacious. The rule
now generally recognized as an accurate
statement of the law on this subject is that
laid down by Lord Thurlow in Humphreys
v. Humphreys, 2 Cox, Ch. 185. He said:
“The only rule to be adhered to is to see
whether the subject of the specific bequest
remained in specie at the time of the testa
tor’s death, for, if it did not, then there
must be an end of the bequest; and the idea
of discussing what were the particular mo
tives
and intentions of the testator in de
stroying the subject of the bequest would be
productive of endless uncertainty and confu
sion." Chief Justice Black states the same
rule, as follows: “If a thing bequeathed in
a will, by such description as to distinguish
it from all other things, be disposed of, so
that it does not remain at the testator's
death, or if it be so changed that it cannot
be called the same thing, the bequest is
gone. If such a legacy be of a debt, pay
ment necessarily makes an end of it. The
legatee is entitled to the very thing be
queathed, if it be possible for the executor
to give it to him, but, if not, he cannot have
money in the place of it. This results from
an inflexible rule of law applied to the mere
fact that the thing bequeathed does not ex
ist, and it is not founded on any presumed
intention of the testator." Hoke v. Herman,
21 Pa. St. 301, 305. The cases repudiating
the distinction alluded to are too numerous
to be cited. They will be found referred to
in 2 Williams, Ex'rs (6th Amer. Ed.) 1323;
2 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. (4th Amer. Ed.)
Redf. \iIiNs,
423. The question now is one of identity,
and not of intention, as gathered from mat
ters extrinsic the will. In such cases the
test is, did the subject of the gift exist in
specie at the testator’s death? If it did, the
legatee is entitled to it against .all persons
except creditors; if it did not, he is not.
Trying the complainant’s right to relief by
this principle, it is clear that judgment must
be awarded against her. .
The demurrer must be sustained, with
costs.
In MULLINS v. SMITH, 1 Drew. & S. 204,
Kindersley, V. C., says: “The points of dif
ference between specific and demonstrative
legacies are these: A specific legacy is not
liable to abatement for the payment of debts,
but a demonstrative legacy is-ifable to abate
when it becomes a general legacy by reason
of the failure of the fund out of which it is.
payable. A specific legacy is liable to ade’mp
tion, but a demonstrative legacy is not. A
specific legacy, if of stock, carries with“ it
the dividends which accrue from the death
of the testator, while a demonstrative leg
acy does not carry interest from the testa
tor’s death."
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ROBERTSON et ux. v. BROADBENT et al.
(L. R. 8 App. Cas. 812.)
House of Lords. July 23, 1883.
Appeal from the court of appeals, (20 Ch.
Div. 676.)
Henry Ovey, by his will dated June 1, 1881.
appointed John Barrow and John Herbert
Greenhalgh (two of the respondents) execu
tors and trustees; and after directing his ex
ecutors to pay all his just debts, and funeral
and testamentary expenses, and giving to va
rious individuals and charities various sums, 1
amounting to £48,600, proceeded thus: “I
give all my personal estate and effects of
which I shall die possessed, and which shall’
not consist of money or securities for money.
I
unto the said Elizabeth Anne Robertson, for
her own use and benefit absolutely. I give.
and devise all the rest, residue, and remain
der of my estate, both real and personal,
whatsoever and wheresoever, to the said
John Barrow and John Herbert Greenhaigh;
upon trust thereout, in the first place, to pay
.
to Alfred Greenhalgh, of 30 Holborn, Lon
don, the sum of five hundred pounds ster
ling; and to R. L. Bloomfield, of Brighton,
aforesaid, secretary to the said Tiudal Rob
ertson, the sum of one hundred pounds ster
ling for the use of his school in such man
ner as he shall think lit, in his uncontrolled
discretion; and as to the residue thereof, or
such part or parts thereof as may be law
fully appropriated to the purpose, for such
one or more or any hospital of a charitablel
nature, and in such proportions as they, in
their uncontrolled discretion, shall think fit.
1 direct .that all the legacies given by this,
my will, shall be paid free of legacy duty;
and also that the aforesaid money legacies
for charitable purposes shall be paid exclu-t
sively out of such part of my personal estate
may lawfully be appropriated to such pur
poses, and preferably to any other paymentt
thereout." The testator having died, this
action was brought by Broadbent and others
of the respondents against the executors for
the administration of his real and personal
estate. The pecuniary legacies amounted to
£49,200, of which £7,500 were in favor of
charitable institutions. The personal estate
was valued under £39,660, and the real estate
at about £20,000. Upon a summons for the‘
redeifvery to the executors of certain chat-l
teis which had been given up to the appei~l
lant, Elizabeth Anne Robertson, Fry, J., be’
ing of opinion that the legacy to her of all
the testator’s personal estate. and effects of
which he should die possessed, and which
should not consist of money or securities for
money, was a specific legacy, made no order,
except as to costs. On appeal, the court
(Jessel, M. IL, and Lindlcy and Holker, L..
JJ., 20 Ch. Div. 676) made an order, May 3,
1882, declaring, inter alia, that the legacy
was not specific, and that all the pecuniary
legacies were payable in full before Mrs.
Robertson could be entitled to anything un
der the bequest to her, without prejudice to
any question, as between her and the tes
tator’s heir at law, as to the liability of the
real estate to the payment of such pecuniary
legacies in priority to the property bequeath
ed to her.
Mr. Maenaghten, Q. C., (Decimus Sturges,
with him,) for appellants. Mr. Fischer, Q.
C., (Mr. Stirling, with him,) for the pecuni
ary legatees, respondents. Cecil Russell,
(with him, Sir H. James, A. G.,) for the At
torney General, respondent. Borthwick, for
the executors, respondents, was not heard.
SELBORNE, L. C. My lords, the question
on this appeal is whether the general person
al estate of the testator, Henry Ovey, given
to the appellant Mrs. Robertson, is exempt
from or subject to the payment of pecuniary
legacies. The general rule of law as to pe
cuniary legacies (in the absence of any sulfi
cient indication of a contrary intention) is
that they are payable by the legal personal
representatives of the testator (in whom the
whole personal estate vests by law) out ~of
the personal estate not specifically bequeath
ed. The presumption is that the testator in
tends them to be so paid. Unless charged
upon it by the will, they are not payable out
of the real estate. The principle of the ex
emption of personal estate specifically be
queathed is that it is necessary to give ef
fect to the intention apparent by the gift. If
the bequest is of a particular chattel, such
as a horse or ship, it is manifest that the tes
tator intended the thing to pass uncondition
ally, and in statu quo, to the lcgatee; which
could not be if it were subject to the pay
ment of funeral and testamentary expenses.
debts, and pecuniary legacies. As against
creditors, the testator cannot wholly release
it from liability for his debts; but. as against
all persons taking benefits under his will, he
may. The same principle applies to every
thing which a testator, identifying it by a
sufllcient description, and manifesting an in
tention that it should be enjoyed or taken in
the state and condition indicated by that de
scription, separates, in favor of a particular
legatee, from the general mass of his per
sonal estate,—the fund out of which pecuni
ary legacies are, in the ordinary course, pay
able. .
This reasoning does not apply to a gift, in
general terms, of the whole personal estate
to which a testator may be entitled at the
time of his death. 1 Rop. Leg. (4th Ed.) pp.
242, 243; Fairer v. Park, 3 (3b. Div. 312;
()useley v. Anstruther, 10 Beav. 453. It is,
of course, in the power of any testator, if he
so pleases, to direct that his pecuniary lega
cies (and also his debts, etc., if be sufficiently
provides for their payment) shall be exclu.,
slvely charged on his real estate, or on any
particular property, real or personal, which
he may think fit. Lance v. Aglionby, 27
Beav. 65; Jones v. Bruce, 11 Sim. 221, 22".~
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But an intention to do so must be discover
able from the terms of his will. In the
cases last cited, such an intention was suffi
ciently clear without any aid from the pre
sumption applicable to specific legacies as
such. It is true that in Jones v. Bruce, 11
Sim. 221, 228, Sir Lancelot Shadwell said
that the gift of the whole personal estate
was as specific as if the testator “had enum
erated every chattel, and then said, 'I give
them to my wife.'" But that dictum was
not necessary for the decision; not can I
reconcile it (if his honor really intended to
say that this, without more, would have been
enough to exonerate the personalty, in the
absence of any other provision for the large
pecuniary legacies there in question) with
either principle or authority. If that gift
had been to the wife for life: with remainder
over, the personal estate must have been
converted into money and invested, and she
would not have been entitled to enjoy it in
specie, under the doctrine of Howe v. Earl
of Dartmouth, 7 "es. 137, and other cases of
that class.
In the present will there is nothing from
which an intention to exempt the general
personal estate bequeatned to sl’rs. Robert
son from its ordinary burdens, or to give it
the quality (in that respect) of a specific be
quest, can be inferred, unless it be one or
the other. or the combination, of these two
circunxstances: (1) That the "money, and
securities for money," of which the testator
might die possessed, are excepted from the
gift; and (2) that it is followed by another
gift of “all the rest, residue, and remainder"
of the testator’s estate, “both real and per
sonal," (to the persons who are appointed
executors at the outset of the will,) upon
,trust, to pay thereout two legacies, and to
dispose of the rest for charitable purposes.
The gift in question to Mrs. Robertson is
preceded, first, by a direction to the execu
tors to pay all the testator’s debts and funer
al and testamentary expenses as soon as con
veniently may be after his death~ and then
by a great number of pecuniary legacies,
amounting together to £48~600, of which £7,
500 are for charitable objects, and £2,000 for
Mrs. Robertson herself. The testator has
nowhere said that his funerai and testamen
tary expenses and debts, or his pecuniary
legacies, are to be paid in any other way
than that in which they would be payable
according to the ordinary course of law. It
is contended that this consequence results
from the residuary form of the gift which
follows, as compared with the gift to Mrs.
Robertson, which is not in form residuary;
“rwidue" being that which remains of the
estate after all necessary deductions, and
after satisfying all prior gifts. The court
of appeal appears to have thought that the
excepted personalty would be primarily lia_
ble to the funeral and testamentary expenses,
debts, and pecuniary legacies; but they de
those charges of the personalty given to Mrs.
Robertson. As to the real estate nothing
was determined. With this view I agree.
I think that the ~exception of something
specifically described from a gift (otherwise
general) of the personal estate cannot make
that gift more specific, in the proper sense
of the term, than it would be if there were
no such exception. It isI indisputable that
this testator intended his pecuniary legacies
-to be paid in full, free of legacy duty; and
he expressly directed that such of them as
were for charitable purposes should be paid
exclusively “out of such part of his personal
estate as might lawfully be appropriated to
such purposes, and preferably to any other
payment thereout." These words. in their
natural sense, extend to every part of his
personal estate which might lawfully be so
appropriated, whether included or not includ
ed in the gift to Mrs. Robertson; and give
the charitable legacies, as against the whole
pure personalty, a preference over every oth
er payment, and therefore over any payment.
to Mrs. Robertson. This could not have
been disputed if the whole personal estate
had been given to Mrs. Robertson. But the
fact that “money," (which might and prob
ably would, at the time of the testator.s
death, be quite insuflicient,) and “securities
for money," (which might be mortgages, or
other securities savoring of reaity,) are ex
cepted, cannot reduce the right of the char
itable legatees (in the event of Mrs. Robert
son surviving the testator, as she did) to a
charge upon such, if any, of those excepted
things only as might consist of pure per
sonalty. A gift which is subject to lega
cies, so far as .relates to the charitable lega
tees, cannot, under the terms of this will,
have a different character as to the other
pecuniary legacies.
The order appealed from is, in my opinion,
right, and I move your lordships to dismiss
this appeal, with costs.
Lord BLACKBURN. My lords, at the
close of the argument in this case I had not
much doubt that the order appealed against
was right, and that the appeal must be dis
missed; but I was glad to have time to look
at and consider the authorities cited, as the
course of my practice as a barrister, and aft
erwards as a judge in a court of common
law, did not make me familiar with this
branch of law, which was principally admin
istered in the courts of equity. A testator
cannot deprive his creditors of their right to
be paid their debts out of his assets, but,
subject to their rights, he may dispose of
the surplus as he pleases. I do not compli
cate the question by saying anything as to
real estate. I suppose the case of a man
having personal property only, such as chat
tels real, ships, stocks, goods. and money.
If he, by his will, leaves legacies, the execu
tor, who takes all the personal estate, must
cldcd that there was no exemption from I first pay the debts and other charges on the
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testator’s estate, and then. as far as he has
assets, pay the legacies. If he has enougn
to do so in full, no question arises. But if,
either from the testator having overestimat
ed his pecuniary means,Ior having underes
timated his liabilities, there is not enough to
pay the whole in full, all the legatees can
not be paid as much as the testator intend
ed; and the question arises whether some
of the legacies are to bear the loss, before
the others are abated at all, and then the
others, if there is still a deficiency, are to.
be abated ratably. Sometimes a testator
foresees this possibility of a deficiency, and
provides for it. This was done by codicil
in Farmer v. Mills, 4 Russ. 86. When a tes
tator does so, there can be no doubt about
it; his expressed intention governs. Some
times, atter giving legacies to a large
amount, he leaves the residue to ome one.
It does not need authority to show that in
such a case the residuary legatee can take
nothing until all the other legacies are paid
in full, for till then there is no residue. But,
in the absence of something to show an in
tention on the part of a testator to the con
trary, he must be taken to intend all his leg
lacies to be paid in full; and, if that is im
pessible, all are to be reduced ratably, un
less there is something to show the inten
tion of the testator that one or more of the
legacies are to be paid in full, though the
consequence may be that the others are to
be the more reduced, or perhaps not paid at
all. I
Let us suppose that a testator leaves his
library, such as it should be at the time of
his death, to A., £10,000 to B., and the resi
due of his personal estate to C., very proba
bly believing, perhaps even indicating on the
face of his will, that he thought his library
would be worth £10,000, and the whole of
his personal estate, including all library,
worth £50,000; and owing either to miscal
culatlon on his part, or to unforeseen dis
asters, his personal estate, including his li
brary, turns out, a ter all debts and charges
are paid, to be
{9,000
only. No one can
doubt that the te 'tator, if alive, would re
model his will, and give something to C., per~
haps burdening the library with a payment
to C., and reducing the legacy to B., so as to
get the means of giving something to C.
But he is dead, and the court cannot make
a will for him. C., hard as it may seem,
can get nothing under the bequest of the
residue; for there is no residue; and it is
settled by decisions, and I think, if it was
res integra, I should hold, that, as the inten
tion on the face of the will is that A. should
have the library, as a specific thing. such
as it should be at the testator’s death, he
must have it, whether it is of more or less
value than the testator supposed, and that
B. can only get the £9,000. It is, as I think,
on this ground. and on thi principle, that,
still be a deficiency, the general legatees,
and then the specific legatees’. I think that,
in considering the case below, more has been
said as to the definition of what is a specific
bequest, as if it were a technical question,
than was quite requisite for the decision of
the case. I do not know, if it were neces
sary to give a definition of s “specific leg
acy," that any would come nearer to my
idea than what has just been said by the
lord chancellor in this case,—“something
which a testator, identifying it by a sufl'l
cient description, and manifesting an inten
tion that it should be enjoyed in the state
and condition indicated by that description,
separates, in favor of a particular legatee,
from the general mass of his personal es
tate." I do not, however, like to bind my
self even to saying that this is a precise defi
nition. I think the real question is, what is
the true construction of the will of this tes~
tator, by which, after giving large pecuniary
legacies, some to charities and some to in
dividuals, among whom is Mrs. Robertson
herself, of £2,000,—though I do not think that
material,—he proceeds thus: [His lordship
read the extract from the will set out ante,
p. 71.]
I think this is really a bequest of all the
residue of his estate to Mrs. Robertson and
the two trustees, the trustees to take the
real estate, and the money, and securities
for money, and Mrs. Robertson all the rest
of the personal estate; and that there Is
nothing on the face of the will to indicate
any intention that either she or the trustees
were to take that property in the state and
condition in which it should be at his death.
It was argued that the testator probably
was thinking of the furniture, farm stock,
etc., at Royden Lodge, which formed the
bulk of his personal estate not consisting of
money or securities for money, and that he
really meant to give her those, to be enjoyed
in the same state and condition in which he
left them. It is possible he did, but he has
not said so in his will. He has, no doubt,
left her those, and his wine in London, and
a steam-launch, and two boats, and a lease
hold stable in London, which it is less prob
able that he meant to be enjoyed in the same
state and condition in which he left them.
But it all comes round to the same thing.
The court cannot make a will for the tes
tator; it must construe the will he has
made. And I think that the bequest of the
residue of his effects which shall not con
sist of money or securities for money to
Mrs. Robertson, and the residue of his per
sonal estate to the two trustees, is one resid
nary bequest to two persons.
I have spoken as if there had been no real
estate~ though, in fact, there was a consid
erable real estate. I have done so because.
the heir not being before the court, it cannot
now decide what portion of that real estate
where there is a deficiency, the first to suiI- ’ is available to pay the legacies, and ought
ter is the residuary legatee. Then. if therei to be so applied in relief of this residuary be
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quest. It may possibly be that the solution
of the questions between Mrs. Robertson and
those entitled to the real estate, which are re
served by the order, will render the present
decision 01.’ no practical consequence. it is
possible that it will leave it 01' great conse
quence. All I now say is that I think it
rightly decided by the order appealed
against.
Lord FITZ GERALD. My lords, I concur
in the judgment of the lord chancellor, and
adopt his reasons. The gift is to be read
as a bequest to the trustees of the money
and securities for money of which the tes
tator should die possessed, and of all the
residue of his personal estate and effects to
Mrs. Robertson for her own use and benefit,
absolutely. The gift is not specific, within
the definition so carefully expressed by the
lord chancellor, and there is nothing in the
will to indicate any intention of the testator
to exempt the subject of that bequest from
its ordinary liabilities. There is much in
the will leading to a contrary conclusion,
and which the lord chancellor has already
pointed out. I think the order appealed
from is correct.
Order appealed from aflirmed, and appeal
dismissed, with costs.
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DUNCAN v. INHABITANTS OF TOWN
SHIP OF FRANKLIN.
(43 N. J. Eq. 143, 10 Atl. 546.)
Prerogative Court of New Jersey. May Term,
1887.
Appeal from orphans' court, Essex coun
ty; Ix‘irkpatrick, Johnson, and Leedwith,
Judges.
James M. C. Morrow, for appellant. John
A. Miller, for appellees.
McGlLL, Ordinary. Jane D. Polneer, by
her will, dated September 27, 1875, and duly
proved by the executors in it named, before
the surrogate of Essex county, on April 6,
1882, after providing for the payment of
her debts and funeral expenses, appointed
the appellant, Henry B. Duncan, and one
Hiram Van Winkle, executors of the will,
and bequeathed several legacies, and among
them one to the said Henry B. Duncan, in
the following language: "Eighth. I give and
bequeath to Henry Benson Duncan, for
his services, (in assisting me at different
times,) the sum of two thousand dollars."
It appeared by the executors’ account, flied
with the surrogate on July 20, 1886, that
the estate was insuflicient to pay all the
legacies in full, and also that the executors
asked allowance for the payment of the
legacy to Henry Benson Duncan by an item
of discharge, as follows: “Paid Henry B.
Duncan legacy under the will, for services
rendered deceased in her lifetime, as stated
in the will $2,000." To this item an excep
tion was filed. The executors did not offer
proof that services had been in fact ren
dered by Mr. Duncan to the testatrix, for
which an obligation to pay existed at her
death, but relied entirely upon the will to
justify their payment~ The exception was
sustained by the order of the orphans’ court,
and from such order this appeal is taken.
The established rule is that where gen
eral legatees are volunteers, taking of the
testator’s bounty, and there is nothing in
the will to indicate that one shall be paid
before another, their legacies must abate
proportionately, in case of a deficiency of
)‘ assets; but where a general legacy is sus
|
I
tained by a valuable consideration, such as
the relinquishment oi. a debt or of a claim
of dower, and the right to the claim, con
stitutlng the consideration, subsists at the
testator’s death, the legatee is entitled to
the full payment of his legacy in prefer
ence to other general legatees, who take
merely of the testator’s bounty. Williams,
Ex'rs, 1365; 1 Rop. Leg. 432; Schouler, Ex'rs.
§ 490, note; 2 Redf. Wills, 452.
The burden of proving that a general
legacy is entitled to priority is upon him
who asserts it, and the proof must be clear,
conclusive, and unequivocal. Titus’ Adm'r
v. Titus, 26 N. J. Eq. 117; Shepherd v.
Guernsey, 9 Paige. 357.
There is not' i1g in this bequest to Mr.
Duncan, or in the will, to indicate that the
testatrix intended that this bequest should
be paid before the other legacies. The e»
pression, "for his services, (in assisting me
at different tlmes,)" does not, standing
alone, import an indebtedness from her to
the legatee, for which payment may be ex
acted by process of law. For aught that
appears to the contrary, the services may
have been rendered gratuitously, and the
legacy may have been given in grateful
recognition of them. That the legacy was
given because of a sense of moral obliga
tion, or as compensation for services, or
other favors rendered as a mere voluntary
courtesy, will not, it no legal obligation to
pay exist at the death of ‘the testatrix, con~
stitute such a valuable consideration as to
entitle the legacy to priority in payment.
Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. Wms. 291; Turner v.
Martin, 7 De Gex, M. & G. 429; Towle v.
Swasey, 106 Mass. 100.
More than six years elapsed between the
making of the will and the death of the
testatrix, yet no evidence was offered to
show that, if a legal indebtedness to Mr.
Duncan existed at the making of the will,
its payment was enforceable when the test
atrix died. The burden of proof, which was
upon the executors, was not discharged by
the simple production of the will. As the
case is presented, no error in the order is
shown.
The order will therefore be aflirmed, with
costs.
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TINDALLIS EX’RS v. TINDALL.
(24 X. J. Eq. 512.)
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
June Term, 1813.
Appeal from the court of chancery.
Bill in chancery by William Tindall against
John Manning and Edward Paxton, execu
tors, etc.. of Aaron Tindall, deceased, for one
eighth part of the sum of $5,000, a laped leg
acy to testator’s wife. Testator, after the
above bequest to his wife, and several other
legacies. bequeathed as follows: “I give and
bequeath whatever of my property shall
main after payment of the above, and du
settlement of all my business, to my two
friends, John H. Manning and Edward Pax
ton." He appointed Manning and Paxton
executors. Testator left no issue. but had
eight brothers and sisters. Two of these (of
whom the complainant is one) survived him.
The other six died before him. All left chil
dren living at the death of the testator.'
The defendant Paxton is one of these chil
dren. The case was argued before the chan
cellor upon bill and answer, who found for
plaintiff, and defendants appealed.
I. W. Scudder, for appellants.
cry, for respondent.
J. R. Em
DALRIMPLE, J. The question in this casq
is whether a certain lapsed legacy of $5,000,
given in and by the will of Aaron Tlndall, de 86168
tion to the rule is that. where the words used
show an intention on the part of the testator
to exclude from the operation of the residu
ary clause certain portions of the estate. such
iintention, as gathered from the whole
will,
must not be defeated. Or the rule embra
clng the exception, as stated in some of the
.books. is that the residuary lcgatee must he
a legatee of the residue generally, and not
partially so only. The rule is so firmly es
tablihed that citation of authority in its sup
,port is hardly necessary. I will, however, rc
fer to the following text-books and adjudged
'cases: 2 Rop. Lag. 1672; 2 Williams, ExIrs,
1313; Easum v. Appleford, 5 Mylne 8:. C. 56;
King v. Woodhull, 3 Edw. Ch. 86; James v.
James, 4 Paige, 117; Banks v. Phelan, 4
Barb. 90; Cambridge v. Boos, 8 Ves. 25; 2
Redf. Wills, 442.
The learned chancellor, in the court below,
held that the case now before us' came within
~the exception to the general rule, because the
estate given was that which should remain
,after payment of the legacies before given.
tBut I cannot see that this form of expression
in any wise limits or restricts the extent of
the gift. The clause would have had pre
clsely the saute meaning and efifect if it had
'~been, in terms, of the residue of the estate.
.All that the testator could give to his residu
.ary legatees was what remained of his estate
after payment of his particular debts and leg
The legal effect is precisely the same,
ceased, falls into the residuum of the estate whether the one form or the other is adopt
and goes to the residuary legatees. or
mains undisposed of, and is to be distrib t
ed among the next of kin of the testator.
The will, after directing the payment of ddJts
and funeral expenses, and the sale and dispo
sition of all testator’s property, real and per
sonal, which he might own at the time of
his decease, and the collection of the moneys
due h'm, gives to his wife, Ann, in lieu of
her right of dower at common law, the said
legacy of $5,000. After certain general lega
cies and bequests, the residuum of the estate
is disposed of as follows. “I give and be
queath whatever of my property shall remain
after payment of the above, and due settle
ment of all my business, to my two friends,
John H. Manning, to him, his heirs and as
signs, and to Edward Paxton, to him, his
heirs and assigns." The residuary legatees
are appointed executors. The testator hav
ing survived his wife, the legacy of $5,000 to
her lapsed. This suit is brought by one of
the next of kin of the testator, to recover a
share of the legacy which has thus lapsed,
and his right to recover is put upon the
ground that, as to the $5,000 in question, the
testator died intestate.
The rule applicable to the question to be
solved, as stated in the text-books, as well as
in many adjudged cases, is that the residual-y
iegatee is entitled as well to a residue caused
by a lapsed legacy, or an invalid or illegal
disposition, as to what remains after pay
ment of debts and legacies. The only excep
LAw suoc.—7
9- ed. The chancellor bases his opinion upon
what he conceives to be the rule as laid down
in 2 Williams, Ex'rs, p. 1315, and in 2 Rep.
Leg. pp. 1679, 1682. He also cites the case
'of Attorney General v. Johnstone, Amb. 577.
Exactly what Mr. Williams statw the true
, rule to be is as follows: “The testator may, by
the terms of the bequest, narrow the title of
the residuary legatee, so as to exclude him
from lapsed legacies; as when it appears to
lbe the intention of the testator that the re
lsiduary legatee should have only what remain
ed after the payment of the legacies." Mr.
, Roper states the exception to the general ruleI
in the following language: “When the legatee
is not generally, but only partially, residuary
=legatee. he will not, in that character, be en
~titled to any benefit from lapses, though very
Ispecial words are required to take a bequest
of the residue out of the general rule; as,
first, when it appears the testator intended
Jthe residuary legatee should have only what
remained after the payment of legacies." If
‘these authors intend to say (which, to my
mind, is by no means clear) that when the
. clause of the will giving the residuum of the
estate contains, or has annexed to it, the
words, "after payment of debts and lega
cies," the settled rule of construction is that
lapsed legacies; are not embraced, but that as
to them the testator is to be held as having
ydied intestate I cannot yield my assent to
the proposition. The cases cited by the au
.thors referred to do not support such a doc
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trine, while there are several wellconsidered
cases to the contrary. ViceChanceilor Wood,
in the case of Bernard v. Minshull, Johns.
Eng. Ch. 276, 299, says: "All you have to
consider is whether the property is excepted,
in order to take it away, under all circum
stances and for all purposes, from the person
to whom the rest of the property is given, or
whether it is excepted merely for the purpose
of giving it to some one else. If the latter,
and the gift to some one else fails, the dances
of all except this property are entitled to take
the whole." In Roberts v. Cooke, 16 Ves.
451, it was held that a general disposition of
personal estate, not thereinbefore specifically
disposed of, comprehended specific legacies
lapsed; the word "specifically" being held to
mean “particularly." In the case of King v.
Woodhull, 3 Edw. Ch. 79, 84, the form of the
bequest was: "The residue and remainder of
my estate, if any there shall be, after the pay
ment of the said $1,000 to the missionary so
ciety, I give and bequeath to the children of
my niece." And it was held broad enough to
embrace as well the legacy to the missionary
society, which it was claimed was void, as a
bequest to a mission school. which was held
to be ineffectual. Vice-Chancellor McCoun
in his opinion in that case says: “The words,
'after payment of debts and legacies,' or after
payment of legacies specified or recapitulated
in the residuary clause itself, are not re
strictive of the bequest to any particular or
partial residue; but the bequest, after all, is
general of the remainder, and may be so un
derstood without doing violence to the ex
pressions of the will. Where the residuary
clause is thus worded, the legatee is as much
a general legatee of the residuum of the es
tate as if such words were not used." in
Shanley v. Baker, 4 Ves. 732, the words were,
all the rest and residue of my estate and
effects “not by me hcrcinbefore particularly
disposed of ;" and they were held to embrace
a leasehold property given as a legacy, which,
by the statutes of mortmain, was void. To
the same efiiect is the case of Brown v. Higgs,
4 Ves. 709. The case of Attorney General v.
Johnstone, Amb. 577, was not decided upon
the ground that the residuary bequest con
tained words of import similar to those now
under consideration, for it did not; but the
conclusion reached in that case was that,
from the whole context of the will, it was
evident that the testator did not intend that
the void legacy should, in any event1 become
a part of the residuum of his estate. The syl
labus of the case, which very well shows the
point decided, is: "Residue, under particular
circumstances, will not take in lapsed lega
cies;" the residue being given as a small re
mainder of about £100, and the lapsed lega
cies amounting to £20,000. I have not been
able to see anything in the residuary clause,
when taken by itself, or in the context of this
will now before us, which will authorize the
result sought by the complainant. It seems
to me quite evident that the testator did not
intend to die intestate as to any part of his
property. He gave the legacy of $5,000 to
his wife, to be accepted at her option, in lieu
of her right of dower in his estate. If she
should decline to accept it on these terms, or
if, by reason of her death in the lifetime of
her husband, it lapsed, the will of the tests
tor, as ascertained from the well-settled
meaning of the words he has used, was that
the lapsed or rejected legacy should go into
and form part of the residue of his estate.
1hr the reasons above stated, the decree
below must be reversed, and the complain
antIs bill dismissed, but without costs in this
court or the court below.
For reversal: THE CHANCELLOR, BEAS
LEY, C. J., and BEDLE, CLEMENT, DAL
RIMPLE, DEPUE, GREEN, SCUDDER,
VAN SYCKEL, and WOODHULL, J~J.
For aflirmance: None.
Ir 1|
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GOVENHOVEN v. SHULER. /
(2 Paige, 122.) z M
Court of Ehancery of New York. April é?
’ 1830.
Suit by Peter Covenhoven and wife. Van
"leek Shuler and Levi Shuler, and i awrence
Shuler, an infant, against Lena Shuler and ,
B. Herrick, her tenant. and John Shuler, the
executor, and against William, Betsey, Sally,
and Abraham Shuler, children of the dece
dent who had refused to join as complainants
in the suit, for an accounting.
Lawrence Shuler died in 1908, possessed of
a farm containing about 800 acres, in fee,
together with a considerable personal estate.
He left by his wife Lena Shuler 11 children
him surviving, to wit: Peter Shuler. Levi
Shuler, Mary, the wife of Jacob Serviss,
Jeremiah Shuler, William Shuler, Caty, the
wife of Peter Covenhoven, Betsey Shuler, Sal
iy Shuler, Abraham Shuler, Van Vleek Shu
ler. and Lawrence Shuler. The young. st
was then less than one year old, and became
of age in December, 1828. The will of Law
rence Shuler, the elder, executed in due form
of law topass real estate, was in the follow
ing words: “I will and order that all my just
debts and funeral expenses be paid out of
my personal estate by my executors, as soon
after my decease as they find themselves en
abled conveniently to do it. Secondly, I give
and bequeath unto my daughter Ann, wife of
David Cady, the sum of $250. to be paid to
her or her legal representatives, within one
year after my decease. by my executors. out
of such of my personals as they may think
proper to dispose of for that purpose. Third
ly, I give, devise, and bequeath unto my be
loved wife Lena the onethird of the residue
of my personal estate, after my debts, funer
al expenses, and the above legacy to my
daughter Ann shall be paid 05 and dischar
ged, together with the use-of_a1l1he residue
of the personal estate, and the occupation
and enjoyment of that part of my real estate
whereupon I now reside, containing 300 acres,
more or less, just as the same is now pos
sessed by me, so long as she remains my wid
ow; and, after her marriage, I do give the
use, occupation, and enjoyment of onethird
of said real estate to her during her natural
life. amhiahhimemincomanfmmmain
immmaasa to be applied for the educa~
tion and maintenance of such children as she
has together by me; and, after the youngest
of the said children shall become of age, I re
quest and order my executors to make an
equal division oi.' all my real and personal es
tate to be made, equally to be divided among
said children which I had by my wife Lena,
to have and to hold them, their heirs and as
signs, forever. And I do hereby declare that
the devise or bequest above made to my said
wife is by me intended to be in lieu of, and
an extinguishment of, her right and title of
dower to any part of my real estate. And,
lastly, I do hereby nominate and appoint my
son John Shuler and my brother-in-law
George Serviss executors of this my last will
and testament," etc. ,The bill alleged the
death of George Serviss before the testator,
and Jeremiah Shuier’s death three years aft~
er his father, and that the other children had
conveyed their interest in the estate to their
mother, the widow, who still remained un
married, and had leased the farm to Ben
jamln and Rufus Herrick for a term of live
years, and that John Shuler, the executor,
had converted moneys of the estate to his
own use, and allowed the widow also to do
so.
D. Cady, for complainants. M. T. Reyn
olds, for defendants.
WALWORTH, Ch. As the complainants
have not given the defendants an opportu
nity to substantiate their answers by proof,
every matter of fact stated or insisted upon
. therein is to be taken as true. The defend
ant W. L. Shuler disclaims all interest in the
subject-matter of this suit. He says he sold
and conveyed all his interest in the estate to
his mother long before the filing of the bill,
and that he believes that fact was known to
the complainants. They had, therefore, no
excuse for making him a party, and the bill
as against him must be dismissed, with
costs. Herrick was also unnecessarily and
improperly made a party to the suit. He was
a bona fide lessee, for a term of years which
would expire before the youngest child be
came of age. Even upon the complainants’
construction of the will, the widow was en
titled to the rents and profits of the farm
until that time. And if they were entitled to
a receiver of the rents and profits, to secure
and apply them in aid of any deficiency of
the personal estate, the tenant of the estate
need not be a party to the suit. If he re
fused to attorn to the receiver, the latter
might be directed to proceed against him, in
the name of the lessor, to recover the rent
as it became due. But there was no pre
tense for appointing a receiver of the income
of the farm in this case during the minority
of any of the children. The bill, as against
Herrick, must therefore be dismissed, with
costs.
The defendants Betsey, Sally, and Abra
ham Shuler were necessary parties, if the
complainants are entitled to an account to
any other relief in this case. They had a
common interest with the complainants in the
estate, and in the establishment and con
struction of the will. If the bill can be sus
tained, even for the purpose of obtaining se
curity, the complainants would be permitted
to retain it for the purpose of having the
trusts of the will carried into effect under the
direction of the court. This could not be
done if all the parties interested in the estate
were not before the court. Whether these rie
fendants must bear their own costs, or
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whether they must be paid by the complain
ants, or out of the estate of the testator, are
difi’erent questions.
The next question which arises in this case
is, what interest in the property did the wid
ow of the testator take under the will? The
rule contended for by the complainants’ coun
sci is undoubtedly correct, as stated by the
master oi.I the rolls in Sims v. Doughty, 5
If two parts of a will are totally
irreconcilable, ithe subsequent part is to be
taken as evidence of a subsequent intention.I
But this rule is only adopted from necessity,
to prevent the avoiding of both provisions for
uncertainty. It is only applied in those cases
where the intention of the testator cannot be
discovered, and where the two provisions are
so totally inconsistent that it is impossible
for them to coincide with each other, or with
the general intention of the testator. The
great and leading principle in the construc
tion of wills is that the intention of the
testator, if not inconsistent with the rules of
law, shall govern; and that intent must be
ascertained from the whole will taken togeth
er, and no part thereof to which meaning and
operation can be given, consistent with the
general intention of the testator, shall be re
jected. Where the words of one part of 3.
ifif are capable of a twofold construction,
hat should be adopted which is most consist
nt with the intention of the testator, as as
certained by other provisions in the will;
and, where the intention of the testator is
incorrectly expressed, the court will etlIectu
ate it by supplying the proper words. The
s rict grammatical sense is not always re
arded; but the words of the will may be
ansposed to make a limitation sensible, or
o carry into effect the general intent of the
estator. 11 "es. 148; Bradhurst v. Brad
iurst, 1 Paige, 343. In Jesson v. Wright, 2
ligh, 56, Lord Redesdaie says: “It cannot
at this day be argued, because the testator
uses in one part of his will words having a
clear meaning in law, and in another part
other words inconsistent with the former,
that the first words are to be cancelled or
overthrown."
Testing the will in this case by these princi
pies, I think the widow of the testator is en
titled to the use of the whole estate during
her life or widowhood. The general intent of
the testator appears to have been to give one
third of his personal estate to his wife abso
intcly~ and the use of one~thlrd of his real es
tate for life in lieu of dower if she married a
second time; and to give her the use of the
whole estate for life if she remained his wid
ow. He undoubtedly supposed, if she re
mained single, that she would support and
educate her children out of the income and
profits ofIthe estate. until they were able to
provide for themselves. There was little
probability she would do injustice to any
while there were no other claims on her
bounty; and, at her death, he intended they
should share the property equally. It was,
however, necessary to provide for the contin~
gency of a second marriage, when the prop
erty would be no longer underIher control,
but under that of her husband. The devise
to her of the use of all the residue of the per
sonal estate, and the occupation of the farm
so long as she remained his widow, is clear
and explicit, and is expressed in language
which can bear only one construction. The
subsequent clause of the will, which was in
tended to provide for the contingency of a
second marriage, is not so clear. The testator
does not seem to have contemplated the pos
sibility of her surviving him, and remaining
unmarried until the youngest child, then an
infant, became of age. He therefore directs
that after her marriage she shall only have
the use of one third of the estate, from which
time the income of the other two-thirds was
to be applied to the maintenance and educa
tion of the children; and that share of the
estate was also in that case to be divided
among the children equally, when the young
est became of age. If the last provision in
the will can be considered as evidence of the
final intention of the testator, a principle
which I consider more fanciful than sound,
it is in favor of the widow in this case; be
cause the last declaration of the testator rec
ognizes the devise and bequest before made to
his wife, and declares that the same is in
tended to be in lieu of, and in extinguishment
of, her dower. As the contingency has not
yet happened which was to deprive her of the
use of any part of the estate, the complain
ants mnnot claim a division of the property
until her death or marriage. There can be
no doubt of the right of the children of the
testator by his wife Lena to the whole of the
property, on the death of their mother, ex
cept the onethird of the personals given to
her absolutely. They take it by necessary im
plicaflon, though not by the express words of
the will. Where there is a bequest for life,
or other limited period with a limitation over,
of specific articles, such as books, plate, etcM
which are not necessarily consumed in the
using, the first taker was formerly required
to give security that the articles should be
forthcoming on the happening of the con
templated event. And the remainder-man
must take them in the situation in which they
will be left by the ordinary prudent use there
of by the first taker. Hayle v. Burrodaie, 1
Eq. Oas. Abr. 361; Bracken v. Bentley, 1
Rep. Ch. 110.
The modern practice, in such cases, is only
to require an inventory of the articles. speci
tying that they belong to the first taker for
the particular period only, and afterwards to
the person in remainder; and security is not
required, unless there is danger that the ar
ticles may be wasted or otherwise lost to the
remainderman. Foley v. Burneil, 1 Brown,
Ch. 279; Slannin: v. Style, 3 P. Wms. 336.
YVhether a gift for life of specific articles,
as of hay, grain. etc., which must necessarily
be consumed in the using, is to be considered.
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an absolute gift of the property, or whether
they must be sold, and the interest or income,
only, of the money applied to the use of the
tenant for life, appears to be a question still
unsettled in England. 3 Ves. 314; 3 Mer.
194. But none of these principles in relation
to specific bequests of particular articles,
whether capable of a separate use for life or
otherwise, are applicable to this case. Where
there is a general bequest of a residue for life,
with a remainder over, although it includes
articles of both descriptions, as well as other
property, the whole must be sold and convert
ed into money by the executor, and the pro
ceeds must be invested in permanent securi
ties, and the interest or income, only, is to be
paid to the legatee for life. This distinction
is recognized by the master of the rolls in
Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 193. He says, if
such articles are included in a residuary be
quest for life, then they are to be sold, and
the interest enjoyed by the tenant for life.
This is also recognized by Roper and Preston
as a settled principle of law in England.
Prest. Leg. 96; Rep. Leg. 209. See, also,
Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 137, and
cases in notes. The case of De Witt v.
Schoonmaker, 2 Johns. 243, seems to be in
collision with this principle. But Mr. Justice
Tompkins, who delivered the opinion of the
court there, does not appear to have noticed
the distinction between the bequest of a gen
eral residue and the bequest of specified arti
cles. He says, however, it was the duty of
the executors, on the death of the widow. to
have paid and delivered the personal estate
to the residuary legatee. If such was their
duty, they were not bound to deliver the prin
cipal of the estate into her hands without re
quiring security that it should be preserved
and paid over to the residuary legatee after
her death. That case was correctly decided,
for it was manifestly the intention of the tes
tator that the property should be delivered
over to the son after the death of the widow,
and that he should pay the legacy to his sis~
ter. The court presumed he had received the
property agreeably to the directions of the
will, and the executors were held not to be lia
ble to the legatee in a court of law.
In the (use before me, the widow was not
entitled to the use or possession of any specific
article of the personal estate, but only to one
third of the principal, and the interest or in
come of two-thirds of the remainder, of the
general residue, after the debts of the testa
tor and the legacy to Mrs. Cady were paid or
satisfied. The complainants are therefore en
titled to an account of all the personal estate
of the testator, in value as it existed at the
death of their father; and after deducting the
legacy to Mrs. Cady, and the funeral charges
and the expenses of administration, their
share of the balance must be invested in per
manent securities, and the income thereofl
paid to Lena Shuler during her life or widow
hood; and the principal, after her death or
marriage, must go to the complainants.
I have stated the rights of these parties in
the hope that some arrangement may be made
for the settlement of these family diffificulties
without the necessity of any further litiga
tion; and I have formed no definite opinion
as to the question of costs on either side.
But no decree for an account can now be
made, as all the proper parties are not before
the court. It appears by the pleadings that
the testator left other children besides those
by Lena Shuler, who were the residuary dev
isces and legatces in remainder. Jeremiah,
one of the children of Lena Shuler. died after
his father; and under the provisions of the
will he took a vested interest in remainder
in the personal as well as the real estateI-
Sturgess v. Pearson, 4 Madd. 411; Bcnyon v.
Maddison, 2 Brown, Ch. 75; Prest. Leg. 70;
1 Rop. Leg. 376; O’Driscoll v. Koger, 2
Desaus. Eq. 295. In that share of the es
late, John Shuler and Mrs. Cady, and the
other brothers and sisters of the half blood,
if there are any, are equally entitled with
those of the whole blood. The cause must
therefore stand over, with leave to the com
plainants, or such of them as have not re
leased their interest to their mother, to file a
supplemental bill for the purpose of bringing
the personal representative of Jeremiah Shu
ler before the court, or such other persons en
titled to a distributive share of his estate as
are not now parties. Those who have con
veyed all their interest in the real and per
sonal estate to their mother since the death
of Jeremiah have no interest in the account
to be taken, and need not be parties.
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PEASLEE v. FLETCHER’S ESTATE./
(14 Atl. 1, 60 Vt. 188.)
Supreme Court of Vermont. Chittenden.
May 28, 1888.
Exceptions from Chittenden county court;
Taft, Judge.
Hard & Cashing, for plaintiff. W. L. Bur
nap and Geo. W. Wales, for defendant.
TYLER, J. The only question presented
by the bill of exceptions in this case arises
in construing the following clause in the will
of Mary M. Fletcher, late of the city of Bur
lington, deceased. or rather that part of the
clause which relates to the bequest of the per
sonal estate of the testatrix: “I give to
my uncle, George L. Peaslee, of Auburn, Me,
my home place on Prospect street, in said
Burlington, with my household furniture and
all my personal goods and chattels on said
premises at the time of my decease." The
plaintiff, who is the devisee mentioned in said
clause, claims that the words “all my per
sonal goods and chattels on said premises at
the time of my decease" are operative to pass
to him seven promissory notes of $1,000 each,
which the testatrix held against one Manwell,
and $1,100.18 in money, which were in the
house or 'theme place" of the testatrix when
she died. In giving construction to this
clause, we must consider all the words con
tained in it, and also its relation to the other
portions of the will, in order to ascertain, if
possible, the testatrix's real intention. It ap~
pears by the bill of exceptions that she was
accustomed to keep her promissory notes, and
other like securities, in her house, and that,
at the time of the execution of this will,
which was during an illness from which she
did not expect to recover, she had in her
house, besides the notes in controversy, other
promissory notes amounting to about $80,000;
also that she was in the habit of having cer
tain United States bonds brought from the
banks in the city, where she usually kept
them, to her house, where they would remain
during the day, while she cut off the coupons.
It is true that the word "chattels" has a
broad enough signification to include promis
sory notes and bank-bills, and, in many loca
tions in a written instrument, it would be con
strued to include them: but in this case, if it
had been the intention of the testatrix to be
queath to the plaintifl.’ so large an amount of
money and personal securities as was often
in her house, and liable to be there at her
decease, it is hardly reasonable to suppose
that she would have employed so general and
inapt a term as "goods and chattels" for that
purpose, when she obviously might have be
queathed them in unmistakable language.
Had she intended to give her uncle all such
promissory notes and money on hand, or any
part thereof, it is fairly presumable that she
would have said so plainly. Again, we must
consider all the language of the clause in ques
tlon,—the words "my household furniture" as
well as "my personal goods and chattels,"—
and determine, if we can, what relation the re
spective words bear to each other; whether
or not the latter are restricted in their mean
ing by the former. The authorities on this"~
point are numerous and somewhat conflicting,
I
but we find that the general current of them,
both in England and in this country, is that,
except in residuary clauses, general words}
such as "goods and chattels," when following
after and coupled with words of a limited
signification, are restricted to the same class
as the former. 2 Williams, ExIrs, 1015, 1017,
and cases cited. Thus, where the testator be
queathed to his niece all his goods, chattels,
household stuff, furniture, and other things
which should be in his house at A., it was
decreed that cash found at the testator’s house
did not pass; for by the words “other things"
should be intended things of like nature and
species with those before specified. Trafl?ord
v. Berrige, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 201. Jarman, in
his work on Wills, cites the case of Lamphier
v. Despard, 2 Dru. & War. 59, where a testa
tor, after devising certain realIestate to his
wife, bequeathed to her all his household fur-
uiture, plate, house linen. and “all other chalt
tel property that he might die seized or pos
sessed of," and, after various legacies, he ap
pointed A. his executor and residuary lega
tee. Sir Edward Sngden held that “all other
chattel property" meant all ejusdem generis,
relying partly on the subsequent residuary
gift. He thought, however, that the words
would clearly not pass money, so that the
clause could not be a general bequest of the
entire personal estate. In Rawlings v. Jen
nings, 13 Ves. 39, the bequest was: "Unto
my wife, Alice Jennings, two hundred pounds
per year, being part of the moneys I now have
in bank security entirely for her own use and
disposal, together with all my household fur
niture and effects, of what nature or kind so
ever, that I may be possessed of at the time
of my decease." The master of the rolls said:
“The second question arises upon the wid
ow’s claim of the whole residue of the per
sonal estate as passing to her under the gen
eral word 'effects.’ That claim cannot be
sustained. Part of his property being par
ticularly given to her afterwards, the word
'effects’ must receive a more limited interpre
tation, and must be confined to articles ejus
dem generls with those specified in the pre
ceding part of the sentence, viz., household
furniture." In Dole v. Johnson, 3 Allen, 364,
the testator bequeathed to his widow all his
household furniture, wearing apparel, and all
the rest and residue of his personal property.
Hoar, J., in construing this clause said: “We
think the meaning/ of the whole will is made
most consistent by restricting the word .prop
erty’ to chattels ejusdem generls with those
enumerated. By this construction the wid
ow will take absolutely the household furni
ture, wearing apparel, and other chattels in
and about the house of the testator adapted
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to personal use and convenience, such as
books, pictures, provisions, watches. plate,
carriages, domestic animals, and the like, but
not including money, stocks, securities. or evi
dences of debt." In Johnson v. Goss, 128
. Mass. 433, where the bequest was as follows:
“I give to my wife all my personal property,
my household effects, horses, carriages, life
insurance, etc.,"—the court held that this gen
eral term, "all my personal property," was
not used in its ordinary sense; that the lan
guageIdid not purport to bequeath thcIresidu
um of the testator’s property, and, construing
it in connection with the words immediately
following, "my household effects," etc., that
the testator’s purpose was to describe prop
erty of the same kind, and that he used the
adjective “personal'’ as descriptive of chattels
of personal use and convenience, not includ
ing stocks, securities, or other productive
property. In Benton v. Benton. 63 N. H. 289,
the bequest was as follows: “I give my wife
every article of household furniture, books,
etc., and every other article of personal prop
erty in and about said homestead, or wherever
found, belonging to my estate;" and under it
the widow and the residuary legatees both
claimed the bank shares, notes, and cash on
hand. The court held that the words "every
other article ofpersonal property" were lim
ited to the same class of things as those enn
merated, and did not include the bank-stock.
notes, and cash claimed by the widow.
Were there no residuary clause in this will,
the words in question might and probably
would be construed to pass this property to
the plaintiff, for the reason that courts are al
ways disposed to give the broadest meaning
practicable to the words of a bequest when it
is necessary to do so in order to prevent in
testacy. The same is true when words of a
general signification are found in the resid
uary clause itself, and for the same reason.
Jarman, in commenting upon cases which in
dicate the disposition of judges of the present
day to adhere to the rule which gives to
words of a comprehensive import their .tull
extent of operation, remarks. however, "that
in all the preceding cases there was no other
bequest capable of operating on the general
residue of the testator’s personal estate if the
clause in question did not. Where there is
such a bequest, it supplies an argument of no
inconsiderable weight in favor of the restrict
ed construction, which is then recommended
by the anxiety always felt to give to a will
such a construction as will render every part
of it sensible, consistent. and cffective."
Many of the cases cited by the piaintiff’s coun
sel are upon the construction of residuary
clauses in wills. Such is the case of Parker
v. Marchant, 20 Eng. Ch. 290, where it was
held that the words "goods, chattels, and ef
fects," after an enumeration of various arti
cles, caried the residue of the testator’s prop
erty. The vicechancellor, in considering the
point whether, by these words, the testator
had disposed of the general residue of his per
sonal estate, or had so far died intestate, said:
“This turns upon the meaning to be attributed
to the words .goods, chattels, and effects,'
having regard to the position in which they
are found in the will. and having regard, also.
to the whole contents of the n " Such.
also, is the case of Browne v. Cogswell, 5
Allen, 556. The will under consideration con
tains a residuary clause. After the bequest
to her uncle, the testatrix gave all the residue
of her estate, except two small legacies, to the
Mary Fletcher Hospital. Upon these well
recognized rules of construction, we hold that
the words "goods and chattels," in the con
nection in which they are found, should be
construed as having only a restricted and lim
ited signification, and as not including said
Manwell notes and cash on hand; that they
are further restricted in their meaning by the
word “personal," which indicates, when con
sidered in its relation to the words "house
hold furniture," that the testatrix intended by
the words in question to bequeath only other
articles of the same kind, belonging to the
house,—"savoring of the locaifty,"—adapted
and pertaining to her personal use. This
view is sustained by the fact that no definite
amount of money and notes was kept at the
house. It often varied with varying circum
stances, and the notes and money were car
ried away and brought back as the testatrix
had occasion to go from or return to her home,
and were being removed when she died. To
give these words the broad meaning claimed
for them by the plaintiff would be to invest
them with power by which they might have
defeated what seems to have been the main
purpose of the will, namely, the endowment
of said hospital; for at times nearly the en
tire personal estate of the testatrix was in her
house.
In the view we have taken of this case, the
testimony of the plaintiff received by the
court below was wholly immaterial. The re
sult is the judgment of that court is aflirmed,
and certified to the probate court.
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DICKISON v. DICKISON.
(28 N. E. 792, 138 Ill. 541.)
Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 31, 1891.
Error to appellate court, second district.
This was an application ofJohn A. Dicki
son to the county court for an order ni
lowing him to share in theestateof Griffith
Dickison, deceased. The county court dis
allowed his application, which order was
affirmed by the circuit and the appellate
courts. He appeals. Affirmed.
McCulloch & Mci'ulloch, for plaintiff in
error. Arthur Keithley, for defendant In
error.
SHOPE. J. April 9. 1874, Griffith Dicki
son. then in life, made his last will and testa
ment. At that time, it is conceded for the
purposes of this appeahhe had 1 children.
In and by clauses 2 to 8, inc naive. and
clause 10, oi the will, he made specific de
vises to his wife and 8 of the children, sev
erally. By clause 9 he made a specific de
vise to his two other children as follows:
“Ninth. To my children John Abraham
and Mary Ann I \vill,devise,and bequeath
the west half of the north-west quarter of
section twenty-seven, in township ten
north, range seven cast, in equal shares,
to be in full of their portions of my estate,
both real and personal, to be theirs, their
heirs' and assigns’ forever. " The eleventh
clause of the will is as follows: “Eleventh.
All the rest of the real estate of which I
may die possessed shall be by my executor
sold, also all the personal property I may
have at my death shall be sold, and from
the proceeds of such sales he shall first
pay all my debts, etc. The remainder he
shall divide amongst my heirs as follows:
To my wife, Sarah A. Dlckison, onethird
part thereof; and the remainder to my
children in equal portionsmhare and share
alike, to be theirs, their heirs’and assigns’
forever absolute. " On the 7th day of
March, 1882, there was executed by the
testator in due form of law, and attached
to the original will, the following codicil:
“Whereas, l, Griffith Dickison, did on the
ninth day of April, 1874. make my last will
and testament, in and by which will I
made devises to all my children then horn;
and whereas, since that date a son has
been born to me, whom I have named
Fred, I make this codicil to my said will,
to have the same force and effect as if it
was a part of my original will: That is
to say, I will, devise, and bequeath to my
son Fred [certain described realty] in fee,
and to my daughter Roxie J. Hitchcock
[certain described realty] in fee.
” The ten
tator died March 14, 1886, and shortly
thereafter said will, with the codicil an
nexed, was duly admitted to probate.
Subsequently the executor reported to the
county court that after payment of all
claims, etc.. he had in his hands $9,214.05
for distribution under the residuary clause
of the will, and asking an order of the
court thereon. The question presented by
this record is whether appellant, John A.
Dickison. is entitled toI participate in the
distribution of that fund. That he was a
child of the testator. and therefore fell
within the designation of persons who
were to take under the residuary clause of
the will. is conceded It must, therefore.
be held that he is a dlstributee thereunder
of the residuum in the hands of the execu
tor, unless that clause is controlled by
other portions of the will, so as to exclude
him from participation; and this must
depend upon the intention of the testator
as expressed in his will. The sole purpose
of construction of the instrument is to
find and declare the intention of the testa
tor,that effect maybe given to such inten
tion, when not contrary to public policy,
or in contravention of law or the rules of
property. The construction depends up
on the intention of the testator, to be as?.
certained from a full view of everything
contained in the will, giving just weight
and operation to each clause and word
employed, unless there is some invincible
repugnance, or some portion of it is abso
lutely unintelligible. 1 iiedl1. Wills, 334 et
seq.; Carulhers v. McNeili,97 lil. 256; Ken
nedy v. Kennedy, 105 Ill. 35'); Tauhenhan
v. Dunz.125 Ill. 529. 17 N. E. Rep. 456. and
cases cited. By the ninth clause of his
will the testator devised to John A. (ap
pellant) and Mary Ann, his son and
daughter. as tenants in common,the tract
of land therein described, “to be in full of
their portion of my estate. both real and
personal; to be theirs, their heirsI and
assigns' forever." The language here
employed is neither ambiguous nor unin
telligible. If understood in their ordinary
and popular significance, as they must
be, except where technical terms are used,
the words conveyndefinite and certain
meaning. The word "portion "in its com
monly accepted meaning is the equivalent
of part, share, or division. Worcester
“To be in full of their part or share or di
vision of an estate," means to be the com
plete measure of such share, part, 0'.I di vis
ion. Worcester. The ovidentintention of
the testator was .that the land devised
was to be the complete measure of what
these devisees should take or receive as
their part, share, division. or portion of
his estate. Nor is the construction less .
satisfactory if it be considered that the
testator used the word "portion" in its
technical legal sense. Technically a “por
tion"is defined to he: “The part of a
parentIs estate, or of the estate of one
standing In the place of a parent, which
is given to a child. “ Bouvier. The devise
would therefore bein full—i. 9., fhecompleie
measure—of the part of the tcstator’s es
tate given or devised, or the provision made
by the testator for these devisees. The
evident intention of the testator, as mani
fested by this clause of the will. was to
limit thequantity of his estate to be taken
or received by his son John A. and his
daughter Mary A. to the specific devise of
the land mentioned in clause9. This in
tention is clearly and unambiguously ex
pressed. The difliculty arises, however,
Inot in respect of any uncertainty as to
the intent expressed in this clause of the
will, but because of the repugnancy exist
ing between this and theeieventh, or resid- /
nary, clause. The latter clause provides"
as we have seen, that all the rest and re -
due of the testator’s real estate, 0t s
cifically devised, and all his pars a1
tate, shall be sold by his executor,
and‘)
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after paying debts. etc.. the remainder be
divided among his heirs as follows: To
his wife. one-third part thereof; “and the
Wlflfllifleflflfil r01.tons, share an s are alike, their bars
and assigns forever absolute." it will be
observed that the testator here again uses
the word “ portion " as the equivalent of
part or share.
It is apparent that if appellantand his
sister Mary A. are held to be included in
this general residuary clause, the provis
ion of clause 9, that the land therein de
vised shall he in full of all they shall re
ceive from the estate of the testator, is
rendered nugatory. There is, therefore. it
is said, repugnance between these two
clauses. and that in such case the later
provision must control. The rule is well
established in this state. as elsewhere,
that when the clauses oi a will are irrecon
cilable, and the repugnanee invincible, the
later clause will generally prevail. Brown
field v. Wilson, 75 Ill.470: Murfitt v.Jessop,
94 ill. 158; 3 Jarm. Wills,705; l Redf. Wills,
443-445. In matters of so great solemnity
as making a testamentary disposition of
property it cannot be presumed that a
testator would purposely make inconsist
ent provisions, incapable of being carried
into effect. Unlike conveyance by deed,
in which the first complete grant leaves
nothing in the grantor to be subsequently
conveyed, a will remains ambulatory,and
the latest expressed intention is to be giv
en operation; and, as the testator might
have changed his mind during the draft
ing of his will, there being no way of ac
counting for or removing the repugnancy,
itwill be presumed that he did, alter writ
ing the former clause, change his purpose,
and that the subsequent clause gives ex
pression to a la ter formed intention. The
rule is adopted by the courts as an aid to
finding the real intention oi the testator,
as finally expressed in his will, and arises
out of the very necessity of the case, and
rests upon the single presumption of fact
oi change oi intention while writing the
will. The fundamental rule oi construc
tion being, as we have seen, that the in
tention is to be found from a consideration
of the whole will. and such construction
given as will uphold all of its provisions,
and give to each clause and part its just
operation and effect, it follows that the
presumption oi the fact upon which the rule
is predicated “ ill never be indulged, or the
rule applied. until it is found by the appli
cation of all other rules of construction
that the difficulty is unsolved, and the
clauses remaininvincibly repugnant. Redi.
Wills, 445-452. and cases cited; Morrall v.
flutton, 1 Phil. Ch. 532. The tendency—-of
modern American decisions at least—is to
wards reconciling the apparent repug
nancy, if possible, without adopting on
reasonable or absurd constructions; so
much so, that it is stated by the learned
author just cited “that it is now becoming
very uncommon with us to hear a court
declare a will, or any of its provisions,
Wholly inoperative by reason of repug-.
nancy or uncertainty." Page 453. The
rule, therefore, which sacrifices the former
clause, because inconsistent with a later
One, is never applied, except upon failure
to give such construction as renders the
whole will effective, and allows each pro
vision to stand. Hence it has been held
that to enable the court to uphold all the
provisions of the will it is permissible to
resort to every reasonable intendment:
to reverse the rain tive order ofthe devises
or bequests; and to transpose the differ
ent provisions of the will, if it be possible
thereby to render them consistent and
give effect to each. Mutter’s Appeal, 88
Pa. SL314; Covenhoven v. Shuler,2 Paige,
122; Pruden v. Pruden, 14 Ohio St. 251;
Langham v. Sanford, l9Ves. 641; Brookle
bank v. Johnson, 20 Beav. 205~, Ridout v.
Dowding, l Atk. 4l9; Hatfield v. Sneden,
42 Barb.615: Crissman v.Crissman, 5 ired.
498. And so repugnant words, in what
ever portion oi the will they occur, which
contravene the evident general purposeand
intention of the testator as clearly ex
pressed, may be rejected or transposed or
limited and controlled by other and prior
provisions, and by the general purpose
and intent thus clearly manifested. Hol
liday v. Dixon, 27 ill. 33; Watlington v. I
Waldron, 4 De Gex. M. & G. 259; Boon v.
Cornforth, 2 Ves. Sr. 277: Jones v. Price,
11 Slm.557. Further discussion of the gen
eral rule will be unnecessary, as we are
not required to go to so great length in
the construction of this will as many of
the cases have gone. .
It is also a familiar rule in the construc
tion of wills that general provisions in a
will must give way to specific provisions:
that where there is a general devise of
property in one part of the will, and a
specific disposition oi the same property
in another part. these are to be regarded,
generally, as excepted out of the general
devise. Rodi. Wills. 446, and cases cited.
Moreover. a general residuary clause, be.
ing ordinarily introduced by the testator
to prevent intestacy as to any part of his
estate, will generally be construed as in
tended for nothing more than a disposi
tion of those portions of the estate not
previously disposed of; and in such case
the presumption of a change of purpose
in the testator’s mind while preparing his "
will cannot arise. Id. The specific direc
tions in the will. where the mind of the
testator has been directly and intelligently
directed to them, are much safer guides to
his intention than general provisions,
which do, by virtue of their generality.
contravene the specific provision, but
which might or might not have been so
intended; and especially is this so where,
as in this case, the general provision is a
residuary clause, which. as we have said,
might, as it generally is, have been insert
ed with the sole view of the disposition
of any residuum of estate not before de
vised. Here the testator made specific de
vises to all his children of land, and ac
companied the devise to appellant and his
sister Mary Ann with the express provis
ion that the land devised was to be in full
of their portion of hisestate, both real and
personal. Nothing can be clearer than
the intention, thus expressed, that neither
appellant nor Mary A. should participate
in the estate of the testator further than
the specific devise made to them. It was
to be. as we have seen, the complete meas
ure of all they should take out of the es.
tate of the testator, “both real and per
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sonal." excluding them from further par.
tlcipation. Following this clause comes
a specific devise of other lands. without
limitation. to another son, Griffith A.,
and then follows the general clause before
quoted. By that clause the residue of the
testator’s property, real and personal, is
to be sold, and, after the payment oi
debts. to be divided, onethird to the tes
taior’s widow, Sarah A. Dickison, and
the remainder to his children, share and
share alike. It is apparent that in mak
ing this clause the testator intended espe
cially to provide for his wile, giving her
onethird oi the residue. which she could
not otherwise, as his widow, have taken,
without renouncing the previous specific
provision for her benefit. The care taken
in naming her cvimes the soifcitude oi the
testator in her behalf, undoubtedly aris
ing from the fact,as shown by the rec
ords, that no formal marriage had been
solemnized between them, and at most a
common-law marriage only existed. which
might be contested. Beyond the naming
oi his then wife, no one else is named. The
remainder of the residue is to be divided
among his children without further des
ignution. There are no other words indi
cating an intention to abrogate or destroy
the limitation coupled with the devise to
appellant. It is much more probable
that the testator introduced the residu
ary clause primarily to protect his widow,
and, secondly, to give effect to the limita
tion coupled with the devise in the ninth
clause of the will by preventing any por
tion oi his estate from becoming intestate
estate,and distributable to his heirs, includ
ingappellant,than that he had changed his
purpose alter the writing oi the second
preceding clause. Especially is this so
when we consider that all that portion oi
clause 9 repugnant to the residuary dispo
sition could have been erased or ex
punged without in the least affecting the
specific devise made.
The intention of the testator must con
trol when it can be ascertained, and we
are of the opinion that it is clearly muni
fest that the testator intended to exclude
appellant from participation in his estate
beyond the specific devise made to him;
that the will, taken and considered as a
whole, leaves no serious doubt oi that in
tention. The testator had just previously
excluded appellant from participation in
any residue of his estate then existing or
thereaiter to be acquired, and undoubt
edly, having in mind this provision,
made the general provision subject to it.
Nor is this rendered less certain by the
codicil made by the testator. it is true
that he therein says that he had, in and
by his will, “made devises to all my chil
dren then born." but the purpose of the
codicil, and to what devises the testator
referred, is clearly apparent. Thereby he
makes a specific devise to a son born sub
sequently to the making of the original
will. and of the same kind as those spe
cifically made to his other children. In
deed, he takes by the codicil the land spe
cifically devised to his_daughter Roxie by
the will, and gives it to the after-born son.
and in lieu thereof specifically devised an
other tract of land to the daughter. He
had, as is said in the codicil, by his will
made devises to all oi his children. He
had specifically devised to each a tract or
tracts of land, as he was then doing for
his younger son,b0rn after the making
oi the will. and to such specific devises
alone the language oi the codicil may be
referred. It was these he manifestly had
in mind, and to which his attention was
attracted, in making like provision for his
other and after-born child. We are oi
opinion that the provisions of this will
clearly evince an intention to exclude ap
pellant from participation in any residue
of his esta te, and that the appellate court
held correctly in excluding him irom par
ticipating therein. The judgment of the
appellate court afifirming the decree of the
circuit court is
aoflirmed.
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FORD v. FORD et al. (two cases).
(331. W. 188, 70 Wis. 19.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. June 1, 1887.
Appeals from circuit court, Dane county.
January 26, 1886, Francis F. Ford. died,
leaving a will bearing date January 25, 1884,
which was admitted to probate in the coun
ty court of Dane county, Wisconsin, May 17,
1886, and which will and schedules annexed
are to the following efl'ect: “Know all men
by these presents, that 1, Francis F. Ford,
of the city of Madison, county of Dane, and
state of Wisconsin, being of sound disposing
mind and memory, do make, publish, and
declare this to be my last will and testa
ment, in terms following, to-wit: I(1) I di
rect that all my lawful debts, funeral ex
penses included, shall be paid as soon after
my deceae as practicable, out of moneys
on hand, or, if need be, from the income of
my estate. (2) It is my will, and I so direct,
that the necessary expenses of carrying my
estate from year to year be paid from the
income thereof. (3) It is my will, and I
so direct, that all indebtedness of any of my
brothers to me shall be, and hereby is, can
celed, and the legal evidences of such indebt
edness shall be returned to the makers there
of. (4) I direct that all properties in Sched
ule A, attached to this instrument, and hear
ing my signature, shall be converted, as soon
as practicable after my decease, into good
rentnble 'inside’ property in Kansas City,
Mo., at schedule prices, or as much better
as may be. (5) I also direct that the several
properties in Schedule B, attached to this
instrument, and bearing my signature. shall,
at the discretion of my executors, either be
sold and the proceeds thereof be invested
in more desirable rentable property in Kan
sas City, or said proceeds be used in improv
ing some one or more of my Kansas City
properties. (6) I also direct that all moneys,
notes, bonds, mortgages, or other evidence
of indebtedness to me from any and all par
ties, except my brothers, shall, as soon as
practicable after my decease. be used either
in the purchase of property in Kansas City,
or for improving properties in said city then
on hand. (7) It is my will, and I so direct,
that my wife, Maggie, shall have he use
of my homestead, furniture, and ppurte
nances located on Spaight street, Madison,
Wis., so long as she may desire to live in
it as her home. In case, at any time, she
cease to desire it as her home, I direct that.
as soon thereafter as practicable, it be sold
at a price not less than ($10,000) ten thou
sand dollars, or as much more as the prop
erty will bring, and the proceeds thereof be
invested in good rentable property in Kansas
City, Mo., and the rentals of such property
be added to the income of the estate. (8)
It is my will, and I so direct, that, in addi
tion to said homestead. and furniture, my
said wife, Maggie, shall have onequarter of
the net annual income of the remainder of
my estate during her natural life, subject
to modifications in article 12 of this instru
ment; and it is expressly stipulated that
the above bequests to my said wife are in
lieu of dower. (9) It is my will, and I so
direct, that my son, Marcus C. Ford, shall
have onequarter of the net annual income
of my estate,.homestead not included, until
such time as, in accordance with the pro
visions of this will hereinafter made, he
shall come into the possession of the entire
estate, but the expenditure and use of said
income during his minority shall be under
the control and direction of his guardian,
and I appoint his mother his guardian dur
ing his minority, and, in event of her death,
I appoint my brothers Edward I. and Henry
T. in her place. (10) It is my will, and I
so direct, that my brother Edward Irving
shall have onequarter of the net annual
income of my estate, homestead not includ
ed~ during: his natural life. (11) It is my
will, and I so direct, that my brothers Jo
seph C. and Henry T. shall each have one
eighth of the net annual income of my estate,
homestead not included, during their natural
lives. (12) It is my will, and I so direct,
that when my son, Marcus C., reaches his
majority, he shall become the owner in fee
of ten thousand dollars’ worth of my real
estate, and at twentyfive (25) years of age
he shall have an additional twenty thousand
($20,000) dollars’ worth, and at thirty (30)
years of age he shall have an additional
twenty-five thousand ($25,000) dollars’ worth.
and at thirty-five (35) years of age he shall
have an additional forty-five thousand ($45,
000) dollars’ worth, and at forty (40) years
of age the remainder of my estate shall be
come his; and I also direct that the income
of my said wife, Maggie, shall be kept up
to fifteen hundred ($1,500) dollars. any deficit
to be taken from the income of my son, Mar
cus C., and, as an offset thereto, my son,
Marcus C., shall be entitled to any excess
in said wife’s income over and above twenty
five hundred ($2,500) dollars a year. (13)
I also direct that in the event that my son,
Marcus C., shall decease after reaching his
majority, leaving one or more legitimate
children of his body, that the income of
forty thousand ($40,000) dollars’ worth of my
estate, or so much thereof as may in pru
dence be necessary, shall be used for the
proper support of such child or children,
until they shall severally become of legal
age, when an equal part of the abovenamed
principal, and accrued interest, shall become
his or hers absolutely. (14) In the event that
my son, Marcus C., shall survive all my other
legatees, and then die before coming into pos
session of my whole estate, it is my will, and
I so direct, that the remainder of my estate
as of that date shall belong to Hamil
ton College, located at Clinton, New-York,
to be used in the endowment of some new
professorship, and the remainder to be used,
at the discretion of the trustees of said col
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'legs, in the erection of some building for
college uses, or in the endowment of addi
tional professorships; such building or pro
i'essorships to bear my name. (15) If either
my wife, Maggie, or one of my brothers,
shall become my only surviving legatee, it
is my will in that event, and I so direct,
that my estate, at that time, be divided as
nearly as may be into two (2) equal parts
-as regards value and renting power, and
said wife or brother shall then choose be
tween the incomes of said two properties,
and have and enjoy the same during his or
.her natural life; and it is my will that the
other part of my estate shall at that date
become the property of Hamilton College, to
be used as directed in article 14 in this in
strument, And I further direct that, at the
death of said wife or brother. the remaining
part of my estate shall become the property
of Hamilton College, to be used as in article
14. I hereby appoint my two brothers Jo
seph C. and Henry T. Ford as executors of
this, my last will and testament. In wit
ness whereof, I, Francis F. Ford, have to
this, my last will and testament, consisting
of four sheets of paper, subscribed my name
and afiixed my seal at Madison~ Wis., this
twenty-fifth (25) day of January, 1884.
[Signed] Francis F. Ford. [Sea1.]"
The lands described in Schedule A were
situated and therein priced as follows:
Homestead, in Madison, Wis., priced at $10,
000; lands in Kalamazoo, Mich., priced in the
aggregate at $27,000; about 1,508 acres of
land in the state of Kansas, priced in the ag
gregate at $38,500. The lands described in
Schedule B were situated in Kansas City, Mis
souri, and therein priced in the aggregate at
$19,200.
The plaintiff, as the qualified executor, com
menced this action in the circuit court for
Dane county for the construction1 of said
H'The
plaintiff
prays the aid of this court,
among ot er things. to determine: (1) Whcth
er the said property, real and personal,
of which the said Francis F. Ford died seized,
is, by virtue of said will, vested in the plaintiff
as executor or Irustee, to be controlled and
managed by him; whether he has power to
receive the rents, incomes, and profits thereof,
and disburse the same as in the said will pro
vided; and, if the said laintiff does not take
the same as trustee, whet er any trusts are cre
ated by said will, and whether the court has
the power to appoint trustees, or whether the
said real estate descends to the heirs of the
said Francis F. Ford, or how and in whom the
title to the said estate and property. real and
personal, vests and descends. (2) Under the
second clause of said will, who is invested with
the power and has the authority to expend the
sums of money to defray the necessary ex
penses
of carrying on said testator’s estate
rom year to year which are to be paid from
the income thereof? (3) Whether. under
fourth clause of said will, the plaintiff. as ex
ecutor of said estate, is invested with the pow
er and has the authority to convert and invest
in good, rentable inside property in Kansas
City all the properties set forth and described
in Schedule A annexed to said will; and, if
the plaintifi has the power to sell the said
last-mentioned property, at what price he is
will so probated in the county court, where
upon the widow, Margaret G. Ford, and Mar
cus C. Ford, the only child of said testator,
by his guardian ad litem, and Hamilton Col
lege, respectively, answered the complaint.
which complaint and answers were severally
amended by leave of the court.
Prior to the trial it was stipulated by the
respective parties, in effect, “that the printed
laws and decisions of the Revised Statutes"
in our state law library, “for the states of
Missouri, Kansas, Michigan, and Iowa, (and
of the state of New York, for the purpose of
proving the incorporation of the trustees of
Hamilton College,)“ might "be referred to by
any and all of the parties herein to show what
the law of any of said states" was “as to any
of the legal points involved in or that" might
“arise in said case, either in the circuit or su
preme court of this state," and that it "should
not be necessary to introduce in evidence any
of said statutes, laws, or reported decisions:
but that any of the parties herein" should
“have the right to use or refer to same as evi
dence herein."
In addition to what has been stated, it ap
peared from the undisputed evidence~ and was
found as facts upon the trial, in effcct: That
the testator died testate at the age of 58 years.
in Kansas City, Missouri, January 26, 1886.
leaving said will. That, at the time of his
death, he was a resident of and domiciled in
the city of Madison, Dane county, Wisconsin.
and had been for 10 years immediately prior
thereto. That he left, him surviving, his wid
ow, the said Margaret G., then aged 46 years;
and one child, a son, the said Marcus C., then
aged 12 years; and three brothers, Edward
Irving Ford, then living at Asbury Park, New
Jersey, and aged 60 years; Joseph C. Ford,
then residing in Madison, Wisconsin, and
aged 55 years; and Hem~y Thornton Ford,
then living at Jersey City, New Jersey, and
authorized to sell the same. (4) Whether the
plaintiff, as executor of said will, and, if not
the plaintiff, who otherwise, has power to sell
the property set forth and described in Sched
ule B annexed to said will, and to invest the
proceeds thereof in more desirable rentable
property in Kansas City, or to determine
whether the same shall be used in improving
some one or more of said Kansas City prop
erty. (5) Whether the
Blaintiff,
as executor of
said will, and, if not t e piaintiff, who other
wise, has power and control of all moneys,
notes, bonds, mortgages, or other evidence of
indebtedness mentioned in the sixth clause of
said will, and ha authority and power to
use the same in the purchase of property in
Kansas City, or for improving properties in said
city on hand. (6) The said plaintiff alleges, up
on information and belief, that it is the in
tention of Margaret G. Ford, who claims
to be the widow of the said Francis F. Ford,
to renounce the benefit and provisions made
in and by said will for her; and the plain
tiflI ra s the aid of this court that if
she s 8.1 so renounce said will, and take such
art of the property of the said Francis F.
i'ord as the law may give to her, what
power of sale he has over the furniture sit
uated in the homestead in the city of Madi
son, and other property connected therewith,
mentioned in clause seven of said will~ and
(:UNS’I’ItUCTlON AND INTERPRETATION OF WILLS. 109I
aged 53 years; and that all of said persons
were still living. That he left, him surviving,
no sister, father, or mother. That said will
was admitted to probate as stated. That
thereupon letters testamentary were issued
by said county court to Joseph C. Ford, the
plaintiff, who thereupon qualified as ex
centor, and has ever since acted and
still acts as such. That, at the time of his
death, the testator’s estate was worth about
$175,000, and located in the states of Wis
cons-in, Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, and MiIs
souri. That the great bulk of said estate
was located in the states of Kansas and Mis
souri. That the personal estate oi.’ said tes
tator consisted of certain household goods
and fm-niture, and other personal property,
such as wagons, sleighs, etc., in Madison,
Wisconsin, and certain rents due him on real
estate. That. a short time prior to his death,
the testator assigned, or attempted to assign,
in writing to his brother Henry Thornton
Ford certain notes and mortgages, amount
ing in value to about $30,000, to determine
the title to which a suit was then [at the
date of the findings] pending in Kansas City,
Missouri, where said securities were at the
time of the testator’s death. That the only
real estate belonging to the testator at the
time of his death. witnin the state of \Vis
cousin, was his homestead in Madison~ of
the value of about $12,000, exclusive of any
furniture therein. That the testator had
about 200 acres of land in Iowa at the time
of his death, or an interest therein. That
the lands so described in said schedules in
Michigan, Kansas. and Missouri were worth,
at the time of his death,and were still worth.
whether he has power and authority to sell and
dispose of the same. (7) That if the said Mar
garet G. Ford shall so renounce under the
said will, what disposition is to be made of the
quarter of the net annual income of the re
mainder of testutor’s estate be ueathed to her
by the eighth clause of said wi l, and whether
th same shall go to increase the income of the
ot er legatees of said will, or what other dispo
sition shall be made of the same. (8) Wheth
er the incomes severally given to the said Mar
garet G. Ford, Marcus C. Ford. Edward Irving
Ford, Joseph C. and Henry T. Ford. by the
eighth. ninth, tenth, and eleventh clauses of
said will, are to be diminished by the estate of
said testator, passing, under the twelfth clause
of said will, to the said Marcus C. Ford,—that
is to say, ten thousand dollars when he arrives
at the age of twenty-one years, twenty thou
sand dollnrs when he arrives at the age of
twenty-five years, twenty-five thousand dollars
when he arrives at the age of thirty years,
forty-five thousand dollars when he arrives at
the age of thirty-five years, and the remainder
of the estate when he arrives at the age of
forty years,—or whether the said Marcus
U--li'ord takes the said several sums, parts of
81nd estate, subject to the payment of said
Several le acies iven for life to said Mar
garet G. ord iarcus C. Ford, Henry T.
Ford, Joseph C. Ford, and Edward Irving
Ford, or whether the said legacies are di
rmnished by the devise of said sums to the said
Marcus C. Ford as the same may become due
and payable to him, and how long and to
what extent said incomes respectively continue
10 said legatees. ‘9) In the event that Marcus
the value placed upon the same by him in'
said schedules as stated. That February 15,
1887, the said widow renounced and sur
rendered one and all the provisions of ev
ery kind made for her in said will, and, in
stead thereof, elected to take under the stat
utes of the several states named. That the
trustees of Hamilton College were, and have
been since May 6, 1812, a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue
of the laws of the state of New York as a
college, and entitled, by virtue of their char~
ter, to take, hold, enjoy, and have lands and
real estate, in feesimple, or for a term of
life or lives, or for years, or in any other
manner, and also goods, chattels, books. mon
eys, annuities, and all other things of what
kind or nature soever. That said corpora
tion has exercised the usual powers of a col
lege for over 40 years. That it is generally
known and spoken of as Hamilton College,
at Clinton, Oneida county, New York. That
the testator graduated at said college in the
class of 1851. That he meant and intended,
by the words “Hamilton College," used in.
the will, the said “'hIustees of Hamilton Col
lege." That, by the laws of Missouri and
Kansas, the vesting of estates may be post
poned, and a suspension of the power of‘
alienation is permitted, for a period of any
number of lives in being, and 21 years, and.
the period of gestation thereafter, accord
ing to the rule of the common law. That
the same period is permitted by statute in
Iowa. That the law of Michigan in this re
spect, both as to real and personal property,
is substantially the same as in Wisconsin.
As conclusions of law the court found, in.
C. Ford hall decease after reaching his ma
jority, leaving one or more le Itimate children
of his body. how the sum 0 forty thousand‘
dollars, mentioned in the thirteenth clause of
said will, is to be ascertained and selected, by
whom the same is to be done, and who is to.
hold the same in trust for the benefit of said
children. (10) Whether the fourteenth clause of
said will, so far as Hamilton College is con
cerned, makes a lawful and valid disposition of
that
Eortion
of his estate described in said four
teent clause. (11) Whether the provision in
the fifteenth clause of said will, on the event
happening therein specified, for the benefit of.
Hamilton College, is a lawful and valid ro
vision for the benefit of said college. (12) ow
the portions of the estate which are to become.
Marcus’ at the time when he arrives at the age
of twenty-one, twenty-five, thirty-five, and forty
ears, respectively. are to be ascertained and se
eeted. by whom the same are to be ascertained
and selected, and whether to be paid over to
him absolutely, or to be held in trust, subject
to the legacies of the income for life to the
several legatees hereinbefore mentioned. (13)If Maren C. Ford dies under the age of twen
ty-one years, or any of the other legatees of
the income of said estate shall die, what disposi
tion is to be made of the income of such person or
persons so dying? Is it to be added to the in
come of the surviving legatees? If not, how
otherwise? 14) If Hamilton College takes a
portion of t e estate. under the fourteenth
clause of said will, does it take the same sub
ject to the payment of the legacies for life to
the said several legatees?"
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effect, that the will was valid in all its parts,
and no part of it within the provisions of the
statutes of this state against perpetuities, or
the suspension of the power of alienation,and
construed it accordingly. The plaiutiff, said
widow, the said guardian for said Marcus
C., and said trustees of Hamilton College,
severally filed exceptions to said conclusions
of law and such construction of said will,
and from the judgment entered upon said
findings of act and conclusions of law they
severally appeal to this court.
I. C. Sloan and John M. Olin, for executor.
Stevens & Morris, for Mrs. Margaret G. Ford,
the widow. Plnney & Sanborn, for Marcus
C. Ford, the son. Gregory, Bird & Gregory,
'for trustees of Hamilton College.
CASSODAY, J. At the time of the testa
tor’s death, and for several years immediate
ly prior thereto, his residence and domicile
were in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. As
stated, he left personal property, and large
amounts of valuable lands in Wisconsin,
Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri. His
-widow and little boy, Marcus C., and his
three brothers and Hamilton College, are the
sole objects of his bounty. The will is unique.
It is said to~have been drawn by the testator
himself. It may be doubtful whether it
would have presented more intricate ques
tions for solution had it been drawn by a
skillful lawyer with that end in view. Its
' validity is challenged as a whole and in
parts, and a construction is demanded.. The
language employed seems to be sufificiently
clear to indicate the purposes intended. The
difliculties arise in applying the law to such
purposes. Before proceeding to make such
application it may be well to state a few
general rules of law applicable to the case,
readily deducible from the authorities and
virtually conceded by all.
1. The validity of every devise or disposi
tion of real estate by will must be governed
by the law of the place where the land is
situated, and this includes not only the form
and mode of the execution of the will, but
also the lawful power and authority of the
testator to make such disposition. Story,
Confl. Laws. § 474, and note; 2 Greenl. Ev.
§ 670; 1 Redf. Wills, p. 398, sub. 8; Rob
ertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608, 3 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 407; White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144.
The importance of this proposition in con
sidering the validity of a will covering lands
in so many different states will be appreci
ated by all.
2. On the contrary, although not as well
defined, nor as extensively enforced, yet the
authorities clearly support the proposition/
that the validity of a bequest or disposition
of personal property by last will and testa
ment must be governed by the law of the tes
tator’s domicile at the time of his death, and
this includes, not only the form and mode of
the execution of the will, but also the law
ful power and authority of the testator to
make such disposition; and especially is this ,
true where, as here, the testator’s domicile,
at the time of making his will, continues to
be the same until the time of his death.
Story, Confl. Laws, §§ 467, 468; Stewart v.
McMartin, 5 Barb. 438; Moultrie v. Hunt, 23
N. Y. 394; Nat v. Coons, 10 M0. 543; Deses
bats v. Berquier, 1 Bin. 336; Somerville v.
Somerville, 5 Ves. 750-786; Anstruther v.
Chalmer, 2 Sim. 1; Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim.
279; s. c. on appeal, 4 Mylne & C. 76; Eno
hin v. Wylie, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 897, H. L. Cas. 1;
Crispin v. Doglioni, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 653; s. c.
on appeal, L. R. 1 H. L. 301; Eames v. Ha
con, 16 Ch. Div. 407; s. c. on appeal, 18 Ch.
Div. 347. This is not shaken by the criticism
of Lord Westbury’s opinion in Enohin v. Wy
lie, supra; by the Earl of Selborne, L. C., in
Ewing v. Orr, 9 App. Cas. 39.
3. The same rule, as to the law of the tea
tator’s domicile, governs in the interpreta
tion or construction of wills. Story, Confi.
Laws, ~§§479a-479c; Van Steenwyck v. Wash
burn. 59 \Vis. 510, 17 N. W. Rep. 289. In the
words of Mr. Justice Story: “The language
of wills is not of universal interpretation,
having the same precise import in all coun
tries and under all circumstances. They are
supposed to speak the sense of the testator,
according to the-received laws or usages of
the country where he is domiciled, by a sort
of tacit reference, unless there is something
in the language which repels or controls
such a conclusion." Harrison v. Nixon, 9
Pet. 504; Trotter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh. (N. S.)
502; Euohin v. Wylie, supra; Chamberlain
v. Napier, 15 Ch. Div. 614. The general rule
is the same respecting real estate, whenever
the object is merely to ascertain the mean
ing and intent of the testator from the lan
guage employed in the will. Id.; 2 Greenl.
Ev. § 671. With these general propositions
in mind, we may, without infringing any rule
of interstate comity, venture to ascertain, if
we can, the intention of the testator as dis
closed in this will. and also its validity, at
least as to certain portions of the property.
4. The papers coming from the county
court must be taken as the will of the testa
tor. Thornton v. Curling, 8 Sim. 310; Price
v. Dewhurst, supra. They consist in what
has been called the will, with Schedules A
and B therein mentioned and thereunto at
tached. In construing the will, we are to
consider these three papers as one instru
ment in law, and together constituting the
will of the testator. Ackerly v. "ernon, Com.
381; s. c. aflirmed on appeal, 3 Brown, Parl.
Cas. 91; Hill v. Chapman, 1 Ves. Jr. 407;
Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jr. 204; Jack
son v. Babcock, 12 Johns. 394; Loring v.
Sumner, 23 Pick. 102; Baker’s Appeal. 107
Pa. St. 381; Fickle v. Snepp, 97 Ind. 289.
5. It is claimed on the part of the executor
that, under the directions of the will, all the
personal property and all the real estate out
side of Missouri must, for the purpose of
determining the validity of the will, or some
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of its provisions, be regarded as converted
and permanently invested in lands in Kan
sas City, Missouri, under the well-known doc
trine oi.I equitable conversion. That doctrine
is firmly established; and if it applies, or in
so far as it applies, it must be enforced. It
may be well to restate it, with some of its
limitations. As long ago as the time otILord
Chancellor Thurlow it was observed by him
"that nothing was better established than
this principle: that money directed to be em
ployed in the purchase oi.’ land, and land
directed to be sold and turned into mon
ey, are to be considered as that species of
property into which they are directed to be
converted; and this, in whatever manner the
direction is given,—whet.her by will" or oth
erwise. “The owner of the fund, or the con
tracting parties, may make land money, or
money land. The cases established this rule
universally. If any difliculty has arisen, it
:has arisen from special circumstances."
Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Brown, Ch. 499.
This was expressly sanctioned by the su
preme court of the United States at an early
day. Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 577. The rea
son for the rule is there stated by Mr.
Justice Washington, speaking for the whole
court, thus: “The principle upon which
.ihe whole of this doctrine is founded.
is that a court oi.I equity, regarding the sub
stance, and not the mere form and circum
stances of agreements and other instruments,
considers things directed or agreed to be
‘done as having been actually performed,
Where nothing has intervened which ought to
prevent a performance." From that and oth
er cases the late chief justice of this court
deduced this general rule: “When a will
contains a power of sale not mandatory in
terms, but it is apparent from the general
icons and tenor of the will that the testator
intended all his realty to be sold, the power
of sale will be held imperative, and the doc
trine oi‘ equitable conversion applied."
Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 97. 1 N. W. Rep.
92; De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 477479. 21
N- W. Rep. 615.
In Pennsylvania it has been held "that the
equitable conversion of realty into person~
811i’, by force of a direction in a deed or will
to sell, only takes place where the direction
18 positive and absolute; ' ' ' that, if a
Proposed sale is contingent or eventual in a
deed or will. equitable conversion does not fol
low." Neely v. Grantham, 58 Pa. St. 437. But
the better opinion seems to be, as. in effect,
held in Dodge v. Williams, supra, that when
ever a direction to convert is apparent from
the whole will, whether expressed or implied,
then the duty and obligation to convert isI
itnDcrative, and the doctrine of equitable con
version applies. Thus, in White v. Howard,
46 N. Y. 162, Grover, J., speaking for the
c01111, said: “To constitute a conversion of
real estate into personal, in the absence of an
actual sale. it must be made the duty of, and
obligatory upon, the trustees to sell it in any
event. Such conversion rests upon the princi
pic that equity considers that as done which
ought to have been done. A mere discretion
ary power oi.I selling produces no such result."
Power v. Cassidy, 79 N. Y. 613, 614; Hobson
v. Hale, 95 N. Y. 605. So it has been held
that, "where the general scheme of the will
requires a conversion, the power of sale, al
though not in terms imperative, operates as a
conversion; and this will be deemed to be
immediate, although the donee of the power
is vested, for the benefit of the estate, with a
discretion as to the time of sale." Lent v.
Howard, 89 N. Y. 169; Ingrem v. Mackey, 5
Redf. 357. But the will must, in terms or by
necessary implication, disclose an intent to
convert, in order to sustain the theory of eq
uitable conversion. Hobson v. Hale, supra.
6. Having thus stated some of the princi
ples and some of the facts upon which the
doctrine of equitable conversion rests, it be
comes necessary to consider the application
of those principles to some of the provisions
of this will.
(a) The lands in Iowa are nowhere men
tioned or referred to in the will or either of
the schedules. This being so, it is manifest
that the doctrine of equitable conversion has
no application to them. They must therefore
be regarded as lands in Iowa; and the valid
ity of the will respecting such lands be deter
mined by the laws of Iowa.
(h) The several pieces of land specifically
described in Schedule B are all situated in
Kansas City, Missouri. Considering that
schedule in connection with subdivision 5 of
the will, of which it forms a part, as we
must, and the directions thereby given to the
executors are that they “shall, at" their “dis
cretion," "either" sell the several pieces of
lands so described in Schedule B, and in
vest the proceeds thereof in more desirable
rentable property in Kansas City, or use said
proceeds in improving some of the testator’s
Kansas City properties. This mere discr
tionary authority can in no sense operate as
an equitable conversion,—certainly not until
an actual conversion should in fact occur.
Besides, such conversion of the lands de
scribed. into other lands in the same city and
state, could in no way affect or change their
legal status. So they must be regarded as
lands in Missouri, in determining the validi
ty of the will respecting the same.
(c) By the sixth subdivision of the will, the
testator expressly directs that all moneys,
notes, bonds, mortgages, or other evidence
of indebtedness to him from any and all par
ties, except his brothers, “shall, as soon as
practicable after" his death, "be used either
in the purchase of property in Kansas City,
or for improving properties in said city then
on hand." This clause of the will relates
particularly to the $30,000 oi.I personal prop
erty in dispute; and which, for the purposes
of these appeals, is assumed to be the prop
erty of the estate. The direction to so con
vert is not prevented from being imperative
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by adding "as soon as practicable after" his
death, and thus giving some discretion as to
the time or times of such conversion. If such
permanent investment of such personal estate
in lands in Kansas City can be lawfully
made, and then lawfully held as lands in
Kansas City during/the time and for the
purposes expressed in the will, then there can
be no doubt but what, subject to the widow’s
rights therein, as hereinafter stated, the doc
trine of equitable conversion i applicable to
such personal estate, and in that event the
same is accordingly to be regarded as lands
in Missouri from the time of the testator’s
death; otherwise not. In other words, since
the right to so convert is dependent upon the
right to so invest and hold, the legality of
such equitable conversion is dependent upon
the same right to so invest and hold. Wheth
er such investment and holding would be
lawful or unlawful will be considered here
after.
I
(d) The several pieces of land specifically
described in Schedule A consist of the home
stead in Madison, Wisconsin, and lands
in Michigan and Kansas. As the directions
in relation to the homestead differ from the
directions in relation to the other lands, the
homestead will be considered by itself here’
after. Considering Schedule A in connection
with subdivision 4 of the will, of which it
- forms a part, as we must, and the directions
thereby given as to the several pieces of land
in Michigan and Kansas are to the effect that
each and all of said pieces of land “shall be
converted, as soon as practicable, after" the
testator’s death, “at schedule prices, or as
much better as may be, ' ‘ ' into good
rentabie 'inside’ property in Kansas City,
M0." The testator manifestly had an exalt
ed opinion of the present and future of Kan
sas City. The scheme of his will indicates an
intention to have his lands in Michigan and
Kansas sold as soon as practicable, and the
proceeds thereof invested in real estate in
Kansas City. He directs, in effect, that the
several pieces of land mentioned shall be so
converted as soon as practicable after his
death. Is such purpose to be frustrated mere
ly by adding “at schedule prices, or as much
better as may be?" On the contrary, were
not those words added as a guide to his ex
ecutors, or for the purpose of stimulating
purclmsers to pay a larger price? It seems
to us that such was his intent, for, appar
ently with the same view, he added to the
schedule price of each piece a still larger es
timated value. Of course, it may turn out
to be impossible to ever sell some of the
pieces at the schedule price; and yet there is
nothing in the will indicating that he ever
contemplated such a result, or any permanent
holding of such lands as a part of the estate,
as is plainly indicated as to the Missouri
lands. There are no negative words indicat
ing an intent not to have any of the lands
in Michigan or Kansas sold at a less price.
As indicated in another connection, some dis
cretion may be given as to the time or times
of making such sales and investments, with
out preventing the application of the doc~
trine of equitable conversion. The only pur~
I
pose manifest in the will for selling any of the
Michigan or Kansas lands is to invest the pro
coeds of such sales in real estate in Kansas
City, and then to hold such lands in that city
as a part of the estate during the time and
for the purposes indicated in the will. If
such permanent investment can be lawfully
made, and such lands so lawfully held, then
we discover no reason why the doctrine of
equitable conversion should not apply to
them. Nevertheless, the legality of such
equitable conversion is necessarily dependent
upon the right to so invest and hold. Wheth
er such investment and holding would be
lawful or unlawful will be further considered
hereafter. What has been thus said is not
by way of determining the validity of the ti
tle to any lands outside of Wisconsin, nor~
the validity of any investment or trust in or .
tenure of such lands, but merely to ascertain
the meaning and intent of the testator from
the language employed in the will, which, as
we have seen, is a duty devolving upon this
jurisdiction.
(e) in regard to the homestead, the direc
tions are, in effect, that it shall be converted,
as soon as practicable after his death, into
good rentable “inside" property in Kansas
City, Missouri, “at schedule price," which is
$10,000, orasmuch betteras maybe; and then,
by subdivision 7 of the will, the testator di
rects, in effect, that his wife shall have the
use of his homestead, furniture, and appurte
nances so long as she may desire to live in it
as her home; and that in case she at any time
ceases to desire it as her home, he directs
that, a soon thereafter as practicable, it be
sold "at a price not less" than $10,000, or as
much more as the property will bring, and
the proceeds thereof be invested in good rent
able property in Kansas City, Missouri, and
the rentals of such property be added to the
income of the estate. Here are directions tr
sell and to invest the proceeds in real estati
in Kansas City, it is true, but they are ac
companied by other directions not to sell nm
to so invest until after the concurrence 0:‘
two events; one being that the widow shall
cease to desire it as her home, and the other is
that it be sold at a price not less than $10,
000. The word “homestead," as used in the
will, manifestly means the house and all the
grounds where the testator lived, and is not
restricted to the onefourth of an acre men
tioned in the statute. Section 2983, Rev. St.
As stated, the widow has elected to take the
provisions made for her by law, instead of
the provisions made for her in the will, as re
quired by the statutes. Section 2172. Upon
making such selection, the widow at once he
came entitled to the same dower in the tes
tator’s lands, and the same rights to the
homestead, and the same share of his per
sonal estate, as if he had died intestate, ex
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cept that the share of personal estate which
she so took was restricted to onethird part
of his net personal estate. Sections 2172,
3935, Rev. St.; Leach v. Leach, 65 Wis. 291,
26 N. W. Rep. 754. Since the testator left a
son as well as widow, her right to the home
stead thus secured by such election is the
right to such statutory homestead of one
fonrth of an acre during her widowhood, and
dower in the balance of the land connected
therewith. Rev. St. subd. 2, § 2271. In other
words, the extent and duration of her right
in the homestead has been diminished by
such election.
Can we hold that the direction in the will
to sell the homestead, and invest the pro
ceeds, as indicated, works an equitable con
version of the estate into Missouri lands?
As observed, there is no such direction to
convert until the widow ceases to desire it
for a home. Presumably this will not occur
during her widowhood, which may be re
garded as an equivalent to a lifeestate. But
the sale is expressly forbidden, even after
the termination of the widow’s right, at any
price less than that specified. To apply the
doctrine of equitable conversion to lands
which are directed not to be sold until the
termination of such lifeestate, nor then, ex
cept in an uncertain event which may never
occur, would be to stretch that doctrine be
yond anything authorized by or contemplated
in the authorities. We must therefore hold
that the homestead must be regarded as
lands in Wisconsin, and accordingly the va
lidity of the will respecting the same must
be determined by the laws of Wisconsin.
7. Before determining such validity, and to
aid such determination, it becomes necessary
to ascertain, if we can, more fully the inten
tion and meaning of the testator, as disclos
ed by the language employed in other parts
of his will. Undoubtedly the legal title to
the personal property belonging to the es
tate is vested in the executor. Scott v. West,
63 Wis. 555, 556, 24 N. W. Rep. 101, and 25
N. W. Rep. 18. Of course he holds the same
for the benefit of the cestui que trust, in
cluding the rights of the widow, as indicated
in the sections of the statute cited above.
So far as the law will permit, the executor,
by virtue of the will, has acquired all the
rights therein given, and is charged with all
the obligations therein imposed. Id. The
several directions in the will are addressed
to him, and his successors in oflice, and his
subordinates, whether by ancillary adminis
tration or otherwise. He and they are to exe
cute the will so far as the law will permit.
He and they are to pay the testator’s lawful
debts and funeral expenses from moneys on
hand at his death, and, if they are insufli
cient, then the balance from the income of
the estate. He and they are to pay the neces
sary expenses of carrying the estate from
year to year from the income thereof. The
will impliedly excludes the whole of the
homestead, while occupied by the widow as
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such, from being a source of income to the
estate, but provides that in case of its con
version, as indicated, then the rentals of such
newly-acquired property are to be added to
the income of the estate.
By the election of the widow to take un
der the statute, instead of the will, the be
quest to her in the eighth subdivision of the
will of "onequarter of the net annual in
come of the remainder" of the “estate dur~
ing her natural life," which by the twelfth
subdivision was to be kept up to $1,500 from
the share of the income given to the son,
becomes inoperative. By such election a por
tion of the home property not included in
the statutory homestead, nor the widow’s
right of dower in the balance, might be the
source of a trifling income to the estate;
but this would be dependent upon the validi
ty of the provision in the will for the future
conversion of the homestead, of which we
shall presently speak. By the direction in
the ninth subdivision of the will the son is
to have onequarter of the net annual in
come of the estate (exclusive of the home
stead) until, under the provisions of the will,
he comes into the possession of the entire
estate, except as the same may be sooner
terminated by his death. By the direction
in the tenth subdivision of the will the broth
er Edward Irving is to have onequarter of
the net annual income of the estate (exclu
sive of the homestead) during his natural
life. By the direction in the eleventh suh
division of the will the brothers Joseph C.
and Henry T. were “each" to have oneeighth
of the net annual income of the estate (ex
elusive of the homestead) during their nat
ural lives. Such bequests annually, from the
"net annual income" of the estate, are clear
ly severable, as each is independent of the
other, and almost necessarily must terminate
at a diflferent time than any of the others.
Since the annual share of each such legatee
is each year confined to such “onequarter" or
"one-eighth"of such net annual income of the
estate, it manifestly cannot be increased by
the onequartler of such net annual income
now undisposed of by reason of the election
of the widow. As the undisposed-of one
fourth of such net annual income cannot
arise from the rents, issues, or profits of
lands in Wisconsin, but must arise from the
rents, issues, and profits of lands outside of
this state, or from the personal estate liable
to be treated as converted into Missouri
lands, as indicated, we reserve further con
sideration of the question whether the ac
cumulation of such undisposedof net annual
income into the residuum of the estate would
or would not be valid. Manifestly, it is the
theory of the will that the several fractional
shares of such net annual income thus be
queathed will from time to time he dimin
ished, as portions of the corpus of the estate
may pass to Marcus under the twelfth clause
of the will; for, the moment he may become
the absolute owner in fee of any portion of
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the land thereby devised, that moment such
portion will become segregated from the es
tate, and thereby relieved from every pro
vision of the will. So, whatever property
the widow, by reason of her election, takes
under the statutes of the several states, he
comes in like manner segregated from the
estate. It is only the onequarter or the one
eighth of the net annual income of the tes
tator’s estate that is thus bequeathed; not
such fractional share of the net annual in
come of what may become the estate of Mar
cus or the widow.
By the will, Marcus is to have no portion
of the corpus of the estate, except as he
becomes entitled to it under the direction in
the twelfth subdivision of the will, and by
such direction he is only to become the own
er in fee to a portion of the corpus of the
estate when he “reaches his majority," and
then additional installments of such corpus
from time to time until he reaches the age
of 40 years, when “the remainder" of the
“estate" is to become his. But in the event
of Marcus dying, “after reaching his majori
ty, leaving one or more legitimate children
of his body," then the direction of the thir
teenth subdivision of the will is “that the in
come of forty thousand dollars’ worth of" his
"estate, or so much thereof as may in pru
dence be necessary, shall be used for the
proper support of such child or children, un
til they shall severally become of legal age,
when an equal part of the abovenamed prin
cipal and accrued interest shall become his
or hers absolutely." That is to say, imme
diately upon the death of Marcus after so
reaching his majority, and before becoming
40 years of age, leaving such child or chil
dren him surviving, the $40,000 "worth of"
the "estate,“ if there shall be so much, is
to be regarded as segregated from the rest,
and held in trust for them, “until they shall
severally become of legal age,“ as therein di
rected. “In the event" that Marcus "shall
survive all" the “other legatees," that is to
say, shall survive the widow and each of
the three brothers, “and then die before com
ing into the possession" of the “whole es
tate," then the fourteenth subdivision of the
will directs “that the remainder" of the “es
tate, as of that date, shall belong to Hamil~
ton College." But the words “the remainder
of my estate." as here used, cannot mean
what will be the entire estate at the time of
such death of Marcus. unless it so happens
that upon such death he leaves no such child
or children him surviving. But in case he
does leave such child or children him sur
viving, then such "remainder" of the estate
will only be what may remain of such estate
after setting apart the $40,000 worth of the
estate for the benefit of such child or chil
dren, as provided in the fourteenth subdi
vision of the will. Such must be the con
struction, for, unless the words “the remain
der of my estate" be so limited. the fom-
teenth subliviion of the will would beclcarly
repugnant to the provisions made for such
child or children in the thirteenth subdi
vision; for it could not have been the inten
tion to give as a remainder of the estate, to
Hamilton College, the $40,000 which might
thus be set apart for such child or children.
If either the wife or one of the brothers shall
become the only surviving legatee, then “in
that event" the fifteenth subdivision of the
will directs that the "estate at that time be
divided, as nearly as may be, into two equal
parts, as regards value and renting power,
and said wife or brother shall then choose
between the incomes of said two properties,
and have and enjoy the same during his or
her natural life;" and “the other part" of the
“estate shall at that date become the prop
erty of Hamilton College;" and “at the death
of said wife or brother the remaining part"
of the “estate shall become the property of
Hamilton College."
The words “my only surviving legatee," as
used in this last subdivision of the will, im
ply, at least, that all other legatees named
in the will, and living at the time of the tes
tator’s death, including Marcus, shall, previ
ous to the time of such sole urvivorship,
have died leaving some portion of the corpus
of the estate which had not before passed
to the widow, to Marcus, or for the benefit
of such child or children by segregation, as
indicated. It may occur that all three broth
ers die before Marcus, or that the widow and
two of the brothers die before Marcus, and
then, after reaching his majority, Marcus
dies, leaving one or more such children him
surviving. In that event, the words, “my
estate at that time be divided as nearly as
may be into two equal parts," as used in
the last subdivision of the will, manifestly
mean only so much of the estate as may
then remain after setting apart the $40,000
worth of the estate for the benefit of such
child or children, as provided in the thir
teenth subdivision of the will. Such are the
provisions of the will we are called upon to
consider. Undoubtedly the will created in
the executor an express trust, within the
meaning of section 2081, Rev. St. In fact
he is required to do much more than to
merely sell or lease lands for the benefit of
legatees. He is required to do much more
than merely to receive the rents and profits
of lands, and apply them to the use of a per
son, during the life of such person, or for
any shorter term. He is required to do
much more than merely to receive the rents
and profits of lands, and to accumulate the
same for any of the purposes and within the
limits of chapter 95, Rev. St. He manifestly
is to take, hold, and manage the estate for
the beneficial interest of the several persons
living and to be born as indicated. Such
duties clearly imply that he is to take a legal
title to the whole estate in trust for the pur
poses mentioned. Scott v. West, 63 Wis.
558-562, 24 N. W. Rep. 161, and 25 N. W.
Rep. 18; section 2086, Rev. St.
rI
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The will throughout deals with the estate
of the testator. It uses the words “my es
tate," or their equivalent, some 16 different
times. It is such estate that the executor and
his successor and subordinates are charged
by the will with managing, converting, rent
ing, improving, gathering, and dividing, and
paying over the income annually, and from
time to time segregating, and finally dividing,
the corpus of the estate, and then giving up
the residuum. Subject to such segrcgations
from time to time, they are required to so
hold and manage the corpus of such estate
until the same finally passes wholly to the
son, at the age of 40, (should be live so long.)
28 years after the testator’s death. Should he
die after reaching his majority, and before
becoming 40, leaving one or more such chil
dren, then such executor, etc., is required to
set apart the $40,000 worth of said estate,
which mayinclude theWisconsin land, or even
the whole of the remainder of the estate, and
hold and manage the same until such children
severally become of age. The time for such
setting apart may commence soon after Mar
cus becomes 21, or not until just before he
reaches 40, and then continue 21 years there
after. No one can tell how many of such
children may be born. or whether any or
how many may reach their majority.
Thus, according to the will. the estate, in
cludfng the Wisconsin land, is liable to be so
tied up from 30 to 48 years after the testa~
tor’s death. But even if Marcus does not so
die leaving such children, still, by the four
teenth and fifteenth subdivisions of the will,
the estate, including the \Visconsin land, is
liable to be so tied up until Marcus and the
widow and the three brothers are all dead
save one. either the widow or one of the
brothers, as the “only surviving legatee." In
other words, at least four, if not all. of these
five persons, living at the time of the testa
tor’s death, must die before either of those
subdivisions of the will can become opera
tive. During such periods, or large portions
of them. it is impossible to tell where the
corpus of the estate will finally go by the
terms of the will. If Marcus lives long
enough, then all is to go to him. If he dies
during the next 19 years after he becomes of
age, leaving children, then a large portion of
it and possibly the whole may go to them.
If he survives all the other legatees named,
and then dies during that period, then a por
tion of it will probably go to Hamilton Col
lege; but no one can tell how much, nor, for
certain. whether any. If he dies under 21,
even though he leave children him surviving,
yet neither he, nor such children, nor his
heirs at law. are to have any of such corpus.
But even then such corpus is, by the will, to
remain tied up during the times and for the
purposes named, and only go to Hamilton
College upon the occurrence of the events
mentioned.
The necessity of the corpus of the estate
, being held by a trustee during such several-
periods, and awaltingIsuch several contingen
cies and possibilities, seems to be absolute.
Scott v. West, supra. Such trustee or execu
tor is directed to sell some lands and buy
others, but he has no authority under the will
to pervert or alienate any portion of the es
tate, in contravention of the trust. Section
2091. Rev. St.; De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis.
475, 21 N. W. Rep. 615. In other words, the
corpus of the estate is inalienable during the
continuance of the trust. Should the trustee
die, it would become necessary to appoint a
successor; and, even while he lives, there may
be a necessity for an ancillaryadministration.
Under this will and our statutes, can we
hold that there is no unlawful suspension of
the power of alienation as to this Wisconsin
land? As indicated, upon the death of the
testator the widow took, under the will, a
present lifeestate in that land; and she has
now substantially the same under the stat
utes. According to the will, the executor, as
trustee. took a future estate in trust in the
same land, for it was “limited to com
mence in possession at a future day." Sec
tion 2034, Rev. St.; Scott v. West, 63 Wis.
570, 24 N. W. Rep. 161, and 25 N. W. Rep.
18. "Future estates," under our statute, “are
either vested or contingent." Section 2037,
Rev St. “They are vested when there is a
person in being who would have an l1nrne-
diate right to the possession of the lands, up
on the ceasing of the intermediate or preced
ent estate." Id. By the terms of the will,
the trustee or executor was to take such fu
ture vested estate in the homestead. As to
the other property he took a present vested
estate. Costcr v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 302, 303.
But neither Marcus nor Hamilton College had
anything more than a contingent interest
therein; for the statute expressly declares
that such “future estates ' ' ' are con
tingent while the person to whom, or the
event upon which they are limited to take
effect, remains uncertain." Section 2037.
“These definitions of vested and contingent
remainders," said Savage, C. J., “are very
different from the common-law definitions of
those estates." Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend.
301. They took no vested interest in the land,
and could convey none. Sections 2086. 2080,
Rev. St.; De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 561,
562, 21 N. W. Rep. 615. Under our statute,
"every future estate," whether vested or con
tingent, is "void in its creation," which “sus
pends the absolute power oi.' alienation
* ' ' for a longer period than during the
continuance of o in being at the cre
ation of the estate," etc. Sections 2038, 2030,
Rev. St.; De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 473,
21 N. W. Rep. 615. The only exception to
this, which is in section 2040, is clearly not
applicable here.
To avoid all uncertainty, one of the same
sections declares that such "absolute power
of alienation shall not be suspended by any
limitation or condition whatever," and the
other declares that “such power is suspend
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ed when there are no persons in being by
whom an absolute fee in possession can be
conveyed." Since the trustee cannot, under
the will, relinquish the trust, which includes
the “possession," until the purposes of the
trust are fulfilled, as the several periods for
such fulfillment transpire; and since persons
are liable to be born who by the terms of the
instrument will be entitled to a large portion,
and possibly the whole, of what may then re
, main of the estate, including this homestead,
—it is very obvious that “there are no per
sons in being by whom an absolute fee in
possession can be conveyed," within the
meaning of the statutes; and since this state
of things must, under the will, continue for
a longer period than two lives in being at the
creation of the estate, such suspension, as to
this homestead, must be adjudged contrary
to the statute, and therefore absolutely void.
Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 317-324; Haw
ley v. James, 16 Wend. 121, 122, 164, 165,
174, 179.
It is impossible to escape this conclusion by
speculating as to the probabilities of Marcus
and his unborn children eventually getting
this Wisconsin land under the will. We have
no authority to speculate upon the chances.
The rule is universal that such suspension of
the power of alienation must necessarily ter
minate, under any and all circumstances,
within the period prescribed by the statute,
or the disposition will be void. Schettler v.
Smith, 41 N. Y. 328; Knox v. Jones, 47 N. Y.
397. Nor is it possible to escape such con
clusion on the theory that the trustee or exec
utor merely has a power in trust to sell such
homestead; for, as indicated, neither the fu
ture estate of Marcus, nor Hamilton College,
therein, is anything more than contingent un
der our statutes. We must therefore hold
that the attempted disposition of the home
stead by the will is void, and that, upon the
death of the testator, the same descended to
Marcus, subject to the widow’s rights there
in, as indicated under the statutes.
8. It is strenuously urged, in effect, that, as
the testator’s residence and domicile were in
this state at the time of making his will and
his death, he could thereby create no valid
trust, except such as are sanctioned by the
laws of this state. In other words, that he
could not by such a will, under the doctrine
of equitable conversion, cause his personal
property, and his lands in Michigan and Kan
sas, to be converted into lands in Kansas
City, Missouri, and there held as his estate,
and the power of the alienation thereof sus
pended beyond the time authorized by our
statutes, even though such suspension would
be valid under the laws of Missouri; and that
the question as to the validity of such suspen
sion is properly determinable by this jurisdic
tion. I frankly confess that I was deeply 1m
pressed upon the hearing with the plausibili
ty and force of this argument. The will was
here admitted to probate. The executor here
qualified, and received his commission from
the county court. He is directly accountable
to and subject to the orders of that court.
There may, necessarily, be ancillary adminis
trations in other states, but they will in law
be subordinate to this, which must be regard
ed as the principal administration. But, in
such intricate matters of title and jurisdic
tion, impressions are of no value unless sup
ported by the logic of the law, if not by au
thority.
In Curtis v. Hutton, 14 Ves. 537, cited by
counsel, the testator devised real estate in
England in trust to be sold, and the proceeds
of the sale, with the personal estate, upon
trust to be laid out in lands for the mainte
nance of a charity in Scotland, and it was
held void as to the real estate, but valid as
to the personal property, by the eflect of the
option. The reason for holding such devise
of such real estate in England void, as given
by Sir William Grant, M. 8., was that "the
owners of such property are disabled from
disposing of it to any charitable use. except
by deed executed twelve months before the
death of the owner," etc., “to take effect from
the execution." Page 541. Such disability of
otherwise disposing of such land was held,
in effect, could not be frustrated by the doc
trine of equitable conversion. That decision
is the foundation of section 479d of Story’s
Conflict of Laws, which cannot be regarded
as of any greater authority; nor does it
squarely meet the question here presented.
Nine years after that decision the same learn
ed master of the rolls, in a case where the
testator by his will directed his executors
to dispose of all his real and personal prop
erty at Grenada, in the West Indies, and re
mit the proceeds to England to be laid out
as a charitable fund in the best manner pos
sible, held that such directions were not void,
as the statute of mortmain did not extend to
Grenada. Attorney General v. Stewart, 2
Mer. 143.
In Attorney General v. Mill, 2 Dow & C.
393, the testator by his will, made in England,
where he was at the time domiciled, and so
remained until his death, gave his personal
and real estate (none of the latter being in
England or Scotland, but in the West Indies)
to trustees, to be laid out in the purchase of
lands, or rents of inheritance, in feesimple,
for a charitable purpose, at Montrose, in
Scotland; and it was held by the house of
lords, aflirming the decree of the chancellor,
“that the bequest was void by the statute of
mortmain, it not appearing from the will
that the testator intended that the trustees
should have the option to purchase lands in
.
Scotland." The plain inference from the
opinion is that had the will directed the pur
chase of the lands in Scotland, then it would
have been valid, as the law there did not
prevent such purchase.
In Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Phil. 515, Lord
Chancellor Cottenham, speaking of this sub
ject, said: “An objection was made that the
bequest of a fund to be invested in a regular
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Scotch entail was void as a perpetuity. The
rules acted upon by the courts in this country,
with respect to testamentary dispositions
tending to perpetuities, relate to this country
only. What the law of Scotland may be
upon such a subject, the courts of this coun
try have no judicial knowledge, nor will they,
I apprehend, inquire; the fund being to be
administered in a foreign country is payable
here, though the purpose to which it is to be
applied would have been illegal if the ad
ministration of the fund had been to take
place in this country. This is exemplified by
the well-established rule in cases of bequests
within the statutes of mortmain. A charity
legacy void in this country under the statute
of mortmain is good and payable here if for
a charity in Scotland. ' ' ' The objec
tion raised upon the ground of perpetuity
cannot be maintained." This seems to be
peculiarly applicable to the personal estate
here.
It is said that Freke v. Lord Carbery, L. R.
16 Eq. 461, is to the contrary. in that case
the testator was a domiciled Irishman in Ire
land, who, after disposing of personal estate
in trust, “gave his leasehold house in Bel
grave square, England, to the same trustees,
upon trust to sell" as directed, and to ap
ply the proceeds in discharge of any incum
brance on the same, and the residue to in
vest in gsvernment or real securities, and hold
the same upon such trusts as declared. "The
validity of the trusts for accumulation was
not disputed, so far as they related to the
testator’s government stocks and funds and
other pure personalty. But the question was
raised whether these trusts was valid as to
the proceeds of the sale of the house in Bel
grave square," and it was held that “the
Thellusson act applied to the English lease
hold, and the proceeds of the sale thereof,
and that the trust for accumulation of the in
vestments of the proceeds of the sale in ex
cess of the periods permitted by that act was
invalid." This is clearly distinguishable
from the other cases cited, and is an author
ity to the point that the law of the place
where the land is situated governs as to the
validity of its disposition by will, instead of
the law of the testator’s domicile, as here
claimed.
in the celebrated case of Hawley v. James,
5 Paige, 337, 16 Wend. 74, 381, and 7 Paige,
213, the testator was domiciled in Albany,
- New York. By his will he directed all his
lands outside of New York city, Albany, and
Syracuse, including 40,000 acres in the state
of Illinois, to -be sold, and the proceeds there
of to be invested in lands in the three cities
named, upon trusts which, under the stat
utes like ours cited, were held void. But in
respect to any lands of the testator situated
in the state of Illinois, or elsewhere outside
of the state of New York, the decree, which
was entered by the court of errors, stated
that it was not to be deemed a decision upon
the title of the said trustees to those lands,
or their power over them, (16 Wend. 281,)
which question was thereby remitted for fur
ther consideration to the court of chancery.
Upon the cause being remitted to the chan
cellor, an application was made for further
directions in pursuance of such decree. Upon
a full hearing, the learned chancellor said:
“This court has no jurisdiction to make a de
cree which will directly aifect either the le
gal or equitable title to lands situated in an
other state. And if the legal title to the lands
now in question was in any of the infant par
ties according to the laws of Illinois, or if
those who had the legal title were out of the
jurisdiction of this court, so that it would be
impossible for it to operate upon them per
.sonally, to compel them to execute the trust
or to convey the legal title according to the
decree, I should consider it my duty to dis
miss the application, and to refer the parties
to the courts of the state where the trust
property is situated." Then, after showing
that the will had been executed in conformity
to the laws of Illinois, so as to vest the legal
title to the lands in that state in the trustees,
and that as the object of the testator in di
recting a sale of the Illinois lands and a con
version of the same into money was to buy
lands in the state of New York, and hold
them upon trusts which were contrary to the
statutes of that state, and therefore illegal,
the trustees were deemed to hold the title
to the Illinois lands in trust for the heirs;
and, as the trustees were all within the juris
diction of the court, they were accordingly
directed to convey the same to the heirs. 7
Paige, 213. I
In Burrill v. Shell, 2 Barb. 457, the testa
tor, domiciled in New York, directed lands
in that state to be sold, and a portion of the
proceeds invested in England; and, as no law
was thereby violated, it was held that the
courts of New York had no power to divert
the investment from England, and direct the
same to be made in New York, except with
the consent of all the parties interested:
and, as some were infants, such consent could
not be obtained.
In Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584, a be
quest by a New York testator was made to
five such persons as the supreme court of
Vermont should appoint to be trustees, to
found, establish, and manage an institution
for the education of females, to be located at
Middlebury, Vermont, and it was held in
effectual for any purpose, since the object of
the bequest was unlawful in the state of the
testator’s domicile. This is in harmony with
the second proposition announced in this opin
ion.
In Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y.
424, the testator was domiciled in the state
of New York, and, among other things, he be
queathed a certain amount to the “Century
Fund Society, a corporation created under
the laws of Pennsylvania for charitable and
benevolent purposes." In passing upon its
validity, the court held that “the law of the
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testator’s domicile controls as to the formal
requisites essential to the validity of the will,
the capacity of the testator, and the construc
tion of the instrument. When, by the lex
domicilll, a will has all the formal requisites
to pass title to personalty, the validity of par
ticular bequests will depend upon the law
of the domicile of the legatee, except in
cases where the law of the domicile of the
testator in terms forbids bequests for any
particular purpose, or in any particular man
ner, in which latter case the bequest would
be void everywhere." The learned justice
giving the opinion said: “So far as the va
lidity of bequests depends upon the general
law and policy of the state affecting proper
ty and its acquisition generally, and relating
to its accumulation and a suspension of own
ership and the power of alienation. each state
is sovereign as to all property within its ter
ritory, whether real or personal. It is no
part of the policy of the state of New York
to interdict perpetuities or gifts in mortmain
in Pennsylvania or California. Each state
determines those matters according to its
own views of policy or right, and no other
state has any interest in the question; and
there is no reason why the courts of this
state should follow the funds bequeathed to
the Century Fund Society to Pennsylvania,
to see whether they will there be administer
ed in all respects in strict harmony with our
policy and our laws." Page 434. To the
same effect is Mapes v. American Home M.
80c., 33 Hun. 360; Bible Soc. v. Pendleton,
7 W. Va. 79.
This case of Chamberlain v. Chamberlain
is in harmony with subsequent decisions in
the same state, in which it has been held,
in effect, that, in the absence of any equita
ble conversion, the question as to the unlaw
ful suspension of the power of alienation of
lands in New York must be governed by the
laws of that state, notwithstanding the tea
tator who attempted to dispose of the same
was at the time of making his will and his
death domiciled in some other state, as, for
instance, in Connecticut, Massachusetts, or
California, as will appear by White v. How
ard, 46 N. Y. 144; Despard v. Churchill, 53
N. Y. 192; Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y. 588.
The only case cited which seems to be in
conflict with the principles stated is Wood v.
Wood, 5 Paige, 596. But that is expressly
overruled in Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43
N. Y. 435, and impliedly so in other cases.
It is unnecessary to look further into the
authorities. The difficulty in holding that the
laws and courts of this state may interdict
the conversion of personal property into lands
in Missouri, or lands in Michigan or Kansas,
or into lands in Kansas City, is apparent
when we remember that the laws of this
state have no extraterritorial force, and the
courts of Wisconsin have no extrastate ju
risdiction. The principles of law thus indi
cated are in strict harmony with the rulings
of this court in Van Steenwyck v. Washburn,
59 Wis. 510, 511, 17 N. W. Rep. 289.
We must therefore disclaim jurisdiction to \
determine the title to any of the lands outside
of Wisconsin, or the legality of accumulations
of rents and profits therefrom. It follows
that the validity of the proposed conversion
of personal property into lands in Kansas
City must be determined by the laws and
courts of Missouri. So the question of the
validity of the proposed converion of lands
in other states into lands in the same city
would seem to be determinable by the same
jurisdiction, but of this we have no authority
to decide. Such questions of the validity of
such conversions should be determined at an
early day by instituting the proper suit in
the proper jurisdiction.
The costs and disbursements of all parties
in this court and the circuit court are payable
out of the estate. The county court will
make such allowance to the respective par
ties out of the estate for counsel fees as,
in the exercise of a sound discretion, may be
just.
The judgment of the circuit court is re_
versed on each of the four appeals, and the
cause is remanded, with directions to enter
itndgment in accordance with, and to the ex
tent indicated in, this opinion, but leaving
open for further action the questions as to
the validity of such conversions, suspensions,
and accumulations, until authoritatively de
termined by the rightful jurisdiction.
Motions for a rehearing, made h each of the
iggezral
parties, were denied hovember 22,
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READ et al. v. WILLIAMS et al.
(26 N. E. 780, 125 N. Y. 560.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Feb. 24, 1891.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, first department.
J. Edward Swanstrom, P. H. Vernon,
John E. Parsons, Fordham Morris, and
Manley A. Raymond, for appellants.
Charles A. Jackson, for respondents.
ANDREWS, J. The jurisdiction of a
court of equity to entertain an action in be
half of the next of kin of a testator for .the
construction of a will disposing of person
al estate, where the disposition made by_
the testator is claimed to be invalid or in
operative for any cause, was asserted by
the chancellor in Bowers v. Smith, 10
Paige, 200, and was maintained in Wager v.
Wager, 89 N. Y. 161, and in Holland v. Al
cock, 108 N. Y. 312, 16 N. E. Rep. 305. It
is true that in such cases the next-0f kin
claim in hostility to the will,but the exec
utors, in case the disposition made by
the testator is invalid or cannot take
effect, hold the personalty upon a result
ing trust for those entitled under the stat
ute of distributions; and thereby the in
risdiction to bring an equitable action for
construction, and to have the resulting
trust declared by the court, attaches as
incident to the jurisdiction of equity over
trusts. The Code of Civil Procedure (sec
tion 1866) has extended the remedy so as
to include suits forconstruction of devises
in behalf of heirs claiming adversely to
the will. and it would not be consistent
with the spirit oi this legislation to nar
row thcjurisdiction in cases of bequests
of personalty. Tne case of Chipman v.
Montgomery, 63 N. Y. 221, contains ex
pressions which, considered independently
of the facts of the case, may seem ud
verse to this view; but, as was said by
RAPALLO, J., in Wager v. Wager, supra,
’-the plaintiffs there had on their own
showing no present interest in the prop
erty, and might never have any." The
case of Horton v. Cantwcll, 108 N. Y.
255, 15 N. E. Rep. 546, was one also where
the plaintiff had no interest in the ulti
mate disposition of the estate there in
question, whether the clauses challenged
were valid or invalid, and the court decided
that she could not maintain the action.
it is not really contended that the pro
vision in the third paragraph of the will.
and the modification thereof in the second
paragraph of the third codicil, setting
apart a trust fund, to be perpetually kept
by the executors and trustees and their
successors, and directing the application
of the income for cemetery purposes, can
be upheld. These provisions are manifest
ly void, as involving an unlawful suspen
sion of the absoiu te ownership of personal
property. The principal question in the
case relates to the validity of the residu
ary clause in the second codicil. That
clause is as follows: “Eleventh. After the
payment and discharge of my just debts,
(if any there be.) funeral expenses, and ex
penses of administration, and after all leg
acics and bequests mentioned in my last
will and testament, as modified by my codi
cils, shall have been paid in full, if there
after there shall be any residue and re
mainder of my estate and property, I give
and bequeath such residue and remain
der, after the same shall have been duly
converted into money, as follows, viz.,
to such charitable institutions, and in
such proportions, as my executors, by
and with the advice of my friend, Rev.
John Hall, D. 1)., shall choose and desig
nate. " Subsequent to thedeath of the tes
tatrix, and prior to the commencement of
this action, the executors, with the ad
vice and approval of Dr. hall, made a
written choice and designation of certain
incorporated charitable institutions or
ganized or existing under the laws of this
state, authorized to take real and person
al property by devise and bequest, among
whom they directed the residuary estate
to be divided. It will be noticed that the
particular donees of the gift are not des
ignated in the will. They could not be
known until the executors should select,
in the manner pointed out, the particular
charitable institutions which should take
the bequest. The range of selection was
unlimited. except that the appointees
were to be institutions of charity, and per
haps, also, it is implied that they were to
be incorporated charities, because a pro
vision ls made that the institutions select
ed shall be under no disability to accept
the legacy; but beyond this there was no
limitation whatever. The selection was
not confined to charitable institutions in
this state or in the United States. If the
power was valid, the executors, with the
approval of Dr. Hall, might appoint the
gift to charitable institutions anywhere
in this country or in foreign countries.
The will did not vest the title to the prop
~erty in any one pending the exercise of the
power of appointment. It was not given
to the executors. nor was it given to any
particular charitable institution which
could be pointed out or ascertained at the
death of the testatrix. if the property,
under the will, vested anywhere, it was
in the whole aggregate incorporated in
stitutions of the whole world capable of
taking by devise or bequest, subject to be
ing divested in favor of such particular
charities as should thereafter be designat
ed by the executors. The question pre
sented is not an original one in this
court. it was decided adversely to the
defendants in the case of Prichurd v.
Thompson, 95 N. Y. 76. There is between
that case and this no distinction in prin
ciple. In that case thelegai title to the
fund was vested in the executors in trust
In this case the executors were given
sim-w
ply a power in trust, without clothing
them, in terms, with the legal title to the
fund to be distributed. But this creates
no legal distinction. The point of the de
cision in Prichard v. Thompson is that,
while the law recognizes the right of a
testator by will to create powers of ap—
pointment and selection, and will sustain
dispositions of property made pursuant
thereto, although the tests tor himself did
not designate the particulnrindividuals
in whose favor the power should be exer~
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cised, nevertheless that this right is sub
ject to the limitation that the testator
must himseli designate the class oi per
sons in whose iavor the power may be ex
ercised, with sufificient certainty so that
the court can ascertain who were the ob
]ects of the power; and that a power to
select the beneficiaries from among all
the members oi the community, or all cor
porations 0! a particular class, wherever
they may exist, however _numerous, is
void for indefiniteness. Such apower is
distinctly in contravention oi the policy
of the statute oi wills. It substitutes ior
the will of the testator the will and dis
cretion oi the douces oi the power, and
makes the latter controllingin the disposi
tion of the testator’s property. That can
not fairiy be said to be a disposition by
the will oi the testator, with which the
testator had nothing to do, except to
create an authority in another to dispose
oi the testator’s property according to
the will oi thedonee oi the power, with no
limitation except that the distribution
shall be made among corporations to be
selected from a large class oi corpora
tions, wherever existing, answering the
description in the will. The statute oi
powers does not define all the purposes
for which a power over property may be
created. It recognizes the existence oi
powers oi appointment and selection,
which were well known to the common
law. But, as pointed out in the opinion
oi VAN Baum', P. J., in the opinion oi the
general term, the statute presupposes
that a power of selection must be so de
fined in respect oi the objects that there
are persons who can come into the court
and say that they are embraced within the
class. and demand the enforcement oi
the power; and the same principle is rec
ognized in the provision that, "if the trus
tee oi a power with aright oi selection
shall die leaving the power unexecuted, its
execution shall be decreed in equity for
the benefit oi all persons designated as ob
lects oi the trust.
"
1 Rev. St. p. 734, § 100.
It would be manifestly impracticable for
the court to ascertain in respect oi the
will in question what corporations con
stituted the whole class oi charitable in
stitutions mentioned in the will, or to de
cree the execution oi the power for the
benefit oi the numerous class embraced in
the description. The ditficulty in this case
is not avoided because the power oi selec
tion has in fact been exercised, nor be
cause it has been exercised in favor oi
corporations which, it they had been the
direct objects oi the testator’s bounty,
would have been entitled to take. The
vice lies in the unauthorized power.
What has been done under it is. in a legal
sense. immaterial. The validity of the
power depends upon its nature, and not
upon its execution. The heirs and next of
kin of the testatrix derive their title un
der the law oi descent and distribution,
and their rights attached. immediately on
the death oi the testatrix. to any part of
the estate not validly disposed of by the
will. lithe power attempted to be creat
ed by the will was valid, their rights,
whatever they were, were subject to it.
li invalid, and there was no valid alterna
tive disposition by the testator oi the res
idue, they immediately became entitled.
This question was considered by RAPAL
LO, J., in Holland v. Alcock, 118 N. Y. 323.
16 N. E. Rep. 309, 310, and it is unnecessary
to iurther elaborate it.
We are of opinion that the court below
erred in holding that the heirs oi the tes
tatrix are excluded. under the doctrine
of equitable conversion,irom any inter
est in the real estate oi the testatrix
remaining undisposed oi. The testatrix
intended to dispose oi her whole estate,
which consisted both oi real and personal
property. By the original will she gave
the residue, aiter satisfying charges and
legacies, to certain specified corporations,
“after the same shall have been duly con
verted into money." By the seventh clause
oi the will she directed the executors to
sell and convert into cash all her real es
tate, “and also to do all and other acts
and things which may be proper and req~
uisite in lawforthe purpose oi and to ac
complish the due payment oi thepequests,
and the carryi out all oi the provisions
in this, my his will and testament,con
tained. " By her second codicil she revoked
the residuary clause in the will, and sub
stituted the power to theexecutors to dis
pose oi the residue, to which refference has
been made; and in the gilt to the institu
tions to be designated she uses the same
language as in the giit to the corpora
tions in the will, viz., "after the same
[her estate] shall havebeen converted into
money." It seems to be quite clear that
the conversion was directed for the pur
poses oi the will. She may reasonably
have supposed that it would be more con
venient that the corporations should take
their respective interests as money, and
not as land. The personal estate was
largely in excess oi the sum required to
pay charges and legacies outside oi what
was given by theresiduary clause. Thedi
rection to sell the real estate apparently
could have had no purpose except to ac
complish an easy division oi the residuary
estate among the corporations to which
it was to be given. The gift failing, the
purpose oi the conversion ceased, and
the direction to sell the real estate
was no longer imperative. The conver~
sion was not directed for the purpose
oi distribution of the estate as money
among the next of kin. The testatrix
never intended that they should take it
in any form. The case falls within the
general principle declared in many cases,
thata power oi sale in a will, however
peremptory in form. if it can be seen that
it was inserted in aid of a particular pur
pose oi the testator, or to accomplish his
general scheme oi distribution. does not
ipso Iacto operate as a conversion where
the scheme or purpose fails by reason 0
iliegality,lapse, or other cause. in that
case the property retains its original char
acter, and it goes to the heir or next oi kin
as reI11 estate or personalty, as the case
may be. Nothing short oia clear inten
tion, to be collected from the will, that the
land shall be sold and converted into
money before divislon,whether the par
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ticularpurpose fail ornot, will besuflIlcient iams, Ex’rs, 663 et seq. In this country
in equity to change the character of the the courts do not seem to hold so strict
property. In England even this is not a doctrine. The result is that theludg
sufilcient to exclude the heir, in the absence ment should be reversed on the appeal of
of an express gilt oi the proceeds away the infant defendant, Kate Haddock, so
from him. Fitch v. Weber, 6 Hare, 145; faras it adiudges an equitable conversion,
Hopkinson v. Ellis, 10 Beav. 169; Taylor and in other respects it should beaflirmed.
v. Taylor, 3 De Gex, M. & G. 190; 1 Will- All concur. Judgment accordingly.
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DAY et al. v. WALLACE.
(33 N. E. 185, 144 Ill. 256.)
Jan. 18, 1893.
Appeal from circuit court, Sangamon coun
ty; Jacob Fouke, Judge.
Cross bill by Mary Wallace against Ed
ward Day and others. Decree for cross com
plainant. Defendants appeal. Reversed.
Patton & Hamilton, for appellants. Ricks
& Creighton and Drennan & Hogan, for ap~
peilee.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
WILKIN, J. By the eighth clause of the
last will of George Gregory, deceased, he de
vised to appellants two tracts of land.—one
|ot 20 acres, and the other of 80 acres. By
the ninth clause of the same will he de
vised to appellee two tracts also,—one of 20
acres, and the other of 80 acres. The 80
acre tract in both clauses is the same. By
her certain cross bill in the court below, up
peilee alleged that the two clauses, in so far
as they attempt to devise the same land, are
irreconcilably repugnant to each other, and
therefore the last must prevail, and she
asked the court to decree her the said 80
acre tract, to the exclusion of appellants, and
the prayer of her bill was granted. From
that decree this appeal is prosecuted.
Appellants do not deny that said 8ilacre
tract was devised twice, in the manner al
leged in the bill, but they deny that the two
clauses of said will are thereby rendered
wholly and irreconcilably repugnant, within
the meaning of the rule which gives efffect
to the latter clause, to the exclusion of the
former; and insist that the rule of construc
tion in such case is to give the land to the
devisces in both clauses. concurrently as ten
ants in common. The authorities are not
uniform on the subject, but the later and
more generally approved rule seems to be as
contended by appellants. In Jarman on
\Vills (volume 2, p. 44) it is said: “Some
times it happens that the testator has. in sev
eral parts of his will, given the same lands
to different persons in fee. At first sight
this seems to be a case of incurable repug
nancy, and, as such, calling for the applica
tion of the rule which sacrifices the prior
of two irreconcilable clauses, as the only
mode of escaping from the conclusion that
both are void. Even here, however, 9. rec
onciling construction has been devised; the
rule being in such cases. according to the
better opinion, that the devisees take con
currently. The contrary, indeed, is laid
down by Lord Coke and other early writers,
who say that the last devise shall take ef
fect; and a similar opinion seems to have
been entertained by Lord Hardwicke, though
he admitted that latterly a different con
struction had prevailed. The point under
went much discussion in Sherratt v. Bentley,
2 Myine & K. 149, already stated; and Lord
Brougham, after reviewing the authorities,
and fully recognizing the general doctrine
which upholds the latter part of a will, by
the sacrifice of the former, to which it was
repugnant, considered that, consistently with
this rule, it might be held that, where there‘
are two devisees in fee of the same property,
the devisces take concurrently. 'It, in one
part of a will,’ he said, 'an estate is given to
A., and afterwards the same testator gives
the same estate to B., adding words of ex
clusion, as “not to A.," the repugnance would.
be complete, and the rule would apply; but
if the same thing be given first to A., and
then to B., unless it be some indivisihle chat
tel, as in the case which Lord Hardwicke
puts in Ulrich v. Litchfleld, 2 Atk. 372, theI
two legatees may take together, without any
violence to the construction.’ It seems there
fore by no means inconsistent with the rule,
as laid down by Lord Coke, and recognized
by the authorities, that a subsequent gift,
entirely and irreconcilaby repugnant to a
former gift, of the same thing, shall abro
gate and revoke it, it it be also held that
where the same thing is given to two differ
ent persons, in different parts of the same
instrument, each may take a moiety; though,
had the second gift been in a subsequent
will, it would, I apprehend, work a revoca
tion." Redfield, speaking on the same sub
ject, says: "The more rational, and perhaps
the general, opinion at the present day is
that, where the same thing is given in the
same will to two diffferent persons, they
shall take jointly, either as joint tenants or
tenants in common. according to the terms
of the devise or bequest." After referring to
what was said by Lord Brougham in Sher
ratt v. Bentley, 2 Mylne & K. 149~ quoted by
Jarman, as above, he adds: "We fully concur
in his lordship’s suggestions here, as everyone
must, we think, in regard to the reasonable
ness of the latter rule of construction, when
it can be applied, as in the case of the de
vise of the same estate to different devisees;
and we have no doubt it will generally be
recognized as the true rule, and the one es
tablished by the authorities, for the govern
ment of cases of this character. But, as well
observed by the learned chancellor, in an att
er portion of his opinion, that is not a case of
clear and irreconcilable repugnancy; but,
the testator having given the same estate to
two persons, in different portions of his will,
it is the same as if all the names had been
united in one gift of the same estate." 1
Redf. Wills, 443. The ease of McGuire v.
Evans, 5 Ired. Eq. 269, goes to the full extent
of holding this doctrine, even as applied to
a double bequest of indivisible property.
On the contrary, as said by Jarman, supra,
authorities are not wanting holding the con
trary construction. Hollins v. Coonan, 9 Gill,
62; Covert v. Sebcrn, (Iowa,) 35 N. W. Rep.
636.
The case is one of first impression in this
state, and, in the conflict of authority on the
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subject, we are left free to adopt that rule
which to us seems most reasonable and best
calculated to efliectuate the intention of the
testator. Taking into consideration all the
facts of this case proper to be considered. it
is manifest that whatever presumption might
otherwise arise in favor of the latter clause
expressing that intention, rather than the for
mer, is rebutted. In the first place, it is clear
from the two clauses that he intended to give
appellants 100 acres of land, and a like quan
tity to appeilee. He owned at the time of
making his will, and when he died, some 240
acres 01! land not disposed of by the will.
Eighty acres of this undisposed-of land was
in the same section as the 80 in question. It
is therefore clear that, instead of changing
his mind after making the first devise of the
macre tract described in the will, either he
or the person who wrote his will made a mis
take in the description of one of the clauses.
It is impossible to tell in which clause that
mistake occurred. We know of no rule by
which we are allowed to say it was made in
the first, rather than in the last. We ca1Tcon~
eeive of no good reason why the consequen
ces of such a mistake should be wholly visit
ed upon appellants. While it is true that an
application of the rule laid down by the
abovenamed authors will not fully carry out
the intention of the testator, it will come
nearer accomplishing that purpose than the
one insisted upon by appeilee, and adopted
by the court below. Certainly it does justice
between the parties. Appellants and appel
lee should take said real estate as tenants in
common, appellants taking one undivided
half thereof, and appeilee the other. We are
of the opinion that the decree below is erro
neous, and should be reversed, and the judg
ment of this court will be entered according
ly, and the cause will be remanded to the cir
cuit court, with directions to enter another
decree, conforming to the views herein ex
pressed.
Reversed and remanded.
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BISHOP v. McCLELLANDIS EXIRS.
(16 Atl. 1, 44 N. J. Eq. 450.)
Court of Chancery of New Jersey. November
13, 1888.
On final hearing on bill and answer.
Bill by Howard Bishop against the execu
tors of Mary A. McClelland, deceased, for
the construction of a will.
C. B. Harvey, for complainant. George C.
Ludlow, for defendants.
"AN FLEET, V. C. Thi is a suit for a
legacy. The ease presents but a single ques
(tion, and that is, what is the complainant
entitled to, $12,000 or $6,000? The complain
ant is a great-grandson of Mrs. Mary A. Mc
Clelland, deceased. By her will, made in
March, 1864, Mrs. McClelland gave her two
grandehildren, Howard W. Bishop (the fath
er of the complainant) and Alexander McC.
Bishop, each the sum of $3,000. Howard W.
Bishop died in September, 1866, leaving the
complainant, his only child, surviving him.
The testatrix. by a codicil made in December,
1868, revoked the gift made by her will of
$3,000 each to her two grandchildren, and
in lieu thereof gave to her executors the sum
of $12,000, with direction to invest the same
for the sole use and benefit of her grandson,
Alexander McC. Bishop, and of her great
grandson, the son of her deceased grandson,
Howard W. Bishop. The codicil then says:
"And I hereby order and direct my executors
to pay over onehalf of the clear yearly in
come of said sum to Alexander, and the
other half of said income to the guardian of
my great-grandson, until my great-grandson
shall become of lawful age; when my execu
tors shall pay over the same, together with
the principal thereof, to my great-grandson
and my grandson Alexander, share and share
alike. Should either of said descendants
die, the survivor shall have the whole of the
interest on said sum. Should both these die
before the said great-grandehild comes of
age, the whole, together with the principal
thereof, shall revert to my estate, to be dis
posed of accordingly." By a further codicil,
made in January, 1869, the testatrix said:
“If my grandson Alexander McO. Bishop,
and my great-grandson Howard Bishop, both
die without children, then their and each of
their shares shall revert to my estate." The
testatrix died in February, 1870. Her grand
son Alexander McC. Bishop died without is
sue, never having been married, in April,
1885. The complainant attained his majori
ity in February, 1888. Shortly after that
event he made demand on the defendants
for the payment of the whole $12,000; claim
ing that, as he had survived his colegatee,
he, on attaining his majority, became en
titled, by the true construction of the will,
to the whole fund. The defendants offered
to pay him onehalf of the whole fund, to
gether with the interest on the whole up to
the time he attained his majority; but this
he declined, and thereupon brought this suit.
The court cannot in this suit, or on the
present record, decide any question except
this: Is the complainant entitled to the
whole fund in question? If it is found that
he is not, but is only entitled to half, the
question where the other half goes, whether
it falls into the residue of the testatrix's es
tate, or goes to the personal representatives
of the deceased legatee, is one that the court
cannot deal with in the present condition of
the record. None of the persons having the
highest beneficial interest in the decision of
that question are before the court as parties,
and they would not, therefore, be bound by
any decision of that question which might
be made in this suit. The gift over, or rath
er the direction contained in the last codicil,
declaring that if both the grandson and
great-grandson die without children, that
then their and each of their shares shall re
vert, must, according to the prevailing rule
in such cases, be held to mean that if both
should die before the time fixed for the
payment of the legacies, that is, before the
great-grandson attained 21 years of age, that
then, and in that case, the $12,000 should
fall into the residue of the testatrix’s estate.
The settled rule of construction in such case
is not to interpret the will as meaning death
at any time, but death before the legacy or
fund is, by the terms of the will, payable
or distributable. Baldwin v. Taylor, 37 N.
J. Eq. 78; on appeal, 38 N. J. Eq. 637.
The complainant puts his right to the
whole fund in question on two grounds:
First, that there is a gift made to him, by
implication, of the whole fund; and, second,
it is claimed that where a bequest is made
to two persons of a particular sum, payable
at a future time, with direction that the
money shall, in the mean time, be invested,
and the interest thereof be paid to the lega
tees, and there is also a gift of the interest
of the whole fund to the survivor, in case
one dies before the time for payment arrives,
that the gift of the interest in such case
carries with it the whole fund, both princi
pal and interest. The claim is that by force
of this rule the complainant is entitled to
the whole fund. On neither ground can the
complainant’s claim, in my judgment, be
sustained. A bequest may undoubtedly arise
from implication, but, to warrant the court
in so declaring, there must be something
more than conjecture to support its declare/
tion. The implication must be a necessary
one. The probability of an intention to make
the gift implied must appear to be so strong
that an intention contrary to that which is
imputed to the testator cannot be supposed
to have existed in his mind. A construction
in favor of a gift by implication should
never be adopted, except in cases where,
after a careful and full consideration of the
whole will, the mind of the judge is con
vinced that the testator intended to make
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the gift. Denise’s Ex'rs v. Denise, 37 N. J.
Eq. 163. Now, as I read the testatrix’s will,
there is not only nothing on its face which
will support an implication that the testatrix
meant that the complainant should, in any
event or under any circumstances, take the
whole fund, but, on the contrary, I think it
quite clearly appears that such was not her
intention. The gift to the complainant and
his co-legatee is made by separate and dis
tinct parts or shares. The principal is to be
paid to them “share and share alike." They
take equally in severalty. Under a gift in
this form to two or more, the legatees take,
not as joint tenants, but as tenants in com
mon, without right of survivorship. 2 Wil
liams, Ex'rs, 1463; Hawk. Wills, 112; Heaths
v. Heathe, 2 Atk. 121; Vreeland v. Van Ry
per, 17 N. J. Eq. 133. The same intention
is made manifest again, when the testatrix
makes provision as to what shall be done in
case either of the legatees happen to die be
fore the fund becomes payable. In that
event she says: “The survivor shall have
the whole of the interest on said sum;" thus,
by express words, limiting the enlargement
or increase of the right of the survivor to the
interest, but leaving his right to the principal
exactly as it stood before; and so, too, it will
be observed that the testatrix, when she
gives direction as to what shall be done in
case both legatees die without children be
fore the fund becomes payable, treats or
speaks of their rights in the fund as several
and distinct. Her language is that “their
and each of their shares" shall revert to her
estate. There is nothing in the testamen
tary provisions under consideration which
will, in my judgment, support the claim of
a gift by implication. The other claim of
the complainant is, in my opinion, also
at"
groundless. There can be no doubt that a
gift of the interest, income, or produce of a
fund, without limitation as to continuance,
or without limit as to time, will, according
to a settled rule of construction, be held to
pass the fund itself; and this will be the
effect given to a gift made in this form,
whether the gift be made directly to the lega
tee, or through the intervention of a trustee.
2 Williams, ExIrs, 1193; Craft v. Snook, 13.
N. J. Eq. 121; Gullck’s ExIrs.v. Gulick, 25
N. J. Eq. 324, on appeal, 27 N. J. Eq. 498;
Huston v. Read, 32 N. J. Eq. 591. But it is
perfectly plain that the complainant cannot,
by force of this rule,lay the slightest claim to
that half of the fund in question which was
given to his co-legatee. It is true that, in
consequence of the death of his co-legatee
before the fund became payable, he became
entitled, under the will, to the interest of the
whole fund from the date of the death of
his co-legatee up to the time when the fund
became payable, but the gift of the interest
to him was not forever or without limit as to
time. The natural and obvious meaning of
the gift of “the whole of the interest on said
sum" to the survivor is not that the survivor
shall have a right to take the interest on the
whole fund forever, or without limit as to
time, but, on the contrary, that he shall have
the right to take it merely for the period in
tervening between the time when his co-lega
tee died and the time when the fund became
payable. As I construe the testamentary
provisions on which the complainant rests
his claim, he is entitled to onehalf of the
fund in question, together with the interest
on the whole fund from the time of the death
of his co-legatee up to the time the com
plainant attained his majority, but to noth
ing more.
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SCOTT v. MCNEAL et al.
(14 S. Ct. 1108, 154 U. S. 34.)
Supreme Court of the United States.
1894.
No. 890.
May 14,
In error to the supreme court of the state
of Washington.
This was an action of ejectment, brought
January 14, .1892, in the superior court of
Thurston county, in the state of Washington,
by Moses H. Scott against John McNcal and
Augustine McNeal to recover possession of a
tract of land in that county.
At the trial, it was conceded that the title
in this land was in the plaintiff until 1888;
and he testified that he entered into posses
sion thereof, and made improvements there
on, and had never parted with the possession,
nor authorized any one to go upon the land;
that he had demanded possession of the de
fendants. and they had withheld it from him;
and that its rental value was $100 a year.
The defendants denied the plaintifIf’s title,
and claimed title in themselves under a deed
from an administrator of the plaintiff’s es
tate, appointed in April, 1888; and in their
answer alleged that in March. 1881, the plain
tifl! mysteriously disappeared from his place
of abode, and without the knowledge of those
with whom he had been accustomed to as
sociate, and remained continuously away un
til July, 1891, and was generally believed by
his former associates to be dead; and spe
cifically alleged, and at the trial offered evi
dence tending to prove, the following facts:
On April 2, 1888, Mary Scott presented to
the probate court of the county of Thurston,
in the territory of Washington, a petition for
the appointment of R. H. Milroy as admin
istrator of the estate of the plaintiff, alleging
..that one Moses H. Scott, heretofore a resi
dent of the abovenamed county and terri
tory, mysteriously disappeared some time
during the month of March, 1881, and more
than seven years ago; that careful inquiry
made by relatives and friends of said Moses
H. Scott, at different times since his said dis
appearance, has failed to give any trace or
information of his whereabouts, or any evi
dence that he is still living; that your peti
tioner verily believes that said Moses H.
Scott is dead, and has been dead from the
time of his said disappearance;" that he was
never married, and left no last will or testa
ment yet heard of; that he left real estate in
his own right in this county of the value of
$000, more or less; that his heirs were three
minor children of a deceased brother; and
that the petitioner was a judgment creditor
of Scott.
Notice of that petition was given by post
ing in three public places, as required by law,
a notice, dated April 7, 1888, signed by the
probate judge, and in these words: “In the
Probate Court of Thurston County, W. T.
Mary Scott having filed in this court a peti
tion praying for the appointment of R. 11.
Milroy as administrator of the estate of
Moses H. Scott, notice is hereby given that
the hearing and consideration of said petition
has been fixed for Friday, April 20, 1888, at
10 oIclock a. m., at the oflice of the under
signed."
At the time thus appointed, the probate
court, after appointing a guardian ad litem
for said minors, and hearing witnesses, made
an order by which, “it duly appearing that
said Moses H. Scott disappeared over seven
years ago, and that since said time nothing
has been heard or known of him by his rela
tives and acquaintances, and that said rela
tives and acquaintances believe him to be
dead, and that his surroundings, when last
seen (about eight years ago), and the circum
stances of that time and immediately and
shortly afterwards, were such as to give his
relatives and acquaintances the belief that he
was murdered at about that time; and it ap
pearing that he has estate in this county:
Now, therefore, the court find that the saidI\
Moses H. Scott is dead to all legal intents and
purposes. having died on or about March 25,
1888; and no objections having been filed or
made to the said petition of Mary Scott, and
the guardian ad litem of the minor heirs here
in consenting, it is ordered that said R. H.
Milroy be appointed administrator of said
estate, and that letters of guardianship issue
to him upon his filing a good and suflicient
bond in the sum of one thousand dollars."
Letters of administration were issued to Mil-/my, and he gave bond accordingly.
On July 16, 1888, the probate court, on the 1\
petition of Milroy as administrator, and after
the usual notice, and with the consent of the
guardian ad litem of said minors, made an
order, authorizing Milroy as administrator to
sell all Scott’s real estate. Pursuant to this \
order, he sold by public auction the land now
in question, for the price of $301.50, to Sam
uel C. Ward. On November 26, 1888, the
probate court confirmed the sale, the land
was conveyed to Ward, and the purchase
money was received by Milroy, and was aft
erwards applied by him to the payment of
a debt of Scott, secured by mortgage of the
land.
On November 26, 1889, \Vard conveyed this
land by warranty deed to the defendants, for
a consideration paid of $800; and the defend
ants forthwith took and since retained pos~
session of the land, and made valuable im
provements thereon.
At the time of the offer of this evidence.
the plaintiff objected to the admission of the
proceedings in the probate court, upon the
ground that they were absolutely void, be
cause no administration on the estate of a
live man could be valid, and the probate
court had no jurisdiction to make the orders
in question; and objected to the rest of the
evidence as irrelevant and immaterial. But
the court ruled that, the probate court having
passed upon the sufliciency of' the petition to
give it jurisdiction, and having found that
the law presumed Scott to be dead, its pro.
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- cess of law."
ceedings were not absolutely void; and there
forIu admitted the evidence objected to, and
directed a verdict for the defendants, which
was returned by the jury, and judgment ren
tiered thereon. The plaintiff duly excepted
to the rulings and instructions at the trial.
and appealed to the supreme court of the
state.
In that court, it was argued in his behalf
“that to give effect to the probateproceed
ings under the circumstances would be to de
prive him of his property without due pro
But the court held the proceed’
ings of the probate court to be valid, and
therefore affirmed the judgment. 5 Wash.
309, 31 Pac. 873.
The plaintiff sued out this writ of error,
and assigned for error that the probate pro-
ceedings, as regarded him and his estate,
were without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and absolutely void; and that the
judgment of the superior court, and the judg
ment of the supreme court of the state af
firming that judgment, deprived him of his
property without due process of law, and
were contrary to the fourteenth amendment
of the constitution of the United States.
Nathan 8. Porter, for plaintiff in error.
Milo A. Root, for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff formerly owned the land in
question, and still owns it, unless he has been
deprived of it by a sale and conveyance, un
der order of the probate court of the county
of Thurston and territory of Washington, by
an administrator of his estate, appointed by
that court on April 20, upon a petition filed
April 2, 1888.
The form of the order appointing the ad
ministrator is peculiar. By that order, after
reciting that the plaintiff disappeared more
than seven years before, and had not since
been seen or heard of by his relatives and
acquaintances, and that the circumstances at
and immediately after the time when he was
last seen, about eight years ago, were such
as to give them the belief that he was 'nur
dered about that time, the probate court
finds that he "is dead to all legal intents
and purposes, having died on or about March
25, 1888;" that is to say, not at the time of
his supposed murder, seven or eight years be
fore, but within a month before the filing of
the petition for administration. The order
also, after directing that Milroy be appointed
administrator, purports to direct that “letters
of guardianship" issue to him upon his giv
ing bond; but this was evidently a clerical
error in the order or in the record, for it ap
pears that he received letters of administra
tion and qualified under them.
The fundamental question in the case is
whether letters of administration upon the
estate of a person who is in fact alive have
any validity or effect as against him.
By the law of England and America, be
fore the Declaration of Independence, and
for almost a century afterwards, the abso
lute nullity of such letters was treated as
beyond dispute.
In Alien v. Dundas, 3 Term R. 125, in 1789,
in which the court of king’s bench held that
payment of a debt due to a deceased person
to an executor who had obtained probate of
a forged will discharged the debtor, notwith
standing the probate was afterwards de
clared null and void, and administration
granted to the next of kin, the decision went
upon the ground that the probate, being a
judicial act of the ecclesiastical court within
its jurisdiction, could not, so long as it re
mained unrepealed, be impeached in the tem
poral courts. It was argued for the plaintiff
that the case stood as if the creditor had not
been dead, and had himself brought the ac
tion, in which case it was assumed, on all
hands, that payment to an executor would be
no defense. But the court clearly stated the
essential distinction between the two cases.
Mr. Justice Ashurst said: "The case of a
probate of a supposed will during the life
of the party may be distinguished from the
present, because during his life the ecclesias
tical court has no jurisdiction, nor can they
inquire who is his representative; but, when
the party is dead, it is within their jurisdic~
tion." And Mr. Justice Buller said: “Then
this case was compared to a probate of a sup
posed will of a living person; but in such a
case the ecclesiastical court have no juris
diction, and the probate can have no effect:
their jurisdiction is only to grant probates of
the wills of dead persons. The distinction in
this respect is this: if they have jurisdiction,
their sentence, as long as it stands unrepeal
ed, shall avail in all other places; but where
they have no jurisdiction, their whole pro
ceedings are a nullity.’' Id. 130. And such
is the law of England to this day. Williams.
Ex'rs (9th Ed.), 478, 1795; Taylor, Ev. (8th
Ed.) §§ 1677, 1714.
In Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch, 9, 23, in
1814, this court, speaking by Chief Justice
Marshall, said: “To give the ordinary juris
diction, a case in which, by law, letters of
administration may issue, must be brought
before him. In the common case of intes
tacy, it is clear that letters of administration
must be granted to some person by the ordi
nary; and though they should be granted to
one not entitled by law, still the act is bind
ing until annulled by the competent author
ity, because he had power to grant letters
of administration in the case. But suppose
administration to be granted on the estate of
a person not really dead. The act, all will
admit, is totally void. Yet the ordinary must
always inquire and decide whether the per
son, whose estate is to be committed to the
care of others, be dead or in life. It is a
branch of every cause in which letters of ad
ministration issue. Yet the decision of the
ordinary that the person on whose estate he
acts is dead, if the fact be otherwise, does not
invest the person he may appoint with the
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character or powers of an administrator.
The case, in truth. was not one within his
jurisdiction. It was not one in which he
had a right to deliberate. It was not com
mitted to him by the law. And although one
of the points occurs in all cases proper for
his tribunal, yet that point cannot bring the
subject within his jurisdiction."
surance Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U. S. 238, 243;
Hegier v. Faulkner, 153 U. S. 109, 118, 14
Sup. Ct. 779. _
The same doctrine has been aflirmed by the
supreme court of Pennsylvania in a series of
cases beginning 70 years ago. McPherson v.
Cunliff (1824) 11 Serg. & R. 422, 430; PeeblesI
Appeal (1826) 15 Serg. 8: R. 39, 42; Deviin v.
Com. (1882) 101 Pa. St. 273. In the last of
those cases, it was held that a grant of let
ters of administration upon the estate of a
person who, having been absent and unheard
from for 15 years, was presumed to be dead,
but who. as it afterwards appeared, was in
fact alive, was absolutely void, and might be
impeached collaterally.
The supreme judicial court of Massachu
setts, in 1861, upon full consideration, held
that an appointment of an administrator of a
man who was in fact alive, but had been ab
sent and not heard from for more than seven
q. years, was void, and that payment to such an
administrator was no bar to an action
brought by the man on his return; and, in
answer to the suggestion of counsel, that
“seven years’ absence, upon leaving one’s
usual home or place of business, without be
ing heard of, authorizes the judge of probate
to treat the case as though the party were
dead," the court said: “The error consists in
this, that those facts are only presumptive
evidence of death, and may always be con
trolled by other evidence showing that the
fact was otherwise. The only jurisdiction is
{over the estate of the dead man. When the
presumption arising from the absence of sev
i en years is overthrown by the actual personal
)presence
of the supposed dead man, it leaves
no ground for sustaining the jurisdiction."
Jochumsen v. Bank, 3 Allen, 87, 96. See,
also, Waters v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1, 13; Day
v. Floyd, 130 Mass. 488, 489.
The Civil Code of Louisiana, in title 3, “Of
Absentees," contains provisions for the ap
pointment of a curator to take care of the
property of any person who is absent from or
resides out of the state, without having left
an attorney therein; and for the putting of
his presumptive heirs into provisional posses
sion after he has been absent and not heard
from for flve, or, if he has left an attorney,
seven, years, or sooner if there be strong pre
sumption of his death; and for judicial sale,
if necessary, of his movable or personal prop
erty, and safe investment of the proceeds;
and, upon proof that he has not been heard
from for 10 years, and has left no known
heirs, for sale of his whole property., and pay
ment of the proceeds into the treasury of the
state, as in the case of vacant successions;
but neither the curator nor those in provision
See also In-.
al possession can alienate or mortgage his im
movables or real estate; and, if he returns at
any time, he recovers his whole property, or
the proceeds thereof, and a certain proportion
of the annual revenues, depending upon the
length of his absence. The main object of
those provisions, as their careful regulations
show, is to take possession of and preserve
the property for the absent owner, not to
deprive him of it upon an assumption that he
is dead. Accordingly, the supreme court of
Louisiana held that the appointment, by a
court having jurisdiction of successions, of
an administrator of the estate of a man rep
resented to be dead, but who was in fact
alive at the time of the appointment, was
void; and that persons claiming land of his,
under a sale by such administrator under or
der of the court, followed by long possession,
could not hold the land against his heirs;
and, speaking by Chief Justice Manning, said:
“The title of Hotchkiss as administrator is
null, because he had no authority to make it,
and the prescription pleaded does not validate
it. It was not a sale, the informallties of
which are cured by a certain lapse of time,
and which becomes perfect through prescrip
tion; but it was void, because the court was
without authority to order it. ' ' ' It is
urged, on the part of the defendants, that the
decree of the court ordering the sale of the
succession property should protect them, and,
as the court which thus ordered the sale had
jurisdiction of successions. it was not for
them to look beyond it. But that is assum
ing as true that which we know was not
true. The owner was not dead. There was
no succession." And the court added that
Chief Justice Marshall, in Griflith v. Frazier,
above cited, disposed of that position. Burns
v. Van Loan (1877) 29 La. Ann. 560, 563.
The absolute nullity of administration
granted upon the estate of a living person
has been directly adjudged or distinctly rec
ognized in the courts of many other states.
French v. Frazier’s AdmIr (1832) 7 .T. J. Marsh.
425,427; State v. White (1846) 7 Ired. 116; Dun
can v. Stewart (1854) 25 Ala. 408; Andrews
v. Avery (1858) 14 Grat. 229, 236; Moore v.
Smith (1858) 11 Rich. Law, 569; Morgan v.
Dodge (1862) 44 N. H. 255, 259; Withers v.
Patterson (1864) 27 Tex. 491, 497; Johnson v.
Beazley (1877) 65 M0. 250, 264; Melia v. Sim
mons (1878) 45 Wis. 334; DIArusment v.
Jones (1880) 4 Lea, 251; Stevenson v. Supe
rior Court (1882) 62 Cal. 60; Perry v. Rail
road (1882) 29 Kan. 420, 423; Thomas v. Peo
ple (1883) 107 I11. 517, in which the subject is
fully and ably treated.
The only judicial opinions cited at the bar
(except the judgment below in the present
case) which tend to support the validity of
letters of administration upon the estate of a
living person were delivered in the courts of
New York and New Jersey within the last 20
years.
In Roderigas v. Institution, 63 N. Y. 460.
in 1875, a bare majority of the court of ap
peals of New York decided that payment of a
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deposit in a savings institution to an admin- I original jurisdiction in such matters. and
istrator under letters of administration is’
sued in the lifetime of the dcpositor was a
good defense to an action by an administra
tor appointed after his death, upon the
ground that the statutes of the state of New
York made it the duty of the surrogate, when
applied to for administration on the estate
of any person, to try and determine the ques
tion whether he was alive or dead, and there
fore his determination 01’ that question was
conclusive. That decision was much criti
cised as soon as it appeared, notably by Chief
Justice Redfield in 15 Am. Law Reg. (N. S5
212. And in a subsequent case between the
same parties in 1879 the same court unani
mously reached a different conclusion, be
cause evidence was produced that the surro
gate never in fact considered the question of
death. or had any evidence thereof,--thus
making the validity of the letters of adminis
tration to depend, not upon the question
whether the man was dead, but upon the
question whether the surrogate thought so.
Roderigas v. Institution, 76 N. Y. 316.
In Plume v. Institution, 46 N. J. Law, 211.
230, in 1884, which was likewise an action to
recover the amount of a deposit in a savings
institution, the plaintiff had been appointed
by the surrogate administrator of a man who.
as the evidence tended to show, had neither
drawn out any part of the deposit, nor been
heard from, for more than 20 years; an infe
rior court certified to the supreme court of
New Jersey the questions whether payment
of the amount to the plaintiff would bar a re
covery thereof by the depositor, and whether
the plaintiff was entitled to recover; and
that court, in giving judgment for the plain
tifif, observed, by way of distinguishing the
case from the authorities cited for the de
fendant, that “in most, if not all, of such
cases, it was aflirmatively shown that the al
leged decedent was actually alive at the time
of the issuance of letters of administration,
while in the present case there is no reason
- for even surmising such to have been the
fact."
The grounds of the judgment of the su
preme court of the state of Washington
in the case at bar, as stated in its opinion,
were that the equities of the case appeared
to be with the defendants; that the court
was inclined to follow the case of Roderigas
v. Institution, 63 N. Y. 460; and that, under
the laws of the territory, the probate court,
on an application for letters of administra
tion, had authority to find the fact as to the
death of the intestate. the court saying:
"Our statutes only authorize administration
of the estates of deceased persons, and before
g~ranung letters of administration the court
must be satisfied by proof of the death of the
intestate. The proceeding is substantially in
rem, and all parties must be held to have
received notice of the institution and penden
cy of such proceedings, where notice is given
as required by law. Section 1299 of the
1881 Code gave the probate court exclusive
LAw succ.—9 ‘
authorized such court to summon parties and
witnesses, and examine them touching any
matter in controversy before said court or
in the exercise of its jurisdiction." Such
were the grounds upon which it was held
that the plaintiff had not been deprived of
his property without due process of law.
5 Wash. 309, 317, 318, 31 Pac. 873.
After giving to the opinion of the supreme
court of the state the respectful considera
tion to which it is entitled, we are unable to
concur in its conclusion or in the reasons on
which it is founded.
The fourteenth article of amendment of the
constitution of the United States, after other
provisions which do not touch this case, or
dains: “Nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor deny to any person with
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." These prohibitions extend to all
acts of the. state, whether through its legis
lative, its executive, or its judicial authori
ties. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318,
319; Ex parte Virginia, Id. 339, 346; Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397. And the first
one, as said by Chief Justice Waite in U. S.
v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 554, repeating
the words of Mr. Justice Johnson in Bank
v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 214, was intended
“to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government, un
restrained by the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice."
Upon a writ of error to review the judg~
ment of the highest court of a state upon
the ground that the judgment was against a
right claimed under the constitution of the
United States, this court is no more bound
by that court’s construction of a statute of
the territory or of the state, when the ques
tion is whether the statute provided for the
notice required to constitute due process of
law, than when the question is whether the
statute created a contract which has been
impaired by a subsequent law of the state,
or whether the original liability created by
the statute was such that a judgment upon
it has not been given due faith and credit
in the courts of another state. In every
such case, this court must decide for itself
the true construction of the statute. Hunt
ington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 683, 684, 13
Sup. Ct. 224; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Tennes
see, 153 U. S. 486, 492-495, 14 Sup. Ct. 968.
No judgment of a court is due process of
law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the
court, or without notice to the party.
The words “due process of law," when ap
plied to judicial proceedings, as was said by
Mr. Justice Field, speaking for this court,
"mean a course of legal proceedings accord
ing to those rules and principles which have
been established in our systems of juris
prudence for the protection and enforcement
of private rights. To give such proceedings
any validity, there must be a tribunal compe
tent by lts constitution—that is, by the law
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of its creation—to pass upon the subject-mat
ter of the suit; and, if that involves merely
a determination of the personal liability of
the defendant, he must be brought within its
jurisdiction by service of process within the
state, or his voluntary appearance." Pen
noyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733.
Even a judgment in proceedings strictly in
rem binds only those who could have made
themselves parties to the proceedings, and
who had notice, either actually or by the
thing condemned being first seized into the
custody of the court. The Mary, 9 Cranch,
126, 114; Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet.
466, 475; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 727.
And such a judgment is wholly void if a
fact essential to the jurisdiction of the court
did not exist. The jurisdiction of a foreign
court of admiralty, for instance, in some
cases, as observed by Chief Justice Marshall,
“unquestionably depends as well on the state
of the thing as on the constitution of the
court. If by any means whatever a prize
court should be induced to condemn, as prize
of war, a vessel which was never captured,
it could not be contended that this con
demnation operated a change of property."
Rose v. Himely, 4 Crunch, 241, 269. Upon
the same principle, a decree condemning a
vessel for unlawfully taking clams, in viola
tion of a statute which authorized proceed
ings for her forfeiture in the county in which
the seizure was made, was held by this
court to be void, and not to protect the officer
making the seizure from a suit by the owner
of the vessel, in which it was proved that
the seizure was not made in the same county,
although the decree of condemnation recited
that it was. Thompson v. Whitman, 18
Wall. 457.
The estate of a person supposed to be dead
is not seized or taken into the custody of the
court of probate upon the filing of a peti
tion for administration, but only after and
under the order granting that petition; and
the adjudication of that court is not upon
the question whether he is living or dead, but
only upon the question whether and to whom
letters of administration shall issue. In
surance Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U. S. 238, 243.
The local law on the subject, contained in
the Code of 1881 of the territory of Wash
ington, in force at the time of the proceed
ings now in question, and since continued in
force by article 27, § 2, of the constitution
of the state, does not appear to us to war
rant the conclusion that the probate court is
authorized to conclusively decide, as against
a living person, that he is dead, and his es
tate therefore subject to be administered
and disposed of by the probate court.
On the contrary, that law, in its very
terms, appears to us to recognize and assume
the death of the owner to be a fundamental
condition and prerequisite to the exercise by
the probate court of jurisdiction to grant let
ters testamentary or of administration upon
his estate, or to license any one to sell his
lands for the payment of his debts. By
section 1, the common law of England, so far
as not inconsistent with the constitution and
laws of the United States, or with the local
law, is made the rule of decision. In the
light of the common law, the exclusive orig
inal jurisdiction conferred by section 1299
upon the probate court in the probate of wills
and the granting of letters testamentary or
of administration is limited to the estates of
persons deceased; and the power conferred
by that section to summon and examine on
oath, as parties or witnesses, executors and
administrators or other persons intrusted
with or accountable for the “estate of any
deceased person." and "any person touching
any matter of controversy before said court
or in the exercise of its jurisdiction," is
equally limited. By section 1340, wills are
to be proved and letters testamentary or of
administration are to be granted in the coun-
ty of “which deceased was a resident," or in
which “he may have died," or in which any
part of his estate may be, “he having died
out of-the territory." By section 1388, ad
ministration of the estate of "a person dying
intestate" is to be granted to relatives, next
of kin, or creditors, in a certain order, with
a proviso in case the person 0 entitled or
interested neglect "for more than forty days
after the death of the intestate" to apply for
administration. By section 1389, an appli
cation for administration must “set forth
the facts essential to giving the court juris
diction of the case," and state "the names‘
and places of residence of the heirs of the
deceased, and that the deceased died with
out a will;" and, by section 1391, notice of
such application is to be given by posting
in three public places in the county where the
court is held a notice “containing the name
of the decedent," the name of the applicant,
and the time of hearing. And, by sections
1493 and 1494, a petition by an executor or
administrator for the sale of real estate for
the payment of debts must set forth “the
amount of the personal estate that has come
to his hands, and how much, if any, remainsI
undisposed of, a list and the amounts of the
debts outstanding against the deceased, as
far as the same can be ascertained, a descrip
tion of all the real estate of which the testa
tor or intestate died seized. the condition and
value of the respective lots and portions, the
names and ages of the devisees, if any, and
of the heirs of the deceased;" and must
show that it is necessary to sell real estate
“to pay the allowance to the family, the
debts outstanding against the deceased, and
the expenses of administration."
Under such a statute, according to the over
whelming weight of authority, as shown by
the cases cited in the earlier part of this
opinion. the jurisdiction of the court to which
is committed the control and management
of the estates of deceased persons, by what
ever name it is called,—ecciesiastical court,
probate court, orphans’ court, or court of the
ordinary or the surrogate,—does not exist or
take effect before death. All proceedings of
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sucn courts m the probate of wills and the
granting of administrations depend upon the
fact that a person is dead, and are null and
void if he is alive. Their jurisdiction in this
respect being limited to the estates of de
ceased persons, they have no jurisdiction
whatever to administer and dispose of the
estates of living persons of full age and
sound mind, or to determine that a living
man is dead, and thereupon undertake to dis
pose of his estate.
A court of probate must, indeed, inquire in
to and be satisfied of the fact of the death of
the person whose will is sought to be proved
or whose estate is sought to be administered.
because, without that fact, the court has no
jurisdiction over his estate; and not because
its decision upon the question, whether he is
living or dead, can in any wise bind or estop
him, or deprive him, while alive, of the title
or control of his property.
As the jurisdiction to issue letters of ad
ministration upon his estate rests upon the
fact of his death, so the notice given before
issuing such letters assumes that fact, and is
addressed, not to him, but to those who after
his death may be interested in his estate, as
next of kin, legatees, creditors, or otherwise.
Notice to them cannot be notice to him, be
cause all their interests are adverse to his.
The whole thing, so far as he is concerned, is
res inter aifos acta.
Next of kin or legatees have no rights in
the estate of a living person. His creditors,
indeed, may, upon proper proceedings, and
due notice to him, in a court of law or of eq
uity, have specific portions of his property up
plied in satisfaction of their debts. But
neither creditors nor purchasers can acquire
any rights in his property through the action
oi.' a court of probate, or of an administrator
appointed by that court, dealing, without any
notice to him, with his whole estate as if he
were dead.
The appointment by the probate court of an
administrator of the estate of a living per
son, without notice to him, being without ju~
~risdiction, and wholly void as against him,
all acts of the administrator, whether ap
proved by that court or not. are equally void.
The receipt of money by the administrator is
no discharge of a debt, and a conveyance of
property by the administrator passes no title.
The fact that a person has been absent and
not heard from for seven years may create
such a presumption of his death as, if not
overcome by other proof, is such prima facie
evidence of his death that the probate court
may assume him to be dead, and appoint an
administrator of his estate, and that such ad
ministrator may sue upon a debt due to. him.
But proof, under proper pleadings, even in a.
collateral suit, that he was alive at the time
of the appointment of the administrator, con
trols and overthrows the prima facie evi
dence of his death, and establishes that the
court had no jurisdiction and the administra
tor no authority; and he is not bound, either
by the order appointing the administrator or
by a judgment in any suit brought by the ad
ministrator against a third person, because
he was not a party to and had no notice of
either.
In a case decided in the circuit court of the
United States for the southern district of
New York in 1880, substantially like Roder
igas v. Institution, as reported in 63 N. Y. 460,
above cited, Judge Choate, in a learned and
able opinion, held that letters of administra
tion upon the estate of a living man, issued
by the surrogate after judicially determining
that he was dead, were null and void as
against him; that payment of a debt to an
administrator so appointed was no defense
to an action by him against the debtor; and
that to hold such administration to be valid
against him would deprive him of his prop
erty without due process of law, within the 1
meaning of the fourteenth amendment of the
constitution of the United States. This court
concurs in the proposition there announced
“that it is not competent for a state, by a law
declaring a judicial determination that a man
is dead, made in his absence, and without
any notice to or process issued against him.
conclusive for the purpose of divesting him
of his property and vesting it in an admin
istrator, for the benefit of his creditors and
next of kin, either absolutely or in favor of
those only who innocently deal with such ad
ministrator. The immediate and necessary
effect of such a law is to deprive him of his
property without any process of 11'; what~
ever, as against him, although it is done by
process of law against other people, his next
of kin, to whom notice is given. Such a stat~
utory declaration of estoppel by a judgment
to which he is neither party nor privy, which
has the immediate effect of divesting him of
his property, is a direct violation of this con
stitutional guaranty." Lavin v. Bank, 18
Blatchf. 1, 24, 1 Fed. 641.
The defendants did not rely upon any stat
~ute of limitations, nor upon any statute al~
lowing them for improvements made in good
faith; but their sole reliance was upon a deed
from an administrator, acting under the or
ders of a court which had no jurisdiction to
appoint him or to confer any authority upon
him, as against the plaintiff.
wJudgment reversed, and case remanded to
the supreme court of the state of Washington
for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
\_
_/
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HADDOCK v. BOSTON & M. R.
(15 N. E. 495, 146 Mass. 155.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Es
sex. Feb. 29, 1888.
Report from supreme judicial court;
Morton, Chief Justice.
Appeal by the Boston & Maine Railroad
from a decree of the probate court for Essex
county, (entered November 16, 1885,) admit-
'
ting to probate the will of Sarah Penrler
gast. The appeal was claimed by the Bos
ton & Maine Railroad Company, at the hear
ing before the probate court, and was al
lowed by the judge of that court, it appear
ing that said railroad owned real estate in
IIaverhill, devised by the will, the title to
which might be affected by the establish
ment of rights under said will. The will
was dated October 31, 1807. At the hearing
in the supreme judicial court, the chief jus
tice made certain rulings, the nature of
which, with other facts, sutficiently appear
in the opinion, and reported the case to the
full court.
S. Lincoln, for appellant.
and P. Webster, for appeilee.
B. F. Butler
DEVENS, J. The first question discussed
by the appellant is whether the probate court
has authority, as matter of law, to admit a
will to probate 63 years after the death of
the testator; and, incidentally, whether
there is any limit of time after the death
of the testator, subsequent to which the
court has no such authority. In Shumway
v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 117, the question was
whether a will not admitted to probate was
admissible in evidence. It was held that
it was not; but it is said: "If a will can
be found, is may be proved in the probate
court at any time, in order to establish a
title to real estate. It differs from an "ad
ministration of personal property, which can
not be originally granted upon the estate
of any person after twenty years from his
deccase.’-’, In the course of the argument,
Mr. Justice Jackson alluded to a case in
Essex county, perhaps 30 years before,
where it was found that a widow must hold
land under the will which had not been
proved. The will having been offered for
probate, the judge of probate declined to
allow it, as more than 20 years had elapsed
since the death of the testator, and, on ap
peal, his decision was reversed, and the will
admitted to probate. The research of the
counsel for the defendant has established
that the case thus alluded to was that of
Dennis v. Bearse, (Essex,) and has supplied
us with as satisfactory an account of it,
drawn from the papers on file, as they will
afford. It is a case to which some weight
must be attached, as it brought into ques
tion, directly, the authority of the court of
probate, and the appeal was to the full
bench of the supreme court, which reversed
the original decree. While no opinion ap
§ was such evidence;
pears to have been written, it could not but
have been a carefully considered case, as it
’reversed the opinion of the judge of probate
as to the extent of his jurisdiction. The
will thus admitted to probate was so ad
mitted 36 or 37 years after its date. How
long after the death of the testator does not
' clearly appear, although some of the papers
found indicate that it was more than 30
years after. In Marcy v. Marcy, 6 Metc.
(Mass.) 360, the question was whether there
was suflicient evidence that a will, which
became operative 43 years before, had been
admitted to probate, so that it could be
read in evidence. The court held that there
adding: “On evidence
like the present, it would be the duty of the
probate court to establish the will, if, for
want of form, the probate should have been
considered so defective that the will had
been rejected as evidence in its present
state." In Waters v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1,
where it was held that the probate court,
14 years after admitting a will to probate.
might admit to probate a codicil, written
upon the same leaf, which had escaped at
tention, and. was not passed upon at the
time of the probate of the original will, it
is said by Mr. Justice Gray, citing the above
cases: “It has been directly adjudged by
this court that a will may be proved even
thirty years after the death of the testator,
although original administration could not,
by statute, be granted after twenty years;"
and again, “if no will had been proved, the
lapse of time would not prevent both will
and codicil from being proved now." While
it is true that in neither of these cases has
it been decided that a will disposing of
lands can he admitted to probate after 60
years, yet there is no suggestion in any of
them that there is any limitation of time
to such proof, and the language used is
quite explicit to the contrary. In view of
the decisions made, and the repeated ex
pressions directly relevant to the cases con
sidered, used in argument by judges of this
court, we cannot treat this inquiry as the
defendant desires we should,—as practically
a new question. We must deem it one that
has been fairly passed upon and decided.
It may be that the inconveniences which
might arise from the probate of a will many
years after the death of the testator are such
that a statute limiting the period might be
properly enacted. That course has, in some
states, been adopted. Conn. Revision, 1875.
c. 11, §§ 21-23; Rev. St. Me. c. 64, § 1. But
‘statutes of limitation are arbitrary, and the
considerations which apply to positive laws
of this character are legislative, rather than
judicial. In every instance, where a great
length of time has elapsed after the death of
a testator, possessory titles may have been
acquired which will prevail against the rec
ord. What is due to the just rights of the
devisces is to be considered with reference
to other rights of property, or to the repose
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..,belong to the domain of legislation.
of the community: but such considerations
So long
as one can produce the evidence necessary to
obtain the probate of a will, we can ee no
legal reason why one who relies upon it
should not be allowed to prove it as he would
be permitted to prove a deed, however an
cient, under which he claimed title. The fact
that he could not offer in evidence a will
not admitted to probate, as he might an an
cient deed, would certainly afford no reason
why its authenticity should not be estab
lished in the probate court by its regular
course of procedure.
The appellant further contended that the
jury ought not to have been allowed (in de
termining the question whether the testatrix
was a widow. and thus competent to make a
will as the law stood in 1807) to consider
the fact that she actually executed a paper,
purporting to be a will devising land, as any
evidence that she had legal capacity so to do.
This fact, in connection with the other facts
proved, was competent to be considered.
There was no ruling that, alone, it would
have been sufllcient to establish her legal
capacity; that is, that she was, at the time
a widow. There was evidence of reputation
that the husband of the testatrix died soon
after their marriage; that a deed was made
to her on December 21, 1801, of the very land
which she undertook to dispose of by will, in
which he was described as “Sarah Pender
grass, widow," which deed was found among
her papers; and that she executed the will
by the same name as that recited in the
'deed,
in which she was described as widow,
although that word is not appended to her
name in the will. The act done by her, of
disposing, or assuming to dispose, of her
property, which she could only lawfully do if
a widow, was an assertion of her status, and
tnus of her legal capacity, made in an im
portant transaction which might properly
have been considered in connection with the
other evidence.
The conclusion we have reached renders it
unnecessary to decide whether the appellant
was lawfully entitled to appeal. Other ex
ceptions taken by it were waived in this
court. Cause to stand for further proceed
lugs.
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SCHLUTER v. BOWERY SAV. BANK.‘
(22 N. E. 572, 117 N. Y. 125.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 1, 1889.
Appeal from supreme court. general term,
first department.
This action was brought by Eliza Schluter,
as administratrix of Antoinette Knittel,
against the Bowery Savings Bank. The
grounds of the action are as follows: ,In
October, 1872, Margaret Knittel, then a m r
ried woman, deposited in the Bowery S v
ings Bank the money claimed in this action,
in trust for Antoinette Knittel, which was
entered upon the books of the bank, and the
pass-book belonging to Mrs. Knittel, as fol
lows: “Bowery Savings Bank. in account
with Margaret Knittel, in trust for Antor
nette Knittel." Antoinette was then an infant
about six years old, and lived with her par
ents in this state. Subsequently, they moved
to the state of New Jersey, where they lived
until June, 1875. when Mrs. Knittel died.
Her husband took out letters of administra
tion on her estate in the state of New Jersey;
and on October 22, 1875, the defendant paid
to him, as such administrator, the deposit,
with the interest thereon, then amounting to
562940. Mrs. Knittel. in fact, left a last
will and testament, which was subsequently,
on the 17th day of November, 1875, admitted
to probate by the surrogate of the county of
New York. and letters testamentary were
issued to Louis Sier, the executor named in
the will. Soon thereafter, he demanded pay
ment of the deposit to him, which was re
fused. On the 18th day of December, 1885,
Antoinette, who continued to reside in the
state of New Jersey, died, and the plaintiff
was, on the 14th day of May thereafter, ap
pointed by the surrogate of New York ad
ministratrix of her estate. She then demand
ed payment of the deposit. and the interest
thereon, which was refused, and then this
action was commenced. The action was
brought to trial at a circuit, and at the closeI
of the evidence the court directed a verdict
in favor of the defendant on the ground that
the payment to the administrator of Mrs.
Knittel discharged the defendant. From the
judgment entered upon the verdict the plain
tiff appealed to the general term, and then to
this court.
John McOrone, for appellant.
Norwood, Jr" for respondent.
EARL. J., (after stating the facts sub
stantially as above.) The defendant was in
corporated by the act, chapter 229 of the
Laws of 1834; and by section 6 of that
act it was provided that deposits therein
should be repaid to each depositor when
required, and at such time, and with
such interest, and under such regula
tions, as the board of managers from
time to time prescribed. One of the by~laws
of the defendant. printed in the pass-book
tAflirming’ 47 Hun, 633, mem.
Carlisle
which was delivered to the depositor, pro
vided that on the decease of any depositor
the amount standing to the credit of the de
ceased should be paid to his or her legal rep
resentatives. We have several times held
that by such a deposit the depositor consti
tuted himself or herself a trustee, and that
the title to the fund was thereby transferred
from the depositor individually to the depos
itor as trustee; and in Boone v. Bank, 84 N.
Y. 83, a case entirely similar to this, we held
that payment of the deposit to the adminis
trator of the depositor, in the absence of any
notice from the beneficiary, was good and
effectual to discharge the savings bank; and
it is unnecessary now to repeat the reasoning
of the opinion in that case. Here there was
no notice to the bank from the beneficiary,
and the payment to the administrator of Mrs.
Knittel was made in entire good faith.
But the claim is made that because Mr.
Knittel was a foreign administrator, deriv
ing his authority from administration granted
in the state of New Jersey, he was not the
personal representative of the deceased. and
that therefore payment could not legally be
made to him. Payment to the personal rep
resentative is good, because at the death of the
intestate he becomes entitled to all his per~
sonal property wherever situated, and, hav
ing the legal title thereto, he can demand
payment of choses in action; and a payment
to him made anywhere. in the absence of any
conflicting claim existing at the time. is valid.
It is true that, if the defendant had declined
payment, the foreign administrator could not
have brought action in this state to enforce
it. But a voluntary payment to such an ad.
ministrator has always been held valid
Therefore, in receiving this payment, Mr.
Knittel was the representative of the de
ceased, and able to give an effectual dis
charge to the defendant. Parsons v. Ly-
man. 20 N. Y. 103; Petersen v. Bank, 32 N.
Y. 21; In re Butler, 38 N. Y. 397; Wilkins
v. Ellett, 9 Wall. 740.
Mrs. Knittel. however, actually left a will.
which was subsequently admitted to probate.
But the letters of administration were notI
therefore void, the court having jurisdiction
to grant them; and, until they were revoked,
all persons acting in good faith were pro
tected in dealing with the administrator thu
appointed. And~ so it has always been held.
Rodgerigas v. Institution, 63 N. Y. 460, 76
N. Y. 316; Kittredge v. Folsom, 8 N. H. 98;
Patton’s Appeal, 31 Pa. St. 465. Here the
payment was made before the will was ad
mitted to probate, and at the time of such
payment Mr. Knittel was the legal represent
ative of the deceased, and authorized to ad
minister upon her estate. Our attention has
been called to no case, and we are confident
that none can be found, holding that the sub
sequent discovery of a will, and its admis
sion to probate, renders the prior appoint
ment of an administrator absolutely void so
as to give no protection to persons who, in
dealing with the administrator, have acted on
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the faith thereof.
571. 588.
Under the act, chapter 782 of the LawsIof
1867, Mrs. Knittel, although a married wo
man,was capable of being a trustee. She con
stituted herself a trustee here. and here the
trust fund remained; and therefore, although
by the law of New Jersey a married woman
could not be appointed a trustee, yet the
trust could be enforced here. Iler removal
to that state did not divest her of the title to
the fund she thus had; and that title re
mained in her. as no one was appointed to
take it from her.
The statutes of New Jersey were proved.
showing that the surrogate of the county of
which Mrs. Knittel was an inhabitant and
resident at -the time of her death had juris
diction to grant letters of administration
upon her estate. While he had no authority
to grant letters of administration unless she
died intestate, intestacy, like inhabitancy,
was one of the facts which he was to deter
mine. He had general jurisdiction of the
subject of administration; and, having de
termined that she died intestate, he was au
thorized to grant administration upon her es
tate. The proceedings in the surrogate’s
court were properly exemplified and proved.
But the further claim is made that the an
Woerner, Adm’n, 568. reason that they were not therein alleged.
It is there alleged “that Margaret Knittel
died an inhabitant of, and domiciled in, and
a resident of, Hoboken, Hudson county. N.
J.: that thereafter, and on the 19th of Oc
tober, 1875. letters of administration on the
goods, chattels, rights, and credits of Mar
garet Knittel. deceased, were duly issued to
one Louis Knittel, the husband of the said
Margaret Knittel, by the surrogate of the
county of Hudson, state of New Jersey; that
said surrogate had jurisdiction, and was duly
authorived and empowered, by the laws of.
the state of New Jersey, to issue said letters
as aforesaid." We think these allegations
were suflicient to authorize proof of the laws
of New Jersey, and of thejurisdiction of the
surrogate in issuing letters. If the plaintiff
desired more specific allegations, and was
fairly entitled to them, he should have moved
to make the answer more specific and defi
nite. The answer gave him every informa
tion to which he was entitled; and he might,
if he could, have shown that the surrogate
had no jurisdiction, and that the laws did not
authorize him to grant administration of the
estate of Mrs. Knittel. So far as the case of
Throop v. Hatch, 3 Abb. Pr. 23, may seem
to hold the contrary doctrine, it does not re
ceive our approval. We are therefore of
swer was insuflicient to permit the laws of opinion that thejudgment should be aflirmed,
New Jersey to be read in evidence, for the with costs. All concur.
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READIS CASE. I \ -
(5 Coke, 87.) "j :1
Common Pleas. 2 Jac. I. '
Read brought an action of debt against
Carter, executor of Yong, which plea began
in the common pleas, Hilt. 44 Eliz. Bet.
401. The jurors found, that the said Yong
made his testament and last will, and made
one A. his executor; and the day of his
death was possessed of goods above the val
ue of the debt in demand, and died; and be
fore the will was psoved the defendant took
the testator’s goods into his possession,
and intermeddled with them; and after
wards, and before the writ purchased, the
will was proved; and if on this matter the
defendant should be charged as executor
of his own wrong was the question. And
on great deliberation judgment was given
for the plaintiff. And in this case these
points were resolved.
1. When a man dies intestate, and a
stranger takes the intestate’s goods and
uses them, or sells them, in that case it
makes him executor of his own wrong. For
although the pleading in such case be, that
he was never executor, nor ever adminis
tered as executor; and therefore it was
objected, that he ought to pay debt or leg
acy, or do something as executor: yet it
was resolved, and well agreed, that when
no one takes upon him to be executor nor
any hath taken letters of administration
there, the using of the goods.of the deceased
by any one, or the taking of them into his
possession, which is the office of an execu
tor or administrator, is a good administra
tion to charge them as executors of their
wrong; for those to whom the deceased was
indebted in such case have not any other
against whom they can have an action for
recovery of their debts.
2. When an executor is made, and he
proves the will, or takes upon him the
charge of the will, and administers in that
case, if a stranger takes any of the goods,
and, claiming them for his proper goods.
uses and disposes of them as his own goods,
that doth not make him in construction of
law an executor of his wrong, because there
is another executor of right whom he may
charge, and these goods which are in such
case taken out of his possession after that
he hath administered, are assets in his hand:
but although there be an executor who
administers yet if the stranger takes the
goods, and claiming to be executor, pays
debts, and receives debts, or pays legacies.
and intermeddies as executor, there, for
such express administration as executor, he
may be charged as executor of his own
wrong, although there be another executor
of right; and therewith agreeth 9 E. 4, 13.
3. In the case at bar, when the defend
ant takes the goods before the rightful
executor hath taken upon him, or proved the
will, in this case he may be charged as
executor of his own wrong, for the rightful
executor shall not be charged but with
the goods which come to his hands after he
takes upon him the charge of the will.
'Note, reader, these resolutions, and the reason
of them, and by them you will better under
stand your books, which otherwise seem pri
ma facie to disagree. 41 E. 3, 13b; 50 Edw.
3, 9; 6 H. 4, 3a; 11 H. 4, 83b, 84a; 13 H. 4, 4b;
8 H. 6, 35b; 19 H. 6, 14b; 21 H. 6,26 & 27;
32 H. 6, 7a; 33 H. 6, 21; 21 E. 4, 5a; 20
H. 7, 5a; 26 H. 8, 7b, 8a; 1 Eliz. 2 Dyer,
166; 9 Eliz. 3 Dyer, 255. And so the quaere
:n 1 Mariae, 1 Dyer, 105, 203, well resolved.
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HATCH v. PROCTOR et al.
(102 Mas. 351.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Worcester. Oct. Term, 1869.
Contract by an administrator of the estate
.of Frank J. Hatch to recover of George L.
Lawrence for goods belonging to the estate,
and sold and delivered. From an order di
recting a verdict for the defendant, plaintifl'!
excepted.
H. B. Staples and F. P. Goulding, for plain
tiff. C. H. B. $now and G. A. Torrey, for
defendants.
COLT, J. The case presented in the offer
of evidence is this: The plaintifff, acting,
with the knowledge of the defendants, as ex
ecutor in his own wrong of his deceased
brother’s estate, delivered certain personal
property, with a bill of sale and warranty of
title, to one Lawrence, in consideration of
the verbal promise of the defendants to pay
the plaintiff $1700 towards the price thereof.
At the time of the sale and delivery, the de
fendants took a mortgage from Lawrence to
secure them the amount to be paid, and no
credit appears to have been given to him by
the plaintiff. The property passed into the
possession of Lawrence, and it does not ap
pear that his title, or the title of the de
fendants, claiming under the mortgage, has
ever been questioned by anybody else, or
possession under it disturbed. After this,
the plaintiff was regularly appointed admin~
istrator of his brother’s estate, and notified
the defendants that he ratified and confirmed
fits administrator, all his acts and contracts
\with them in the sale of said property. And
thereupon they told him, by the defendant
Proctor, their agent in the premises, that the
agreement for the payment of said sum was
fair, and the inoney should be paid; though
shortly after, while the property still reinain
ed with Lawrence, they notified the plaintif!
that they claimed no title to the same under
the mortgage, which they thought invalid.
In the opinion of the court, the evidence
offered should not have been rejected. The
facts, if proved, would entitle the plaintiff/to
maintain his action.
The defendants do not now insist that the
contract cannot be enforced as against the
statute of frauds. It was an original prom
ise made by the defendants to pay for prop
erty delivered to another. Stone v. Walker,
13 Gray, 613; Swift v. Pierce, 13 Allen, 136.
The personal estate of a deceased intestate,
when an administrator is appointed, vests in
him by relation from the time of the death.
Until then the title may be considered to be
in abeyance. Lawrence v. Wright, 23 Pick.
128. He may have an action of trespass or
trover for goods of the intestate taken before
letters granted. When the wrongdoer has
sold the property taken, the administrator
may waive the tort and recover in nssumpsit
for money had and received. And, in a case
very like the one at bar, it was held that,
where the sale was made avowedly on ac
count of the estate, by one who had been
agent of the intestate, the administrator aft
erwards appointed might recover from the
vendee in assumpsit for goods sold and de
livered. Foster v. Bates, 12 Mees. & W.
226, 233. It is said that, if an executor de
son tort obtains letters of administration
pendente lite, it legaifzes his previous tor
tious acts. 1 Williams, ExIrs (6th Ed.) 598,
and cases cited. By the law of this state.
as laid down by Hoar, J., in Alvord v. Marsh.
12 Allen. 603, the letters of administration.
by operation of law, make valid all acts of
the administrator in settlement of the estate
from the time of the death. They become
by relation lawful acts of administration for
which he must account. And this liability
to account invorves a validity in his acts
which is a protection to those who have dealt
with him.
The case here presents no question as to
the peculiar liability of an executor in his
own wrong, to creditors, to the rightful ad
ministrator, or to others who have suffered
by his unlawful acts. As to the defendants,
the sale here was not tortious. It was made
legal, and the title of the vendee confirmed,
by the retroactive effect of the subsequent
letters of administration. Nor is it to be
overlooked that the defendants knew, when
the property was delivered and the war
ranty of title given, that the vendor had no
legal right to sell. There was no ignorance
or mistake on their part, and no fraud or
false aflirmation of title on the part of the
plaintiff. The property still remains undis
turbed in the hands of the purchaser. The
plaintiff’s express confirmation of the sale
was agreed to, and payment of the price
promised. These last considerations alone
would. under the circumstances, seem to be
a suflicient answer to the defence set up.
Story, Sales, § 367b, note; Id. § Q3.
Exceptions sustained.
138 ACTS DONE BEFORE GRANT OF LETTERS.
ROZELLE v. HARMON.
(l5 s. w. 432. 103 140.839.)
Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.
Feb. 24, 1891.
Appeal from circuit court, Holt county;
C. A. ANTHONY, Judge.
L. R. Knowles, John Edwards, and H.
8. Keller, for appellant. E. Van Buskfrk
and T. C. Dungan, for respondent.
MACFARLANE. J. This suit was com
mencedin thecircuit court of Holt county.
Plaintiff was a creditor of one B. W. Ross.
deceased. The suit was for the purpose
of recovering the amount of the debt from
defendant on the ground that he had
wrongfully appropriated and converted
the assets belonging to Ross’ estate to his
own use. Plaintiff recovered judgment in
the circuit court. and defendant appealed
to the Kansas (I.ity court of appeals, where
the judgment was reversed. The case was
certified to this court by the court of ap
peals on the ground that the decision
rendered therein was in conflict with the
decision of this court in the cases of Foster
v. Nowlin, 4 Mo. 18, and Magner v. Ryan,
19 M0. 196. The question presented by
the record in this case is mlfllriflntly stated
by Judge PHrLrPs (29 Mo. App. 578) to be
"whether there can be, under the probate
system of this state, an executor de son
tort,in so for as to authorize a single cred
itor ofthe intestate to maintain an action
of trover against him, as here sought, and
thereby appropriate the whole assets to
the payment of plaintiff’s debt." The
system provided by the la ws of our state
for thesettlement of the estates of deceased
persons was evidently intended to be ex
clusive of all others. Theconstitu tion pro
vides for the establishment of a probate
court in each county, which shall have
jurisdiction in all matters pertaining to
probate business. Tlieluws of the state
governing the procedure in the manage
ment and settlement of estates are ample
and suflicient to meet any emergency that
may possibly arise during administration.
They provide for the appointment of ex
ecutors and administrators, for the pres
ervation of the property, and the collec
tion of the debts of- the estate. They also
provide summary and efficient proceed
lugs for the discovery of assets, and for
their recovery 'from the possession of one
who in tcrmeddles with them. Under
them any creditor can have an adminis
trator appointed. Each county is provid
ed with a public administrator. already
qualified, whose duty requires him sum
marily to take charge of all estates in
which the property is leftina situation ex
posed to loss or damage; and the court is
given power to require him to take charge
of any other estates in case of necessity.
Ample provision is made for the allowance
and classification of debts, converting the
assets into money, and paying the debts
of all creditors pro rata according to clus
sification. Executors and administrators
alone, under these laws, can recover the
assets or damages for its conversion. All
these provisions of the law are wholly in
.consistent with the idea of executors de
son tort as at common law. The admin~
istration laws of the state do not recog
nize the right to wrongfully administer,
nor the right of onecreditor to secure pay
ment of his debt to the exclusion of others.
Itisinsisted by plaintiff that thisstate has
adopted the common law, that under
the rules of the common law his action is
authorized. and that the rules of the com
mon law on this subject have not been.
abrogated by the statutes.
ed that under proper rules of construction
a statute in derogation of the common
law must be strictly construed, and that
none of its rules can be changed, except by
express terms of the statute, or by neces
sary implica tion therefrom.
construction is not of universal applica
tion. It depends much on thecharacter of
the law to be affected. in case of statutes
penal in their character, or in derogation
of common right, a strict construction is‘
required; but in regard to statutes merely
remedial in their characters fair. if not -
liberal, construction should be given.
()ster v. Rabeneau. 46 M0. 595; Putnam v.
Ross, Id. 337; Chamberlain v. Transfer
Co., 44 N. Y. 305; Buchanan v. Smith, 43
Miss. 90. The statute of this state. adopt
ing the common law, itself limits or modi
fies the rule of construction insisted upon.
Section 3l17. St. 1879, provides that the
common law, which is not repugnant to
or inconsistent with the constitution of
this state or the statute laws in force for
the time being. shall be the rule of action
and decision in this state. The examina
tion we have given shows conclusively that
thestutute laws of thisstate on thesubject
ofadministration, taken together as form~
ingoneentiresystem.are wholly repugnant
to and inconsistent with the common law
in respect to administrators de son tort.
We must therefore conclude that the inten- \
tion of the legislature was to supcrsedethe
common law on that subject altogether./
The early cases of this court referred to by
the court of appeals do seem to have rec
ognized and acted under the common-law
doctrine invoked by plaintiff in this case.
but since that early day the- administra
tion laws of the state have been greatly
enlarged, the jurisdiction of the probate
courts ex tended, and the powers and duties
of administrators and executors increased
until there is no longer a place in the sys
tem for the inequitable. expensive, and
tedious proceedings required by the rules
of the common law in bringing intermed
dlers tosettlement. The opinion of Pun.
1Ps,P.J..in thlscase when before the court
of appeals, and which is reported in 29 Mo.
App. 570, with the authorities cited by him,
is convincing and conclusive, and is adopt
ed as the opinion of this court. The judg
ment of the court of appeals is uflirmed,
and that of the circuit court of Holt coun
ty reversed. All the judges of this division
:oncur.
it is contend-x
That rule of r
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VAUGHN v. BARRET.
(5 Vt. 333.)
Supreme Court of Vermont.
1833.
Rutland, Jan.,
This was an action of debt on judgement
brought by Wm. Vaughn, administrator upon
the estate of John W. Mott, deceased, late of
,the city, county and state of New York. The
writ in this case was dated and served on
the first of September, A. D. 1831. It was
alleged in the declaration that the judge
ment was recovered by John W. Mott, afore
said, against the defendant, by the consider
ation of the liutland county court, at their
term, began and holden at said Rutland on
the 2d Monday of Sept. A. D. 1826, for the
sum of four hundred and fifty-seven dollars
and nine cents, for damages and costs, and
that no part of said judgement has been
paid except $309.88, being part of the dam
ages which had been allowed against the
estate 01’ Erastus Barker, ving the sum of
one hundred and thirty-sis dollars and two
cents damages, and the further sum of twelve
dollars and nine cents costs, making in
whole $148.11, being the residue of said
judgement. The defendant pleaded that
after the recovery of said judgement and be
fore the commencement of this suit, to wit,
on the 20th of October 1827, Henry Mott, of
the said city of New York, was regularly ap
pointed administrator by James Campbell,
surrogate of the said city of New York, upon
the estate of the said John W. Mott; and
that afterwards, to wit, on the 24th day of
November, A. D. 1830, the said Henry Mott
as administrator as aforesaid, for a valu
able consideration executed to the said Jaaz~
aniah a discharge of said judgement in favor
of said John W. Mott. To this plea, the
plaintifl.’ replied that prior to the said 24th
day of November, A. D. 1830, the time at
which the said Henry Mott discharged the
judgement, to wit, on the third of April, A.
D. 1830, the said William Vaughn was regu
larly appointed administrator upon the
estate of the said John W. Mott, by the pro
bate court for the district of Rutland, but
there was no protert of the records of said
probate court. And that the defendant at
the time of the recovery of the said judge
ment against him in favor of the said John
W. Mott, and long before and ever since, has
been and still is an inhabitant of the state of
Vermont, residing in said probate district,
and not a citizen or inhabitant of the state
of New York. To which replication there
was a general demurrer and joinder in the
demurrer. The county court rendered judge
ment for the plaintiff, and the defendant.ex
cepted; whereupon the case comes here for
reconsideration.
J. Clark, for plaintift'. Moses M. Strong,
for defendant.
PHELPS, J. It appears that John W.
Mott, being a citizen and resident of New
York, obtained a judgement against the de
i’endant, and afterwards died in -New York.
Administration of his effects was there com
mitted, by the surrogate, to Henry Mott, and
administration of the effects of J. W. Mott
in this state, was granted to the plaintiff, by
the probate court, for the district of Rut
land within which the defendant resided.
Subsequently the defendant obtained a dis
charge from Henry Mott, and, the plaintiff
having brought this action, the defendant
pleads that discharge in bar. The question
is, will the discharge avail him? The dis
position of effects left vacant by the decease
of the owner, has ever been regarded as a
matter strictly of tocal jurisdiction. It is in
deed a proceeding in rem; and in every
country, is considered as falling within the
jurisdiction of the particular state, province
or district. in which the effects are situate.
In England, where this subject is com
mitted to the ordinary, if there are effects in
two dioceses, administration must be taken
in the provincial court; and if there are ef
fects in two provinces, i. e. within the juris
diction of two arch-bishops, administration
must be taken in both. The reason given is,
that they are each supreme jurisdictions,
and neither can act in the other. Bac. Abr.
tit. “Executors," E; Hardress, 216; 1 Salk.
39-40; 3 Bl. Comm. 509. So no notice is
taken there, of administration granted
abroad, nor does a grant of administration
in England extend to the colonies. "lie
same view of the subject has ever been taken
in the United States. Hence, an adminis
trator appointed in a foreign state, has no
authority in the United States. Graeme v.
Harris, 1 Dall. 456; Dixon v. Ramsay, 3
Cranch, 319; Lewis v. McFarland, 9 Cranch,
151; Selectmen of Boston v. Boylston, 2
Mass. 384. So letters of administration
granted in one of the states are of no au
thority in another. This point has been re
peatedly decided by the courts of the United
States. See Fenwick v. Sears, 1 Cranch, 259;
Dixon v. Ramsay, 3 Cranch, 319; Champlin
v. Tilley, 3 Day, 304, Fed. Cas. No. 2,586. It
has been so held in Maine, (see Stearns v.
Burnhnm, 5 Greenl. 261;) in New Hamp
shire, (see Sabin v. Gilman, 1 N. H. 198;) in
Massachusetts, (see Goodwin v. Jones, 3
Mass. 514; Selectmen of Boston v. Boylston,
2 Mass. 384; Borden v. Borden, 5 Mass. 67;
Richards v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 506; Stevens v.
Gaylord, 11 Mass. 256;) in Connecticut, (see
Riley v. Riley, 3 Day, 74; Stanton v. Holmes,
4 Day, 87;) and similar decisions have been
had in Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, and North
Carolina. So far indeed has this doctrine
been carried, that in some states, they do
not hold an administrator appointed abroad
responsible within their jurisdiction, nor an
administrator appointed within the state, re
sponsible for effects received out of their
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jurisdiction.
above.
This subject has also been before our
courts, and similar decisions had. See Dodge
v. Wetmore, Brayt. 92; also, Lee v. Havens,
Id. 93. The case of Lee v. Havens, is strict
ly in point with the present. In that case an
administrator appointed in Massachusetts,
had attempted to evade our jurisdiction, by
indorsing a note due from a citizen of this
state to his intestate there. A suit was
brought by the endorser, but the court held
the indorsement nugatlory as the adminis
trator had no interest in, or control over, the
note in question. In short, if the courts of
this state have jurisdiction, it follows that
the courts of no other state can have. The
idea of a concurrent jurisdiction, in such a
case, is absurd and impracticable. If any
reason be necessary to show the propriety of
the decisions on this subject, it is found in
the obvious propriety, not to say necessity,
of protecting the rights of our own citizens
who may be creditors 01’ the intestate. To
suffer the eflfects of the intestate to be eioin
ed, without attending to these rights, is an
act of comity to other jurisdictions which
no state doc, or will exercise. An idea
seems to have been entertained, that the
jurisdiction over the debt in this case, fol
lowed the person of the creditor. But it is
to be observed, that jurisdiction, or the right
of administration in respect to debts due a
deceased person, never follows the residence
of the creditor. They are always bona no
tabififa, unless they happen to fall within the
See 2, 5 and 8 Mass., cited jurisdiction where he resided. See Bac. Abr.
"Executor-s," E; Cro. Eliz. 472. Judgements
are bona notabiifa where the record is, (lid.
Raym. 855; Garth. 149; 8 Mod. 244; Anon,
6 Geo. 11., cited by Selw.;) specialties, where
they are at the time 01' the creditor’s deceasc,
(Lum v. Dodson, cited in Selw. N. P.; Byron
v. Byron, Cro. Eliz. 472;) and simple con
tracts where the debtor resides, (Carth. 373;
Salk. 37; Ld. Raym. 562.)
An attempt is also made to support this
defence upon the rule of lex loci contractus.
This rule in most cases is founded upon the
supposed intent of the parties. Further than
this it is a matter of comity merely, as no in
dependent state is bound to execute, or be
governed by, the laws of another. To apply
the rule however to a case like the present,
and permit the interference of another state
with subjects falling within our jurisdiction,
would be an abandonment of our sovreignty.
All transactions taking place in New York,
upon matters subject to their jurisdiction, it
regular by their laws, would be properly re
garded here. 'A judgement rendered there
if the parties and subject matter are within
their jurisdiction, would be held conclusive;
and even the act of a sheriff executed there,
would, under like circumstances be esteemed
valid, if called in question here. But we
should hardly concede to their courts, the
power of acting upon the title of our lands,
or to theirIsheriflfs that of disposing of them
at auction.
The judgement of the county court is
therefore aflirmed.
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NELSON v. POTTER.
(15 Atl. 375, 50 N. J. Law, 324.)
Supreme Court of New Jersey. Feb. Term,
1888.
On certificate upon a feigned issue out of
the court of chancery. .
Argued, November term, 1887, before DE
PUE, VAN SYCKEL, and KNAPP, Jus
tices.
John S. Voorhees, for plaintiff. A. Q.
Keasbey, for defendant.
DEP UE, J. This suit involves title to cer
tain lands situate in the county of Middle
sex, in this state, oi.’ which Isaac J. Potter
died seized. The deceased, whose domicile
was in California, died May 19, 1885. By
his last will, dated November 19, 1884, he
devised the residue of his estate, in which
the lands in question were included, to two
incorporated societies. The plaintiff derived’
title by conveyance from these societies.
The defendant makes title as an heir at law
of the deceased. The testator’s will was 'in
writing, and signed by him, but not executed
by him in the presence of subscribing w-it
nesses. It is admitted that the will was
made and executed in compliance with the
laws of Cali’ornia, and that under the laws
of that state it would be a valid testamen
tary disposition of lands. It was not made
and executed in conformity with the law Iof
‘ this state, which requires all wills to be ex
ecuted in the presence of two witnesses,
present at the same time, who shall sub
scribe their names thereto as witnesses in
the presence of the testator. Revision, p.
1247, § 22. The certificate presents the ques;
tion whether a will, made and executed by
a non-resident testator. in such a manner
as by the law of his domicile would be a
,valid devise of lands, can operate to devise
glands in this state, the will not having been
executed in conformity with the law of this
state.
‘
The incidents of real estate, its disposi
tion, and the right of succession, depend up
on the lex rei sitae. The validity of be
quests ot personal property depends upoIn
the law of the testator’s domicile, and the
validity of devises of real property upon the
law of the state where the lands lie. Hence
a will executed according to the law of the
testator’s domicile will pass personal prop'
erty wherever situate; but, with respect to
devises of lands, the will must be executed
according to the formalities prescribed by
the law of the state in which the land is
situated. 4 Kent, Comm. 91, 93; Story, ConflI.
Law, § 474; Whart. Confi. Law, § 585; Jones
v.Habersham, 107 U. S. 174-179, 2 Sup. Ct.
336; Robertson v. Pickreli, 109 U. S. 608, 3
Sup. Ct. 407; Pratt v. Douglas, 38 N. J. Eq.
516; 1 Jarm. Wills, (Rand. Ed.) 1, note b.
The courts of one state are without ju
risdiction over title to lands in another state.
The clause of the federal constitution which
requires full faith and credit to be given in
each state to the records and judicial pro’
ceedings of every other state applies to the
records and proceedings of courts only so
far as they have jurisdiction. Public Works.
v. College, 17 Wall. 521; Davis v. Headley,
22 N. J. Eq. 115-121. Hence the probate ot
a will in one state, though conclusive as to,
title to personalty if the probate be made at
the domicile of the testator, is of no force in
establishing the sufliciency or validity of a
devise of land in another state. It can ob;
tain such force only in virtue of some law
of the state in which the lands are situate.
McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192; Dar
by v. Mayer, Id. 465; Watts v. Waddle, 6.
Pet. 389; Robertson v. Pickreli, 109 U. S.
608, 3 Sup. Ct. 407; Brine v. Insurance Co.,
96 U. S. 6I27, 635. The state legislature might
provide that lands within the state should
pass by a devise in a will executed accord
ing to the law of the state or country in.
which the testator was domiciled. But an
act of legislation oi.' that import would be so
extraordinary and impolitic, in its tendency
to introduce doubt and uncertainty in the
title to lands, that a statute of that simill
tude would not be allowed that effect, unless.
such intent was expressed in clear and un
equivocal language.
The testator’s will was duly probated in
the oflice ot the clerk of Tuolumna county,
Cal, May 27, 1885, and an exemplified copy
thereof filed and recorded in the surrogateIs
oflice of Middlesex county, in this state, May
2, 1887, in compliance with the act of the
legislature of May 11, 1886, (Supp. Revision,
775.) It is contended by the plaintid? that,
by force of this statute, a will, not executed
in the manner prescribed by the law of this
state, is nevertheless operative to devise
lands in this state, if it be executed accord
ing to the formalities required for a devise
of lands by the law of the state or country
where the testator was domiciled. The act
in question provides that when any will shall
have been admitted to probate in any state
or territory of the United States, or the Dis
trict of Columbia, or in any foreign state
or kingdom, and any person shall desire to
have the same recorded in this state, for the
purpose of making title to lands or real es
tate in this state, it should be lawful for the
surrogate of any county in this state, upon,
an exemplified copy of such will and of the
certificate of probate thereof and of the let
Iters testamentary, exemplified and attested
as mentioned in the act, being filed in his
oflice, to record such will, certificate, and
letters, and file the said copy in his ofifice.
The act further provides that any such will,
certificate, and letters, being so recorded,
should have the same force and effect, in
respect to all lands and real estate whereof
the testator died seized, as if the said will
had been admitted to probafe,I and let
ters testamentary had been issued in this
state. It also provides that all. conveyances
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(heretofore or thereafter made by any ex
ecutor, or by any devisee, should be as valid
as if said will had been admitted to probate,
and letters testamentary, etc., had been' ls
sued in this state, and that such record or
certified copies thereof should be received
in evidence in all courts of this state. This
statute was originally passed March 28, 1866,
(Nixon, Dig. p. 1035, § 40.) It was repealed
in 187-, (P. L. 187;, p. 58,) and restored lm
1873, (P. L. 1873, p. 168,) and was included
in the orphans’ court act in the Revision 04
1874. Revision, p. 757, § 26. It was reenact
ed with some amendments in 1882, (P. L.
1882, p. 112,) and again in 1856, with some!
other amendments, (Supp. Revision, 775;)
but the act as it now stands is, so far as
concerns this suit, substantially the same
as it was when it was passed in 1866. The
act, as passed in 1866. was entitled “A sup
plement to the act relative to the probate
-of wills from other or foreign states," which
was an act passed April 15, 1846, (Nixon,
Dig. p. 1032, § 31.) The act of 1846, to which
the act of 1866 was a supplement, was orig
inally passed March 6, 1828, under the title
of "An act relative to the probate of wills,"
(Har. Comp. 195;) and with some additions.
of no importance in this case, was included
ln the Revision of 1846, under the title above
mentioned.
When the act of 1828, providing for the
record of foreign wills, was passed, statutes
were in force making the record of wills
originally proved under the laws of this
state, either in the prerogative court or be
fore the surrogate, or transcriptsthereof,
competent evidence of the same validity and
eflfect as if the original will were produced
and proved. The germ of this legislation
was the act of March 17, 1713-14, (Nixon,
Dig. 1034; Revision, 1249;) which in the sec
ond section provided that wills thereafter
made in writing, signed and published by
the testator in the presence of three sub
scribing witnesses. and regularly proved and
entered upon the books of records or regis
ters, should be sufficient to devise and con
vey lands, tenements, hereditamcnts, or oth
er estates, as effectually, to all intents and
purposes, as if the testator had conveyed
the same away in his lifetime; and that
the books in which they were registered or
recorded should be accepted, and be suflicient
evidence at all times and places. The fourth
section declared that the copy of any will,
made in any of his majesty’s colonies, by
which any real estate within this colony is
devised, being proved according to the cus
tom of such colony, and certified under the
great seal of such colony, should be received
in evidence in any of the courts within this
province, and be esteemed as valid and sufifi
cient as if the original will or testament was
then and there produced and proved. This
act is still in force. (the word “colony" being
taken to include “state,") except as modified
by the act concerning wills, of March 12,
1851, (Revision, 1247,) with respect to the
number of witnesses required, and the mode
of executing and attesting wills. Graham
v. Whitely, 26 N. J. Law, 254-259; 4 Griff.
Law Reg. 1241, § 72. Mr. Griffith, in com
menting on the act of 1713-14, and other
provisions for authenticating wills made in
other states. as furnishing evidence of the
existence and of the probate of such a will
in another state, containing a devise of lands
in this state, adds that: “Still it [the will]
must appear to be executed in such manner
as our law requires for the devising of real
estate lying here." 4 Griff. Law Reg. 1241,
§ 72, note 1.
None of these acts, which made the rec
ord of probate or transcripts thereof evi
dence, was designed to change the law with
respect to the manner in which wills were
required to be executed to make a valid de’
vise of lands. When these acts were passed,
and down to the act of 1851, a will of per’
sonalty was valid, and therefore entitled to
probate, though it was executed without any
subscribing witnesses; and at the same time
a will was inoperative to devise lands, un
less executed in the presence of subscribing
witnesses, and with certain formalities pro
vided by statutes regulating that subject.
The object of these acts was simply to pro
vide instruments of evidence to dispense
with the production of the subscribing wit
nesses in support of title by devise. As was
said by Chief Justice Beasley, the inten~
tion was to make them prima facie evidence
for the sake of convenience. Otterson v.
Hofford, 36 N. J. Law. 129-133. If the will,
as probatcd, showed a will executed in such
a manner as was required for a valid devise
of lands. the record of the probate, or a tran
script thereof, was prima facie evidence of
the title of the devisee. If the record did
not exhibit a will so executed, the record or
transcript went for naught. Den. v. Allen, 2
N. J. Law, 35, 38, 42, '£3; Allaire v. Allaire, 37
N. J. Law, 312, 318, 319, 39 N. J. Law, 113.
The act of 1846, which applies to foreign
wills, must receive the same construction;
for by the third section of that act it is de
clared that such record, or certified copies
thereof, should be evidence in the same man
ner, and have the same force and effect, as
if such will had been proved in the usual
manner, under the existing laws of this
state. It was so decided in Allaire v. Al
laire, supra.
It was contended by the plaintiff, to sus
tain this devise, that the act of 1886, (Supp.
Revision, 775,) requires a broader construc
tion. The argument was based upon the
phrase. "shall desire to have the same re
corded in this state for the purpose of mak
ing title to lands or real estate in this state,"
and the fact that conveyances theretofore
or thereafter made by executors or devisees
were validated. The reason for the intro
duction of the words above quoted, with re
spect to the purpose for which such will was
\/
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recorded, is apparent. The act of 1846 con- I
templated letters testamentary, or of admin
istration upon the recording of the will, and
required a bond, with security from non
residents for the faithful administration of I
the testator’s estate. In some instances the |
record of a foreign will in this state was i
needed exclusively as a munlment of title, I
without any administration on the testator’s
estate. The supplements of 1866 and 1886 I
were designed to meet this situation of af- i
fairs. Provision was therein made for re
cording the will for the sole purpose of mak
ing title to lands or real estate in this state
without letters testamentary or of adminis
tration thereon. and consequently without
any bond for the administration of the tes~ ,
tator’s estate. And it will be observed that
in every instance in these statutes, in which ,
the effect of such a record is declared, it is
declared that such will, upon being recorded, I
"shall have the same force and effect, in re
spect to all lands and real estate whereof .
the testator died seized. as if said will had 1
been admitted to probate, and letters testa-
imentary or of administration with the will ,
annexed had been issued in this state;" and
that conveyances of such real estate by the ’
executor or devisee, “shall be as valid as if
said will had been admitted to probate, and '
letters testamentary or of administration I
with the will annexed had been issued in this 1
i
i
i
state." in this language the legislature ex
pressed a purpose to put such a will, when ,
recorded, on the same footing, with respect
to lands, as wills recorded under the act of
1866. The language in which these stat
utes are expressed gives no countenance t0
the supposition that the legislature intended
to suspend the statute concerning wills, with
respect to lands in this state, in favor of for
sign testators: or to give the record of for
eign wills an effect which it has not given
to domestic wills, duly probated in our
courts. The whole of the legislation with re
spect to the force and effect of the probate
and recording of wllls,—domestic or foreign,
—upon the title to lands, is of the same char
acter. The record of probate, or a transcript
thereof, is made competent evidence dis
pensing with proof by the subscribing wit
nesses; leaving the legal effect of the will,
as a devise of lands, to be determined as it
would be if the original will was produced
and proved. The testator’s will, if produced
and proved, would be inoperative to devise
lands in this state. It acquired no additional
force from the recording. A certificate will
be made that the title to the lands in ques
tion did not pass under the testator’s will,
but descended to his heirs at law.
In preparing this opinion, I have not over
looked the fact that upon the testator’s
death, in 1885, the lands in question de
scended to his heirs at law, and that their
title was vested before the act of 1886 was
passed. But inasmuch as the act of 1882,
which was in force when the testator died,
: is, in all respects material to this contro
versy, identical with the act of 1886, I pre
ferred to consider the case as if controlled
by the latest act on this subject.
NOTE. According to the uniform course of
i the decisions of this court, the validity of these
devises, as against the heirs at law, depends upon
the law of the state in which the lands lie, and
the validity of the bequests, as against the next
of kin, upon the law of the state in which the
testatrix had her domicile. Vidal v. Girard, 2
How. 127; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55; Mc
Donogh v. Murdoch, 15 How. 367; Fontain v.
Ravenel, 17 How. 369, 384, 394: Perin v. Ca
rey, 24 How. 465; Lorings v. Marsh, 6 Wall.
331; U. S. v. Fox. 94 U. S. 315; Kain v. Gib
boney, 101 U. S. 362; Russell v. Allen, 107 U.
S. 163, 2 Sup. Ct. 327.
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JOHNSON et al. v. “"ALLIS et al.
(19 N. E. 653, 112 N. Y. 230.)
Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 15, 1889.
Appeal from supremecourt, general term,
Second department.
Action for specific performance, brought
by William S. Johnson et al. against Hamil
ton Wallis et al., executors of A. H. Wallis.
Judgment for plaintiff was aflirmed by the
general term, and defendants appeal.
William G. Wilson, for appellants. Frank
C. Lown, for respondents.
FINCH, J. Thi is an action in equity to
compel the specific performance by the vend
ors of a contract to sell and assign a judg
ment recovered by John McAnerney and
others in the supreme court of this state
against a corporation known as the "Hud
son River Iron Company." The judgment
was assigned to one Alexander H. Wallis,
who was a resident of New Jersey, and
died, leaving a last will and testament,
which has been duly proved in that state,
and by which the defendants were ap
pointed executors. They have qualified,
and entered upon the performance of their
trust. They thereafter made a written con
tract with one Jacob Russell, all whose
rights have passed to the present plaintiff,
to sell and assign to him such judgment for
a price to be fixed as follows: The judgment
was a lien, or supposed to be a lien, upon
certain lands under the waters of the Hud
son river, near Poughkeepsie, in this state,
and had no value beyond such lien. Ar
bitrators were chosen to fix the value of
one acre of the upland, and that value,
multiplied by the number of acres subject
to the lien, was to be the purchase price of
the judgment. That value was ascertained,
the price tendered, and a deed duly de
manded, which was refused, and thereupon
this action was brought. The plaintiff had
judgment, which the general term aflirmed,
and the defendants appealed to this court.
They rely mainly upon the proposition
that as foreign executors they could not sur
or be sued in this state, and acquire all
their rights from and owe their responsi
,billties to another jurisdiction. That is the
)general rule, but in this state, at least, is
confined to claims and liabilities resting’?
wholly upon the representative character. In
Lawrence v. Lawrence, 3 Barb. Ch. 74, the
rule was declared to be applicable only to
suits brought upon debts due to the testator
in his lifetime, or based upon some trans
action with him, and does not prevent a
foreign executor from suing in our courts
upon a contract made with him as such ex
ecutor. Of course, where he can sue upon
such a contract, he may be sued upon it.
The remedy must run to each party, or
neither. In the present case the action is
not founded upon any transaction with the
deceased, but upon a contract which the de
fendants themselves made. By force of th
will and their appointment they became \/
owners of the judgment. Their title, al
though acquired under the foreign law, was
good. In Petersen v. Bank, 32 N. Y. 21, the
foreign executor sold an obligation of the
estate, and his assignee sued upon it. The
;action was sustained on the grounds that,
the title of the foreign executor was good,I
and he could transfer it, and while he could
not have sued upon it his asslgnee was not
prevented. In this case, therefore, the de
fendants were owners of the judgment, and
could lawfully contract for its sale. Having
done so, they were liable upon that contract,
which could be enforced against them be
cause they made it, and it did not derive
its existence from any act or dealing of
their testator. We agree, therefore, with the
courts below that the action could be main
tained.
Objection is made that the arbitrators
valued the land under water, and not the
upland. The arbitrators certify that they
valued the land per acre lying between the
railroad and the river. That was upland,
and not land under water. While they de
scribe lt as 11 8-10 acres, that may be re
jected as an immaterial element of the de
scription, and does not establish that their
valuation extended to anything but the up
land. Taking their whole report together.
its fair meaning is that they valued one
acre of upland at $25, and so the value of
the 11 8-10 was $295.
The judgment should be afflrmed with
costs.
All concur.
Judgment aflirmed.
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FUGATE v. MOORE et al.
(11 S. E. 1063, Ski Va. 1045.)
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Sept.
17, 1890.
Appeal from decree of circuit court of Lee
county, rendered June 21, 1887, in a suit
wherein Nathan H. Moore and others were
complainants and the appellant, Peter P.
Fugate, executor of M. B. Overton, deceased,
was the defendant. Opinion states the case.
Duncan & Seweif, for appellant. A. L.
Pridemore, for appeliees.
LEWIS, P. The testator at his death, in
1880, was domiciled in Tennessee, and there
the will was proved, and the executor quali
fled. No administration upon the estate has
ever been granted in Virginia. The legacy
sued for is claimed under the second clause
of the will, which is as follows: “(2) I give
and bequeath to Martha J. Combs, daughter
of Virginia A. Combs, deceased, five hun
dred dollars out of the G. B. Short debt,
when collected and put at interest, including
the amount due her in my hands from the
estate of Virginia A. Combs, deceased; and, if
the above Martha J. Combs should die leav
ing no heirs of her body, the said amount
to be divided equally between my heirs."
The bill alleges that the complainant, Moore,
after the testator’s death, intermarried with
the said Martha, since deceased, and had
issue by her, who survived her about three
months, leaving the complainant its sole dis
tributee; that both the complainant and the
defendant, the executor, reside in Lee
county, in this state; that the Short debt
"was owing" in that county; that the same
has been “collected by the said executor;"
and that the money remains undisbursed in
his hands. The object of the bill, therefore,
as averred, is "to enforce said trust, and to
compel the defendant to pay said legacy."
There was a demurrer to the bill, on the
ground—First, of want of jurisdiction, inas
much as the bill shows on its face that the
defendant has never been appointed or
qualified as the personal representative of
the testator in this state, but in Tennessee
only, where the testator was domiciled; and
secondly, because the complainant, not be
ing the personal representative either of his
deceased wife or of their deceased infant
child, had no right to sue. The defendant
also answered the bill, denying, among
other things, that the Short debt was pay
able in this state, and averring that Short,
the debtor, resided in Hancock county, in
Tennessee, and that the debt had there been
collected. Afterwards an amended bill was
filed, in which it was charged that the Short
debt was secured by a lien on certain real
estate in Tennessee, which had been sold to
enforce the lien; that at the sale the defend
ant purchased the land for a sum suflicient
to pay the debt. and now owes the purchase
LAw SUCC.—10
money. To this the defendant answered
that he had not bought the land for him
self, individually, but for the estate, and
that he owed nothing on account thereof.
He admitted, however, that the debt had
been collected. He also demurred to the
amended bill. Afterwards Reese D. Flan
ary, administrator of the deceased wife,
and also of her deceased child, was by con
sent made a party plaintiff to the suit; and,
when tne cause came on to be heard, a de
cree was entered directing the legacy to be
paid to him, which is the decree appealed
from.
It does not appear from the record what
disposition was made of the demurrers to
the original and amended bills; but, as the
decree adjudicates the principles of the cause,
we must assume that they were overruled.
Matthews v. Jenkins, 80 Va. 463.
A number of questions were dicussed in
the argument at the bar, of which one of
the principal was whether the legacy is a
vested or contingent one; but, in the view
we take of the case, it will not be necessary
to pass upon that question. We think the
objection to the jurisdiction must be sus
tained, and therefore that the case must go
on’ on that ground.
It is an established general rule that a
grant of administration has no legal opera
tion outside of the tate from whose juris
diction it was deri ed. Hence, ordinarily,
no suit can be maintained by any executor
or administrator, or against any executor
or administrator, in his oflicial capacity, in
the courts of any other state. Story, Confl.
Laws (7th Ed.) § 513; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 153;
Andrews v. Avory, 14 Grat. 229; Harvey v.
Richards, 1 Mason, 381. If, however, an
executor or administrator should go into an
other state, and there, without taking out
new letters of administration, should collect
debts or other assets of his decedent, found
there, he would be liable to be sued in the
courts of that country by any creditor there,
and held liable to the extent of the assets
so collected. And in Tunstall v. Pollard, 11
Leigh, 1, it was decided that an executor
who has qualified and received assets in a
foreign country, and has brought them in
to this state, is liable to be sued and to be
compelled to account here, although he has
never qualified here, and although he may
have received no assets here. The present
case however, is not within the principle
of that decision, for here no assets have
been collected in this state, nor have any
been brought hither, by the defendant. The
charge in the amended bill that the land
upon which the Short debt was secured was
purchased by the defendant, and that he now
owes the purchase money out of which the
legacy is payable, is denied in the answer;
and the agreed statement of facts in the
record, upon which the case was decided, is
in conformity with the averments of the
answer on that point. According to those
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averments. the land was purchased by the I strongly combated by Mr. Justice Story in
executor, not for himself, but for the estate;
and it is neither alleged nor proven that,
under the laws of Tennessee the purchase
for the estate was not a valid one. It is ad
Imitted, however. that the debt has been
collected, so that the case stands upon the
same footing as if the land had been sold
to a stranger for cash. The fact that~ the
executor resides in this state does not affect
the case. He is none the less a foreign ex
ecutor on that account. The testator at his
death was an inhabitant of Tennessee; the
executor qualified there; administration has
never been granted here; and no assets of
the testator are, or at any time have been,
in this state; and that is decisive of the
case, so far as the question of jurisdiction
is concerned. The jurisdiction is sought to
be maintained on the ground of a personal
trust in the executor, which, it is insisted,
may be enforced in the courts of this state;
and Governor v. Williams, 3 Ired. 152, cited
in 1 Rob. Pr. (New,) 179, is relied upon. In
that case, it is true, Chief Justice Ruflin
expressed the opinion that an administrator
may be compelled to account in a court of
equity where he may be found to those en
titled to the estate, wherever ‘it may be sit
uate, on the ground of a personal trust, no
matter where it may have been assumed;
but the remark was purely obiter, (the case l
being an action at law, and consequently no
such question being before the court,) and
is, therefore, not authority, even in the
courts of North Carolina. The doctrine is
his treatise on the Conflict of Laws, (sec
tion 514,) where numerous authorities are
cited, including Doolittle v. Lewis, 7 Johns.
Ch. 45, in which case Chancellor Kent said:
“It is well settled that a party cannot sue
or defend in our courts as executor or ad
ministrator under the authority of a for
eign court of probate. Our courts take no
notice of a foreign administration, and, be
fore we can recognize the personal repre
sentative of the deceased and his repre
sentative character, he must be clothed
with authority derived from our law. Ad’
ministration only extends to the assets of
the intestate within the state where it was
granted. If it were otherwise, the assets
might be drawn out of the state, to the
great inconvenience of domestic creditors.
and be distributed, perhaps, on very differ
ent terms, according to the laws of another
jurisdiction." See, also, Vaughan v. North
up, 15 Pet. 1; 1 Lomax, ExIrs, marg. page
142. This doctrine, it is true, has been modi
fied in Virginia, to the extent of holding, as
we have seen, that where a foreign execu
tor comes into this state, bringing assets
with him. he may be sued here; but that, as
we have also seen, does not affect the pres
ent case, nor are we aware of any principle
upon which the unqualified doctrine enunci
ated by Chief Justice Ruflin, and contended
for here, can be supported. The decree
must therefore be reversed and the bill dis
missed for want of jurisdiction.
Decree reversed.
PAYME.’T OF DEBTS AND LEGACIES. 147
HOOVER v. HOOVER.
(5 Pa. St. 351.)
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. June 9, 1847.
Appeal from the orphans’ court of Cumber
land.
The petition (or bill) stated that John
lloover devised a tract of land to his son
David. yielding and paying out of the same
$7,250. in instalments of $700; the first pay
able in six months after testator’s decease.
the second in eighteen months thereafter,
and the remaining instalments yearly. Out
of the first instalment a legacy of $500 was
given to the petitioner. Oi.I the residue. por
tions were given to the testator’s other chil
dren, and the amount undisposed of, with
the residue of the estate, was given equally
among all the children. The petition then
averred the acceptance of the land devised,
prayed an order of sale, etc.
The answer of the devisee admitted the
will, of which he and another were execu
tors, and averred a settlement of an admin
istration account, by which it appeared he
had paid debts of the estate beyond the as
sets $1,683.63, and that debts yet remained
unpaid, which, with that sum. amounted to
$4,453. It further averred there were no as
sets nor any annual payment due out of the
land which respondent could apply to the
payment of legacies. That testator had
made no provision by his will for payment
of his debts, and that the estate would not
be suflicicnt to pay all the legacies when the
assets came to hand, but that they must
abate ratably.
The complainant demurred. and
dismissed the bill.
Graham and Reed, for appellants. Biddle
and Watts, contra.
the court
BELL, J. It is admitted by the defend
ant’s answer, as indeed it could not, with
any show of reason, have been denied, that
the sum of $7,250, bequeathed by the testa
tor to be paid to his children in the propor
tions and at the time mentioned in his will.
is a charge upon the lands devised to David.
It is also admitted that the latter, in pursu
ance of the will, took possession of the lands
devised. and still continues in the seisin and
occupation of them. Upon these facts alone,
it is not to be disputed that. having taken
the land cum onere, he is bound to pay to
his brothers and sisters their several lega
cies as they respectively fall due, and this
liability may be enforced by a proceeding in
the orphans’ court, such as has been insti
tuted here, under the statute giving the spe
cilic remedy. By the terms of this will. not
only is a lien created on the land devised,
but the devisee, immediately upon his ac
ceptance of it, became personally responsible
to the legatees for the amount of their re
spective legacies. As is said in Glenn v.
Fisher, 6 Johns. Ch. 33, a case which can
not, in this particular, be distinguished from
the present, by acceptance, the devisee be
comes absolutely bound for the legacies, and
cannot set up any condition precedent to it.
for the law makes none. He who accepts a
benefit under a will, must conform to all its
provisions, and renounce every right incon
sistent with them. To the same effect is the
doctrine of our own case of Zobach’s Case.
6 Watts, 167, which, in its leading features,
is also very similar to the present. The tes
tator, said Mr. Justice Kennedy, in deliver
ing the opinion of the court, not only intend
ed to charge the land, but to make it a
‘personal charge on the devisee, and he he
came personally liable on taking possession
under the will. These distinct liabilities are
illustrated by the consideration that the es
tate given to David may be treated as an
estate on condition. In a will, no precise
form of words is necessary to create a con~
dition. Any expressions denoting such an
intention will have that effect. Thus a de
vise to A., "he paying," or “he to pay £500
in one year after my decease." would, it is
said, he a condition for the breach of which
the heir might enter. 2 Pow. Dev. 251;
Barnardiston v. Fane, 2 Vern. 366; 1 Eq. Cas.
Abr. 109, pl. 8. But in such a case equity
would afford relief against the forfeiture, on
payment of principal. interest and costs, (1
Pow. Dev. 195, note 7;) and it is not to be
doubted that, on application of the party en
titled to payment out of the land devised, the
devisee would be compelled to perform the
condition, on the principle that no man shall
be allowed to disappoint a will under which
he takes a benefit. Per Eyre, Chief Baron,
in Blake v. Bunbury, 1 "es. Jr. 523. But the
defendant. David Hoover, endeavours to ex
cape from the responsibility he has thus
assumed, by showing that. although five in
smlments of $700 each were due, and pay
able under the will of the testator, at the
time the plaintiff filed his bill in the orphans’
court, these were not suflicient in amount
to cover a balance of debts remaining due
from the testator’s estate, after exhausting
the personal estate and other lands not de
vised; and, therefore, he avers "there are no
assets of the estate of the said John Hoover,
deceased, in his bands, which he could apply
to the payment of the legacy of Michael
Hoover, nor is there any annual payment
due and payable out of the land so as afore
said devised to him, which he can legally
and safely apply to the payment of the said
legacy or any part thereof." This averment
proceeds upon the notion that, although the
aggregate sum charged on the land, and
which, as we have seen, has become the per
sonal debt of the devisee, is directed to be
paid in ascertained legacies and by way of
residuary bequest to the other children of
the testator. yet that is subject to be first
appropriated in payment of the debts due
from his estate. leaving only any balance
that may remain, applicable in satisfaction
‘
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of the legacies, pro rata. This view seems
to have been adopted by the orphans’ court,
and to have led it to the support of the de
fendant’s answer by a dismissal of the plain
tifff’s bill with costs. But in this, we are
of opinion the court was clearly wrong.
Viewed as a personal liability attaching up
on the devisee, there can be no pretence
whatever to say the plaintiff’s legacy is lia
ble to be defeated by the fact that the tes
tator died indebted in a larger amount than
his personal estate was suflicient to dis
charge. This legacy is made directly pay
able by the devisee to the legatee, without
the intervention of the executor, who alone,
has to do with the payment of his testator’s
debts. That the devisee was also executor
can make no difference, for the land devised
did not pass to him in that character, but as
devisee, and his acceptance of it immediately
raised a promise to pay the sums charged
upon it, irrespective of the testator’s debts.
It may be true the latter acted upon a mis
take as to the amount of these debts, and
that a consequence will be a diminution of
the benefit intended to be conferred by him
on his devisee; still this acceptance by the
latter of the thing devised, subject to the
burden expressly imposed on it, closes his
mouth from averring, as a defence to the
plaintiff’s claim, that there are no assets of
the estate of the deceased in his hands appli
cable to the payment of the legacy. The
right of the legatees to claim payment at the
hands of the devisee does not rest upon :1
sets, as such, in his possession. but upon his
liability as devisee, holding under the same
will that gives birth to their interests.
But if we put out of view the personal rc
sponsibilities oi.' the devisee, and treat this
as a case in which a chancellor would mar
shal assets as between creditors, devisees,
and legatees, it will be found the defence set
up here is equally unavailing. In this as
pect, the legacies must be regarded as demon
strative, and, in some sort, partaking of the
nature of specific legacies, as charged upon
a particular fund specially appropriated to
their payment. Ward, Leg. 21. This fund
is the devised land which, it is not denied,
is suflicient for the payment of the balance of
the testator’s debts. and the legacies be
queathed. The established order of the ap
plication of the several funds liable to the
payment of debts is definitively settled by ad
judged cases, and is thus generally stated
by text writers upon this subject. 1. The
general personal estate not expressly, or by
implication, exempted. Q. Lands expressly
devised to pay debts. 3. Estates descended
to the heir. G Devised lands, charged with
the payment of debts generally. whether de
vised in terms general or specific, (every de
vise of land being in its nature specific.) 5.
General pecuniary legacies, pro rata. 6.
Specific legacies. pro rain. 7. Real estate
devised, whether in terms general or specific.
2 Pow. Dev. 667, 668, and cases there cited.
In this instance the first and third class of
assets have been exhausted, without fully
satisfying the debts; and this testator did
not expressly devise any lands for their pay
ment. Nor did he charge any of his lands
with the payment of his debts generally, so
far as we are enabled to ascertain from the
paper-book, which, however, does not set out
the whole of his will. But with us, all the
lands of a decedent, whether descended or
devised, are, by law, charged with the pay
ment of his debts, and, as is intimated in
Manning v. Spooncr, 3 Ves. 118, and express’
1y said by Mr. Justice Rogers, in Walker’s
Estate, 3 Rawle, 241, a case also turning upon
the mode of marshalliug assets in payment
of debts; every testator is presumed to know
the law oi.’ the country in which he lives,
and to make his will in reference to it; and:
he adds, that though a clause in wills, char~
glng the testator’s estate with the payment of.
his debts, is usual, it is by no means neces
sary. for the estate is equally bound without
such direction, and in the order indicated.
Accordingly, in that case, personal property
bequeathed to the widow of the testator was
decreed to be subject to the payment of
debts, before descended real estate could be
called .on. It does not, however, follow
from this, that when no other fund than the
personal estate is provided for the payment
of legacies, and this is swept away by the
creditors of the testator, the legatees are en
titled to call upon the lands devised to re
place the amount abstracted from the per
sonalty, for this would be in contravention
of the order of application I have already
stated. The right to do so seems to depend
upon an expression of intention by the testa
tor to charge the devised lands with his
debts, in which case the assets will be mar
shailed in favour of pecuniary and specific
legatees: lands so charged being appli
cable before pecuniary or specific lega
cies. But the case is very different where
the burden of paying the legacies is spe
cifically imposed on the devised land.
The devisee then takes it so subject, and, in
Pennsylvania, on failure of the prior funds.
also onerated with the debts. The testator
says he shall pay the legacies, and the law
says he shall pay the debts. It is, in this re
spect, like a devise of mortgaged lands,
charged by the testator with the payment ofI
a sum certain, partly applicable to the dis
charge of legacies given to other children of
the testator. When construing such a de
vise, C. J. ~McKean, as the organ of the court,
observed: “It appears to have been the in
tention of the testator that the legacies, spe
eific and pecuniary, should be paid. as well
as that the devise of the real estate should
take effect; and. if practicable, the assets
should be so marshaifed that the testator’s
intention in the whole should be carried into"
execution;" and it was. accordingly, decided
that the specific and pecuniary legacies be
queathed to the children, ought not to be
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brought in case of the particular lands
mortgaged, for the devisee of the real estate
must take it cum oncre, that is, subject to
the mortgage, unless the residue of the per
sonal estate be suflicient to discharge it. In
this case, too, it was apparent the testator
had miscalculated the amount of his debts, a
circumstance which is never allowed to de
feat legatees, where a suflicient fund still
remains. Ruston's Ex'rs v. Ruston, 2 Dali.
243. A similar principle was announced in
the case of Davies v. Topp, 1 Brown, Ch.
455, in note, where one seised in fee of con
siderable real estate, subject to a mortgage,
by his will gave to his sister an annuity,
during her life, to be paid by the person who
should be seised of his real estate, under his
will, and also several pecuniary legacies, the
payment of which, together with his debts,
he charged upon all his real and personal
estate, which he devised, subject thereto, to
his nephew in tail male; and to the same
nephew he gave all the rest of his personal
estate, subject to his debts, legacies, and fu
neral expenses, and appointed him executor
of the will. Upon a bill brought for an ac
count and application of the personal estate,
not specifically bequeathed, in payment of
debts and legacies, and in case the personal
estate should not be suflicient, to have the
deficiency raised by a sale or mortgage of a
competent part of the real estate, the master
of the rolls decreed, and this decree was af
terwards aflirmed by Lord Thurlow on appeal,
that the personal estate not specifically be
queathed should be first applied in payment
of debts, funeral expenses, and legacies, but
in case the personal estate should be insufli
cient for the payment of debts, the balance
due the mortgagee and other specialty cred
itors to be raised by mortgage or sale of cer
tain freehold estates, acquired of the testator
after making his will, and which had de
scended to his heirs at law; and in case
these funds should not be suflicient for the
payment of debts and legacies, the deficiency
to be made good out of the real estate de
vised by the will, charged with the payment
of the testator’s debts and legacies. In
these, and similar instances, a demonstrative
legacy is not suffered to fail while the fund
charged with its payment holds good for the
purpose. After debts, these have the pri
mary claim upon the fund, and where that
fund is land devised, the devisee is, if neces
sary, to be postponed. But here the devises
claims to apply the legacies in case of the
land upon which they are charged, which,
as we have seen, cannot be done. It follows
that, under the facts disclosed, the orphans’
court erred in dismissing the bill of Michael
Hoover, the legatee, and its decree must,
therefore, be reversed.
Decree reversed, and it is ordered that
the record be remitted to the orphans’ court,
with directions to proceed.
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HAYS et al. v. JACKSON et al.
(6 Mass. 149.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Nov. Term, 1809.
The petitioners alleged, and proved by the
requisite documents from the probate of
fice, that the personal estate of the testator
was insufficient, by the sum of 66.000 dol
lars, for the payment of his just debts and
legacies, and thereupon prayed that they
might be licensed to convey so much of the
real estate, of which he died seized, as
should be suflicient to pay those debts and
legacies, with the charges of sale.
Upon notice ordered, the heirs at law ap
pcared, and sundry questions arose, all of
which are discussed in the following opin
ion of the court.
Otis and Sullivan, for petitioners. Pres
cott and Jackson, for respondents.
PARSONS. C. J. Henry Jackson made
his last will on the 13th of January, 1805,
in which he makes the following disposition
of his estate. .
First. After all his jirst debts and funeral
charges are paid, he gives to such of his
nephews and nieces as may survive him,
fifty dollars each. Also, he gives to his
sister Susanna Gray in tee, certain specifick
real estate, on condition thatI she does not
demand against his estate her portion of her
father’s estate remaining in his hands; and
his executors are to hold the real estate,
thus devised her, upon the same trusts as he
held her said portion.
Also, he gives to Mrs. Hepzibah C. Swan
in fee, all the remaining part of his estate,
real and personal, of which he might die
seized, or which might afterwards descend
to him by gift, grant, as heir at law, or oth
erwise, to be held in trust by his executors,
for her sole use and disposal.
And he appoints Judah Hays and Elisha
Sigourney his executors.
Mrs. Swan, the residuary legatee, and also
the heirs at law are before us.
The testator was seized of other real es
tate, than that specifically devised to Mrs.
Gray, when he made his will; and he att
erwards acquired other real estate, which on
his death, without a republication of his
will, descended to his heirs.
It appears that the personal estate, left by
the deceased, is insnflicient to pay all. his
debts. The heirs contend that the lands,
which would pass by the residuary devise to
Mrs. Swan, shall first be applied to the pay
ment of the debts, before the descended
lands can be called for. On the other side,
Mrs. Swan and the executors, who are her
trustees, insist that the descended lands are
first to be appropriated to the payment of
the debts.
Whether we are authorized, on this peti
tion, to marshal the assets; and if we are,
in what manner they are to be marshalled,
are the questions before the court.
The case may first be considered as at
common law, and according to the equitable
rules established for marshalling assets,
where there is a will.
At common law, the lands of a testator
are not assets in the hands of the heirs, for
the payment of any but specialty debts,
where the heir is bound expressly by the
contract. And his lands are not bound for
the payment of any of his debts in the
hands of a devisee, unless charged by the
testator, either generally or specially, in his
will. To prevent the injustice of the testa
- tor, in devising his lands without charging
them with the payment oi? his debts, the
statute of 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 14, was passed,
by which the lands in the hands of a devisee
are made assets for the payment of debts
due on specialties. Since that statute all
the lands of the testator, whether they de
scend or are devised, are charged by law
with the payment of the creditors by spe
cialty; who may also resort to the personal
estate. But creditors by imple contract
can avail themselves only of the personal
estate, and of such of the lands as are
charged in the will with the payment of
debts; unless when they take the place of
creditors, who have been paid out 01.’ the
personal estate. These rights oi.’ the credit
ors remain uncontrouled by any provisions.
which a testator can make.
But as between legatees and devisees who
claim under the will, and the heirs who can
take only what the testator has not given
away, he may regulate the funds, out of
which his debts shall be paid; by which
regulations they will be bound.
And the general rule inequity for mar
shalling assets is thus settled. 1. The per
sonal estate excepting specific bequests, or
such of it as is exempted from the payment
of debts. 2. The real estate which is ap
propriated in the will as a fund for the pay
ment. 3. The descended estate, whether
the testator was seized of it when the will
was made, or it was afterwards acquired.
4. The rents and profits of it, received by
the heir after the testator’s death. And 5.
The lands specifically devised, although
they may be generally charged with the
payment of the debts, but not specially ap
propriated for that purpose. And this rule
is executed by a decree in cbancery, accord
ing to the rights of the pardes respectively
interested.
The laws of this commonwealth, ap
plicable to this subject, may next be con
sidered. And here all the personal estate
of the testator, and all the real estate, of
which he died seized, whether devised or
not, are assets for the payment of all his
debts, whether due by simple contract, or
by specialty. Also by the statute of 1783,
c. 24, § 10, all estate real or personal, unde
vised in any will, shall be distributed as if
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it were intestate, and the executor shall ad
minister upon it as such.
A question has been made, whether the
executor must take out administration on
\such undevised estate, or whether he shall
administer it ex ofiiclo as executor. The
usage has been to administer it without a
letter of administration: and we are satis
fied that this usage is correct. There can
be no benefit to any person, from having
two accounts opened by the executor in the
probate office; and the natural construction
of this section supports the usage. For the
executor. by the probate of the will, has the
administration of the testate estate, ao
cording to the will, and on undevised estate
he is also directed to administer agreeably
to the provisions respecting intestate es
tate.
According to the strict rules of law, there
can he no undevised personal estate in a
will, where an executor is appointed: for he
has all the personal estate. whether ac
quired before or after the will. in trust,
tirst to pay the debts and then the legacies;
and if any remained, it was his own, un
less the testator by his provision for the
executor. had excluded him from it; in
which case he was trustee of the remainder
for the next of kin.
As questions frequently arose, whether
the executor was excluded from the residue
or not, the section of the statute above. cited
removed all doubt: and the executor is now
in all cases trustee of the undisposed resi
due for the next of kin.
As to the distribution of undevised lands,
this section is merely affirmative of the com
mon law. which gives to the heir all unde
vised estate. But by the obligation imposed
on the executor to administer it as intestate
I estate, it becomes assets in his hands for the
payment of the testator’s debts; and it may
be sold by the executor, on license for that
purpose, or a creditor may take it in execu
tion.
There is another provision, applicable to
this subject, in the 18th section of this stat
ute; where it is enacted, that whenever a
testator in his will shall give any chattels
or real estate to any person or persons, and
the same shall be applied to satisfy the debts
of the testator. all the other legatees, de
visees. or heirs. shall refund their propor
tionable part of such loss, and contribution
may be compelled by suit.
From this view of our statute provisions, it
is manifest that a testator cannot, by any
dispositions in his will, affect the rights of
creditors, who may, if their debts are not
discharged, enforce satisfaction by the levy
of their executions on any estate, which
was the testator‘s at his decease; the whole
of it being assets in the hands of the exec
utor. But it is also manifest that the testa
tor may bind, by his dispositions, his leg
atees, devisees and heirs.
. Hence results the right and duty of the
court, in the due exercise of its jurisdiction,
so to marshal the assets, that as little in
terruptlon be given to the interests of the
claimants under the will, and of the heirs,
as may consist with the more perfect rights
of creditors. This can be done only by a des
ignation in the license of the estate, which
the executor may sell for the payment of
debts.
has appropriated an adequate fund for the
payment of the debts, it would be unreason
able for the court to permit that fund to lie
by, and to license an executor to sell a spe
ciffick devise, and thus drive the specifiek
deviseeto his action at law, for relief out of
the appropriate fund.
In what manner the assets are in this case
to be marshalled, is the next question. And
in our opinion, the rule established in equity,
in cases where all the debts are due by spe
cialty, is applicable in this case, except as
it relates to the rents and profits of the de
scended estate, received after the testator’s
death, which we cannot come at. For in
those cases, the whole estate personal and
real, as well the devised as the descended
lands, are assets for the payment of all the
debts. So here the whole estate of Jackson,
the testator, including the descended real
estate, is assets for the payment of all his
debts, in the hands of his executors. And in
both cases the charge on the estate is by
operation of law.
In this will there is no specifick bequest of
any chattel, and no exemption of any part of
the personal estate, from the payment of
debts. Therefore the whole of the personal
estate, after the payment of the expenses of
the last sickness, funeral charges, and of the
debts due to the government, (if any,) is first
to be applied to discharge the debts. It is
also very clear. that the devise of lands to
Susanna Gray is a specifick devise. not lia
ble, by the terms of it, to any deduction. The
descended estate must then be applied to the
payment of the debts, before the speciflck
devise can be resorted to. And the same rule
must apply to the lands, which Mrs. Swan
can claim as residuary legatee, if the devise
of those lands can be considered as specifick
within the intention of the rule.
Jackson first provides that his debts and
funeral charges be paid: He next bequeaths
legacies to his nephews and nieces, and
makes a specifick devise to his sister Susan
na Gray. Then he gives to Mrs. Swan in
fee all the remaining part of his estate real
and personal. The just construction of which
is, “when my debts and funeral charges. and
the legacies are paid, and the specifick devise
to my sister is deducted, then what remains
whether real or personal. I devise in fee to
Mrs. Swan." If nothing should remain, then
nothing is devised to her.
We cannot therefore consider this devise
of the remainder as specifick. it is rather
creating a fund for the payment of the debts
and legacies, with a devise of what remains,
And when the testator. or the law
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if any, to the residuary devisee. If after the
personal estate was exhausted by the debts,
the unsatisfied creditors should levy their
executions on all the devised lands, except
ing those specifically devised to Mrs. Gray,
Mrs. Swan could not compel contribution by
Mrs. Gray and the heirs, under the tatute;
because a general residuary legatee cannot
have contribution, if nothing remains. For
in that case nothing is given to him, but on
a contingency that some estate may remain:
and if no estate shall remain, then nothing
devised to him is taken from him. to satisfy
a creditor of the testator. The debts and
legacies, being first to be paid, are to be con
sidered as a deduction from the property
contemplated to be given: and if after the
deduction, there is no remainder, the con
templated bounty has wholly failed, there
being in fact, no object, on which it could
operate.
Thus when the testator, after mortgaging
lands, devised them, with a clause, that the
devisee pay off the mortgage. he can resort
to no other part of the estate for relief: but
the money secured is considered as a deduc
tion from the property devised. But the case
of King v. King, 3 P. Wms. 3.38. is in point.
There the testator being seized 0f freehold
lands, and of a copyhold, which last he had
mortgaged, devised and copyhold to his
nephew; and after all his debts were paid,
he devised the rest of his estate real and per
sonal to his son. who was his heir. And it
was holden that.the import of this devise
was, that until all the debts were paid, noth
ing was devised to the son; or that when the
debts should be paid, then and then only, he
should be entitled to the residue. We can
not therefore consider this residuary devise
to Mrs. Swan as.specifick, within the rule
of marshalling assets, so that the descended
lands shall first be sold.
It has been argued by the counsel for the
petitioners, admitting the rule to be general
ly correct, yet that in this case it ought not
to apply, because in the residuary devise the
testator gives, not only all his real and per
sonal estate, of which he was then seized
and possessed; but all of which he might
afterwards die seized; and therefore that he
contemplated after acquired estate; which
although it could not pass by his will, yet
was evidently intended to pass: and that
this intent ought to be so far executed, as to
cause it to be sold for the payment of debts,
before the residuary devise should be ap
plied for that purpose.
This argument, however ingenious, is not
solid. For the testator cannot, in his will
charge with the payment of his debts after
purchased lands, any more than he can de
vise them. And if in this case he intended
it, the intent was void. And an intent
against law cannot affect this rule or prin~
ciple of law. Otherwise the rights of the
heirs would be implicated by a testamentary
disposition, made before the lands were ac
quired by the testator. If this case should
be allowed as an exception, it would involve
most residuary devises: for it is common for
the scrivener to include expressly all the resi
due of the estate, of which the testator may
die seized or possessed. We think therefore
that the rule should be applied in this case,
without admitting the exception.
The order of the court was entered as fol
lows.
Ordered that the said executors be, and
they hereby are empowered and licenced to
raise the sum of by sale at publick auc
tion of the houses, lands, or tenements, of
which the said Henry Jackson died seized
in fee, being devised by him by his last will
and testament: excepting such part thereof
as is therein devised in trust for his sister
Susanna Gray, and such as may have been
held by said Jackson to the use of, or in trust
for any other person or persons; the said
sum when raised, to be applied to the pay
ment of the debts aforesaid, with the inci
dental charges of sale: and if the said sum
cannot be raised by such sale, it is further
ordered, that the said executors may raise
by sale at publick auction of so much of the
real estate of which the said Jackson died
seized, not having devised the same in and
by his last will and testament, such further
sum of money, as with the money raised by
the sale first above ordered, will amount in
the whole to the said sum of to be ap
plied as aforesaid, giving bond, &e.
. "Q.
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BRILL v. WRIGHT et al.‘
(19 N. E. 628, 112 N. Y. 129.)
Court of Appeals of New York. January 15,
1889.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Second department.
Action by Job Seaman Benjamin against
William H. Wright, executor, etc., of Job
Seaman, deceased, and James 0. Cronk and
Matilda Cronk, for a legacy given to the
plalntiff by said will, to require an account
by the executor, and. in case ofa deficiency
of the personalty, to charge plaintiff’s legacy
on the real estate. The latter two defendants
were residuary legatees. Pending the ac
tion the plaintiff died, and it was revived
in the name of Rowland Brill, his administra‘
tor. The special term adjudged the legacy a
charge on the realty, which was aflirmed on
appeal to the general term, (4-1 Hun, 628,.
mem.,) and the defendants again appeal.
C. B. Herrick, for appellants. O. D. M.
Baker, for respondent. .
ANDREWS, J. Where in a will general
legacies are given. i.ollowed by a gift of all
the rest and residue of the real and personal
property of the testator by a residuary clause
in the usual form, and nothing more, it must
now, we think, be regarded as the establish
ed rule in this state that the language of
the will alone, unaided by extrinsic circum
stances, is insuflicient to charge the legacies
upon the lands included in the residuary de_
vise. This was clearly the opinion of Chan
eellor Kent in the leading case of Lupton v.
Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch. 614, as appears by his
comment on the case of Brudenell v. Bough
ton, 2 Atk. 2625;although hi judgment in that
case rested in part upon the circumstance
that, in the will then under consideration,
there was a prior devise which easily per
mitted an interpretation reddendo singuia
slngulls of the residuary clause. In Hoyt v.
Hoyt, 85 N. Y. 1Q, Folger, G. J., referring
to Lupton v. Lupton, and other cases, justly
stated that they asserted the doctrine that,
“unaided and alone, the words that make up
the usual residuary clause of a will are not
enough to evince an intention in the testator
to charge a general legacy upon real estate,"
but the question was not passed upon in that
case.
The courts, however, have held that a gift
of general legacies, followed by a general re
siduary clause, is not inconsistent with an
intention on the part of a testator to charge
the legacies on the land. They have there
fore permitted extrinsic circumstances to be
considered for the purpose of ascertaining
the actual intention of the testator, and in
some cases, by reading the langauge of the
will in the light of the circumstances. have
inferred an intention to charge legacies on
‘Reversing 44 Hun, 628, mem.
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the land, and given effect to such intention,
although the language, considered independ
ently of the circumstances, would not alone
justify such an inference.
The cases of \Viltsie v. Shaw. 100 N. Y.
191, 3 N. E. 331, and McCorn v. McCorn, 100
N. Y. 511, 3 N. E. 480, illustrate very clearly
the attitude of this court upon the subject.
Both were cases substantially of wills giving
general legacies, followed by the usual re
siduary clause. In each the question was
whether the legacies were charged on the
land. In Wiltsie v. Shaw it appeared that
the testator left a large personal estate, am
ple for the payment of debts and legacies;
and, no other circumstance appearing, it was
held that a legacy given by the testator in
his will, in trust for a son, was not a charge
on the lands which passed to the testator’s
daughter under the residuary clause. In Me
Corn v. McCorn the legatees were the wife
and son of the testator, and the gift of the
legacies was followed by the usual residuary
clause, under which all the testator’s real es
tate passed to four other children. It appear
ed that the will was made the day before
the testator’s death, and that his personar
estate was insuflicient to pay his funeral ex
penses. The legacies to the testator’s wife
and son were mere pretenses, "unless meant
to be a charge on the real estate." Under
these circumstances, the court held that the
legacies were intended to be charged on the
realty, and sustained the claim of the lega
tees.
We think the cases in this state establisn
these two propositions: First, that general
language in a will giving legacies, followed
by the usual residuary clause, is alone insufli
cient to charge the legacies on the realty;
and, second, that such language will justify
uch charge if it is made to appear by extrin
sic circumstances, such as may under the
rules of law be resorted to, to aid in the in
terpretation of written instruments, that it
was the testator’s intention that the legacies
should be charged on the land. The rule in
England, and in some of the states in this
country, and in the United States supreme
court, is different from the rule in this state.
The cases are cited in Hoyt v. Hoyt, supra.
In Greville v. Browne, 7 H. L. Gas. 689, it
was regarded as having been long settled in
England that where legacies are given gener
ally and the rest and residue of the real and
personal estate is afterwards given in one
mass, the legacies are a charge on the re
siduary real, as well as the personal, estate.
But some of the judges were of the opinion
that, if the question was r% nova, the natu
ral construction of the language would lead
to the opposite conclusion.
Under the rule in this state, we think the
legacy of $2,000 given by the will of Job
Seaman to his nephew Job S. Benjamin was
not charged on the real estate which passed
under the residuary clause to James O. Cronk
and Matilda Crook. The will is very simple,
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and is partly printed and partly written.
After the usual introductory clause, the will
proceeds as follows: “First, after all my
lawful debts are paid and discharged, I give
and bequeath to Job S. Benjamin the sum
of two thousand dollars, to be paid to him
within three months after my decease; sec
ondly, I give and bequeath all the rest and
residue of all my real and personal estate, of
whatsoever name or nature, to James O.
Cronk and Matilda Cronk, to each the one
half part thereof. Likewise I make. consti
tute, and appoint William H. Wright" execu
tor, etc.
It is claimed that the words in the first
clause, viz., "after all my lawful debts are
paid and discharged, Igive,"etc., (which were
printed.) indicate an intention to constitute
the whole estate, real and personal, a fund
for the payment in the first instance of the
debt and legacy. The direction as to the
payment of debts was formal and conven
tional merely. The law charges the debts
of a decedent upon his real estate, if the
personal estate is insuflicient to pay them.
The debts owing to the testator amounted
only to $114.11, and his personal property
was appraised at $2,643.07, and produced
$3,553.36. Similar language was in the will
considered in the case In re Rochester, 110
N. Y. 159, 17 N. E. 740, and was held insufli
cient to create a charge on the realty.
The extrinsic circumstances do not tend to
show an intention on the part of the testator
to charge the legacy on his real estate. Ex
cept for the expenses allowed against the es
tate, growing out of a contest on the pro-
bate of the will, instituted by the legatee
and a niece of the testator, and in subsequent
proceedings on an accounting by the execu
tor, the personal estate left by the testator
would have been ample to have paid the
legacy and the ordinary expenses of admin
istration. The legatee was of kindred to the
testator, and the residuary devisees and lega
tees were strangers in blood; but they be
came members of his family when they were
children and lived with him until his death.
one for the period of 20 and the other for 25
years. The testator’s wife was-.infirm and
crippled, and died a short time before the
testator. and they had no children or direct
descendants living. We perceive no circum
stance which takes the case out of the gener
al rule. The condition of the testator’s prop
erty when the will was made, in 1879, four
years before his death, is .not shown. He was
a small farmer, and it is quite probable that
his circumstances had not materially changed
during that time. It may be assumed that
the testator intended that the legacy to his
nephew should be paid. But there is no pre
sumption that when the will was made his
personal estate was not adequate for that
purpose. If it was not, and the fact was ma~
terial, the burden of establishing it was upon
the legatee, who in this proceeding is seeking
to charge the real estate in a case where the
language of the will does not aflirmatively
show that this was the intention of the tes
tator. It is quite significant of his actual in
tention that he directs the legacy to be paid
within three months after his death, and
gives no power of sale to his executor.
We think the judgments below should be
reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs
to the executor appellant in all courts against
the respondent, but without costs to the other
defendants.
All concur.
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In re ROOT’S WILL.
HINER v. ROOT'S HEIRS.
(51 N. W. 485, 81 Wis. 263.)
Supreme Court oi Wisconsin. Feb. 2, 1892.
Appeal irom circuit court. Fond du Lac.
county; NORMAN S. GiLsoN, Judge.
Petition by the administrator with the
will annexed oi Truman Root, deceased,
for leave to sell real estate for the pay
ment oi legacies. From an order oi the
circuit court afifirming a judgment oi the
county court of Fond du Lac county. de
nying the prayer oi the petition, the ad
ministrator appeals. Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the fol
lowlng statement by LYON. C. J.:
Truman A. Root, lute oi Fond du Lac
county, died seised oi a farm in that coun
ty; oi a parcel oi land in the city oi Fond
du Lac, on which were two~dwelling
houses, (one oi which was his homestead ;)
and oi some personal property. He left
a will, which has been duly probated, in
which he directed a sale of his iarm, the
payment to his widow oi $1,000 of the
proceeds, the investment of another $1,000
thereoi in a house and lot or other pro
ductive property in that city, and the pay
ment to his widow of the rents, issues,
and profits of such property during her
life. He also devised to his widow the
other city property above mentioned, for
her llle. He made general money bequests,
amounting to $2,600, to 15 or more per
sons other than his widow,R of whom
were not his heirs at law. The others
were such heirs. He left two heirs at law
to whom no bequests were made. The re
sidnary clause oi the will is as follows:
"After the sale oi said farm. and the pay
ment of said debts. legacies, bequests, and
devises as aforesaid, the rest, residue, and
remainder oi my property shall go to my
wifefor llie, remainder over to my heirs
atlaw." The testator leit no lineal de
scendants. In due course of administra
tion the iarm was sold; the $1,000 be
queathed to the widow paid to her: an
other $l,000 oi the proceeds invested in
building another house on the city lot,
under the order of the county court; the
personal property was sold, and the debts
of the estate paid; and a bulanceremained
in the hands oi the administrator, appli
cable to the payment of the general lega
cies, of about $500. None oi these legacies
have been paid. ’l'hereupon the adminis
trator presented a petition to the county
court, setting forth the above iacts, and
praying license to sell the reversion oi the
Fond du Lac city propertymo that he
might pay the unpaid legacies, and close
the estate. The heirs at law oi the testa
tor interposed objections in the nature 0!
a demurrer to the petition, and the mat
ter was determined on the petition and
objections thereto, without testimony.
The county court denied the petition, and
the circuit court, on appeal, afifirmed the
order of the county court denying the
same. The administrator now appeals
to this court irom the judgment of aflirm
ance.
’
J. W. Hlner,
for appellant.
spondents.
(George Gary, oi counsel,)
David Bsbcock, for re
LYON, C. J., (uiter stating the iacts.)
For the purposes oi this appeal, the objec
tions interposed by tne heirs oi the tests.
tor to the petition oi the administrator
[or leave to sell the reversion in the Fond
du Lac city property must he treated as
a demurrer thereto, and hence the aver
ments in such petition must be taken to
be true. Indeed, we do not understand
there is, or will be, any controversy con
cernlng the facts oi the case. Some ques
tion was made in the argument as to
whether the interest of the heirs oi the tes
tator in the Fond du Lac real estate is a
remainder or reversion. If they take un
der the will, undoubtedly they take an es—
ta te in remainder; but if by descent, they
take an estate in reversion. And whether
it be one or the other, itis a vested es
tate. Rev. St. §§ 2033-2037,incluslve. For
reasons which will presently appear, the
question is not important. it may be
observed, however, that at common law
the rule seems to have been well settled in
England, and in many, perhaps most, oi
the United States, that a devise to the
heir at law oi precisely the same estate he
would take by descent. were there no de
vise, is void. and the heir taken by descent
in such case, and not by purchase. 4
Kent, Comm. 507. The rule was changed
in England by statute?» & 4 Wm. IV. c.
106. Were it necessary to decide the ques
tion, we should probably be constrained
to hold that, notwithstanding the resid
uary clause in the will. the heirs of the
testatorln this case take their estate in
the city property by descent, because they
would take the same estate therein had
the will contained no rcsiduary clause;
and hence. that their estate is a reversion.
But whether their estate be a remainder
or a reversion, the will itseli contains in
disputable evidence that the testatorin
tended to charge his real estate not spe
cifically devised with the payment oi leg
acies, if the personal estate proved insutiIl
cient to pay them. Such evidence is
found in the residuary clause, which ex
pressly limits the residue of his estate,
both real and personal, to such oi it as
shall remain after all debts, legacies. be
quests, and devises have been paid. Lan
guage could not m e plainly express the
intention of the tes tor to charge both
his real and personal estate with the pay
ment oi the legacies in his will. Such in
tention oi the testator is controlling in
the distribution oi his estate. It may be
observed here that there is abundance of
authority to theeifect that when, as in this
case. legacies are given generally, and the
residue oi the real and personal estate is
aitcrwards given in one mass. such lega
cies are a charge on the reslduury real as
well as personal estate, unless such con
structionis opposed to other provisions
in the will. In Turner v. Gibb. (N. J. Ch.)
22 Atl. Rep. 580, numerous cases are cited
which sustain this doctrine. Under this
rule, the reslduary estate would be charged
with the payment oi legacies in this case,
even though the residuary clause did not
contain the limitation above mentioned.
It ioilows that the heirs took the rover
sion or remainder (whichever it may be)
subject to the payment oi legacies. The
personal estate has been exhausted, and
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it has proved insuificient to pay all the
legacies. Hence. the contingency has
arisen which renders necessary a resort to
the residuary real estate to make up the
.deficiency. A reversion or vested remain
der may be sold on execution beffore the
expiration of the precedent estate. 1
Freem. ExIns, §l78, and cases there cited.
No valid reason has been suggested why
the some interest may not also he sold to
enable an administrator to pay legacies
which are a charge upon such interest.
We think the power and duty of the
court to order the residuary estate sold
to pay legacies is not impaired or af
lected by the circumstance that a por
tion of such estate was the homestead of
the testator at his decease. The testator
had the right. while living. to convey to a
stranger. without the signature oi his
wife to the conveyance, the reversion in
the homestead alter it should cease to be
such. Ferguson v. Mason. 60 Wis. 37?. 19
N. W. Rep. 420. He may also devise it to
a stranger, (Rev. St. §§ 2271, 2277. 2280,)
and his widow can preserve a homestead
right therein only by electing to take the
provision made for her by law. instead of
that contained in the will of her deceased
husband. 1d. §§ 2W1. 2l72. Here the has
band specifically devised to the wife an ce
tate in the homestead which may endure
longer than that she would have taken
under the statute, for under the statute
her estate would terminate upon her
marriage. as well as at hsrdeath. while
under the will it only terminates at her
death. She elected to take under the will,
and holds the property by virtue oi the
devise thereol to her. ’l'hefactthatit was
once the homestead of her husband and
herself does not aifect the tenure upon
which she holds, one way or the other,
and there remains attached to the prop
erty no quality oi‘ a homestead which in
terferes with thesale ol the reversfonary
interest therein to complete the payment
ol legacies. It is urged that. inasmuch as
the widow is only about 45 years of age
and liable to live many years. the rever
sion in the property dependent upon her
lifeestate would sell for but little, and
hence that it would he a hardship on the
heirs to force a sale thereof. The answer
to this is the same that would be made
were the property about to be sold on
execution. or loreciosure oi a mortgage.
or mechanicIs or laborer’s lien; that is,
the heirs must protect themselves by hid
ding, or procuring bidders at the sale.
The legatees must protect themselves in
like manner. The courts cannot always.
or usually, save the parties interested in
property about to he sold underjudicial
process from the peril that it may be sold
below its value. The remedy against
such peril is. in a large measure, in the
hands ofsuch parties themselves. it seems
to us that in this case some amicable ar
rangement might be made between the
heirs and legatees who are not heirs,
i,y which the property may be made to
sell lor its value. or a sale thereol be
avoided by a satisfaction ol the legacies,
the assignment oi the residuary estate to
the heirs by the proper court, and the dis
charge of the administrator. But. how
ever that may be. we think the petition of
the administrator for leave to sell the
residuary estate should have been granted.
It is scarcely necessary to add that the
specific lifeestate in the property devised
to the widow is not chargeable with the
payment of legacies. The judgment of
the circuit court is reversed, and the cause
will be remanded. with directions to that
court to reverse the order and judgment
of the county court, denying the petition
of the administra tor, and for iurther pro
ceedings according to law.”
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DAVIDSON et al. v. COON.
(25 N. E. 601, 125 Ind. 497.)
Supreme Court of Indiana. Oct. 28, 1890.
Appeal irom circuit court, Hancock coun
ty; M. E. FORKNER, Judge.
T. B. Reddinn, M. Marsh, and W. W.
Cook, for appellants. D. S. Gooding, M.
B. Gooding, and J. A. New, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J. The appellee’s complaint
contains these allegations: That (.'onrad
Coon died the owner of real estate of the
value 0! $5,000. That he died testate,
having executed a will, and that his will
was probated in due course of law. That
the willcontains this provision: “Aiterthe
death of my wife, 1 direct that my estate
shall be divided in the following manner:
First, lglve to my son Joseph Coon the
sum of eight hundred dollars in money, to
be made out oi my estate, and I also di
rcct that my son Joshua shall have three
hundred dollars,also to be made out of my
estate, alter the death or marriage of my
wife. When the above amounts of money
shall have been paid, 1 direct that the re
mainder 0! my whole estate shall be equal
ly divided among my heirs." The legacy
bequeathed to the appeilee, Joseph Coon,
is wholly unpaid. That since the testa~
tor’s death the real estate has been con
veyed to the appellants. That all oi.’ the
debts of the testator’s estate have been
paid except the legacies bequeathed by
him to the legatces named in the will.
That “ the estate has been finally settled,
and that there was not then, nor is there
now, any personal property with which
the legacy could or can be paid."
The general rule is that the personal cs
tate supplies the load out of which lega
cies are to be paid. Duncan v. \Vnllace,1l4
Ind. 169, 16 N. E. Rep.137. Whereaspeclfic
devise of land is made, and a general leg
acy is bequeathed, without charging the
legacy upon the land devised, then it is in
cum bent upon the legatee who seeks to
charge the land to show that the testa
tor had no personal estate at the time the
will was executed out of which the legacy
could he paid. The reason for this rule is
that where there is a specific devise oi land
to one, and the bequest oi a general leg
acy to another, but no express words
charging the land. there must besuch facts
as authorize the implication that the tes
tator intended to charge the land. Where
there is no personal property out oi whichI
the legacy can be paid, there is reason forI
inferring that the testator meant to
charge the land specifically devised, other
wise thebequest would be amere mockery.
Duncan v. Wallace, supra; Hovt v. Hoyt,
85 N. Y. 142; Met'orn v. McCorn, 100 N. Y.
51l, 3 N. E. Rep. 480; Corwine v. Corwine,
24 N. J. Eq. 579; Lypet v. Carter, 1 Ves. Sr.
499; Cross v. Kennington, 9 Beav. 150; El
liot v. Hancock, 2 Vern. 143. But where
there is personal property at the time of
the execution of the will, although it may
be aiterwards wasted, there is no ground
lorimplylng an intention on the part of
the testator to charge the land specifical
ly devised. The general rule is that, where
the provisions of the will can be given ef
lect without hardening the land specific
ally devised, it will be done, and this im ~
plies that where there is a specific devis
of land~ and a general bequest of money,
and no express charge upon the land,
the ian is not burdened unless it appears
that th testator impliediy intended that
the land should be charged; and where
he has personal estate no such intention
can be implied, as against the specific dev
isee. Ii the will beffore us is to be re
garded as specifically devising land with
out charging it by implication with the
general legacy, then the complaint is in
taily defective, because it does not show
that the testator did not; have personal
estate out of which the legacies could be
paid. The question hinges upon the con
struction to be given to the peculiar pro
visions of the will. The will docs not
specifically devise the real estate to the
heirs of the testator, but the devise is a
residuary one. The general rule respect
by residuary clause except upon the con
dition that something remains after all
paramount claims upon the testator’s es
tate are satisfied." Tomlinson v. Bury,
145 Mass. 346, 14 N. E. Rep. 137. The will
we are considering does, by its terms,
make the legacies a paramount claim, in
asmuch as there is no specific devise of the
land, and there is manifested aclear inten
tion to devise only what remains after the
payment of the legacies. This intention is
exhibited in the provision that the lega
cies shall be made out of the estate, and
by the use of the words that follow the
bequests, which are: “1 direct that the
remainder of my whole estate shall be dl
vided among my heirs." These words
clearly evince an intention to vest in the
heirs the estate remaining after the pay
ment of the legacies; and the antecedent
provisions, taken in connection with this
language, express an intention to charge
the whole estate with the payment of the
legacies. Wilson v. Piper, 77 Ind. 437;
Lofton v. Moore, 83 ind. 112; Castor v.
Jones, 86 Ind. 289; Porter v. Jackson,95
1nd. 210. As the will does not specifically
devise the land, and does, by its terms,.l
bequeath a legacy to the appellee, and
make it a charge upon the land, it was not
necessary, in order to have the lien oi the
charge established, that the complaint
should allege that the testator had not
sufificient personal estate to satiefy the
legacy at the time he executed the will.
The authority of Reynolds v. Boud.83
Ind. 36, and McCoy v. Payne, 68 Ind. 327,
is invoked to sustain the proposition that,
as the estate has been finally settled, the
action will not lie. These cases are not,
influential, lor the reason that the heirs
took by a residuary clause of the will, and
acquired their in tcrest subject to the leg
acies charged upon theland; and, as there
was no personal estate upon flnal settle
ment, the legatees had a right to establish
against the land the equitable lien created
by the will. As we understand the cases
of Reynolds v. Bond, supra, and Gound v.
ing such devises is that “nothing is
givent
L
Stcyer. 75 ind. 50, they assert that the lien v
created by a legacy charged upon the land
may be established after fina-l settlement.
No other rule can be sound, for if, after
flnal settlement, there is no personal estate,
the charge fixes upon the land, and the
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equitable lien may beestablished. ’I'heex
ecu tor, to be sure. is the person primarily
bound to pay a general legacy, but he is
only bound where there are personal as
sets in his hands, and no charge upon the
land. The cases of Lovering v. Ring, 97
Ind. 130, and Carr v. Huette, 73 Ind. 378,
are not relevant to the point here in dis
pute. The point in dispute in those cases
concerned the rights of creditors. while
here the pointin dispute concernsthe right
of a legatee whose legacy is a charge upon
land. While the complaint is lacking
in symmetry and precision it is good as
against a demurrer, for it states, although
somewhat vaguely and obscurely, facts
constituting a prima facie case.
The facts contained in thespecial finding
shortly stated are these: Conrad Coon
executed the will filed with the complaint.
He died the owner of the land in contro
versy, and the will was probated on the
11th ofNovember, 1861. The personal prop
erty of which Conrad Coon died the owner
was taken by.hls widow and applied to
the payment of the debts of his estate.
Numerous conveyances were made by the
heirs: somefrom one toanother, and some’
to third persons. Theconveyances to which
Joseph Coon was a party are these: One
executed on the 30th oi May,l862, in which
he appears as a grantee: three executed
on the 9th of April, lbiiil, in two of which
he was one of the grantors, and in one of
which he was a grantee; one on the 16th
day of February, 1866, in which he was a
grantee; one on the 213th day of February,
1876. in which he was one of the grantors;
and one on the 13th day of January, 1x76,
in which he was of the grantors. All of
the deeds referred to, except that of Feb
ruary 26, 1876. executed to Washington
Jackson, were quitclaimdecds. The deeds
of April 9, 1864. were executed simply to
partition the lands described among the
parties. in executing those deeds, the ap
pellce’s legacy was not considered, nor has
he ever been paid any part of it. The ap
pellant Davidson purchased the land from
the grantees of the heirs of Conrad Coon,
as appears from the deeds referred to in
the special finding. The rule established
by the decision f the co i_tr_t_,__l__umnM[mitey enants n commo - d
r eet , ( oes not imply a warM Weiser. 5 Watts, 280;icot v. Page, 26 510.422; Dawson v.Law
rence, 13 0hi0,546; Carpen ter v. Schermer
horn. 2Barb.Ch.322; Beardsley v. Knight,
10 Vt. 185; Rountree v. Denson, 69 Wis.
522, 18 N. W. Rep. 518. This rule has been
asserted in cases where there has been a
failure of title, and one of the co-tenants
has demanded compensation from an
other, or where there has been an attempt
to estop one of the co-tenants from assert
ing an after-acquired title. It is very ev
ident that no such case is before us. Here
no warranty is invoked, no failure oi title
is asserted, nor any effort made to defeat
an after-acquired title. In this instance,
all the title and interest the appellee had
existed when the parlition was |nade,and
tltlon, accepted grants, and executed con
veyances. He was treated as a co-tenant.
and, for aught that appears, he reaped all
the benefits of that position. He acqui
esced in the partition for almost 20 years.
in our judgment, he is not now in a situa
tion to assert that the legacy beq ueathed to
him by the ancestor, who was the source
of title. is a charge upon the land. The
reason of the rulethat there is no warranty
in case of voluntary partition completely
fails in such a case as this. Ordinarily. a
quitclaim deed conveys all the existing in
terest oi the greater in the land described,
but does not affect an after-acquired title.
Title passes as effectually by a quitclaim
deed as by any other. Hastings v. Brooker,
98 Ind. 158; Rowe v. Beckett, 30 1nd. 154:
McConnel v. Reed, 4 Scam. 117; Fash 1’.
Blake. 88 Ill. 363; Graff v. Middleton, 43
Cal. 341; Hall v. Ashby, 9 Ohio, 96; Hunt
v. Hunt. 14 Pick. 374; Smith v. Pendell, 19
Conn. 107. Our statute sets this question
at rest, for it declares that “a deed of re
lease or quitclaim shall pass all the estate
whicn the grantor could convey by a deed
of bargain and sale." Rev. St. § 2924. If
the appellee was not a tenant in common,
his deed would, beyond controversy, con
vey all the estate he had in the land at the
time of its execution. if the legal effect of
the deed is changed, it is solely because it
was executed by him. in the capacity of a
tenant in common,in order to effect a par
tition of the land. We are not inclined to
rule that the position be occupied com
pletelychanged the effect which the law so
emphatically aflixes to his deed; but, if
we were inclined to so rule, it would give
the appellee no comfort. The appeilee is
in this dilemma: if his deed is to have its
usual effect, it conveys his interest in the
land, and releases his lien; if it is not to
have its usual effect, it is because it was
executed by him as one of several owners
in common; but, if it was executed by him
as one of several owners, he cannot as
sert his lien, since that was buried or
merged in his character of an owner. We
are not unmindful. of the doctrine that
equity will not suffer a merger to take
place where injustice would result. but
that doctrine the appellee, after having
voluntarily assumed the position of a
tenant In common, is in no plight to in
voke. Equity almost imperiousiy de
mands that his lien shall bemerged.for
no other course will promote justice. At
law, where the estate of a llenor meets
that of the owner in one person, the lien
is merged. That rule must govern here,
for there is no equity to break its force.
The appcllee having by unequivocal acts
asserted that he was one of several ten
ants in common, claiming under the same
ancestor, and having for so many years
deported himself as an owner. is in no sit
nation to cast aside that character, and
enforce a lien by taking upon himself the
character ofalienholder. Upon the facts
contained in the special finding, the law
is with the appellants. Judgment re
versed, with instructions to restate conclu
sions of law. and enter judgment in favor
.the deeds executed. He united in the par- i of the appellants.
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COOCHIS EX’R v. COOCHIS ADMIR.
&
(5 Beast. 540.)
Court of Errors and Appeal of Delaware.
June, 1579.
. Mr. Patterson, for appellant. Mr. Gray,
it’or respondents.
I COMEGYS, C. J. The controvery be
tween the parties in this case arose out of
the will of William Cooch (the husband of
the appellant’s testatrix), which is in these 1
words:
"In the name of God, amen. I, William
Couch, of I’encador Hundred, New Castle
county, and state of Delaware, being of
sound and disposing mind and memory, do
make and declare this to be my last will I
and testament, hereby revoking all former
wills heretofore made by me. Item 1. It is
my desire and wish that my executor, here
after named, shall pay all my just debts ‘
and funeral expenses as soon after my de .
cease as possible. Item 2. I give, devise,
and bequeath to my beloved wife. Tamar,
all my personal property, and three thousand '
five hundred dollars in cash out ofipyleal
estate, as soon as sold by my executor. Item
3Tdevise, give, and bequeath to Dillon
Hutchison the sum of five hundred dollars.
Item 4. I devise, give, and bequeath to my
brothers Zebulon H. Cooch and Levi G. '
Cooch the balance of my estate, to be di~
vided between them, share andshare alike.
It is my desire and wish that my executor,
hereinafter named, shall sell all my real es
tate at public sale within one year after my
decease, and convey to the purchaser or pur
chasers thereof a good and lawful deed or
deeds for the same. I do hereby nominate
and appoint my brother Levi G. Cooeh to be
my executor of this my last will and testa
ment. In witness whereof." etc.
The appellant conceived his testatrix to be
entitled under this will to all the personal
estate of her husband, without any dedue
tion therefrom whatsoever; and, the re
spondents not admitting such claim, the bill
which forms part of the record before us .
was brought to determine that question. The
case presented by it having been so conduct
ed on both sides as to require of the chan
cellor a decision of the matter in controversy,
he made it on the 21st day of February last, '
denying the claim of the complainant in his .
court. From that decision this appeal was
taken, and we have been favored by the
chancellor, in the opinion expressed by him
in the cause, and now read to us, with the
reason or grounds upon which he based his
decree. Such reasons are full and lucid;
and we proceed to give our views of the law
by which this court is to decide whether they
are sufficient or not in our judgment.
There are certain wellestablished and rea
sonable rules which serve as a sure guide
l
I
|
to courts in the decision of such questions
as that presented by the record in this case,
and which are by no means new, but are so
old as to have become venerable landmarks
of equity decisions in cases of this nature
under wills. They are those for the admin
istration of the estates of all testators, and
have so long prevailed as to be entitled to
the appellation of maxims. They are as fol
lows: 1. The personal estate of a testator
is the primary fund for the payment of his
debts. and of such legacies as he may choose
to give. 2. In the payment of legacies, those
of a specific nature are to be paid before gen
eral ones. 3. The real estate is not liable
for the payment of either debts or legacies,
unless the testator has unequivocally so de
clared in his will.
With respect to this rule we may now say,
as we shall repeat hereafter, that in this
state all the property of a testator is sub
ject to the payment of his debts, but the real
is only to be resorted to for that purpose,
even in the case of liens upon it, after and
i not until the personal estate has been ex
hausted, which still preserves the rule that
the personal estate is the primary fund for
the payment of a testator’s debts. Of course,
.
we are not to be understood as speaking of
liens which the creditor proceeds to enforce.
We did not understand the learned solicitor
for Tamar Cooch’s executor to make any con
tention with the respondents upon this view
of the law, but he did insist, and exhibited his
usual industry in collecting and citing author
ities to sustain his view, that according to the
true legal construction of the will of her hus
band, her executor is entitled to the whole
personal estate of the testator, and that, by
force of the terms used by him, all his debts,
funeral charges, and expenses of administra
tion are thrown upon the proceeds of the sale
of the real estate, which is substituted in lieu
of the personal for the payment and dis
charge of them; and he founds or places his
argument or contention upon the express
words of the second item of the testator’s
will: “I give, devise, and bequeath to my
beloved wife, Tamar, all my personal prop
erty, and three thousand five hundred dol
lars in cash out of my real estate as soon as
sold by my executor."
If the question presented by the solicitor
for theappellant had never been decided.
we might possibly take the view of it sub
mitted by him, and conclude that the chan
cellor erred, and that the appellant could
claim the whole personalty of the testator,
and that such claim should be allowed; but
such question has been passed upon and de
termined over and over again by courts of
equity. whose concern it is chiefly to inter
pret wills; and never, in cases having no
special features more than this case has, has
it been decided otherwise than that the per~
sonal estate must first be applied to the pay
ment of debts before resort can be had to
\_
j\
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the real estate. The very words used in this
case, "all my personal estate," have, in the
numerous instances produced by the learned
solicitor for the appellees in his forcible ar
gument in their behalf, undergone the most
critical and exhaustive examination that
minds of the highest order of legal acumen
could give to them, and they have always
(where there were no expressions in the will
that required a different construction) been
held to mean sim l the balance of the rmu my
ment of the debts of the testator and the
other legal charges, such as those of
burial and of administration. We are not
aware of any cases in contravention of this
view, or that would justify us, as a court of
review, in departing from the old accustomed
pathway of the law. In looking through
this whole case, with the will of William
Cooch and all its provisions or clauses in our
mind, we do not see how we can do other
wise than confirm and establish the chan
cellor’s decree.
A case in some respects similar to the pres
ent (though there were many different cir
cumstances or facts in it) came before this
court, and was decided at the June term,
1872. It was that of Morris v. Morris’s Ex'r,
4 Houst. 414, involving the construction of
Elijah Morris’s will. While the expression
in it is not the same exactly as that in
Cooch’s will, yet the question was so much
the same that the court felt called upon, and
properly, to express its opinion in language
involving the very considerations this case
requires. His honer, Judge Wootten, in the
judgment of the court then declared, and
speaking the sense of all its members, said
the import of the words “balance of my
whole estate, after deducting the aforesaid
legacies," being in question, “this cannot
mean the whole original estate, but it is the
residue remaining after the payment of the
debts; that residue is what constitutes a
man's estate; and, when we speak of our
own or another’s estate, we mean that which
remains clear for distribution after the pay
ment of debts. Whatever is necessary for
the payment of a deceased man's debts be
longs to his creditors, and cannot properly
be considered any part of his estate for dis
tribution, and especially when we apply the
act of distribution; for no matter how much
property he may have in possession. if it is not
more than suflicient to pay his debt, he has no
distributive estate. This is true, not only in a
common-sense view, but in legal contempla
tion." We not only feel ourselves bound by
the words of the court, spoken by its organ
for that case, but independently we decide
that there is nothing in the will of William
Cooch that would justify us in reversing the
decree of the chancellor, which, to say noth
ing of its suflicient reasoning, is strictly in
accord with the law as we take it to be.
In this case there is no question between
legatees; it is simply one between the de
visees, in effect, of the real estate, and th
legatee of the personal; and we have been
unable to find any case, nor has the learned
solicitor for the appellant furnished us with
any, which decides that the words, “all my
personal estate," in a will like that before
us, have been held to cast the payment of
debts. expenses of administration, and lega~
cies upon the realty. Much stress was laid
by him upon the fact (which he assumed)
that the bequest to the widow was specific;
but we do not agree with him that it was
specific in any legal sense, although it was
of all, etc. A legacy is only specific when it
designates a particular thing or things by
specific description, as my bay mare, my
gold watch, my shares of stock in such a
bank, or the like; or mentions some place
where the thing itself can be found, as my
bank notes in a certain drawer; or indicated
some part of the personal estate consisting
of various articles which can be easily dis
tinguished and set apart from the residue,
as all my personal property in a certain
room, house, hundred, county, etc. Cases of
a similar kind will be found referred to in
part 2 of Redfield on Wills, 475, where will
also be found authority for the principle that
a bequest of all a man’s personal propertyy
is not a specific legacy. Where it is of all
merely, indicating no locality or more pan
ticular specification, it is general, the same
as is imported by the words “rest" and “resi
due," because such word means what every
testator must be taken to know,—the balance
after payment of debts, etc.,—the law being
that the personal estate must first be ex
hausted before resort can be had for such
payment to the realty. Every testator is pre
sumed to know the law with respect to the
liability of his estate for his debts, and con
sequently to make disposition of it in ac
cordance with such knowledge. Therefore
it is that, where a testator even uses
such sweeping and apparentlyIconclusive
words in disposing of his personalty as
"all my personal estate," the law still holds
that he only meant such portion of it I
L
as should be left after taking from it;
all that it was liable to, either as matter
of legal responsibility for debts, funeral ex
penses, and charges of administration, or on
account of some further deduction which the
provisions of his will require,—for example,
a specific legacy. The authorities are abun
dant upon this point, and were fully laid be
fore us in the argument in June last; it is
unnecessary to recite them here. And, fur
ther, there is, in our opinion, no warrant for
the position assumed by the learned solicitor
for the appellant that this bequest is specific.
We have before given examples of specific
legacies; we now refer to authorities in like
cases of specification. Sayer v. Sayer, 2
Vern. 688; Free. Ch. 392; Gilb. ExIns, 87;
Green v. Symonds, 1 Brown, Ch. 129, in
l/
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notes; Moore v. Moore, Id. 127; Gayre v.
Gayre, 2 Vern. 538; Shaftsbury v. Shafts
bury, Id. 747; Land v. Dcvayanes, 4 Brown,
Ch. 537; Clarke v. Butler, 1 Her. 304. The
principle is the severance of the particular
property from the great body of the estate,
and the specific gift of it to the legatee. l
ltop. Leg. 243. Where there are no such
restrictive expressions, a legacy of personal
estate generally will be general, and not
specific; and even the circumstance that the
real and personal estates are blended togeth
er will make no difference, although as to
the former the devise must necessarily be
specific. Id.; 2 Williams, ExIrs, 819.
But of course the case is different when a
testator exonerat’s his personal estate from
the payment of his debts, and casts that
burden upon his realty. Whenever that oc
curs, the primary liability is transferred from
the personal and thrown upon the real, and
the latter is the source to which the execu
tor must first apply. There is no doubt of
that. When the intention of a testator to
create a new fund for the payment of his
debts appears plain. that fund must first be
resorted to if he has so expressed himself.
But, before that is taken as a fact, there must
be no doubt left upon the face of the will;
it must plainly appear by it that the testator
so want. This is not to be settled by con
lecture or mere inference, but is to be shown
_by unequivocal language or expressions con
tained in the paper itself. There must be
something the courts will recognize as sufli
cient for that purpose to justify them in de
parting from the old, established, certain
rule, that the primary fund for payment of
debts is a testator’s personal estate. And
our system of settlement of estates, under
which all a man’s property, as well real as
personal, is responsible for his debts, does
not affect the rule; for the primary liability
is still on the latter, and there remains until
it is exhausted. In England, the real estate
was not liable for simple contract debts at
all unless made so by a testator; but here it
has always been otherwise, and the law as
uniform as it is now. But, notwithstanding
the difference, the first fund to be taken has
always been the personal, the real being
merely auxiliary or secondary.
Now,in looking through the will that forms
part of the record before us, we do not find
any clause, word, or expression that would
allow us to depart (if we were inclined to do
so) from the established line of decisions up
on questions such as are by that record pre
sented to us. There is certainly nothing said
about exempting the personal estate from
the payment of the testator’s debts, nor is
any language used that can fairly be con
strned as favoring the notion of such an in
tent. There is not even any charge of the
real estate with them, though that by itself
would mean nothing more than that they
should be paid at all events. Nor does the
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testator direct that, to insure the payment of
his debts, his real estate should be turned in
to money, and made part of the personal.
If he had gone as far as that even, still the
first fund to be taken would be personalty;
as, by a well-known rule, the residue of such
real estate, after such charge upon or with
respect to it had been liquidated, would
descend to the heir or pass to the devisee
qua realty, he having the right to redeem it
from sale, and take it as heir or devisee,
according as it may have been undevised or
devised.
But, in reality, the will itself negatives
the idea that the land of William Cooch
was devoted by him as the first fund for
the payment of his debts. The language
of the first item is that the executor shall pay
all the just debts and funeral expenses of
the testator as soon after his decease as pos
sible; and in the second paragraph of the
fourth item he expresses his desire and wish
that his real estate shall be sold within a
year from the time of his death, thus allowing
the executor a full year to find an advan
tageous period to offer his land for sale. If
anything could be wanting to furnish us with
assurance that the conclusion we are about
to announce is the correct one, these clauses
would be suflicient to do it. The testator
evidently contemplated that his personal es
tate should be at once, in the usual course,
converted into money to satisfy his creditors,
and his land in a reasonable time to raise
the money to be paid out of it.
The question is, did William Cooch, by his
will, intend that his real estate should be re
sorted to before his personal in the settle
ment of his estate? As we do not find in
that will any language that requires of us
to say that he did, the bequest to his wife
being a general and not a specific legacy, and
that bequest alone being the source to which
we have been referred and must resort for
such a conclusion, and the two clauses of the
will we have just referred to being, as we
think, at variance with the idea of substitu
tion, we are of opinion and decide that the
decree of the chancellor in the court below
was right, and should be aflirmed.
WALES, J‘. The general rule is well set--
tled that, in the absence of express words or
manifest intent of the testator, his personal
estate is primarily liable for the payment of
his debts: Duke of Ancaster v. Mayer, 1
Brown, Ch. 454; Samwell v. Wake, Id. 145;
Dickens, 597; Walker v. Jackson. 2 Atk.
625; Tait v. Lord Northwick, 4 Yes. 824.
The doctrine is clearly stated by Sir William
Grant, in Hancox v. Abbey, 11 Ves. 186, as
being perfectly established, that in order to
exonerate the personal estate there must be
either express words or a plain intention.
Precise and specific words of exemption are
not necessary, but it is suflicient if the inten
tion can be collected from the whole will to
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give the personal estate exemption from the
debts. Mr. Jarman, in his treatise on Wills,
after a full discussion of the authorities, re
marks: “These cases seem to authorize the
proposition that whenever the personal estate
is bequeathed in terms as a whole, and not
as a residue, and the debts, funeral, and tes
tamentary charges are thrown on the real
estate, this constitutes the primary fund for
their liquidation." 2 Jarm. Wills, 586. This
rule, and the principles on which it is found
ed, have been fully recognized and accepted
by the courts in this country. 1 Story, Eq.
Jur. $§ 572, 573; Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns.
Ch. 623; In re Walker’s Estate, 3 Rawle, 229.
In England, real estate is not liable for the
payment of simple contract debts. Here that
estate is subject to the demands of all Ithe
creditors of the deceased, but not until the
personal estate has been exhausted, when it
becomes the auxiliary fund for the payment
of debts. Hence the doctrine of the English
courts of equity has been adopted, that not
only must the testator charge his lands with
the payment of his debts, but must also show
his intention to exempt the personalty. If
the personal estate has been specifically be
queathed, and the lands directed to be sold
for the payment of debts, the personal is
held to be exempted by necessary implica~
tion. But the testator is always presumed to
act upon the legal doctrine that the personal
estate is the natural and primary fund for
the payment of all debts until he shows~ some
other distinct or unequivocal intention. In
Lupton v. Lupton, 2 Johns. Ch. 623. Chancel
lor Kent states the rule broadly, and as not
admitting of dispute, that the real estate is
not as of course charged with payment of
legacies. It is never charged unless the tes
tator intended it should be, and that inten
tion must be either expressly declared or
fairly and satisfactorily inferred from the
language and dispositions of the will. It is
not suflicient that debts or legacies are direct-
ed to be paid,-that alone does not create the
charge,—but they must be directed to be first
or previously paid, or the devise declared to
be made after they are paid. Where there
is an express bequest of all the testator’s per
sonal estate (with or without an enumeration
of particular articles), and the will also con
tains a charge of debts upon the real estate,
these facts have sometimes been held to
favor the exemption of the pcrsonalty. But
the position is nowhere sustained that a spe
cific bequest of the personal estate, without
a charge on the lands for the payment of
debts. will exonerate the former. Hill, Trus
tees, 352; Duke of Ancaster v. Mayer, 1
White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 918.
Applying these rules of construction to the
interpretation of Mr. Cooch’s will, in which
are no express words of exemption, resort
must be had to the intention of the testator
in order to ascertain what was his wish in
respect to the payment of his debts. The
flrst item contains the general and usual di
rection to his executor to pay his debts and
funeral expenses. By the second, he be
queaths to his wife "all my personal proper
ty, and three thousand five hundred dollars
in cash out of my real estate as soon as sold
by my executor." By the third, he gives to
D. Hutchison flve hundred dollars. By the
fourth, he gives to his brothers "the balance
of my estate, to be divided between them
share and share alike." Finally, he empow
ers his executor to sell his real estate at pub
lic sale within one year after his decease.
Th question is, what does the testator mean
by "balance of my estate?" Do these words
signify what may remain or be left after all
the personal property has been given to the
wife, and the debts and legacy to Hutchison
have been paid out of the proceeds of the sale
of the land? And is the inference plain from
the context of the whole will that the inten
tion is to cast the burden of the debts upon
the real estate? It would be begging the
question to say that the inquiry suggests a
doubt. and there is therefore no plain declara
tion or manifest intent to change the legal or
der of payment.
It cannot be denied that in the expressions
and terms of this will there is room for con
jccture that the testator may have desired
to leave to his wife all his personal property
free and discharged from the payment of his
debts, but there is no plain declaration or
manifest intent to that effect. He neither
discharges the personal nor charges the real
estate, and he is. in the language of Judge -I
Story, presumed to act upon the legal doctrine
that his personal estate is the natural and
primary fund for the payment of his debts
until some other distinct and- unequivocal
intention be shown. The object in selling
the real estate appears to have been to se
cure the cash payment of thirty-five hundred
dollars to his wife, and the division of “the
balance" of the proceeds of such sale between
his two brothers. This was the purpose of
the conversion of the real estate, and in this
respect it differs from the case of Sharpley v.
Forwood’s Ex'r, 4 Har. (Del) 336, where the
court held that if there be no direction as to
the object of the conversion, and the land is
directed to be sold, it is a change, out and
out, of the realty. Here there is a special di
rection to pay the wife three thousand five
hundred dollars out of the real fund, and to
divide the balance between the brothers.
There is, then, no fair or satisfactory infer~
ence to be drawn from the context that Mr. .
Cooch intended to exonerate his personal es
tate. As was said by the master of the rolls
in Brydges v. Phillips, 6 Ves. 570, it is only a
probable conjecture. There is no certainty,
no clear, unambiguous intention to be col
lected from the whole will, that he meant
that. There is no ground upon which to
judicially collect a settled intention. The
word '.'all" prefixed to “my personal estate"
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is not suflicient to make a specific legacy,
which is of a particular and individual char
acter, precisely described and limited as to
its nature, value, or the place where it may
be found. But, admitting the legacy to the
wife to be a specific one, the debts must still
be paid out of the personalty, unless there is
at the same time an express charge on the
realty for that purpose, or an evident inten
tion to make the charge. A testator must
comply with the rules of construction and
the settled principles of law, which have been
established, as well to carry out his intention,
where it is consistent with them, as to admin
ister the estates of deceased persons, accord
ing to a fixed and regular order. Looking
at the will alone, and extracting its mean
ing by intrinsic evidence, there is wanting
that clear, unequivocal, and manifest intent
which is required to exempt the natural and
primary fund, and throw the burden upon the
real estate.
164 PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND LEGACIES.
WELCH et al. v. ADAMS et Al.
(25 N. E. 34. 152 Mass. 74.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Buffolk. June 28, 1800.
Reserved case from supreme judicial
court, Suffolk county.
Chas. A. “@1011. for plaintiff. W. Gas
ton and F. E. Snow. for Adams. J. L.
Thorndike and M. Storey, for residuary
regatees.
DEVENS. J. The plaintiffs. who bring
this bill for instructions, are the executors
of the will of Isaac Adams. which is dated
the 13th of May, A. D. 1879. Mr. Adams
had his legal domicile in the state of New
Hampshire, and died on July 19, 1883. His
will having been admitted to probate in
New Hampshire. the present plaintiffs
have there received letters testamentary,
under which they have duly qualified; the
decree of the appropriate probate court
having been finally affirmed by the su
preme court of that state on August 6,
1385. All of the testator’s personal es
tate except household effects, farming
implements, etc., was in Massachusetts,
and on November 26, 1883, by reason of
the necessary delay in granting letters
testamentary in respect to the testator’s
personal estate in this commonwealth,
which was large, the plaintiffs had been
duly appointed special administrators
thereof, with authority to take charge of
his real estate. and had given bond for the
faithful performance of their duties as
such. On March 7, 1887, upon the petition
of the plaintlfis,aiter due notice it was or
dered by a decree of the probate court for
the county of Suffolk that a copy oi the
said will and the probate thereof in New
Hampshire. duly authenticated and pre
sented to that court, should be filed and
recorded. and letters testamentary be
granted to the plaintiffs. Pub. St. c. 127. §§
15-17. From this decree an appeal having
been taken, it was affirmed on the 5th of
October, 138?,by this court; and theplain
tlfis, having here received letters testa
mentary, have qualified, and proceeded to
act thereunder. By this bill the plaintiffs
seekinstructions as to the payment of two
legacies given by the will, or rather of the
interest claimed to be due thereon, one be
ing a legacy of $64,000 to Mrs. Anna R. Ad
ams, wife of the testator, and the other of
$5,000 to Julius Adams, his son. Mrs.
Adams having deceased since the death of
the testator, Julius Adams has been ap
pointed her administrator with the will
annexed. It is found that the personal es
tate in the hands of the executors is more
than sufficient, after paying all debts and
other legacies, to pay all sums which are
claimed on account of these legacies.
Under Pub. St. c. 127. § 34. and chapter
156, §§ 5. 6. the supreme judicial court and
the probate court have concurrentiuris
diction of a petition by theexecutor for in
structions as to the construction ofa will,
and from the decree of the probate court
any party aggrieved may appeal to this
court. Assumingfor the moment that the
subjects on which the bill requestsinstruc
tions present inquiries such as in ordinary
cases where the testator has been domi
ciled here and original administration has
been here granted could properly be ad
dressed to this court. it is to be considered
whether the matter is in any way affected
by the fact that the testator was domi
ciled in New Hampshire. and that the
original probate of his will was in that
state. In dealing with personal property
here found the executors are accountable
to the probate court in this common
wealth, and there is no duty imposed up
on them to transfer it or its proceeds to
New Hampshire, to be there administered,
even after the paymentoi the debts in this ,
state. On the contrary,it would be irreg
ular so to do unless an order tothat effect
was made by the probate court. The
Public Statutes (chapter 133, § 1.) provide,
in the case of administration taken .in this
state on the estate of an inhabitant ofany
other state or country, that “his estate
found here shall, afterpaymentofhis debts,
be disposed of according to his last will,
if he left any duly executed according to
law;" otherwise his real estate is to de
scend according to the laws of this com
monwealth, and his personal estate to be
distributed and disposed of according to
the law of the state or country of which
he was an inhabitant. Section 2 provides
that after payment of the debts in this
commonwealth “the residue of the per
sonal estate may be distributed and dis
posed of in the manner aforesaid by the
probate court, or, in the discretion of the .
court, it may be transmitted to the execu
tor or administrator, if any, in the state
or country where the deceased had his
domicile, to be there disposed of according
to the laws thereof." Sections 3, 4. and 5
provide for the settlement of the estate in
this commonwealth if it is insolvent, and
are intended to enablecreditors here to ob
tain an equal share, in proportion to their
respective claims, of the whole property,
whether within or without the common
wealth. This statute certainly .gives the
right to the probate court here to dispose
of the estate according to the will as orig
inally proved in another state. in leaving
it in its discretion to determine whether,
after the payment of debts here, the resi
due of the personal property shall be trans
mitted to anotherjurisdiction, the statute
is only declaratory of a general principle
often acted on. Stevens v. Gaylord, 11
Mass.256. 264 ; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mason
B81; Ewing v. Ewing, L. R. 9App. Cars. 34, 39,
L.R.10 App. Cas.453. 502. It is said by Mr.
Justice STORY, in discussing the question
whether a court in which ancillary admin
istration had been granted oughtto enter
tain a decree for final distribution of the
assets among the various claimants hav
ing equities or rights in tne iund,that such
court is not incompetent to act upon the
matter, and that whether it will do so, or
whether it will transmit the property to
the forum of the domicile of the deceased,
is a matter of judicial discretion. depend
ent on the circumstances -of the case.
“There can be," he adds, “and ought to
be, no universal rule on the subject. But
every nation is bound to lend the aid of
its judicial tribunals for the purpose of en
forcing the rights of all persons having a
title to the fund, when such interference
will not be productive of injustice, or in
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convenience, or conflicting equities, which
may call upon such tribunals for absti
neuce in the exercise of the jurisdiction."
Story, Eq. Jur. -6589. If the property had
been transmitted to another jurisdiction,
this court would not undertake to con
strue the will or determine how the estate
should be distributed, or how interest
should be computed on the legacies.
Emery v. Batchelder. 132 Mass. 452. But
the personal property is here, and was so
when the testator deceased. It is ample
for the payment of the legacies immedi
ately in question, as well as all other leg
acies or debts, whatever may be the inter
est thereon. The lcgatees are also here,
as well as the residuary legatees, who are
the only persons who can be affected by
any determination as to these legacies,
and no such case is presented as might be
if the marshaling and distribution of the.
whole estate were now to be considered.
Under such circumstances, it does not con
stitute a valid objection to the giving of
instructions that the testator was (lomi’
, ciled in another state, or that his will was
~originally proved there.
If it be urged that the probate court
may yet, in the exercise of its discretion,
order the personal property transmitted
to New Hampshire, and thus that any in
structions we might give would become
inoperative,it is sufficient to say that it is
not to be presumed that it would do so
when all the circumstances exist which
render the disposition of the property, so
far as the legatees are concerned, more
appropriate here than elsewhere, and
when important rights of opposing par
ties have here been settled upon lull no
tice; especially so when any order for this
transfer of the funds would be subject to
review by this court, sitting as the su
preme court of probate.
The first question presented by the ex
ecutors, according to the report,is wheth
er the legacy by Mr. Isaac Adams to his
wife carries interest from the date of the
testator’s death, orirom the end ofone year
thereafter. This bequest was of “the sum
of six ty-four thousand dollars in money, to
be paid her as soon as convenient after
my deccase, " and was accompanied by a
devise to her of five pieces of productive
real estate in Massachusetts, of which she
was dowable. These provisions by the
devise and bequest in behalf of his wife
are declared to be in full satisfaction “of
her dower and homestead rights in my es
tate, and of all distributive share or rights
whatsoever therein." In Pollard v. Pol
iard,1 Allen,4!)0,it was held that a widow
to whom a- legacy was given in lieu of
dower was entitled to be paid in full, in
case of a deficiency of assets, in preference
to legatees who were mere volunteers,
and also to receive interest thereon from
the death of the testator, if he had pro
vided no other means for her support dur
ing the first year after his death; and this
upon the ground that she is to be regard
ed as a purchaser for value, by reason of
her relinquishmentof her important rights
in her husband’s estate. The question
here presented is, however, to be decided
according to the law of New Hampshire.
It is not merely a question of how prop
erty shall be here administered, but what
is the construction and effect of the will,
and what was the intent of the testator
by its provisions. The construction of the
will, and the distribution thereby made of
the testator’s personal estate, are to be
governed by the law of his domicile. Sew
all v. Wilmer.132 Mass.136; Pub.5t.c.138,
§1. By the law of New Hampshire, as of
Massachusetts, the wife is treated, in ac
cepting a provision by will, as a pur
chaserfor value, and the general rule which
applies in the case of creditors who receive!
a legacy in satisfaction of a debt,and whot
are held entitled to interest from the death
of the testator, would apply where no dif
ferent intent is shown. Towle v. Swasey,
106 Mass.100; Williamson v. Williamson,6
Paige, 298. But by the law of New Hamp
shire, as of Massachusetts, while the wid
ow is a purchaser for value she also has a
right to determine whether she will accept
the provision made. and to acceptor reject
it as she may choose. Gen. Laws N. H. c.
202, §§ 9, 18; c. 193, § 13. if she accepts it,
she must accept upon the terms and con-
\ditions on which it is made. She can have
only what the will gives her, and in the
mode in which it gives the property be
queathed to her. The precise point decid
ed in Pollard v. Pollard, ubi supra, does
not appear to have been decided in New
Hampshire. In Lorlng v. Woodward. 41
N. H.391. it is said that to the general
rule there laid down, that a pecuniary
legacy, payable generally, without desig
ation of any time of payment, is payable
t the end of a year from the death of the
estator, without interest, and, if not then
aid, with interest after the end of the
year, there is one exception, which is in
favor of minor children of the testator,
who are entitled, unless other provision
is made for their support, to interest upon
their legacies from the date of the testa
tor’s decease. It is argued therefore by
the residuary legatees,that in New Hamp
shire no such exception exists in favor of
the testator’s widow as has been held to
exist in Massachusetts, as otherwise the
learned chief justice of New Hampshire
who delivered the opinion would not have
failed to state it. We shall not have oc
casion to consider this contention, or
whether the language used is fairly to be
construed as holding that no other excep
tion to the general rule than that specified
actually exists in New Hampshire. We
are of opinion that upon other grounds
the position taken by the residuary lega
tees is correct. In Pollard v. Pollard, ubi
supra. it is clearly implied that if other
provision is made by the testator for the
support of the wife, which will avail her
during the year following her husband’s
decease, she would not be entitled to in
terest from that time. The legacy to Mrs.
Adams was accompanied by a devise to
her of five pieces of productive real estate,
to the considerable income of which she
became at once entitled, and the case is
not presented of a widow left without
other means of support than her legacy.
In Loring v. Woodward it is said that
minors are entitled to interest upon their
legacies from the decease of the testator
only in those cases where no other pro
vision was made. If, therefore, it can be
held that in New Hampshire the same ex
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ception exists in favor of the widow as to
the allowance oi interest that exists in
this commonwealth, it cannot be reason
ably doubted that it applies only in those
cases where other provision is not made
for her support. Again, it is said in Lor
ing v. Woodward, nbi supra. that the gen
eral rules there laid down on the subject of
interest and income do not apply where
specific directions are given by the will, or
where adiiferent intention is to beinferred
from its provisions. The inference is fairly
to be drawn from the provisions of Mr.
Adams’ will that he did not intend that
the payment oi the legacy should beim
_mediate. If a will is silent as to the time
lwhen a legacy is to be paid. one to whom
'such a legacy is bequeathed. and who
.stands in the position oi a purchaser for
, value, is entitled to have the time of pay
ment determined by the legal presumption
oi thcintent oi the testator. If a time
were specified for its payment, he could
make no claim for any delay in its pay
ment except after the expiration of the
time specified. By the terms in which the
legacy to Mrs. Adams was given, no time
for its payment was specifically stated:
but the provision that “it shall be paid as
soon as convenient alter my decease" dis
tinctiy shows that the legacy would not
be paid at once, but that its payment
I would be governed by the convenience of
the estu te. The rule that legacies draw
interest only after the expiration oi.’ a year
contemplates that such atime is a reason
able one for the collection oi assets and
reducing them to money. By accepting
her legacy to be paid at the convenience
oi the estate. for that is its lair interpreta
tion, the widow consented to wait for the
expiration oi the usual time for its pay
It follows that she would not be
nd such instruction is given accordingly.
The next question reserved for our con
sideration by the report, and on which
the bill requests instructions. is whether
the interest upon both the legacies oi $64.
000 to the widow and $5,000 to Julius
Adams, is affected by a deposit made on
August 8.1857, with the New England
Trust Company, to the credit oi Julius
Adams, oi an amountequal to these sums;
and also in what manner, and at what
rate, interest on these sums shall he com
puted. The inquiry thus presented does
not involve the construction oi the will,
but concerns the duty of the executors un
der it, and the effect of the acts which they
have already done. It is well established
that trustees may ask the instruction of
the court, not merely as to the construc
tion of the instrument under which they
act, but also as to their duties under it.
Hyde v. Wason,l3l Mass.450. Nor is there
any reason why executors and adminis
trators might not do the same, except
where the matter is one which can be
more appropriately dealt with in the pro
bate court, especially in the settlement of
their accounts. ’iIreadwell v. Cordis, 5
Gray, 34l. 348. Whenever a trustee doubts
as to his safety and security in complying
with aclaim of the cestui que trust, his
only prudent and sale course is to wait
for the directions of acourt of equity.
Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 1368. While
ent.
l ghtitled
to interest until the end oi a year,
our statutes have established an elabo
rate system oi procedure for the adminis
tration of the estates of deceased per
sons. in the settlement oi the accounts of
executors, the jurisdiction of the probate
court is limited to these, and it cannot,
upon a hearing of that character. give
directions as to how future accounts shall
be rendered, or the duties oi executors
performed. Lincoln xI. Aldrich, 141 Mass.
342, 5 N. E. Rep. 517; Trust Co. v. Eaton,
140 Mass. 532, 4 N. E. Rep. 69. The probate
court may indeed, upon proper petition,
concurrently with this court determine
all questions arising under wills or relat
ing to their construction, any party ag
grieved hy the decision of that court
having a right oi appeal to this. Pub.
St. c. 127, §34: c. 156, §§ 5, 6-11; Swasey v.
Jaques, 144 Mass. 135, 10 N. E. Rep.758. It
may be that the inquiry which the execu
tors seek now to have determined could
be passed upon and decided in the probate
court on the final settlement of their ac
count by the order for the payment of
debts and legacies, and oi distribution to
be passed thereon, from which order an
appeal could be taken by any party ag-
grieved to this, as the supreme court of
probate. Yet, in the situation in which
the executors find themselves by the de
lays and embarrassments oi the case. and
by the accumulations of interest on the
funds they have collected.a majority of the
court are of opinion that the executors may
properly ask instructions upon the matter
thus in question. Whether such a bill
shall be entertained, or whether the par
ties interested shall be left to the other
remedies provided, is, to some extent, a
matter ol discretion. The inquiries sub
mitted have been iully argued by the lega
tees and the residuary legatees, who are
the only persons interested, and both par
ties have desired that they should be defi
nitely passed upon.
On August 8, 1887, the plaintiffs, after
some correspondence with Julius Adams,
who had become the administrator with
the will annexed oi the estate oi his mnth~
er, who had then deceased.deposited with
the New England Trust Company the
amount of the two legacies of $64,000
and $5,000 (together with another sum
for rents collected, not necessary to be
here considered) to the credit of Julius
Adams. These sums were deposited with
out any interest being included, the mat
ter of interest having been the matter
in dispute bet ween Adams and the execu
tors. Adams never authorized or ratified
this deposit with the trust company, re
fused to receive the deposit book, and has
in no Way recognized the deposit, which
bore interest at the rate of 2% per cent.
He had been informed before the deposit
was made, he having declined to receive
these sums without interest, that they
would be thus deposited unless he should
receive them. or designate some other
place for their deposit. On behalf oi the
residuary legatees it is contended that
the executors had a right to require J n
has Adams to receive, on account of the
legacies, the principal of the amounts due;
that he was not at liberty to refuse to re
ceive any portion unless the whole sum
due was paid; and that the deposit oi
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these sums with the trust company was
a valid appropriation in part satisfac
tion of thelegacies. Itisconceded by them
that the legacies carried interest from
the end of a year after the testator’s
death, and therefore that the sums depos
ited on account of the legacies were less
than the amounts due at that time.
The first inquiry which we consider in
this transaction is whether the plaintiffs,
as executors, were then in a position right
fully to make appropriations for the pay
ment of legacies. If they were not. Adams
could not be called upon to deal with
them.nor be bound to assent to their acts.
On August 8. 1887, their situation was a
somewhat peculiar one. The will of Isaac
Adams had been finally admitted to pro
bate in New Hampshire, and they were
lawfully appointed executors in that state
on August 6, 1885. Previous to this time
the same gentlemen had been appointed
special administrators in this common
wealth, on November 26, 1883. On March
7, 1887, the probate court of Suffolk coun
ty had admitted to probate a copy of the
will proved in New Hampshire, and from
this decree Julius Adams had appealed.
This appeal was pending until October 5,
1887, when the decree of the probate court
was affirmed. but letters testamentary
were not issued to the plaintiffs until Sep
tember 17, 1888. On the 8th of August,
1887, the plaintiffs were not executors in
this commonwealth. As executors of a
foreign wili,they had no right to act here,
and to dispose of the estate here. In or
der that they should have this authority,
it was necessary that the will should have
been here admitted to probate, and letters
testamentary issued to them. Campbell
v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. 8; Pub. St. c. 127, §7.
As special administrators, whose duty is
only to take care of and preserve property
until it can be regularly administered,
they certainly had no authority to pay
legacies. While the plaintiffs acted ap
parently as executors appointed in the
state of New Hampshire, describing them
selves as "co-executors" before any ap
pointment of them as such in this com
monwealth, the two sums deposited
“were paid out of the personal estate of
the testator in Massachusetts. which had
come to the hands of the plaintiffs as spe
cial administrators. " The probate court
had never authorized or directed the
transfer of any part of the property held
by the plaintiffs as special administrators
to themselves as executors in New Hamp
shire. In the account subsequently filed
by the plaintiffs on November 23,1888. as
executors in this commonwealth, they
claim to be allowed for the payment of
these sums. Adams was not called upon
to deal with the plaintiffs while occupying
so ambiguous a position. or to recognize
them as having authority as executors
under the laws of New Hampshire to deal
with property here without having been
authorized to do so by this common
wealth. Until, in its discretion, the pro
bate court directed the personal estate
here found to be transferred to the foreign
jurisdiction, executors there could not
rightfully deal with it. Many acts may
without doubt be done by one as executor
previous to his appointment, as such,
which, if in themselves not illegal, and
such as an executor may properly do,
might be validated by his subse uent ap
pointment relating back to the 1; me of do
ing the acts. No person, however, is re
quired to deal with one who may thereafter
be appoinied as executor, trusting to the
chance that he will be appointed. orfocon
sent to appropriations made by him in the
anticipation that they may thereafter be
lawfully made. The case as here present
ed has also this peculiarity: that if the
appropriation made by the plaintiffs while
executors in New Hampshire is to be treat
ed as authorized, so as to bind Julius Ad
ams. in whose favor the deposit was
made, it i so because of their subsequent
appointment in Massachusetts. Acts
done in one capacity are thus treated as
authorized by a subsequent appointment
of the actors to another capacity. The
plaintiffs are now attempting to adminis
ter the estate in Massachusetts. This is
the foundation of their bill for instruc
tions, yet the act concerning which in
struction is asked was done while they
were executors in New Hampshire only.
At the time when the plaintiffs undertook
to offer payment of the legacies, to appro
priate a sum therefor, and to make a de
posit thercof, they had no authority to do
so in such manner that the rights of the
legatees would be affected.
Nor, irrespective of this matter of the
plaintiffs’ authority, are we of opinion
that legatees are bound to accept a pay
ment by installments which should oper
ate pro tanto to diminish their ciaimslThat it is an exceedingly convenient mode
often of administering an estate to make
partial payments to creditors or legatees
when the rights of creditors are satisfied
may be admitted. Orders to this effect
are often made by courts, independently
of statute authority, for the more conven
ientdistributton of the estatmas the funds
accumulated in administration by the
collection of debts or the reduction of se
curities into possession would otherwise
be substantially idle. In this common
wealth, the practice is recognized by stat
ute. and the probate courts are authorized
to order partial distribution of the funds
of estates in the course of administration.
Pub. St. c. 136. §21. If such an order is
obtained, there would be much force in
contending that interest should not, after
such an order, or proper information of
such an order, be allowed except on the
balance of the debt or legacy which would
remam after the application of the partial
payment was, or might have been. made.
No such order was passed or applied for,
and the iegatee or creditor ought not to
be expected to receive payment of his
legacy on debt in such instailmen ts as the
executor may, in his own discretion. see
fit to apportion to him. The existence of
the power in the court to order partial
payments, and its frequent exercise, do
not indicate that the executors have any
such power, but rather otherwise. If the
legatee or creditor should consent to re
ceive partial payments, which no doubt
are often made without any order of
court, it certainly would be right that in
terest on his claim should be diminished.
in the case we are considering the two
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sums offered to Adams, and deposited to
his credit, were relused by him, and it is
conceded that they did not equal, interest
included, the amount of the legacies to
which. in his own right and that of his
mother, he was entitled. Even if the offer
was madethat Adams should rcceivethese
sums for the legacies, leaving the question
oi interest upon them open for further
consideration or litigation. he was un
der no obligation thus to accept them.
These views render it unnecessary to
consider several points which have been
quite fully discussed, viz., what was the
true construction of the correspondence
between the executors in some other re
spects, and whether Julius Adams might
safely have accented the offer of the exec
utors without waiving his right to op
pose the probate oi his father’s will in this
common wealth, which he was then con
fiesting.
and certain other claims made by
lm.
It is urged in connection with the claim
for interest on these legacies that the con
duct oi Julius Adams in opposing the pro
bate of his in ther’s will in New Hamp
shire and in this commonwealth was litig
ions and unreasonable. So far as the
legacy to Mrs. Adams is concerned, her es
tate should certainly not be diminished
by any acts done by her son in his individ
ual capacity. The facts are not before us
upon which we could decide vi hether his
conduct was litigious and his resistance
to the probate of the will unwarraninble,
even if we could hold that his claim for in
terest should be aflected thereby. It is
without doubt true that, where the settle
ment of an estate is delayed by legal con
troversy, and where funds are accumulat
ed under such circumstances that they
cannot be permanently invested, loss may
be occasioned to the residuum of the es
tate. The contestant who disputes a will
is still, however, in the exercise of lns legal
rights. It was held, therefore, in Kent v.
Dunham, 106 Mass. 586. that the fact that
legatees had caused delay by unjustifia
ble proceedings, embarrassing the execu
tors in the settlement of the estate, was
inadmissible for the purpose of defeating
theirclaim to interest. On the otherhand,
we can perceive no ground for the claim
on behalf of Julius Adams that interest
should be computed on these legacies alter
the expiration of one year from the death
of the testator, with annual rests, and
thus that the legatees should receive com
pound interest.
The question remains to be determined
at what rate interest shall be computed.
It is urged on behalf oi the residuary leg
atees that it should besomethingless than
the legal rate, and that certainly this
should be so alter the deposit made by the
plaintiffis,upon which only 2% percent.was
to be allowed. In the view we have tak
en, the matter of interest is not affected
by the deposit. That interest at the legal
rate is payable after one yearirom the tes
tator’s death, is well established as a gen
eral rule in Massachusetts and New Hamp
shire. Lorim.' v. Wood ward, Kent v. Dun
ham, ubi supra; Ogden v. Pattee. 149
Mass. 82, 21 N. E. Rep. 227. Even where
the estate could not have been reduced to
money within that time, or where the ad
ministration had not been taken for a
considerable time after the death of the
testator, it would still be allowed to the
iegatee as an incident and accretion to the
legacy. Ogden v. Pa ttee, ubi supra; Lamb
v. Lamb, 11 Pick. 371; Martin v. Martin.
6 Waits, 67. This allowance is made, not
merely became’ it will be presumed that the
estate will, alter the year has expired,
have actually made this sum, but also be
cause, as it would be difficult, if not im
possible, to investigate how much inter
est had been made in such cases. it is a
reasonable rule to adopt that rate of in
terest which the law has fixed where none
other is stipulated for. It is urged that it
is a matterofpablic knowledge that no in
terest can now he obtained as high as 6
per cent. on any sale investment: that
such an allowance should no longer pre
vIail; that the court should determine. ei
ther directly or with the aid of a master.
what could reasonably have been ob
tained, and that this only should now be
allowed. ltis probable that the rate of
interest does not so nearly represent now
what can be earned by a safely invested
fund as it did when it was originally es
tablished by statute as the legal rate, and
that it would be difificultnow to obtain it.
But, as it is inferred that where no time is
specified for the payment of a legacy it is
not to be paid until theend of a year lrom
the death oi a tcsta tor. so it is a reasona
ble inference that the testator intended, if
the legatec did not receive it until some
time alterthat period. that he should then
receive it with the interest allowed by in w.
His gift fairly imports this, because that
is the rate where a debt or payment which
is due in przesenti is deferred. This view is
not in conflict with Williamson v. Will
iamson, 6 Paige, 298, and Healey v. Top
pan, 45 N. H. 243. The question in these
ca ses was not between legatees of specified
sums and the estate, but between those
who were the legatees, one class of whom
were entitled to an estate for life in the
legacy, and the other to the remainder.
As between them.there was no doubt that
the tenant for life, after the fund was act
ually formed, was entitled only to the in
terest or income which it produced. In
determining what should be the basis of
apportionment between them before the
settlement ol the estate and before it was
actually formed and productive, it was de
termined that 5 per cent. upon it as ulti
mately ascertained would be right, as it
represented the income which might have
been obtained. It by no means follows
.that what is right as between legatees in
terested in different proportions in the
same fund is a proper rule between a lega
tee of a definite sum and the estate of the
testator. It is urged that by the English
rule less than the usual or legal rate oi in
terest is often allowed, and that the
amount of interest which legatees areenti
tied to recover is regulated by the court
of chancery with reference to the amount
which executors could have made, and
that this rate has been diminished from
time to time by reason of the change in
the value of the interest upon money.
Bcckford v. ’l'obin. 1 Ves. Sr. 308,3l1; Guil
lam v. Holland. 2 Atk. 343; Wood v. Bri
ant, Id. 523; Sitwell v. Bernard, 6 Ves. 520.
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The rule oi the court of chancery appears
from these cases to have been that it
could determine, at its own discretion,
how much interest should be allowed,and
even without inquiry into the circum
stances of any particular case. Sitwell v.
Bernard. ubi supra. No action could have
been brought at common law to recover
the amount of a legacy which was treated
only as a direction to the executor. The
remedy oi the legatee was only in the ec
clesiastical courts or the court oi chan
cery. These courts have always assumed
the right to determine the terms on which
the beneficiary should receive it. This is
given as one of the reasons why an action
at law should not be maintained for it.
Deeks v. Strutt,5Term R. 690; Allen v. Ed
wards, 136 Mass. 138. In this common
wealth an action at law has lougbeen the
remedy to recover the amount of such a
legacy. Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138,
and authorities cited. Such is the rule, we
believe, in most. if not all. of the states of
the Union. While in many cases inter
est has been recovered, none has been
cited or is known to us where it has been
at less than the legal rate. It has been
recovered upon the same principle that: it
is awarded in any case where the pay
ment of a debt due has been deferred. We
have no reason to believe that the law of
New Hampshire in this respect differs
irom that which prevails in this common
wealth, and we do not feel authorized to
change the rule so long as the statute re
mains unchanged which fixes a rate oi
interest. Kent v. Dnnham, ubi supra;
Ogden v. Pattee, ubi supra; Pub. St. 0.
77, § 3; Wood v. Cori, 4 Metc. 203; Loring
v. Woodward, ubi supra; Gen. Laws N.
H. c. 232, § 2. The executors are there
fore instructed that the legacies ol $5,000
and $64,000 are payable, with legal inter
est, in a year irom the death of the tests.
tor. Instructions accordingly.
4%“
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PARKER v. PROVIDENCE & S. STEAM
BOAT CO.
(28 Atl. 102, 17 R. I. 376.)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island. Nov. 21, 1891.
Action on the case by Arabella ’1'. Par
ker against the Providence & Stonington
Steam-Boat Company for personal injuries
to plaintiffIs testator resulting in death.
Defendant pleaded in bars ettlcment and
receipt of plaintiff in full of all demands
by reason of the injury complained of. to
which plaintiff demurred. Demurrer over
ruled.
bItephen A. Cooke, Jr., Louis L. Angel],
IV. 0. Parker, and ii‘. M. Butler, for plain
tiff. lVaIter 1I. Vincent, for defendant.
TILLINGHAS’I’, J. After the overruling
of the defendant’s demurrer to the plain
I tifi’s declaration inthis case. (Index ii. 24,)1
the defendant pleaded the folio wlngreiease
in bar of said action: “New Bedford, Mass,
July 16, 1889. Received from the Provi
deuce & Stonington Steam-Ship Co. the
sum of one (1) thousand dollars, the same
being in full settlement of all claims and
demands which I, as executrix of the last
will and testament of Charles W. Parker,
deceased, and as iegatee named in said
will, may have against the Providence &
Stonington Steam-Ship Co., its agents
and servants, for loss of life in conse
quence of the collision on the 14th day of
May, 1889, between the schooner Nelson
Harvey and the steamer Nashua, owned
by the said Providence & Stonington
Steam-ShipCo.; and I do herebycovenant
and agree, to and with said company,
that no suit shall at any time be brought
or prosecuted against said company
therefor. ARABELLA T. PARKER, Exec
utrix. Witness: FRANK N. Howss." To
this plea the plaintiff has demurred. as
follows: “And the said plaintiff. as to the
first plea, or plea of ettlement of said
cause of action,comes," etc.,“ when,
" etc.,
“and says that the said plea, and the
matter therein contained, in manner and
form as therein set forth, are not suffi
cient in law for a bar to said action, and
. the said piaintiffis not bound by law to
answer the same, because said right of
action is given to said plaintiff in her said
capacity as a representative of her chil
dren as well as herself, and is not included
in the powers given by statute to admin
istrators to compromise claims such as
appear in is vor of ordinary estates, and
is such a claim as cannot be compromised
or settled by her as administratrix with
out concurrence of her children, if of age.
or their duly-qualified guardians of such
of them as are minors, and this she is
ready to verify. Wherefore, for want of
asnflicient plea in this behalf, she prays
judgment of this court, and that said de
fendant may further answer the said dec
laration."
The only question raised by the demur
rer is whether an executrix has the power
to compromise and settle such a cause of
action as is set out in the plaintiff’s dec
laration without the assent of the next of
Pub. St. R. I. c. l84,§ 32, provideskin.
'29 Atl. Rep. 284.
as follows: “Executors and administra.
tors may submit to arbitration or may
adjust by compromise any claims in favor
of or against the estates by them repre
sented, in the same manner and with the
same effect as the testator or intestate
might have done." The defendant con
tends that this statute authorizes the
plaintiff in her said capacity to compro
mise and settle a claim like the one in
suit, and that, having done. so, as set no in
the plea in bar. she is precluded H'Oni
maintaining her action. The defendant
further contends that said statute is
simply intended to afford executors and
administru tors additional protection, and
not in any manner to take away or
abridge their common-la \v powers, among
which is that of compromising and ad~
justing disputed claims in favor of or
against the estates which they represent.
The plaintiff, on the other hand. contends
that said statute does not confer any au
thority upon her to make said compro
mise, and also that it has no bearing up
on the case at bar, because she is merely
a representative of the widow and next of
kin, and sues exclusively for their benefit,
the damages to be recovered not being
assets in her hands. with which to pay
the debts or liabilities of the testator, but
to go to the widow and next of kin
under‘the statute. Shefurther contends that the
action is brought under the provisions of
Pub. St. R. I. c. 204, § 15, and that section
I.20ofsaid chapter has no application. Said
sections are as follows: “Sec. 15. If the
life ofany person, being a passenger in any
stagecoach or other conveyance, when
used by common carriers, or the life of any
person, whether a passenger or not, in the
care of proprietors of, or common carriers
by means of, railroads or steam-boats, or
the life of any person crossing upon a pub
lic highway with reasonable care, shall be.
lost by reason of the negligence or care
lessness of such common carriers, pro
prietor, or proprietors, or by the unfitness
or negligence or carelessness of their serv
ants or agents. in this state, such com
mon carriers, proprietor, or proprietors
shuif be liable to damages for the injury
caused by the loss of life of such person,
to be recovered by action of the case, for
the benefit of the husband or widow and
next of kin of the deceased person. one
half thereof to go to the husband or wid
ow, and onehalf thereof to the children of.
the deceased." "Sec. 20. In all cases in
which the death of any person ensues
from injury inflicted by the wrongful act
of another, and in which an action for
damages might have been maintained at
the common law had death not ensued,
the person inflicting such injury shall be
liable to an action for damages for the
injury caused by the death of such person,
to be recovered by action of the case for
the use of the husband. widow, children,
or next of kin,in like manner and with
like effect as in the preceding five sections
provided."
The power of an executor or adminis
trator at common law to compromise or.
submit to arbitration disputed claims in
favor of or against the estate which he
represents is undoubted. Chadbourn v.
Chadbourn, 9 Allen, 173; Bean v. Far
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nam, 6 Pick. 269; Chase v. Bradley, 26 Me.
531; Ohouteau v. Suydam, 21 N. Y. 179,
184; Wood v. Tuunlclifi, 74 N. Y. 2&8; Mur
ray v. Blatchford, 'l Wend. 583, 616: Rog
ers v. Hand, 39 N. J. Eq. 270. 271, and note.
Pub. St. R. I. c. 204. §§ 15-20, are printed
in index Ii, pp. H5, 116. It is also well
settled that a statute like the one under
consideration does not change the power
of the executor or administrator existing
at common law, but simply reinforces and
affirms the same. if, in the exercise of
this power, the executororadmiuistrator,
by reason of negligence or any serious er
ror in judgment, obtains a less sum than
he would clearly be entitled to recover at
law, he may be held to be guilty of a dev
astuvit, and be required to make up the
loss out of his own estate; but still the
compromise, if made in good faith, would
be binding upon the parties thereto. in
Rogers v. Hand. 39 N. J. Eq. 270, 275,
which was a case in which the executors
compromised and settled a claim against
the estate, without suit, the court says:
“ When they act in good faith, those who
would impeach their conduct must show
fraud or mistake, or that they have act 6I
without authority or contrary to la ."
“They may compromise a lawsuit, may
buy the peace of the estate, and extinguish
even doubtful claims against it, provided
they act discreetly and in good faith."
\See, also, Meeker v. Vanderveer’s Ex’rs,
15 N. J. Law. 392.
It will be seen that what we have said
thus far relates to the power of executors
'
and administrators generally to com’
promise claims in favor o! and against
the "estates" which they representpIas
that term is ordinarily understood; and
the question which now presents itseli is
whether the law, as above stated, is ap
plicable to a case like the one before us, in
which the cause of action is purely stat
1 utory, and where the damages do not ac
crue to the “estate" of the deceased, prop
erly so called, but to the widow and next of
kin. We fail to see, upon principle, that
any distinction can properly be made be
tween the two classes referred to. The
reasons which underlie and support the
law above laid down,in its application
to executors and administrators, general
ly, are equally applicable and cogent in a
case in which the claim arises by statute.
The plaintiff, in her capacity as executrix,
had a claim against the defendant c0r
Foration
growing out of its alleged neg
igence and wrongful acts in causing the
death of herhusband. Shecould prosecute
this claim or not, at her option. No one
else had any power to prosecute it. Good
win v. Nickerson, (R. 1.) Index ii, 115.1 Ii
suit is brought upon said claim, it is her
suit, and she may discontinue, compro
mise, or settle the same at her pleasure.
And if she has power to compromise the
suit aiterit is brought, why should she
not also have power to compromise the
claim upon which it is based without
bringing a suit? We cannot see that any
reason can be urged in support oi the ex
istence oi the power in the former case
which does not also apply with equal, if
not added, force to the existence thereof
'23 Atl. Rep. 12.
~for the benefit oi the widow and
in the latter. In Greenlcc v.Railroad Co.,
5 Leu, 418, which was a case brought by a
widow, under a statute quite similar to
the one under which this suit is brought,
it was held that she had power to control
the suit by compromise or otherwise.
The court says: “The question -is, can
the widow, under the statutes author
izing the suit, dismiss it against or with
out the consent of the children? ' * *
it is true, as argued, that the suit is
chil
dren. It is also true, the widow alone
has the right to suein theiirst instance.
The children have the right only when
there is no widow. The widow may
sue or not, at her option. We have hold
en that, if she fail to sue for the period oi
12 months, the suit is barred even as
to minors. Having, then, the right to sue,
to be exercised at her own election, it fol
lows,as aa'ecessaryincident to that right,
that she' may control the suit by compro
mise, abandonment, prosecution, or dis
missal." In Stephens v. Railroad Co., 10Lea, 448, which was a suit for the benefit L.
of the widow and children oi deceased, it
was held that she had the right to com
promise or settle the suit as she saw fit,
without the consent oi the guardian of
the child of the deceased. and against the
consent of her own attorney who man
aged the case.
~IAs to the contention of the plaintifi
that the action is brought under the pro
'visions of Pub. St. R. 1. c. 204, §'l5, and
hence that section 20 of said chapter has
no application, two answers suggest
themselves: First,the second countin the
deciaration is evidently framed upon both
of said sections, as it not only charges
thatthe deceased came to his death by
reason of the carelessness and negligence
of the defendant. but also by the wrong
ful acts oi said defendant: and,secund,
that, even though the declaration were
framed solely upon section 15, as con
tended, yet so long as the two sections
give but one remedy, and the declaration
might as well have been framed under the
one section as under the other, or even
under both together, we think they should
clearly be construed together in determin
ing the question whether the plaintiif had
power to compromise the claim upon
which this suit is based before any suit
was brought. if the inlury had not re
sulted in the death of the plaintiii’s testa
tor, he would undoubtedly have had
power to compromise and adjust the
claim against the defendant. Furthermore,
the iniurv here complained of was not
occasioned by the mere passive neglect of
the dei'endant, as was the casein Bradbury
v. Furlong, 13 R. I. 15. cited by the plain
tii"i, but might properly be described as an
injury “inflicted by a wrongful act." See,
also, Chase v. Steam-Boat Co., 10 R. I. 79.
and McCaughey v. Tripp. 12 R. I. 449.
Furthermore, the law favors the compro
mise of disputed claims, (1 Bouv. Law
Dict., l5th Ed., tit. “C(impromise,‘ and
cases cited,) and will sustain the same as
far as possible, when fairly made. But
the plaintiff argues that the settlement in
question,“ allowed to stand, will have
the effect to bind living parties, who are
competent to act for themselves, which
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is very different from the settlement of
claims in favor of or against the estate of
a person who is dead,und which are neces
sarily represented by the executor or ad
ministrator as theonly one who can repre
sent them. We do not think that this is so.
There are no parties to this suit, except
ing the plaintiff and defendant. The
next of kin are not and cannot be made
parties thereto. And while the settlement
made, if allowed to stand, will doubt
less incidentally affect their interest. still
it is not a. proceeding in which they have
any right as parties thereto. Nor is the
case materially different in this respect
from that of an ordinary claim in favor of
an estate in the hands ofan executor or ad
ministra tor; for, as we have already seen,
they have power to compromise claims,
and by so doing they incidentally afi’cct the
interest of the heirs or devisees, as thecase
may be, in the estate. If a large amount
is realized it inures to their benefit, as
suming, of course, that the estate is
solvent, while if onlya small amount is
realized they will suffer the loss, if such it
may properly be called. In other words,
the.executor or administrator has full
p0 wer to settle the estate in conformity to
law, and, this being done. the heirs or
devisees have no legal cause of complaint,
whether they receive much or little there
from. But no one would contend that he
cause of their interest they either are, or
have the right to be made, parties to a
suit, or a proceeding of compromise. In
conclusion, we think that the statute in
question, being evidently intended to
facilitate the settlement of disputed claims
growing out of or appertaining to the es
tates of deceased persons, should be lib
erally construed 'in favor of the object
sought to be attained, and that, thus con
strued, it mayfairiy be held to include such
a compromise as the one under considera
tion. The demurrer to the defendant’s
said plea in bar must therefore be over
ruled. Demurrer overruled.
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BARRY v. LAMBERT.
(98 N. Y. 300.)
Court of Appeals of New York. March 3, 1885.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
second department.
Action by one Barry against one Lambert,
executrix of the will of Thomas Lambert,
deceased, to establish a trust in a certain
loan made by said executrix. From a
judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant ap
peals.
William E. Osborn, for appellant. N. C.
Monk and J. S. Stearns, for respondent.
RUGER, C. J. The evidence in this case,
outside of the admissions of the defendant’s
deceased co-executrix, tended strongly to
show that the plaintiff, immediately previ
ous to January 31. 1882, delivered to Maria
Lambert, defendant’s co-executrix, the sum
of $2,000 in bills of the denomination of $100
each, and on that day the defendant with his
co-executrix of the estate of Thomas Lam
bert, loaned $1,800 of this identical money,
together with $6,000 belonging to the estate,
and about $200 belonging to Mrs. Lambert,
in one aggregate sum of $8,000 to Margaret
Lawrence, taking back a bond and mort
gage as security therefor to themselves
as executors.
Outside of such declarations, however,
the evidence was not entirely clear as to
the particular understanding and agreement
with reference to the disposition of these
moneys entered into, between Mrs. Lambert
and the plaintiff; when the money was deliv
cred to her. This evidence was attempted
to be supplied by proof of certain declara
tions, made by the deceased co-executrix,
Maria Lambert, soon after the loan was
made, in the presence of the plaintiff and
other parties. Mrs. Lambert was at that
time in feeble health, and her early death
was then anticipated. The declarations
were offered to be proved by the witnesses
who were present at the time they were
made, but their admission was objected to by
the defendant upon the ground that the dec
larations of one executor were not admis
sible as against his associate. The objec
tion was overruled by the court, and the
evidence was received, to which ruling the
defendant excepted. This exception pre
sents the only serious question in the case.
The proof showed that Mrs. Lambert then
made statements to the effect that she had
.received $2.000 from the plaintiff, to make
up the sum of $8,000 loaned to Mrs. Law- '
rence, and that plaintifl? was to have an in
terest in the mortgage taken as security
for the loan, and to receive her share of the
interest as it was paid by the mortgagor;
that she intended to make an acknowledg
ment to that efl.ect, either by her will, or in
a separate instrument, before she died. She
also stated that she expected to live until
September. She in fact died in June, soon
after this conversation. These declarations
were made by Mrs. Lambert in reply to a
request on behalf of, and in the presence
of, the plalntiff, that she should make such
a declaration or acknowledgment, as, in the
event of her death, would render the interest
of the plaintiff in the Lawrence mortgage
secure to her. Mrs. Lambert then promised
to attend to it as soon as she got a little
stronger, but death intervened before she
was able to perform her undertaking.
Assuming, for the purpose of the argu
ment, that this evidence was admissible,
there can be no doubt that these facts
raised a valid implied trust in invituiu
(Haddow v. Lundy, 59 N. Y. 320; Newton v.
Porter, 60 N. Y. 137), and that the express
acknowledgment made by Mrs. Lambert
operated as a full and perfect declaration of
trust, suflicient, within the authorities, to
charge the property then in the hands of the
executors with the obligations of the trust.
While there is no proof of any express
stipulation made between the parties, at the
time the money was delivered, that the se
curity for the loan was to be taken in such
form as to disclose the plaintifff’s interest
therein, yet an understanding to the effect
that the plaintiff was the owner of one
fourth of the mortgage, and of the interest
accruing thereon, mut be implied from the
absence of any agreement transferring the
title of the money advanced to the execu
tors. A trust by implication arises from
the use of the money according to such un
derstanding and agreement, and notwith
standing the security was taken in the
name of the executors, equity will protect
the interest of the beneficiary, and follow
the property in which the money was in
vested, and impose a lien thereon in favor
of the plaintiff to the extent of the sum
belonging to her thus advanced and in
vested. Price v. Blakemore, 6 Beav. 507;
Perry, Trusts, § 842; In re Frazer, 92 N. Y.
240; In re European Bank, 5 Ch. App. 358;
Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. & G. 37...
No difliculty arises from the blending of
the money of the estate with that of another
person in the same loan, for, the units
of which it is composed being of equal val~
ue, it is clearly severable and distinguish
able, and sufficient data are given to
enable such severance to be made. The
cases above cited show numerous instances
in which such a separation has been de
creed. Conceding for the present that the
admissions of Mrs. Lambert were incompe
tent to establish the facts upon which a
trust in invitum can be decreed, it is never
theless true that her statement also operat
ed as a valid declaration of trust. It is
well settled that a trust in personal prop
erty may be created by parol, and that no
particular form of words is necessary for
its creation, but the words or acts relied
on to effect that object should be unequivo
cal, and plainly imply that the party maiz
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ing them intended to divest himself of his
interest in the property, and to hold it there
after for the use and benefit of another.
Hill, Trustees, 130; Martin v. Funk, 75
N. Y. 140; Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 438;
Willis v. Smyth, 91 N. Y. 297. This is
all that is required to create a trust even
as against the owner, and although be con
tinues to retain possession of the property
devoted to the trust. But when the legal
title is in one party, and the equitable
ownership in another, it is only necessary
for those facts to appear, in order to con
stitute the holder a trustee for the benefit
0f the other. Pye’s Case, 18 Ves. 140.
The evidence, aside from the declarations
in question, tended strongly to establish
these facts, and a strong presumption of
an intended trust might fairly be implied
from the nature and surroundings of the
transaction.
By the will of Thomas Lambert, his wife,
Maria Lambert. was given a life estate in
all of his property, both real and personal,
and his executors were directed to keep it
invested during her life, and pay to her the
income thereof as long as she should live.
The duties of their oflice required the exec
utors to seek for advantageous investments,
and keep the moneys of the estate em
ployed. It’ was entirely withingthleinpower,
if it was not their duty, in~case~a profitable
investment oifcred itself 1ar:er_ln_amQlmt
than the available assets of illugtrte, to
supplement them with other funds, if they
could be legitimately obtained from other
parties. These moneys were received by
Mrs. Lambert under such a contingency. and
she was engaged in the lawful and legitl~
mate performance of her duties as an exec
utrix when she received and invested them.
There is nothingin the office or obligations
of executors that precludes them from act
ing as trustees upon other trusts, and for
other beneficiaries, if the transaction is not
inconsistent with the duties which they owe
as executors. Neither will that fact sub
ject property, thus held by them in trust, to
the hazard of a loss on account of their dual
character, so long as such property can be
separated and distinguished from the funds
held by them under their trust as executors.
The transaction between the plaintiff and
Mrs. Lambert was. so far as here appears, a
beneficial one for both of the funds intrusted
to her, and in receiving the plaintiff’s money
she was acting in the performance of her
legitimate duty as an executrix. It was
clearly the duty of Mrs. Lambert, when she
used the plaintiff’s money in acquiring this
mortgage, to have caused a recognition of
the plaintifI’s interest to appear in the instru
ment itself (Price v. Blakemore, supra), and
it was evidently her intention to repair this
omission before her death, by making such
adeclaration of trust as would protect the in
terest of the plaintiff, and the question in
this case is whether legal proof has been
given, from which a court of equity will find
the existence of the trust.
Co-executors, however numerous, consti~
tute an equity. and are regarded in law as
an individual person. Consequently the acts
of any one of them in respect to the admin
istration of estates are deemed to be the acts
of all, for they have all a joint and entire
authority over the whole property. Wil
liams, Ex'rs. 810; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 9
Cow. 34. Thus one of two executors may
assign a note belonging to the estate of the
testator (Wheeler v. Wheeler, supra), or
make sales and transfers of any personal
property of the estate (Bogert v. Hertell, 4
Hill, 492). He may release or pay a debt,
assent to a legacy, surrender a term, or
make an attornment without the consent or
sanction of the others. Williams, ExIrs, 812;
Jackson v. Shaffer, 11 Johns. 513: Douglass
v. Satterlee, Id. 16; Murray v. Blatchford, 1
Wend. 583. It was said in Wheeler v.
Wheeler, supra, “that, if a man appoint sev
eral executors, they are esteemed in law as
but one person representing the testator, and
that acts done by any one of them, which
relate to the delivery, gift, sale or release
of the testator’s goods, are deemed the acts
of all." It would seem to follow from this
principle that they have the power of joint
and several agents of one principal, and that
any act done or performed by one, within
the scope and authority of his agency. is a
valid exercise of power, and binds his asso
ciates.
It is quite true, however, that neither ex
. ecutors nor administrators, whether acting
separately or jointly, have authority to cre
ate an original liability on the part of the
estate, or enter into an executory contract
binding upon or enforceable against it. Mc
Laren v. McMartin~ 36 N. Y. 88; Ferrin v.
Myriek, 41 N. Y. 315; Austin v. Munro, 47
N. Y. 366.
It would seem to follow, as the result of
the authorities, that the powers of executors,
in the administration of estates confided to
them, are commensurate with those express
ly granted, or necessarily implied, from the
nature of the duties imposed upon them,
and their power to bind their associates by
their acts is limited only by the nature of the
transactions they are called upon to perform.
Thus having no power to bind the estate by
a new contract, or to revive a demand which
has once expired, neither their contracts nor
admissions can have the effect of creating
one or reviving the other: but having the
original power to transfer the property of
the estate for the purposes of their trust, any
act, whether performed by one or all. which
has this effect, is within their authority. and
binds the estate. It must be assumed, how~
ever, that such a transfer is made for a law
ful purpose, and in form sufficient to operate
as a transfer of property between individ
uals.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
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acknowledgments of Mrs. Lambert consti
tuted a good declaration of trust, and that
the making thereof was an act done in the
performance of her duty as an executrix of
the estate of Thomas Lambert, which oper
ated upon and was enforceable against it.
It would hardly be contended, under the cir
cumstances of this case, that a declaration
made by Mrs. Lambert, at the time these
moneys were received by her, as to the pur
pose for which they were received, would
have been incompetent to prove her nIust
character, even as against her co-executor;
and it is diflIicult to see why a similar decla
ration made by her at a subsequent time
would not be equally competent. Such a
declaration could in no just sense be said to
create any liability against the estate rep
resented by hcr, or subject it to any action
on account of the statement made. for such
an action could arise only by a wrongful re
tusal on the part of the executors to recog
nize the plaintiffl’s equitable rights of prop
erty. The arrangement shown by such a
declaration, instead of creating a liability
against the estate, would simply have the
effect of protecting the party advancing the
money from an unjust claim ofIownership on
the part of the executors, by reason of the
form in which the securities for the loan
were taken.
The establishment of this trust works no
injury to the estate, {or the evidence, aside
trom the declaration, shows quite conclusive
ly that the plaintiff’s moneys, to the extent
of the lien claimed, and to which the estate
had no title, went to make up the value of
the property now in possession of the de
fendant.
Some objections were made by the appel
lant to remarks that fell from the plaintifi?
while giving her evidence, that tended to
show personal communications and trans
actions between herself and Mrs. Lambert.
The witness was admonished by the court
not to relate such transactions, and no rul
ing was made by the court, or exception
taken by the appellant, on the subject of
such evidence on the trial. After the close
of the trial the appellant asked to have
these expressions struck out. This motion
was denied by the court, and we think cor
rectly disposed of.
The expressions referred to were inadvert
ently used by the witness, were ruled as in
competent by the court at the time they
were made, and were not relied upon in de
clding the case.
The conclusion arrived at on the main
point of the case renders it unnecessary for
us to consider the question as to the admissi
bility of the declarations of one executor
against his associate, when offered as evi~
dence to prove the facts stated in such dec
iarations.
The judgment should be ~aflirmed.
All concur.
Judgment attirmed.
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CARTER v. MANUFACTURERS’ NAT.
BANK OF LEWISTON.
(71 Me. 448.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov., 1880.
An action by an administrator de bonis
non against the Manufacturers’ National
Bank of Lewiston for the conversion of
shares belonging to the decedent, transferred
on the books of the bank to "John G. Cook,
Executor." The executor borrowed from the
bank on his note, giving the stock as security.
The money was loaned by the bank on the
statement of the executor that it was re
quired in the settlement of the estate.
Wm. P. Frye, John B. Cotton, Wallace H.
White, and Seth M. Carter, for plaintiff.
Ludden & Drew, for defendants.
VIRGIN, J. The main question is whether
the bank obtained a valid title to the shares
of stock pledged to it by the executor as
collateral security for the payment of his
note.
The interest which an executor as such has
in the personal estate of his testator is not
the absolute title of an owner, else it might
be levied on for his personal debts; but he
holds in autre droit, as the minister and
dispenser of the goods of the dead. Went.
Off. Ex'r (14th Ed.) 196; Pinchon's Case, 9
Coke, 86b; Dalton v. Dalton, 51 Me. 171;
Weeks v. Gibbs, 9 Mass. 76; Hutchins v.
State Bank, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 423. As soon
as he is clothed with a commission from the
probate court, the executor is vested with
the title to all the personal effects which the
testator possessed at the instant of his de
cease; but the title is fiduciary and not ben
eficial (Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y.
21), and hi oflice is not that of an agent,
but of a trustee (Dalton v. Dalton, supra;
Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 198; Shirley v.
Heaids, 34 N. H. 407).
As a necessary incident to the execution of
the will and the administration of the estate,
the power to dispose of the personal estate
is given to the executor. And no general
proposition of law is better established than
that an executor has an absolute control
over all the personal effects of his testator.
Petersen v. Chemical Bank, supra; 1 Wil
liams, ExIrs (6th Am. Ed.) 709; 2 Williams,
Ex'rs, 998; 1 Perry, Trusts. § 225, and cases
in notes. And this rule prevails where no
statute intervenes. Rev. St. c. 64. § 49.
While it is the duty of an executor to use
reasonable diligence in converting assets into
money for the general purposes of the will,
the law permits him to exercise a sound dis
cretion as to the time, within a limited pe
riod, when he will sell. And high authority
has declared that circumstances may exist
in which it is certainly not wrong in him,
although it may not be a positive duty, to
make advances for the benefit of the estate
and reimburse himself therefrom. Munroe
v. Holmes, 13 Allen, 110. If he may advance
his own money for the general purposes of
the will, and may sell the personal eflfects
for the like object, it is diflicult to see why,
in the absence of any prohibltory provision
in the will, he may not mortgage or pledge
the assets for the same purpose; and the
great weight of authority so holds. 2 Wil
liams, ExIrs, 1001, and cases cited; McLeod
v. Drummond, 17 Ves. 154; Andrew v. Wrig
ley, 4 Brown, Ch. 125. In Earl Vane v. Rig
den, 5 Ch. App. 663, Lord Hatherly said:
“Lord Thurlow expressed his opinion clearly
to be that the executor is at liberty either to
sell or pledge the assets of the testator.
Scott v. Tyler, 2 Dickens, 712, 725. In fact,
he has complete and absolute control over
the property, and it is for~the safety of man
kind that it should be so; and nothing which
he does can be disputed, except on the‘
ground of fraud or collusion between him
and the creditor." And Sir W. M. James, in
the same case, said: “It seems to be settled
on principle, as well as by authority, that an
executor has full right to mortgage as well
as sell; and it would be inconvenient and
very disastrous if the executor were obliged
immediately to convert into money by sale
every part of the assets. It is a very com
mon practice for an executor to obtain an
advance from a banker for the immediate
wants of the estate by depositing securities.
It would be a strange thing if that could not
be done." See, also, 3 Redf. Wills, c. 8, §
32, pl. 4 et seq.
In considering the question whether an ex
ecutor had followed a specific power in a
will, Chancellor Buchner made the general
remark: “It is certain that an executor, as
such, has no power to pledge the estate of
his testator for a loan of money." Ford v.
Russell, 1 Freem. Ch. (Miss.) 42. If the
learned chancellor meant that an executor
has no authority to pledge the assets of his
testator for a contemporaneous advance of
money for the use of the estate,—for a pur
pose connected with the administration of
the assets,—he is not sustained by the great
current of modern authority. 1 Perry, Trusts,
270. and cases there cited, and cases supra.
Although the general proposition mentioned
is so well established. nevertheless. like most
others, it is not without an exception; for
while it is of the greatest importance that the
disposal of a testator’s effects should be made
reasonably safe to the purchaser, still it is
the bounden duty of the executor to faithfuh/
- ly appropriate the assets to the due execution
of the will; and a misapplication thereof is a
breach of duty for which he is liable. And
all the authorities concur in holding that, if
the purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee know
or have notice that the transfer to him is
made for the purpose of misapplyiug the as
sets, his title cannot be upheld, and he there
by becomes involved, and is made liable to
all persons beneficially interested in the will,
except the executor. 2 Williams. Ex'rs, 1002,
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and cases in note x: 1 Perry, Trusts, 270, and
cases in note 1; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 400, 402,
and cases; McLeod v. Drummond, 17 Ves.
153, where the cases are critically reviewed
by Lord Elden; Collinson v.Llster, 7 De Gex,
M. & G. 633; Yerger v. Jones, 16 How. 30, 37,
38; Hutchins v. State Bank, supra.
It also now _seems to be well settled, inequmt, that~aIn executor ~caInImake
noTaTlld sale or pledge of his testator’s effects
for the payment or security of his own pri
vate debt (2 Sugd. Vend. 372, and cases in
note 0; 1 Perry, Trusts, 270, and cases in note
3; 2 Williams, ExIrs, 1004, and cases in note
(1), on the ground res lpsa loqultur, giving the
purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee such notice
of the misapplication as necessarily to in
volve him in the breach of duty.
Chancellor Kent concludes a critical exami
nation of the cases which had then been de
cided as follows: “I have thus looked pretty
fully into the decisions of a purchaser from
an executor of the testator’s assets, and they
all agree in this: that the purchaser is safe
if he is no party to any fraud in the execu
tor, and has no knowledge or proof that the
executor intended to misapply the proceeds,
or was in fact by the very transaction apply
ing them to the extingulsbment of his own
private debt. The great dlfliculty has been
to determine how far the purchaser dealt at
his peril, when he knew from the very face
of the proceeding that the executor was ap
plying the assets to his own private purposes,
as the payment of his own debt. The later
and better doctrine is that ln.such a case he
does buy at his peril, but that, if he has no
such proof or knowledge, he is not bound to
inquire into the state of the trust, because
he has no means to support the inquiry, and
he may safely repose on the general pre
sumptlon that the executor is in the due exe
cation of his trust." Field v. Schieftelln, 7
Johns. Ch. 150, 160.
So Chief Judge Taney said: “An executor
may sell or raise money on the property of the
deceased, in the regular execution of his du
ty; and the party dealing with him is not
bound to inquire into his object, nor liable
for his misapplication of the money. ' ' '
But it is equally clear that if a party dealing
with an executor has at the time reasonable
ground for believing that he intends to mis
apply the money, or is, in the very transac
tion, applying it to his own private use, the
party so dealing is responsible to the per
sons injured." Lowry v. Commercial &
Farmers’ Bank, Taney, 310, 330, Fed. Cas.
8,581.
The law recognizes a. distinction between
an ordinary trustee and an executor. The
LAw succ.—l2
former has possession for custody, and the
latter for administration. The latter has a
necessary incidental power of disposal which
the former does not; and, as a consequence.
when one purchases of the latter stocks or
other securities bearing on their face the rev
elation of a trust, he may do so safely in the
absence of notice or knowledge of any in-
.tended breach of trust on the part of the ex
ecutor; but, if he purchases like trust prop
erty of an ordinary trustee, the law imposes
upon him the duty of inquiring into the right
of the trustee to change the securities. Dun
can v. Jaudon, 15 Wall. 165, 175; Shaw v.
Spencer. 100 Mass. 1388; Pendleton v. Fay, 2
Paige, 205; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 8 Allen, 15;
1 Perry, Trusts, § 225, p. 271.
In the case at bar the certificate of stock
was changed by the corporation, and issued
to Cook, executor, thus revealing to the bank
the trust. But this alone would not imperil
the bank in the transaction, for the executor
had the presumptive right to sell or pledge
the stock. But the executorgave to the bank
his note, for the security of which the pledge
was made. The note could not be collected
against the estate, for it was the personal
note of the executor. Davis v. French, 20
Me. 21. He could not create a debt in that
manner against the estate. And if the money
was thereby procured for his own private
use, and the bank knew it at the time, the
transfer of the stock would be a devastavit,
and could not be upheld. If the note had
been given to the bank for a private debt due
to the bank from the executor, created before
or during his executorship, but independent
thereof, it would come within the principle of
the numerous cases before cited, ‘where the
transaction itself would speak, and conclude
the bank. But, if given as a voucher for
money obtained for a legitimate purpose con
nected with a bona fide administration of the
will, then, though the executor alone was
made liable for its payment, the transaction
would be legitimate, and the estate would
have no reason for complaint. The case finds
“that the money was loaned in good faith by
the bank, and upon the statement made by
Cook that the same was wanted in the settle
ment of the estate." The presumption is that
he was acting faithfully. There is no evi
dence to the contrary, and the presumption
must stand. The doctrine of this case is rec
ognized in Pettiuglll v. Pettingiil, 60 Me. 412,
425.
Plaintiff nonsuit.
APPLETON, O. J., and WALTON, BAR
ROWS, LIBBEY, and SYMONDS, J.1., con
curred.
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RICH et al. v. SOVVLES.
(2a Atl. 72a, 64 Vt. 4021.)
Supreme Court .of Vermont. Franklin. Feb.
15, 1892.
Exceptions from Franklin county court:
TYLER, Judge.
Assumpsit by L. H. 8: J. P. Rlch,ad
ministrators, against Albert Sowies, ad
ministrator, to recover the price of a pair
of horses. Judgment for plaintiffs. De
fendant excepts. Affirmed.
At the time of the sale the defendant
was the administrator of one W. L.
Sowles, and was carrying on a farm be
longing to the estate of his intestate.
The horses were bought for use on this
farm. The sale was by letter. The plain
tifl’s intestate addressed the defendant
as "A. Sowles, Adm’r." and the defendant
signed. “A. Sowles, Adm'r." The writ
and declaration ran against "Albert
Sowles, administrator of \V. L. Sowles'
estate," and the court rendered judgment
againstthe defendant“as administrator."
S. E. Royce, for plaintiff. E. A. .50 wles
and H. A. Burt, for defendant. .
BOSS,C.J. The declaration sets forth a
good cause of action, and was properly
adjudged sufficient against the causes al
leged in the demurrer. It commands the
attachment of the goods. chattels, or es
tate of Albert Sowles, administrator of
William L. Sowles' estate, and not of the
estate of Wiltiam L. hIowies, of which Al
bert Sowles is administrator. The words,
“administrator of William L. Sowies’ es
tate, " are descriptive of the person named
as the defendant in the suit. if, by chance,
there were two persons of that name in
that locality. these descriptive words
would direct the officer serving the writ
to the person intended. The common
counts in general assumpsit- constitute the
declaration. Those declare that the de
fendant, vim, Albert Sowles. and that one
who holds the office of administrator of
the estate of William L. Sowles, is in
debted,and made the promises, to the tes
tator whose will the plaintiffs are execut
ing. The plaintiffs do not declare, nor
seek to recover, upon a promise or under
taking of William L. Sowies. the intes
tate, of whose estate Albert Sowles is ad
ministrator. Inasmuch as the defendant
is the legal representative of the estate of
William L. Sowles, if the declaration
sought a recovery upon the promise or
undertaking of the intestate it would be
necessary to describe him a such repre
sentative. Then the recovery would be
against the estate, or the defendant as the
representative of the estate. The judg
ment, in such a case, would be against
and to be satisfied out of the estate, and
not out of the property of Albert Sowles.
The words, "administrator of Wm. L.
SowlesI estate," in such an action, would
be descriptive of the capacity in which Al
bert Sowles was sued, and that he stood
as the representative of the estate of Will
iam L. Sowles. Hence, when these words
in the declaration follow the name of the
party, whether they will be deemed de
scriptive of his person ordescriptive of the
character or capacity in which he is sued,
is determined by the allegations of the
declaration. [f the declaration is against
him personally, they will be held to be de
scriptive of his person. That is the only
office they can serve in such a declaration.
They may be rejected as surplusage. If
the declaration is against the estate which
he represents, and the promises declared
upon are not his promises, but; the prom
fees of the person he represents, then they
will be held to be words properly used,
necessary to set forth the representative
character in which he is sued. The allega
tions of the declaration and the facts
found show a personal promise by the de
fendant' and these words are only descrip
tive of the person intended to be named as
defendant. The writ might be amended
by striking them out. Johnson v. Nash,
20 Vt. 40; Waterman v. Railroad. 30 Vt.
614; Myers v. Lyon, 51 Vt. 272; Jones v.
Tattle. 54 Vt. 488.
As contended by the defendant, an ad
ministrator has no authority, as such rep~
resentative, to create any debts against
the estate. He only has authority, by
virtue of his ofhce, to administer upon the
estate; that is, to ascertain both its as
sets and debts, and to put the formerin
condition to pay the latter, if sufficient.
and the surplus, if any_in a condition tobe
distributed to those legally entitled there
to. Whatever proper expenditures he
may make in accomplishing this will be al
lowed him by the probate court out of
the estate, on the settlement of his admin
istration account. But if, in caring for
and administering upon the estate, it be
comes necessary to incur an indebtedness,
he can bind himself, and not the estate,
for its payment. He cannot incur a debt
in the administration of the estate. and
bind the estate for its payment. He can
bind himself only for such payment. Up
on his becoming insolvent, equity will not
enforce the payment of such a debt out of
the estate. Lovell v. Field, 5 Vt. 218;
Bank v. Weeks. 53 Vt. 115.
Whether, when trust or other property
not owned by the estate has become
mingled with it,a suit may be maintained
for its recovery out of the estate against
the administrator in his representative
capacity. as was held in De Valengin v.
Duffy, 14 Pet. 289, is not involved in this
suit, and need not be considered.
The execution for the enforcement of the
judgment follows the writ. Rider v. Alex
ander,l D. Chip. 267; Perry v. Whipple, 38
Vt. 278; Wright v. Hazen, 24 Vt. 143. As
the writ is against the defendant. not rep
resentatively but personally, so must; the
judgment and execution be. Rendering
judgment against the defendant, “as ad
ministrator," did not make it a judgment
to be enforced out of the property of the
estate of which the defendant; is adminis
trator, but to be enforced against the de
fendnnt’s own property. Adding “ admin
istrator" to his name when the defendant
purchased the horses did not bind the es
tate for their payment, but bound the de
fendant. No more does such addition to
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his name in the judgment affect the nat
ure 0! the judgment. or change it irom a
judgment to be satisfied out of the defend
ant’s property to one to be satisfied out
of the property of the estate. Such addi
tion in making thecontract and rendering
the judgment might indicatethat the debt
was contracted by the defendant in admin
istering upon the estate, and that he
claimed that it constituted an item in his
administration account. It might be re
lected as surplusage. or by way of amend
ment, without changing the legal nature
of the contract or judgment. This dis
poses of all the contentions insisted upon
in this court. Judgment aflirmed.
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LUSCOMB v. BALLARD.
(5 Gray, 403.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Nov.
Term, 1855.
Action of contract against the executor of
Nathan Cook for services in taking care of
the house and furniture of said Cook after
his decease. There was evidence that one
Osborn, named as executor in the will, but
who declined to accept the trust, employed
plaintiff to take care of the house; that a
special administrator, afterwards appointed,
did not discharge plaintiff, but permitted
him to remain. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintifff, and defendant excepted.
S. H. Phillips, for plaintiff. J. W. Perry,
for defendant.
O
THOMAS, J. The jury have found that
the defendant neither caused, nor in any
way assented to, the employment of the
plaintiflf for the services for which this suit
is brought. He cannot therefore be charged
de bonis proprifs.
It not liable as of his own goods, has the
estate in his hands been charged by the acts
of Osborn, or the special administrator, so
that there may be a judgment de bonis tes
tatoris? WeIthink not; but that the law
is. that by a promise, the consideration of
which arises after the death of the testator
or intestate, the estate cannot be charged,
but that the executor or administrator is per
sonally liable on his contract. And whether
the amount is to be repaid from the estate
is a question for the court of probate, in the
settlement of his account.
The old doctrine seems to have been, that,
upon any promise made after the death of
the testator or intestate, the executor or ad
ministrator was chargeable, if at all, as of
his own goods, and not in his representative
capacity. Trewlnlan v. Howell, Cro. Eliz.
91; Hawkes v. Saunders, 1 Cowp. 289; Jen
nings v. Newman, 4 Term R. 348; Brlgden
v. Parkes, 2 Bus. & P. 424.
The more recent authorities, however, have
settled that an executor may, in some cases,
be sued in his representative capacity on a
promise made by him as executor; and ajudg
ment had de bonis testatoris. But it will be
found that, in these cases, that which con
stituted the consideration of the promise or
the cause of action arose in the lifetime of
the testator. Dowse v. Coxe, 8 Bing. 26;
Powell v. Graham, 7 Taunt. 581; Ashby v.
Ashby, 7 Barn. & C. 444. And an action for
goods sold and delivered to one as executor,
or for work done for one as executor, charges
the defendant personally, and not in his rep
resentative character. Corner v. Shew, 8
Mees. & W. 350. See, also, Forster v. Fuller,
6 Mass. 58; Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass.
162; Davis v. French, 20 Me. 21; Myer v.
Cole, 12 Johns. 349.
In this commonwealth, an exception _is
made in the case of funeral expenses of the
deceased. For these, the executor or admin~
istrator may be charged in his representa
tive character, and judgment be rendered de
bonis testatoris. But the case stands on its
peculiar ground, and is to be limited to it.
Hapgood v. Houghton, 10 Pick. 154.
The modern English doctrine on this point
is, that if the executor or administrator gIives
orders for the funeral, or ratifies or adopts
the acts of another party who has given or
ders, he makes himself liable personally, and
not in his representative capacity. Brice v.
Wilson, 8 Adol. & E. 849, note; Corner v.
Shew, 3 Mees. & W. 350; 2 \Villiams,-ExIrs,
1522.
It the contract of Osborn, or of the special
administrator, did not charge the estate, of
course the defendant can in no form be lia
ble.
In this view of the case, it is unnecessary
to consider how far the contract of Osborn,
who was named executor in the will, but de
clined the trust, could bind the estate. If
the executor could not so charge the estate,
a fortiori one who never accepted the trust
could not.
Exceptions sustained.
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I
NANZ v. OAKLEY.
(24 N. sec, 120 N. Y. 84.)
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi
sion. April 15, 1890.
Appeal from supreme court, general
term, first department.
William H.Arnoux, for appellant. David
Thornton, for respondent.
HAIGH~I', J. One Eliza Mundy, as the
present owner of the claim in suit, joins
with the plaintiff in this appeal. The ac
tion was brought against the defendant,
as surety upon an administrator’s bond,
to recover the amount adjudged by the
surrogate to be due and owing by the ad
ministrator, and which he was ordered to
pay to Cornelius W. Depew as administra
tor of Rachel Depew,deceascd. It appears
that one Mary Ann Schultz died in the
city of New York intestate, and that
Rachel Depew was her only heir. at law
and next of kin; that, on her petition,
'Bornt P. Winant and herself were ap
pointed administratorand administratrix
of the estate, and the defendant and one
Peter Cortclyou executed the usual bond,
which was joint and several, as sureties.
It further appears that Winant alone ad
ministered the-estate, and that. on a final
accounting before the surrogate, it was
adjudged and decreed that there was in his
hands as such administrator the sum of -
$1,930, which, with the interest, costs, and
disbursements of the proceedings to com
pel him to account, amounted in the ag
gregate to $4,017.57, which sum he was or
dered to pay over to Cornelius W. Depew as
administrator of Rachel Depew, she having
died in the mean time.
converted the money to his own use, failed
to make payment, and the decree was duly
docketed, execution issued and returned
unsatisfied; and thereupon this action
was brought against the defendant. the
sole surviving surety upon the adminis
trator’s bond, Depew,as such administra
tpéI,
having assigned the claim to the plain
t .
The trial court held that the plaintifl
was not entitled to recover, for the reason
that Rachel Depew was a co-administra
trix with Winant, that she was one of the
principals in the bond of which the defend
ant was surety, and that she could not
maintain an action against her own sure
ty for the wrongful acts of her co-princi- "
pal. This would be so if, by executing the
bond, she became liable as surety for the
devastavit of Winant, her co-principal.
This question has received attention in
numerous reported cases in the different
states, in some of which it has been held
that one executing a bond is liable for the
default of his co-principal. Brazerv. Clark,
5 Pick. 96; Towne v. Ammidown, 20 Pick.
535; Newton v. Newton, 53 N. H. 537;
Ames v. Armstrong. 106 Mass. 15; Boyd
v. Boyd, 1 Watts, 305; Bostick v. Elliott,
3 Head, 507; Babcock v.Hubbard, 2 Conn.
536: Caskie v. Harrison, 76 Va. 85; Jefiries
v. Lawson,39 Miss. 791; Braxton v.State,
25 Ind. 82; Moore v. State, 49 Ind. 558;
Eckert v. Myers. (Ohio,) 15 N. E. Rep. 862.
In several of these cases the question ap
Winant, having l
pears to have received but slight atten
tion. Some have cited as authority the
case of Brazer v.Clark, supra, of which we
shall speak later on, whilst others have
been overruled by later decisions. In the
case of Boyd v. Boyd the administrators
filed a joint inventory, and it wasIheld
that they were jointly and severally liable
for the whole amount of the personal
property described in the inventory upon
the joint and several bond which they had
given. In the case of Ames v. Armstrong,
it was held that the bond was binding
upon both of the executors as to all the
assets included in their inventory which
had come into their joint possession. In
the case of Brazer v. Clark, two executors
gave a joint and several bond with sure
ties. One died, and afterwards the sur
vivor committed waste, which the suretles
upon the bond had to pay. It was held
that they had no right of action for in
demnity or contribution against the heirs
or representatives of the deceased execu
tor; and to the same effect is the case of
Towne v. Ammidown. it will be observed
that these cases have chiefly been disposed
of upon questions of liability outside of
the bond; and in the last two cases the
decision was. in fact, against the right to
recover. The Indiana cases to which we
have referred have been expressly over
ruled in the case of State v. \Vyant, 67 Ind.
25, in which case it was held that where
two persons, as administrators, executed
a smgle bond with sureties, such bond
must be construed as if each of the princi
pal obligors therein had executed a sepa
rate bond with the same sureties, subject
to the sameconditions; and in suchacuse,
after the resignation of one of the adminis
trators,the other maymaintain an action
against him and his sureties upon the
bond for breaches committed by him
alone. In our own state but one case has
been found in which the question appears
to have been considered; and that was
the case of Kirby v. Taylor, first reported q
in 6 Johns. Ch. 242-253, wherein Chancellor
KENT remarks that “it was probably not
the intention of the bond that Thompson
. should himself he considered as a surety
for his co-guardian. " The same case was
, again reported in~Hopk. Ch. 309-331, in
which Chancellor SANDFORD considers the
question in an elaborate opinion, reaching
the conclusion that a principal in a guard
ian’s bond is not liable to the sureties for
the default of his co-principal. This ques
tion was not considered in the case of
Tighe v. Morrison, 116 N. Y.. 263, 22 N. E. Rep.
164; and in the case of Sperb v.McCoun,
. 110 N. Y. 605, 18 N. E. Rep. 441, the ques
tion was as to whether one administrator
could maintain an action upon the bond
against the sureties to recover the amount
of the devastavit of a co-administrator,
and it was held that such action could be
maintained even upon its assumption
that the plaintiff individually was liable
to the sureties upon the bond. But it was
expressly stated by the court, in its opin
ion. that it did not deem it important to
determine the relation which the plaintiff,
individually, as one of the principals in
the bond, bears to the sureties in reference
to the default.
The question in reference to the liability
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oi executors and administrators ior the
deffault oi each other, independent oi any
bond, is well settled by the authorities.
Each oi several executors or administra
tors has the power to reduce to possession
the assets, and collect all the debts due
the estate, and is responsible for all that
he receives. The payment oi money or
delivery oi assets to a co-executor or c0
administrator will not discharge him irom
liability; for, having received the assets
in his oificial capacity, he can discharge
himself only by a due administration there
oi in accordance with the requirements oi
the law. Consequently, one joint execu
tor or administrator is not liable for the
assets which come into the hands oi the
other, nor for the laches. waste, devasta
vit, or mismanagement of his co-executor
or co-administrator, unless he consents to
or joins in an act resulting in loss to the
estate, in which event he will become
liable. In other words, co-executors and
co-adminlstrators may act either separate
ly or in conjunction. They are jointly re
sponsible for joint acts. and each is sepa
rately answerable forhis separate acts and
deffaults. Bruen v. Gillett. 115 N. Y. 10, 21
N. E. Rep. 676; Croft v. Williams, 88 N. Y.
884; Ormiston v. Olcott, 84 N. Y. 339; .
Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539; 2 Woerner, I
, executed separate bonds.
of the estate l trators may be willing to undertake the
Adm’n, §348; Brandt, Sur.
it is not claimed that any
came into the hands oi Rachel Depew as
administratrix, or that she, as such, com
mitted any act ordefault that would make
her liable for the devastavit oi Winant, un
less she may be liable thereffor upon the
bond executed by her. The bond thus exe
cuted wasin the form required by the stat
utc. conditioned that they should iaith
iully execute the trust reposed in them as
such administratrix and administrator,
and that they shall obey all orders oi the
surrogate touching the administration oi
the estate committed to them. The statute
provides that every person appointed ad
ministrator shall, before receiving letters,
execute a bond to the people oi the state,
with two or more competent sureties, to
be approved by the surrogate, and to be
jointly and severally bound. 8 Rev. St.
(6th Ed.) p.82,§ 56. So that,beffore receiv
ing letters, she was required to execute
the statutory bond; and, having been as
socia ted with Wlnant as co-administra
trix, shejoined with him in executing the
bond, in which they each undertook to
faithfully execute the trustreposed in them
as administratrix and administrator.
What was the trust reposed in her as ad
ministratrix? It was to administer upon
the money and assets coming into her
hands, and for which she became person
ally liable, and for such assets as came in
to their joint possession in which they be
came jointly liable to administer and ac
count, anrl not to execute the trust as to
money and assets which came into the ex
elusive control and management oi her co
principal, over which she had no jurisdic
tion or control. They were to obey all
orders of the surrogate touching the ad
ministration oi the estate committed to
§ 490.
them. What orders was she to obey?
Those that were addressed to her, not
those that were addressed to her co-ad
ministrator. The object oi an administra
tor’s bond is to enforce or insure the dis
charge oi the duty reposed in the
sons appointed. It was not intended, in
requiring such a bond to be executed,
to change the liability or duties oi the
persons appointed irom that which ex
isted under the provisions oi the statute
independent oi the bond. The bond was
not intended to vary their obligation or
their rights and duties as are defined by
law. Their duties were the same after the
bond had been given as they would have
been had no bond been required or execut
ed. They were, consequently, jointly lia
ble for joint acts, and severally liable for I
their own acts. Rachel Depew and Wi
nant each signed the bond as principal.
Neither signed it as surety. The deffend
ant signed as surety, and as such she be
came liable for the joint acts oi the princi
pals, and for the individual defaults oi
each. It is true they joined in executing a
single bond jointly with sureties. They
doubtless had the right to execute and flle
separate bonds; but this was unnecessary,
for their act in executing the one instru
ment should be construed asii they had
Joint adminis
trust reposed in them when each knows
that he is responsible onlyfor his own acts
and those in which he joins with his asso
ciate, when he would not be willing to be
come surety for the separate acts oi his
colleague. The claim that joint liability
for the acts oi each other under the bond
will promote diligence on the part oi the
principals does not appear to us to be well
fouuded. It may be true that sureties are
at times without power, by timely inter
vention, to prevent waste by one oi sever
al administrators; but such want oi pow
er may be equally true in reference to the
other joint administrators. As we have
seen, one may collect a debt or take into
his possession an asset; and, having re
duced it to possession, he must be respon
sible for the proper administration oi it.
His associate cannot demand or recover it
irom him; and, should he see fit to ah~
scond or commit waste without the
knowledge oi his associate, such associate
would have no other, further, or greater
power to prevent it than the surety.
Other questions were raised upon the ar
gument in refference to the transfer oi this
claim to the plaiutiii, but none which we
deem it necessary here to discuss. As to
the appeal oi Eliza Mundy, we have not
thought it necessary to consider at this
time. it has done no harm. No motion
was made to dismiss in this court. Such
motions have been made in the court be
low, one oi which is said to be still pend
ing. For the reasons already stated the
judgment should be reversed, and a new
trial granted, with costs to abide the
event. All concur, except FOLLETT, C. J.,
and Vans, J., dissenting.
Judgment reversed.
per- '-/
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McKIM, Judge of Probate, v. AULBACH
et al.
(130 Mass. 481.)
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Suffolk. March 4, 1881.
J. J. Abbott and B. Dean, for plaintiff. A. I
Russ and D. A. Dorr, for defendant.
COLT, J. The defendant is sued upon a
probate bond, given by him as one of two ex
ecutors. A judgment having been ordered
for the penalty of the bond, the question be
fore us is how much of the penalty is due
in equity and good conscience, for which an
execution should be awarded. Several breach
es of the bond are assigned. Upon two of ,
these, namely, the failure to file an invento
ry, and the failure to render an account with
in a year, the defendant is liable for nomi~ I
nal damages.
The principal question arises on an al
leged breach by the defendant, in negligently
permitting his co-exccutor Wellbrock to ap
propriate the personal estate of the testator
to his own use, whereby it was lost. The
bonds given by the two executors were sev
eral and not joint, and neither is liable for
losses caused exclusively by the default of
the other. In order to charge the defendant,
the burden is on the plaintiff to show that,
in the administration of the estate, the de
fendant was negligent in the performance of
some duty which the law devolves upon him
personally. Austin v. Moore, 7 Metc. (Mass.)
116, 124.
A mortgage due to the testator, in the :
state of Ohio, which by his will the execu
tors were authorized to collect and invest as
they might judge to be for the interest of
the estate, was collected upon a joint release
and discharge, signed by both executors,
which was forwarded to the mortgagor
through an express company. The money
when returned by the express company was
received by the co-cxecutor Weifbrock with
out the defendant’s knowledge, and deposit
ed by him in a savings bank m good stand
ing, partly in his own name and partly in
his name as trustee. He afterwards took the
money from the bank without the knowl
edge of the defendant, and it was lost to the
estate by his misappropriation of it. It is
sought to charge the defendant for the loss
of this money.
The report finds that Wellbrock had al
most exclusive management of the estate;
that he was a neighbor and friend of the
testator, and had relations more intimate
than the defendant with parties interested
under the will; and that the defendant was
not familiar with laws and forms of busi
ness, or with the English language, and
was content to leave the business in the
hands of his co-executor. It appears that
the defendant accounted for all the estate
which actually came into his individual pos
session. In their first account, which was
filed, assented to by the parties in interest,
and allowed, after the mortgage was collect
ed, the executors charged themselves with
the amount paid thereon; and in a few days
after it was allowed, the defendant resigned
his trust. Two other accounts were after
wards filed by Wellbrock, the remaining ex
ecutor, which were assented to by the par
ties in interest, by which he charged himself
with the amount collected on the Ohio mort
gage.
It was the right of each executor to re
ceive and hold the funds of the estate. Ed
nionds v. Crenshaw, 14 Pet. 166. Neither
can be held responsible for the waste or mis
conduct of the other, unless there be some
act or agreement, on the part of the one
sought to be charged, by which the estate
has gone into~ or has been negligently suf
fered to remain in, the exclusive possession
and control of the one by whose misconduct
the loss occurs. Thus both were held liable
in a case where money was delivered to one
executor, and immediately handed over to
the other, who appropriated it to his own
use. Langford v. Gascoyne, 11 Ves. 333.
But an executor is not held any farther than
he is shown to have participated in the mis
appropriation. "Merely permitting his co
executor to possess the assets, without going
farther and concurring in the application of
them, does not render him answerable for
the receipts of his co-executor. Each execu
tor is liable only for his own acts, and what
he receives and applies, unless he joins in
the direction and misapplication of the as
sets." Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 532,- 562;
Brazer v. Clark, 5 Pick. 96, 104; Sterrett’s
Appeal, 2 Pen. & \V. 419.
It is contended that the defendant is lia
ble in this case, because he must be treated
as having concurred in the wrong, by join
ing in the release by which his co-execuior
was enabled to obtain possession of the
, money due on the mortgage and to mingle
l it with his own property. The rules which
govern the liability of co-executors follow
in most respects the rules which prevail as
to co-trustees. But, while the latter are not
liable for the money which they have not
received, although they join in receipts given
for the same, it was at one time held that
the former were liable in such cases. The
reason given for this distinction was that eo
executors, unlike co-trustees, have each an
independent power over the personal prop
erty of the testator, and may dispose of it,
receive, pay and give receipts in their own
names, and therefore, that, if one joins with
his co-executor in giving a receipt, he does
an unmeanlng act, unless he intends to ren
der himself jointly answerable for the mon
ey. But this rule, which does not seem to
have been maintained with entire uniformity,
is declared in Williams, ExIrs, (6th Am. Ed.)
1938, to have been greatly relaxed in favor
184 POWERS AND LlABlLlTlES OF REPRESENTATIVES.
of executors; and Lord Eldon, in Shipbrook
v. Hiuchinhrook, 16 Ves. 478, declares it to i
have been broken down.
in Joy v. Campbell, 1 Schoales & L. 328,
341, Lord Redesdaie states the distinction
thus: “If a receipt be given for the mere
purposes of form, then the signing will not
charge the person not receiving." "The true
question in all those cases seems to have
been, whether the money was under the con
trol of both executors. If it was so consid
ered by the person paying the money, then
the joining in the receipt by the executor
who did not actually receive it, amounted
to a direction to pay his co~executor;" “he
became responsible for the application of the
money just as if he had received it." In
Hovey v. Blakeman, 4 Ves. 596, 608, Lord
Alvanley, the master of the rolls, referring
to the earlier rule, declared that he would
not consider the fact that an executor joins
in the receipt as absolutely conclusive; and
in Scurfield v. Howes, 3 Brown, Ch. 91, he
stated his dissent from the rule, when an
executor joins in signing a receipt, if it ap
pears that he joined for conformity only.
In. McNair’s Appeal, 4 Rawle, 148, 157, the
supreme court of Pennsylvania declares that
“there is no good reason for making execu
tors or administrators liable more than trus
tees for moneys which they have never
actually received, merely because they have
joined in a receipt with the co-executor or
co-administrator who did receive it. The re
ceipt when proved must always be consid
ered prima facie evidence against each of
the signers that he received the money; and
if he wishes to avoid the consequent ifabili~
ty, it will lie upon him to prove that it was
not received by him." The weight of mod
ern authority, both English and American,
| is that a joint receipt is only presumptive
evidence that the money came into the pos
session or under the control of both. Monell
v. Monell, 5 Johns. Ch. 283. And this pre
sumption may be rebutted by proof that the
money was in fact received by one, and that
the other jormed only as matter of form and
for the sake of conformity. See also Mana
han v. Gibbons, 19 Johns. 427; Ochiltree v.
Wright, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 336; Perry, Trusts,
§§ 421-426.
It is further contended that, even if the
defendant cannot be charged upon the
ground of his having joined in the release of
the mortgage, and having allowed the money
due thereon to be collected and deposited by
Wellbrock alone, yet that the finding of the
master in favor of the plaintiff is supported
by the facts stated in the report, that, in
April 1873, within a month after Wellbrock
received and deposited the money, and before
the greater part of it had been drawn out
again by him, "either the defendant was
warned and put on his guard, as testified to
by one of the parties in interest, or his sus
picions were aroused;" and that "since that.
whereas before that time receipts for rent
had been given in the name of Wellbrock
alone, he insisted that thereafter they should
be signed by both of the executors."
But this statement of the master is toomea
gre and ambiguous to enable us to come to
a satisfactory conclusion on this branch of
the case; and, for the purpose of a fuller
and clearer ascertaining and statement of the
facts and circumstances relied on to charge
the defendant by reason of negligence and
breach of duty on his part since the original.
receipt and deposit of the money by Weil
brock, the case must be
Recommitted to the master.
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